Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that divine providence extends to the being of all things, he now wishes to show that it extends to the operations of all things ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things. First, he shows his proposition; second, he removes certain doubts, chap. LXXI.

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows his proposition; second, he infers a certain corollary, in the following chapter; third, he excludes a certain false opinion, chap. LXIX.

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: God is the cause for all operating things that they operate.

It is proved first. Every operating thing is in some way a cause of being: either according to substantial being or according to accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except insofar as it acts by divine power. Therefore, an operating being operates through the power of God.

Note that, although when one of the premises is negative, an affirmative conclusion cannot be inferred regularly and according to the proper form of arguing, nevertheless, not caring about the form of arguing, St. Thomas in this place infers an affirmative conclusion when one of the premises is negative, because in that negative premise there is manifestly included the affirmative premise required for the proper form, namely this: Everything that is a cause of being acts by the power of God. Hence from those propositions it can be argued formally thus: — Everything that is a cause of being acts by the power of God. But every operating thing is a cause of being, namely by its operation. Therefore, every operating thing acts by the power of God.

II. Second. Every power of each ² agent is from God, as from the principle of all perfection. Therefore God is the cause of every operation. — The consequence is proved. Because every operation that follows upon some power is attributed as to a cause to that thing which gave that power: as is evident regarding the motion of heavy and light things, which is attributed to the generator. But every operation follows upon some power.

III. Third. If the divine influence ceased, every operation would cease. Therefore every operation is traced back to God as to a cause. — The consequence is proved. Because every action that cannot remain when the impression of some agent ceases is from that agent. This is made clear in the manifestation of color by the sun, and in violent motions. — But the antecedent is proved. Because just as God not only gave being to things when they first began to be, but, preserving them in being as long as they exist, causes being in them; so he not only imparted operative powers to them when things were first established ³, but always causes them in things.

Note that the foundation of this reason is that whatever is the cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect. For from this it follows, since power is the cause of operation, and God is always the cause of power as long as power remains, that God is also the cause of operation.

IV. Fourth. Every application of power to operation is principally and primarily from God. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because operative powers are applied to their proper operations through some motion: either of the body, or of the soul, such as of apprehension and appetite. But the first principle of each motion is God, since he is the first mover, entirely unmoved; and every motion of the will is traced back to God as to the first appetible and to the first willing agent. — But the consequence is proved. Because whatever applies a power to act is called the cause of that action.

It should be noted that, since the will is both a second cause acting in some way with respect to its operation, and such a cause as is an appetite, it has a twofold relation to God. One is as to the first agent, the other as to the first appetible: for God moves the will to operation both by way of agent and by way of end. St. Thomas, therefore, to signify this twofold relation, said that the motion of the will by which powers are applied to operating is traced back to God as to the first appetible, in which is designated the order to him as to the end; and as to the first willing agent, in which is designated the order to him as to the first mover and first agent.

V. Fifth. In the order of agent causes God is the first cause. Therefore all inferior causes act by his power. Therefore he is principally the cause of any action rather than second agent causes. — The first consequence is proved. Because in all ordered agent causes it is always necessary that the following causes act by the power of the first cause. This is made clear in natural and voluntary things. — The second is also proved. Because the cause of an action is more that by whose power it is acted than that which acts: just as the principal agent acts more than the instrument.

Sixth. To order things to an end belongs to God himself, as was shown above. Therefore every agent acts by the power of God. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because every operating thing is ordered by its operation to the ultimate end: since it is necessary that either the operation itself be the end, or its effect.

It is confirmed by the authority of Isaiah 26; John 15; and Philippians 2. — It is also confirmed because in Scripture the effects of nature are frequently attributed to divine operation: according to that of Job 10, Hast thou not milked me as milk, etc.; and in the Psalm, He thundered from heaven, etc.

VI. It should be noted that from these reasons it appears that God is in multiple ways the cause of the creature's operation. For from the first and second it is held that he is its cause as giving to the creature the power by which it operates. — From the third it is held that he is the cause as preserving the very power of the creature in being. — From the fourth it is held that he is the cause as applying the power of the creature to operation. — From the fifth it is held that he is the cause as the principal agent that moves the secondary agent. — From the sixth, however, it is held that he is the cause as directing each one's operation to the end.

2. But against the aforesaid things it is argued by some. For Aureoli doubts, in Capreolus, in the place cited ⁴, how one of these agents is not superfluous if the same action proceeds from both; and why one agent would not produce that action without the other if it proceeds sufficiently from both. Durandus, however, asks ⁵ how the same action can sufficiently be from God and a creature, since there is not one power in them. But because their questions are satisfied by St. Thomas below, chap. LXIX, it is not necessary to answer otherwise here.

The remaining things that could pertain to this conclusion and to the arguments adduced have been thoroughly treated in the Second Book, where creation was dealt with ⁶.