Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas determined concerning God according as He is the end of all things, he now wishes to determine concerning His universal government, according as He governs every creature ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of divine providence itself in itself; second, of its conditions, chap. XCIV. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he treats of divine providence and government according as it extends to all things in common; second, as it extends particularly to men, chap. LXXVIII. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he treats of providence itself; second, of the order of the execution of divine providence, chap. LXXVII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows in common that God governs all things by His providence; second, he shows in particular concerning certain things that they are contained under divine providence, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, this conclusion is posited: God by His divine providence governs and rules all things.

For the evidence of this conclusion, before it is proved, it must be considered that providence and government are related as practical reason, which namely is ordered to someone's operation, and the execution of the thing ordered through knowledge: just as the plan of the house to be produced existing in the mind of the builder and the production of the house are related. For providence, properly speaking, is nothing other than the idea and exemplar of the order of things to their ends, with the purpose of executing such an order in things. Whence, defining it, St. Thomas, First Part, q. XXII, a. 1, says that it is the plan of the order of things to an end: for in this definition plan is taken for the practical conception existing in the divine mind, regulating the order of things to their ends; just as divine art is the exemplar of things according as they go forth from God and are placed in their grades. — Although also, by extending the name providence, the very devising of the order of things to an end, which denotes the act of the divine intellect terminated at the idea and exemplar of such an order, can be called providence.

It must be noted, however, that by the name of the plan of the order of things to an end, there is not taken the exemplar by which alone the very relation and order of each thing to its own proper end is represented: but by which there are also practically represented and disposed in the divine mind those things which contribute to the attainment of the end, and those things which can impede from the attainment of the end. It is clear from I Sent., d. XXXIX ², For God, in providing for the universe, disposes in His mind to what end each single thing is to be ordered; and what things are to be conferred upon it as useful to the end; and also what things are to be removed from nature as impeding the attainment of the end; as, because man is ordered to the knowledge of things through the intellect, there is given to him a body so complexioned that it can serve intellective knowledge, but not the body of an ass or a horse, which would rather impede such knowledge.

It must also be considered that we can speak in two ways of those things contributing to the end and impeding from it. In one way, with respect to the first and principal thing provided for, which is the universe. And then it is to be understood that it belongs to providence to dispose and bestow all things contributing to the end, and to remove all impediments, both extrinsic and intrinsic: because providence with respect to the universe itself is not only concerning the order to the end, but also concerning the event of the end, which is the manifestation and communication of the divine goodness in such a manner, and the order of the parts in the universe is ordered to such communication and manifestation. — In another way, with respect to those things which are secondarily provided for, as namely ordered to the perfection of the universe. And then it belongs to providence to remove all intrinsic impediments from nature: namely, so that the thing may not have in its nature anything through which it is disproportionate to its proper end to which it is ordered. It does not, however, belong to it to remove all extrinsic impediments from all things of this kind: because not all things are so provided for that they entirely attain the end, but some are so provided for that they have an order and proportion to their end, but yet can be impeded from the attainment of the end.

When therefore it is said that God by His providence governs all things, it is given to be understood that with Him is the practical conception and idea of the order of each single thing to its end, which is signified by the name providence; and that He works toward this, that all things be directed to their ends, which is expressed by the name government.

II. The conclusion is therefore proved first thus. All things are ordered to the divine goodness as to an end. Therefore God, to whom that goodness principally belongs, as substantially possessed and understood and loved, is the governor of all things.

The consequence is proved. Because whenever any things are ordered to some end, all things are subject to the disposition of him to whom that end principally belongs. — It is proved by the example of an army, and of subordinated arts. For the parts of an army, and their works, are ordered to the good of the general, namely to victory: and therefore it belongs to the general to govern the whole army. Likewise the art which is about the end commands and gives laws to the art which is about those things which are to the end: as the civil art to the military, the military to the equestrian, and the art of governing a ship to the ship-building art.

2. It must be noted that, when it is said that the divine goodness is substantially possessed and understood and loved by God, we can take the word substantially as determinative of all the following. For the divine goodness is understood and loved by us in one way, and by God in another. For by us it is understood and loved, not as existing of our substance, but as something extraneous to our substance. Therefore it is not substantially understood or loved, but accidentally, insofar as everything extraneous to a thing is called accidental to it. Also, the act by which we understand and love it is not our substance, but an accident. Therefore and for this reason also we do not understand and love it substantially. But by God it is understood and loved as His own proper substance, and by such an act as is His substance: so that in Him the one understanding, the thing understood, and the understanding; likewise the one loving, that which is loved, and the very act of loving; are one substantially in Him. And on this account it is well said that it is both understood and loved substantially by Him. — We can also take it as determinative only of the word possessed: so that the sense is that it is possessed as His substance, and is principally understood and principally loved.

III. Secondly. God uses all things by directing them to an end. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because to direct to an end is to govern. — But the antecedent is proved. Because all things that have being in any way whatever are effects of God made on account of the end which is Himself. But whoever makes anything on account of an end uses it for an end.

IV. Thirdly. God is the first unmoved mover. And He is a mover through intellect, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore He moves all things through intellect to their ends. Therefore He governs all things that are moved to an end: whether they are moved corporally: or spiritually, as the one desiring is said to be moved by the thing desired.

The first consequence is proved. Because the first mover moves not less, but more than secondary movers: since without it others do not move. And all things that are moved are moved on account of some end, as was shown above. — But the second consequence is proved. Because to rule and govern through providence is nothing other than to move certain things through intellect to an end.

2. Concerning that which St. Thomas added to the conclusion, namely, as the one desiring is said to be moved by the thing desired spiritually, it must be noted that, although motion is properly not said except in bodies, the name of motion has nevertheless been transferred to signify every operation, even immanent in the agent. And thus some operating thing is said to be moved by such an operation while it operates: although its motion is not the act of that which exists in potency ³, but the act of that which exists in act. And this is said to be moved spiritually: because namely that motion is not a corporal and extended accident, but a spiritual operation. When therefore it is said here that the one desiring is moved by the thing desired spiritually, it is understood that it is moved by it, not in the way a body is moved by something through the reception of some form partibly, but according as an operating thing is said to be moved to an operation by that which is in some way the cause of its operation. And because the thing desired is the cause of desire by way of an end, therefore the one desiring is said to be spiritually moved by the thing desired.

Since therefore God is the first unmoved mover, not only in the genus of efficient cause, inasmuch as every efficient cause operates in His power, but also in the genus of final cause, inasmuch as nothing has the ratio of an appetible thing except from participation in Him, who is the first appetible; on that account He governs all things that are moved to an end, whether they are moved corporally or spiritually; either, namely, as by an efficient cause, or as by an end.

V. Fourthly. Natural bodies are moved on account of an end, although they do not know the end: as was proved above, namely in chap. III, from the fact that in them there always happens that which is better or more frequent; and also because they would not otherwise be made through art. Therefore the whole operation of nature is ordered by some knowledge. Therefore by God, mediately or immediately. Therefore etc.

The first consequence is proved. Because it is impossible that any things not knowing the end should operate on account of an end, and reach it in an ordered way, unless they are moved by someone knowing the end: as is clear concerning an arrow. — The second also is proved. Because every inferior art and knowledge receives principles from a superior: as appears in the speculative and operative sciences.

For the evidence of the second proof of the antecedent, it must be considered that, since art imitates nature as far as it can, as is said in II Phys. ⁴; if art were to make natural things themselves just as it makes artificial things in their likeness, it would make them in the same way as nature makes them. But it is manifest that art would make them on account of some end: because it is manifest that it belongs to an agent through intellect to operate on account of some end. Therefore it is necessary that nature also in its works intend some end. And this is the reason which St. Thomas intended by those words, and they would not otherwise be made through art.

Concerning the second consequence and its proof, it must be considered that, just as there is an order in moving and final causes, so that an inferior cause does not act except in the power of a superior cause; so both in practical and speculative knowledges there is a similar order, that an inferior science does not cause knowledge of its conclusions except in the power of a superior and more noble knowledge. And because the power of a science is contained in the principles, therefore it is necessary that in its principles there be preserved the power of the superior science: which comes about inasmuch as it receives them from the superior science as known. For it is clear in our sciences that all sciences receive principles from Metaphysics, which is superior, inasmuch as in their principles there is preserved the power of the first principles, which is considered by the Metaphysician. In practical matters also it is clear that inferior arts are regulated according to principles handed down to them from a superior art: as the military art receives from the civil art the principles by which it is regulated; and the ship-building art receives the knowledge of how a ship ought to be, from the art of governing a ship. And therefore, since divine knowledge and art is superior to every other art and knowledge, it is necessary that by it every other art, and every other knowledge, be regulated and directed. And on that account, if any things are directed to an end by some inferior knowledge, it is necessary that such order also depend on divine knowledge, inasmuch as that inferior knowledge is directed and regulated by superior knowledge.

VI. Fifthly. In the universe of things there are distinct and contrary things agreeing into one order: since some receive the operations of certain others, and some are aided by certain others, or even are wrought ⁵, that is, are made and produced: for in this place are wrought is taken in a passive signification. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because those things which are distinct according to nature do not agree into one order unless they are gathered into one by one ordering agent.

2. For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that, since the order of the universe is twofold, as is said in XII Metaph. ⁶, namely the order of the parts of the universe among themselves and in the whole, and the order of the whole universe to God as to an end; properly speaking, as is said in Verit., q. v, a. 1, ad 9 ⁷, disposition regards the order of the parts to one another, because certain things are said to be disposed according as they are placed in diverse grades by God; but providence regards that order which is of the whole to the end. Which is to be understood not only concerning the universe, but also concerning each particular thing: because disposition regards the order of the parts of a thing, if it has parts, and the order which it has in the universe to other parts; but providence regards its order to its end, for it is the idea or exemplar of the order of each single thing to its end, existing in the divine mind ⁸. But as to that which is said in Prima, q. xxii, a. 1; and I Sent., d. xxxix, q. ii, a. 1, that disposition regards both orders: it is to be understood, not according to the strict propriety of the word, but according to its extension and transference. For because the order of the parts of the universe is on account of its order to God, for they are so ordered that the universe itself can attain the likeness of the divine goodness, and that in it the abundance of the divine goodness can be manifested: therefore the name of disposition has been extended to signify also the exemplar or idea of such an order to the end. This exposition is clear from the very words of St. Thomas. For in the First Part, to show that he was speaking not according to the strict propriety of the word, but according to a certain extension of the name, he said, not absolutely that disposition is such, but that disposition can be called both the plan of the order of things to an end, and the plan of the order of parts in the whole.

3. It could also be said that the order of things to an end can be taken in two ways. In one way, on the part of the ordered thing alone: when namely the thing has a disposition through which it is fitting and proportioned to such an end; just as the order of medicine to an end, on its own part, is that it be so disposed that it is sufficient to cure such a disease or to draw out such humors, and has a proportion to an effect of this kind. — In another way the order to an end can be taken on the part of the application of the thing to the attainment of its end: according as the very actual application to attaining the end can be called order to the end; as, when someone takes medicine, he is said to order it actually to health, inasmuch as he takes it on account of attaining health.

If order to an end is taken in the first way, thus it belongs to disposition: because upon the order of the parts among themselves or in the whole there follows its order and proportion to the end; for the parts are not suitably ordered unless from them there results in the whole a suitability and proportion to the end. And thus both orders belong to disposition. For while God resolves to communicate the likeness of His goodness to creatures, He devises in His mind that the parts of the universe are so to be ordered among themselves, and that from them so ordered the universe is to be apt for the end which He intends, namely for the manifestation of His goodness, in that manner in which He wills it to be manifested; and according to this devised order He proposes to effect creatures. And this is to dispose the universe within Himself. In this sense St. Thomas speaks in the First Part and I Sentences.

If, however, order to an end is taken in the second way, thus it belongs to providence. For providence is the exemplar and idea not only of proportion, but also of direction and application of things to the attainment of the end, and of those things which can contribute to attaining it or also can impede, with the purpose of bringing them to the end in its own manner, namely fallibly or infallibly; those things which can contribute to this having been introduced into such a nature; and those which can impede having been excluded from nature, as is evident in I Sent., the place cited above. In this sense he spoke in the Questions on Truth: for such order to an end belongs not to disposition, but to providence.

4. If, however, the exposition of Capreolus in the First Book, d. XL, a. 2 ⁹, saying that he corrected in the Questions on Truth that which he said in I Sentences, pleases anyone more, let him follow it. But let him remember that what is said in I Sentences is also said in the First Part; but that Capreolus very frequently, for other purposes, said that what St. Thomas held in the Summa must be held, since that is his last testament. For it is not in harmony with this if we say that those things which he said in the First Part were retracted in the Questions on Truth. Wherefore it will be better to save both sayings, either in one of the said ways, or in some other better way, than to say that one was retracted by the other.

5. But although divine disposition is distinguished from providence according to reason, yet because disposition accompanies providence and is ordered to it, therefore very frequently St. Thomas attributes the act of disposition to providence, and from it concludes divine providence. Which indeed he does in this reason. For from the fact that He gathers distinct things into one order of the universe, he concludes that He is the governor and orderer of all things, using indifferently the name of governor and of orderer of diverse natures into one.

VII. Sixthly. Of those things which appear concerning the motions of celestial bodies, a reason cannot be assigned from the necessity of nature: since some of them have more than certain others, and entirely difform. Therefore it is necessary that the ordination of those motions be under some providence: and consequently of all inferior motions and operations, which are disposed through them.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that, since nature is determined to one, where in those things which belong to a certain thing some multiplicity and variation is seen, it is necessary to attribute that not to nature, but to some other principle. Therefore, since the motions of the heavens are varied; and of one heaven there are multiple motions even difform, as the motion from the east and the motion from the west, and the motion of trepidation of the eighth sphere; it is not right to refer them to nature, as if the heaven were therefore moved by those motions because nature impels to those motions; but to some principle which directs and orders those celestial motions to some end. And according to this this reason proceeds.

It must be noted, however, that St. Thomas does not intend that the motions of the heavens are in no way natural: for they are natural on the part of matter, inasmuch as the heaven has in its nature an aptitude to be moved by intellect with such motions, as he says in II Phys. ¹⁰, and in many other places. But he means that they are not natural on the part of form and on the part of the active principle, so that it could be said that they proceed from the necessity of nature which is form, and are not ordered by an agent through intellect and voluntary.

VIII. Seventhly. Certain things are found ordered so much the more perfectly as they are closer to God: as is clear in celestial bodies, which never fail from that which is according to the course of nature, as inferior bodies do; and in intellectual substances, which are not even mutable. Therefore God is the cause of the whole order of things. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because if something is participated so much the more perfectly by certain things as it approaches closer to a certain thing, it is a sign that that thing is the cause of that which is diversely participated. It is declared in hot things from approaching to fire. But this comes about because, the closer something is to a cause, the more it participates of its effect.

IX. Eighthly. That which is maximally good in created things is the good of the order of the universe, which is maximally perfect: according to the Philosopher, XII Metaph.; and also as is given to be understood in Gen. I. Therefore the good of the order of the universe is that which is principally willed and intended by God. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things. — The first consequence is proved. Because of the divine intellect and will, through which God operates, as is clear in the foregoing, the ultimate end is His goodness, namely that He might communicate it to things. But things participate the divine goodness, by way of likeness, inasmuch as they are good. — But the second consequence is proved. Because to govern any thing is nothing other than to impose order on it.

2. Concerning the proof of the first consequence, note that from these two propositions, namely, God's goodness is the end that it may be communicated, and, Things participate in the divine goodness, by way of likeness, in so far as they are good, St. Thomas leaves it as manifestly following that the more good things are, the more they are willed and the more they are intended, because they are more assimilated to the divine goodness. From which it is clear that, if the order of the universe is the greatest good in created things, it is also the most willed and intended. Which was the consequence to be proved.

3. Concerning this proposition, There can be no other ultimate end of the divine intellect and will than His goodness, namely, that He might communicate it to things, it must be noted first, as was said in what preceded regarding the mind of St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. III, a. 15, ad 14,¹¹ that this is not understood as if the very communication of the divine goodness were the ultimate end of the divine will—for then the communicated likeness itself, and consequently something created, would be the end of God—but because His goodness is His end, from the love of which He wills to communicate it.

It must be noted secondly, that St. Thomas makes mention of the ultimate end for this reason: because, since by the ultimate end he understands the end of the agent, which he principally intends through his work, he wishes to leave it that it is not unfitting for God to act for another end besides His goodness, which indeed is not His ultimate end, but is the end of the work, to which namely the created thing is brought: such as assimilation to God, or whatever else to which the created thing is ordered.

X. Ninth: and it is a confirmation of the preceding reason. The good of the order of the universe is closest in created things to the divine goodness, which is the end of the divine will. Therefore God cares most for this order, Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because whatever intends some end cares more for that which is closer to the ultimate end, since this is also the end of the others. — But the antecedent is proved. Because it is ordered to that good: as is clear in the parts, which are ordered to the being of the whole.

XI. Tenth, the argument proceeds from the same foundation. The order of created things according to the distinction of natures and degrees proceeds from divine wisdom. Therefore also the order of operation. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because through operation things approach closer to the ultimate end, in that through it a thing attains its ultimate perfection: since the ultimate end and perfection of a thing is either operation, or the term or effect of operation, just as its first perfection is form, as is said in II De Anima, text 5. — The second is also proved. Because to order the actions of some things to an end is to govern them.

2. Concerning that proposition, The ultimate end and perfection of a thing is either operation, or the term or effect of operation, it must be considered, as was also shown in what precedes,¹² that operation or the effect of operation is called the ultimate end and perfection of a thing, not according as perfection names an act existing in the perfectible, if we speak universally, since not every operation remains in the agent, taking operation for any second act whatsoever; but according as it names the ultimate actuality of the thing. For a thing conjoined in its own way to that operation, or to the effect, does not remain in potency to a further act, in such a way that the operation or its effect constitutes the thing in potency to a further act, just as form constitutes the thing of which it is the form in first act indeed, but in potency to second act. For when nothing is left behind from the operation, as is found in immanent operations, or even in some transient operations, then the operation itself is the ultimate end and ultimate perfection of the thing, because it is the ultimate to which the thing was ordered; and the thing itself, united to such an operation, whether subjectively or according to the power by which the operation goes forth from it, has its ultimate completion, which is to be united in any way whatsoever actually to its operation. But when something is effected through the operation itself, as happens in house-building, then the term or effect of such an operation is the ultimate end and ultimate perfection of the thing: because the ultimate to which it is in potency is the effect; and through a certain continuation of its power with the effect it is constituted ultimately in act; so that the operating thing is not constituted from the effect itself in potency to a further act, but its potency is ultimately completed.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, where God is called Lord and King: for it belongs to a king and lord to rule and govern subjects by his command. — It is also confirmed because the course of things is ascribed to divine command in Job ix, and in the Psalm.

Through this is excluded the error of the ancient natural philosophers, who said that all things come about from the necessity of matter, and consequently by chance, and not from the order of providence.