Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that God governs all things by His providence in common, he now wishes to show in particular concerning certain things that divine governance extends to them ¹. And in this he does three things: first, he shows that the being of things is subject to divine governance; second, that the operations of all things are subject to it, ch. LXVII; third, that singular things are, ch. LXXV.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that all things are conserved in being by God; second, that nothing gives being except in virtue of God, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first in this way. In divine goodness things are ordered toward the end of God, not only through this that they operate, but also through this that they exist. Therefore their conservation in being pertains to divine providence. — It is proved. Because things, insofar as they exist, bear the likeness of divine goodness, which is their end, namely intrinsically, as was shown above. -- The consequence also is proved. Because, since things are said to be ruled and governed insofar as they are ordered to the end, everything by which things attain their end pertains to governance.

II. Second. God by His intellect and will is the cause of being to all things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since the conservation of a thing is nothing other than the continuation of its being, it is necessary that the same be the cause of the thing and of its conservation.

Concerning the proof of the consequence, it should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Potentia, q. v, a. 1, ad 2; and Prima, q. civ, a. 1 ², that the action by which God produces things in being, which is called creation, and that by which He conserves them, which is called conservation, is the same in reality: but they are distinguished in reason. Because creation imports in its notion a respect to the thing insofar as it begins to be; and it says an order of duration, at least imaginary, to a preceding non-being, according as we ourselves use it, holding, according to faith, that the world had a beginning of its duration; for to create, taken thus, is to make something out of nothing anew. But if we take creation in so far as it names only the production of something out of nothing, thus it would say the respect of production to the being of the thing, not including its newness, but the order of nature to the non-being of the thing. — Conservation, moreover, beyond the habitude of the production of the being itself, says the continuation of the influx and of the production of that being; and the order of the being of the thing to a preceding measure in which it had being, namely that such action is not interrupted in time. Hence here it is said that conservation is the continuation of the being of the thing, that is, it is the production of the being of the thing without interruption.

III. But a doubt arises against the aforesaid from Aureolus, in Capreolus, in II Sent., d. 1, q. II ³. For creation, and universally every production of a creature, does not have to last except for an instant: otherwise God could not annihilate the product after the first instant, and thus the product would be from itself a necessary being. But conservation imports continuation: and thus it has to last more than for an instant. Therefore production and conservation are not one and the same action.

It is confirmed. Because God communicates action and production to the creature: but not conservation. Therefore etc.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, since we can speak of creation and conservation in two ways, namely as to their absolute entities, and as to their proper notions, which are imported by the names of creation and conservation: if we speak of them as to their entities, thus, since they are nothing other than divine action, which is divine substance, it is certain that they are eternal in the same way, and in the same way have to last, not only for an instant of time, but always, just as divine substance is eternal and will never fail.

But if we speak of them as to their proper notions, then we must speak otherwise, taking creation in so far as it includes the newness of being in the creature, in which way Catholics use this name: and otherwise taking it in so far as it does not include such newness. For if it is taken in the first way, then creation has to last only for an instant: because, since the creature receives being from God anew only in the first instant of its being, the relation imported formally by the name of creation, which terminates at the creature according as it receives being anew as such, lasts only for an instant. But conservation has to last as long as the being of the created thing lasts. Whence that action which in the first instant of the being of the creature has the notion of creation, in all the time following that instant has the notion of conservation: because it is an action continuing the being of the thing, not indeed a being continuously flowing in the manner of an inception, but maintaining the being previously produced.

But if we were to take creation as importing only an influx of being without newness, in which way beings produced from eternity could be said to be created: thus it is not of the notion of creation to last through a flowing instant or through time, but only that it be an action influencing the being of the thing. For if a thing were posited created from eternity and never ceasing, and creation itself always remained just as conservation, the same divine action would always have the notion of creation and the notion of conservation. Yet the notion of creation would be one, and the notion of conservation another: because that action itself, as connoting only the habitude of an influx of being with no matter presupposed, would be called creation; the same, as connoting the habitude of maintaining a being previously had, would be called conservation.

3. Therefore to the argument, the antecedent is denied, if creation and conservation are taken as to the substance of the action itself. And it is clear that the proof does nothing against this sense: because, since the entity of creation itself can exist without something being created by it, just as it existed before the world was created, although then it did not have the notion of creation; it is certain that no created thing is from itself a being that is a necessary being, and that any one of them could not have been produced and could never have existed.

But if these actions are taken as to their formal notions, the antecedent being conceded concerning creation which imports newness of being in the effect, the consequent is also conceded: for it is true that creation and conservation are not one and the same action formally, that is, as to their formal notions. Nor do we say the opposite of this: indeed, that they are distinguished in reason itself was shown above ⁴. — But if creation were taken as not including newness of being, but as saying only an influx of being, the antecedent would also be denied. And to the proof, the consequence would be denied: because just as it does not have to last through an instant, so also it does not have to last through any determinate time; since the duration of time or of a passing instant is beyond its notion, nor does any determinate duration follow upon its notion.

Whether a thing which God produces by creation necessarily remains for some time: — it is said that this is indeed necessary with the necessity of supposition. For, supposing that it receives being from God, it is necessary that it have being for some time: because of permanent things the last being cannot be given, otherwise an instant would be immediate to an instant. Indeed, it must last for infinite time, if it is produced from eternity. Nor yet does it follow that it is a being that is from itself a necessary being. Both because it could not have been produced. And because there is no time so small that God could not annihilate it before that time. Just as also, supposing that motion is produced, it is necessary that it have being for some time: and yet motion is not a being that is a necessary being.

4. To the confirmation, the consequence is denied. For this consequence does not hold: God communicates being to a stone. And He does not communicate wisdom to it. Therefore divine being and His wisdom are not one and the same thing. But it does follow well that they are not the same in notion. So in the present case, from the fact that God does not communicate the conservation of the created thing, but communicates action, it does not follow that they are not one action materially, but only that they are distinguished formally. — The antecedent is also perhaps false. For a place is conservative of the thing placed. And one created thing is conserved by another as by an instrument of divine virtue.

IV. Third ⁵. God is the per se cause of species. Therefore He is related in this way to their conservation, just as this generating agent in nature is related to the generation of which it is per se cause. But, when the operation of the generator ceases, generation ceases. Therefore all the species of things would also cease, when divine operation ceases. Therefore etc.

The antecedent is proved in the human species. There must be some per se active cause of the human species: as appears from the composition and order of parts preserved in all things not impeded. Therefore God causes it mediately or immediately: since He is the first cause of all things.

The first consequence, however, is proved and at the same time declared: from the fact that no particular univocal agent can simply be the cause of a species, but only of this individual. For this man is not the cause of the human species: because then he would be the cause of man ⁶, and consequently would be the cause of himself. But he is the cause of the generation of this man, speaking per se, in so far as he is the cause that the human form be made in this matter.

V. Concerning this proposition, No particular univocal agent can simply be the cause of a species, it should first be noted that by the cause simply of a species St. Thomas understands the cause of the thing itself according as it is such a species, and not considered with some addition; and he understands of the per se cause; as appears from Pot., q. v, a. 1, and Prima, q. civ⁷, where he also posits this argument.

But something can be said to be the per se cause of something in two ways: in one way, on the part of the cause; in another way, on the part of the effect. Something is said to be the per se cause of some effect on the part of the cause, when it causes it by virtue of its own nature; not, however, because it formally participates another's nature, or because it is joined to a per se cause. Just as we say that fire heats per se, but water, which is hot, does not heat per se, but through another, because it heats in so far as it participates something of the nature of fire; and we say that the housebuilder builds per se, but not the white man, but per accidens. — On the part of the effect, however, something is said to be the per se cause of some effect, when the effect according to its own nature and notion has dependence on that cause; not, however, because it is joined to something to which causality is first terminated according as it is such. Just as we say the housebuilder builds per se; but the white man, or a quarrel arising from a house, cause per aliud or per accidens.

In the present case, therefore, the per se cause is to be taken on the part of both. For when here it is said that the individual is not the cause simply of the species, and elsewhere ⁸ that it is not the cause of the species in so far as of such, it is given to be understood that per se is taken on the part of the effect. For that is called the cause of some species simply which is the cause of the thing itself, no addition being made to it: just as that is called the cause of the human species which causes man; but that which does not cause man, but this man, is not said to be simply the cause of the human species. Similarly, when something is said to be the cause of a species in so far as of such, it is certain that in so far as of such determines the notion of the effect. — From the fact, however, that it is said in the First Part, where above, that the individual of one species is not the per se cause of the form of another in so far as it is such a form, it is given to be understood that the perseity is also to be taken on the part of the cause.

2. Secondly it must be considered that, because the per se cause of a species directly has causality over the essence of the species in so far as it is such an essence, and equals the specific notion itself, it is necessary that in whatever the essence of the species is found, that thing be caused by such a cause. Whence it is necessary that the causality of such a cause extend to the whole species, and to all things contained under the species. Because of this St. Thomas very well deduces that, if this man were the cause of the human species, he would be the cause of man ⁹, and thus would be the cause of himself, since he himself is a man.

3. Thirdly it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas on Pot., q. v, a. 1; and II Sent., d. XVIII, q. II, a. 1, that, since no individual of the species itself can be the per se cause of the whole species, it is necessary that its cause be something of a higher order and higher grade. For that which is of a lower order cannot be its cause: since the per se and principal cause cannot be more ignoble than its effect. But that which is of a higher order and higher grade than the species is not of the same notion with it. Therefore it is not its univocal agent, but equivocal. And thus what is the cause of a species in so far as of such must be an equivocal agent, not a univocal one. Because of this St. Thomas did not say absolutely that no particular agent is the cause simply of a species, but added univocal: which, I say, is contained under the species, and participates the notion of the species.

4. Lastly it must be considered that, although this man is not primarily the cause of man in so far as man is man, but only of this man, he is nevertheless secondarily the cause of man. Because this man, whose cause he is, is also a man: nor can they be separated so that this man is not a man. And thus what is the cause of the first must also be the cause of the second. Because of this St. Thomas said that this man is the cause of this man speaking per se: as if he said, secondarily, however, and through another, he is also the cause of man. Whence he also added that this man is not the cause of man except in so far as he is the cause that the human form be made in this matter.

VI. Concerning this proposition, Neither this man, nor any univocal agent in nature, is the cause except of the generation of this or that thing, it should be noted that St. Thomas touches the distinction which he expressly posits in the First Part, where above ¹⁰: namely that the agent is twofold, one which is the cause of the effect as to its fieri only; another which is the cause of the effect also as to its esse. A univocal agent is the cause of the effect as to its fieri only, so that the fieri itself alone depends on the cause: but it is not the cause of the thing itself as to its esse, so that the esse of the effect depends on it (namely per se). For since the esse of the effect formally follows the form itself, that alone is the cause of the thing per se as to its esse which is the per se cause of the form in so far as it is a form: but that which is the cause, not of the form in so far as it is a form, but of the form as to the reception of itself in matter, is not the per se cause of the thing as to its esse, but only as to its generation; which is to say, as to the reception of the form in matter. Because of this St. Thomas said that a univocal agent is the cause only of the generation of this or that thing. For just as an equivocal agent has as its per se effect the species itself absolutely, so a univocal agent has as its per se effect the generation of this particular thing. Therefore just as, when the action of this particular univocal agent ceases, the generation of the thing which was being generated ceases; so, when the action of the equivocal agent over the species ceases, the species itself ceases.

VII. But concerning the aforesaid certain doubts occur. The first is about that conditional: If this man were the cause of the human species, he would be the cause of himself. For that conditional does not seem to have truth except from this proposition: That which is the cause of some form according to the notion of the form itself is the cause of all things participating in that notion. But that proposition seems to be false. For God is the cause of being in so far as it is being: and yet He is not the cause of every being, because He is not the cause of Himself. And heaven is the cause of lower bodies in so far as they are bodies: and yet it is not the cause of all bodies, because it is not the cause of itself. Therefore etc.

The second is about what was said, that this man is not the cause of man per se, but of this man. For this seems false. Because every univocal agent acts per se like itself according to form. But the likeness of one man to another is according to that in which they agree in the nature of the species. Therefore this man is the per se cause of the specific nature.

The third is about what was said, that this man is not the cause except of the generation of this or that thing. For it is of the notion of generation, as appears V Phys. ¹¹, that it be terminated at the being of the thing. Therefore what is the cause of the generation of some thing is also the cause of its being. Therefore this man is not the cause only of the generation of this thing, but also of its being.

VIII. To the first of these it is said that that proposition on which the truth of that conditional depends is true: and I think it is true of any notion whatsoever, whether, I say, it be specific, or generic, or analogous. Because we also see in the cognitive powers that, if a power regards the object according to some formal notion, it extends itself to all things to which that notion belongs: for sight extends itself to all colors, and the intellect to every being.

To the disproof it is said that God is not the cause of being in so far as being, if we speak properly, but of created being. And thus He need not be the cause of Himself, but of all things to which the notion of created being belongs. And similarly heaven is not the cause of body in so far as it is a body, but of generable and corruptible body in so far as of such. Therefore it need not be the cause of itself, because that notion does not belong to itself. And, speaking universally, nothing is the per se cause of something according to that notion under which it is itself contained, as appears from the aforesaid ¹².

2. To the second it is said that an agent can be said to act per se like itself according to form in two ways. In one way, so that the perseity is a mode of the cause according to which it is terminated at a thing like itself, which namely receives the same form which the agent has. And thus it is true that a univocal agent acts per se like itself according to form: for this man generates per se this man, who is like himself according to humanity. — In another way, so that it is a mode of the cause according to which it is terminated at the form according to which the likeness is attended. And then it is not true that an agent acts per se like itself according to form: that is, that it acts the form according to which the likeness is attended, in so far as it is such a form. For this man does not first generate humanity, but secondarily, as has been said ¹³, in so far as he makes it that the form of the species be introduced in this matter.

3. To the third it is said that St. Thomas does not understand that a particular univocal agent causes esse in no way, because, as was argued, generation is terminated at the being of the thing, and consequently the generator gives being to the generated: but that the being of the thing is not its per se effect, but only the generation and fieri of the thing. For as was said above ¹⁴ of his mind in the First Part, if the agent is not the cause of the form in so far as of such, it will not be the per se cause of the being which follows upon it. For since that is called the per se cause of the form which gives the being of the form in so far as of such, that which is not the cause of the form in so far as of such cannot be the per se cause of the being of the form itself. Secondarily, however, and as it were indirectly, it is its cause: because it is the cause of the reception of the form of the species in matter, from which reception results the being of this individual, and consequently the being of the species. Whence it can be said that the univocal singular is the per se cause of the production of the being of the form in this matter, just as in this way it is also the cause of the form: but it is not the per se cause of the being of the form itself in so far as of such, that is, according as it is in the state of finished being (in facto esse).

IX. Fourth ¹⁵. It is supposed that, although motion happens to something existing, motion is nevertheless beyond the being of the thing. Then thus: Body is the cause of that which is being moved to being, which is the fieri of the thing: but God is the first and per se cause of every being. Therefore divine operation is related to the being of things as the motion of a moving body is related to the fieri and being moved of things made and moved. But it is impossible that the fieri or being moved of something remain, when the motion of the mover ceases. Therefore it is also impossible that the being of some thing remain except by divine operation. — The antecedent is proved. As to the first part indeed, because, since no body acts except through motion, it is not the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved. As to the second part, because God is His own being, but other things have participated being.

2. Concerning the proof of the first part of the antecedent, it must be considered that we can interpret it in two ways. First, so that the argument is drawn from the motion by which the body itself, in acting, moves matter or the movable subject, arguing thus: No corporeal thing is the cause of any thing except insofar as that thing is moved, because no body acts except through motion, in accordance with which some movable subject is moved. Therefore, no body is the cause of the being of any thing insofar as it is being, but is the cause of its being moved toward being. And then the consequence holds through the things that are said in the Disputed Questions on the Power of God, in the place cited¹⁶: namely that, since a body does not act except by moving, it cannot be the cause of a form except insofar as the causality of change can extend itself. But this is insofar as it disposes matter and educes the form from the potency of matter. Therefore, a body is the cause of a form only with respect to this, that it is educed from the potency of matter, which is the becoming of the generated thing, but not with respect to the being of the form absolutely.

Second, we can interpret it so that the argument is drawn from the motion by which the body itself is moved by another, arguing thus: No corporeal thing is the cause of any thing except insofar as the body itself is moved, because no body acts except through the motion by which it is itself moved. Therefore, a body is not the cause of anything except its being moved toward being. And then the consequence itself holds by force of this proposition, that the being of the effect is proportioned to the being of the form through which the agent acts, as such. For from this it follows that, since the being of the form of the acting body, insofar as it is being, is not the principle by which the agent acts, but rather insofar as being moved is joined to it (because it does not act except insofar as it is moved), the being of the thing, insofar as it is being, is not the effect of the corporeal agent, but only insofar as it underlies being moved itself. And thus a body is not the cause of the being of a thing absolutely, but of its being moved toward being. The presupposed proposition¹⁷ seems to favor this exposition, namely that, although motion is accidental to some existing thing, motion is nevertheless outside the being of the thing. For from this it is gathered that, although a body acts through the motion by which it is moved, it is nevertheless not necessary that it act through being itself insofar as it is being, because motion is outside the being of the thing. — Either exposition can be adapted to the text.

X. Fifth. Artificial things are preserved in being by the power of natural things, just as a house is by the solidity of the stones. Therefore, natural things are not preserved except by the power of God. — The consequence is proved. Because just as the work of art presupposes the work of nature, so the work of nature presupposes the work of God creating; for the matter of artificial things is from nature, and the matter of natural things is from God through creation.

It should be noted concerning this reason that, just as in natural things an univocal agent is the cause of the thing only with respect to its becoming, so it is also in artificial things. For, since the form of a house, which is composition and order, follows upon the natural power of certain things, the builder does not make the house except by applying those things, and applying them to one another, namely the cement, the stones, and the timbers, which are receptive and preservative of such composition and order; just as a cook cooks food by applying the active natural power of fire¹⁸. Hence the artisan is not directly and per se the cause of the form of the artificial thing insofar as it is such, but is the cause of its introduction into this matter, by applying natural powers. Therefore, artificial things are not preserved in being by the artisan, since the form does not depend per se and directly on him, but by the power of the natural things upon which the form itself follows. On account of this, it was said in this reason that artificial things are preserved in being by the power of natural things.

XI. Sixth. Being is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone. Therefore, no thing can remain in being if the divine operation ceases.

The consequence is proved. Because the impression of an agent does not remain in the effect, once the action of the agent ceases, unless it is turned into a nature. — This is made clear from the forms and properties of generated natural things. And from habits. And from this, that that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus (namely, existing formally in it, and not merely virtually) does not remain after the action of the agent, as is clear concerning light.

2. Concerning this deduction of St. Thomas, a doubt immediately occurs. For although being is not the nature or essence of any created thing, it nevertheless follows upon the form, which is of the essence of the created thing. And this seems to suffice for it to be able to remain upon the cessation of the divine operation. For that proposition, The impression of an agent does not remain in the effect, once the action of the agent ceases, unless it is turned into a nature, is understood of that which is turned into a nature not only as existing of the essence of the thing, but also as following upon the essence. This is clear because an example was given of the properties of generated things, and of habits. Hence the consequence seems to be null, and poorly proved through that assumed proposition.

He answers that the deduction of the argument is good if it is well understood. For St. Thomas presupposes as manifest that being cannot flow from the nature of a created thing as from an efficient cause, since no thing produces itself into being. Hence, if it is assumed that it is not even the essence or nature of the thing, it is gathered that it is in no way turned into a nature, in the way in which to be turned into a nature is taken in this place. For that proposition, The impression of an agent does not remain, once the action of the agent ceases, unless it is turned into a nature, is understood thus: namely, unless it either comes to be of the essence of the thing, or originates from the essence of the thing as from an efficient cause. Therefore, St. Thomas gives an example both of the form of a generated thing, which is of its essence, and of properties, which originate efficiently from the essence. An example is also given of habits, which are difficult to move, because also from frequent acts that quality which is a habit has been made agreeable to nature, and as it were its property resulting from it, from which it has the feature that it is lost with difficulty.

XII. Seventh. If things were newly produced in being by God, as faith posits, therefore the being of things follows upon the divine will, and likewise their non-being, because He permitted things not to be when He willed, and made them to be when He willed. Therefore, they are for as long as God wills them to be. Therefore, His will is the preserver of things. — If, on the other hand, they flowed from God from eternity, as some philosophers have willed, it is not possible to assign a time or instant in which they first flowed from God. Therefore, either they were never produced, which is false, or their being always proceeds from God for as long as they are. Therefore, etc.

2. Concerning the first part of this reason, it should be noted that it presupposes that the will of God is the cause of the thing willed. But from this it follows that, because He wills the thing to be for so long, His will itself is the cause of the duration of the thing by continuing its being.

Concerning the second part, however, there is a doubt. For it could be answered to it that the consequence does not hold. For it is consistent that things are produced by God, and that it is not possible to assign any time or instant in which they first flowed from God, and yet the being of things does not always proceed from God. For it will be said that they were indeed produced in an instant, but were produced in no determinate instant, such that one instant could be assigned in which it would be true to say, In this instant they were produced.

But this response is null. Because if things are produced in one instant only, and are not produced in many or in all, that instant must be determinate and capable of being demonstrated according to the intellect, because each individual instant is determinate and distinct from every other instant. And then it will be true to say that in that instant things were first produced. Which is repugnant to being produced from eternity. Therefore, it follows well, as St. Thomas was deducing: Things are produced by God. And there is not any instant in which they were first produced, nor any time. Therefore, they are always and in every instant produced: not indeed through a beginning of being, but through the maintenance of the being that was received.

XIII. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Heb. 1, and of Augustine, IV On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis.

Through this is excluded the error of certain Mutakallimun in the law of the Moors, who posit that all forms are accidents, and that the formation of things is always in becoming, and thus that things do not need a preserver after their making. — Some of whom are said to posit that indivisible bodies, from which substances according to them are composed, can remain for an hour if the governance of God ceases. — While others say that a thing would not cease to be unless God caused in it an accident of cutting-off¹⁹, that is, of deficiency and defection.

XIV. Concerning the principal conclusion a doubt occurs. For there are some things that have no intrinsic potency for failing, such as the intelligences and the heavenly bodies. Therefore, with all action removed after their production, they will not fail. Therefore, they do not need preservation.

Likewise, it would follow that a natural corrupting agent would overcome the action of God preserving.

2. To the first of these, it is said that, although those things do not have an intrinsic potency for non-being, namely matter subject to privation, their being nevertheless presupposes the influx of the divine power. And therefore they can extrinsically not be, namely through the withdrawal of the divine influx. On this account they need God preserving them in being, just as they needed Him producing them. Hence the first consequence is false.

To the second, the consequence is denied. Because just as God preserves a thing for as long as He wills, so He co-acts with the corrupting agent when He no longer wills to preserve it, and withdraws His influx from that which is corrupted and ceases to be.