Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The third conclusion is¹: In that happiness which comes from the divine vision, every human desire is fulfilled, as is said in the Psalm; and every human endeavor there receives its consummation.

I. It is proved by running through everything toward which the human appetite is borne, and which, according to Aristotle, are required for happiness.

For in that vision the desire of man according to the contemplative life, concerning the knowledge of truth, is consummated: which belongs to him insofar as he is of an intellectual nature. Because to him will become known all things that the intellect naturally desires to know, as is clear from what was said above.

His desire will also be fulfilled according to the active and civil life: which belongs to him according as he has reason, by which he can dispose lower things. For many are the desirable things of the civil life: namely, to live according to virtue, toward which it principally tends; the height of honor; the renown of fame; and riches; all of which men attain in that vision. The first, indeed: because the reason will be in its highest vigor, illuminated by the divine light, lest it be able to fall away from the right. — The second, truly: because the Blessed are raised to the highest altitude of honor, insofar as they are united to God; a sign of which is that they will reign with Christ, as is said in Apoc. 20. — The third, moreover: because through that vision they are rendered renowned not by the opinion of men, who can be deceived and deceive, but according to the truest knowledge of God and of all the Blessed; whence that beatitude is named glory in the Psalm. — The fourth, finally: because in that beatitude the Blessed thoroughly enjoy that which embraces the perfection of all goods; which is shown both in Wis. 7 and in the Psalm.

The desire of pleasure will also be fulfilled: which is common to man and to all animals, and belongs to him according to the voluptuous life. Because in that happiness there is the most perfect pleasure, as is said in the Psalm: and so much more perfect than that which is according to the senses, as the intellect is higher than sense; and it is so much² more pure from all admixture of sorrow or troublesome care, as that good in which we shall take pleasure is greater than every sensible good, and more intimate and continually delighting.

The desire of preserving being will also be fulfilled: which is common to him and to all things. Because the Blessed will attain perfect everlastingness, secure from all harm: as is said in Isaiah 49 and Apoc. 21.

And thus it is clear that Boethius rightly said that beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.³

St. Thomas infers, lastly, that to this perfect and ultimate happiness nothing in this life is so similar as the contemplative life. And on this account the philosophers placed the ultimate happiness of man in the contemplation of truth that is possible in this life. And also by the Lord the contemplative life is more commended, in Luke 10, as more lasting than the active: for it begins in this life, but is consummated in the future.

II. Concerning the fulfillment of the desire of pleasure, it should be noted that, speaking simply and absolutely, spiritual pleasures are superior to bodily ones, although bodily ones are more vehement with respect to us. St. Thomas, however, speaks in this place of them according to their order per se and absolutely: and he touches in a few words upon many arguments which he explicitly sets down in I-II, q. 31, a. 5; and IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5.⁴

One is that, since for pleasure there is required a good conjoined, that to which it is conjoined, and their conjunction itself, as to all these things spiritual pleasure is superior to bodily pleasure. As to that, indeed, to which the good is conjoined: because the intellective part is much more noble, and more cognitive, than the sensitive part. This is touched on here when it is said that the intellect is higher than sense. — As to the conjoined good also: because the spiritual good is greater, and more beloved, than the bodily good. A sign of which is that men endure many hardships, and abstain from the greatest bodily pleasures, for the sake of honor, fame, and the like, which are spiritual goods. This is touched on here when it is said that that intelligible good is greater than every sensible good. — As to the conjunction itself, truly: because spiritual things understood are more intimately united to us than bodily things apprehended through sense; because the intellect reaches all the way to the intimate quiddity of the thing; whereas through sense we are conjoined to bodily things as it were superficially only, since we apprehend only extrinsic accidents. This is touched on here when it is said that that good is more intimate.

Another reason is that spiritual pleasures are more lasting, as proceeding from incorruptible and immovable causes: whereas corporeal pleasurable things are corruptible. St. Thomas touched on this when he said that that good is continually delighting.

Another reason, lastly, is that spiritual pleasures are without motion and all at once, and consequently purer: whereas bodily ones are with motion, from which they induce weariness. St. Thomas also touches on this here when he says that the pleasure of the Blessed is more pure from all admixture of sorrow.

III. Concerning that which is said, that the contemplative life begins in this life and is consummated in the future, it should be noted that this is not said as though the contemplation that is in this life remains in the future in the same manner, because, as St. Thomas says in II-II, q. 180, a. 8, ad 1, the mode of contemplating is not the same here and in the Fatherland: but because the contemplative life remains with respect to the same acts which it had in the wayfarer. For just as in this life there is some contemplation of divine truth, so also in the Fatherland: although this one is imperfect, but that one perfect. It is also understood by reason of charity toward God, in which the contemplative life has its principle and end. Whence Gregory says, on Ezekiel⁵, that the contemplative begins here so that it may be perfected in the heavenly fatherland: because the fire of love, which begins to burn here, when it sees him whom it loves, blazes forth more fully in the love of him.

IV. Concerning the conclusion principally intended a doubt arises. For it does not seem that in that happiness through the divine vision the desire of man is fulfilled. For the blessed soul desires to be united to the body, and the beatitude of the body, which it does not yet have. Likewise a certain Blessed desires the salvation of someone which that person has not yet attained. Therefore through the vision of the divine essence the desire of man is not fulfilled.

V. It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 5, that the fulfillment of the desire of the Blessed can be understood in two ways: in one way, on the part of the desirable object; in another way, on the part of the desirer. Therefore the desire of the separated soul totally rests on the part of the desirable object: because it has that which is sufficient for its appetite. But it is not totally fulfilled on the part of the desirer: because it does not possess that object according to every mode in which it would wish to possess it.

This response of St. Thomas I understand thus, that the desire of the blessed soul is not so fulfilled from the vision of the divine essence that there is in it no movement of desire: since, as was argued, it desires certain other things. Whence also in I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3; and III Sent., d. 26, a. ult., qu. 2, St. Thomas says that blessed souls are not properly said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it; and IV Sent., d. 45, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1, he says that the holy martyrs have a desire for obtaining the robe of the body, and for the fellowship of the saints who are to be saved. But its desire is said to be fulfilled on the part of the thing desired: insofar as it has the most perfect and most sufficient good, which it was desiring as its ultimate end, on account of which it willed all other things, in the attainment of which its essential happiness consists; although it does not have it in all the modes in which it would wish, because it does not have it as beatifying the body. For such an object is sufficient for its appetite. Both because, all other things being removed, it is essentially blessed from its attainment, as having the highest good. And because the attainment of it brings it about that everything it desires, it infallibly obtains. For, since it desires nothing except what it sees God wills; and the will of God is always fulfilled: it follows that its desire also is always fulfilled, whether concerning union with the body, or concerning the fellowship of those to be saved, or concerning anything else. Whence St. Thomas says in I-II, in the place cited above⁶, that the glory of the body, which the Blessed desire, has an inevitable cause.

In this sense, therefore, is understood what is said here, that through the divine vision intellectual substances attain true happiness, in which every desire is quieted. Because, namely, through it is had the highest good, which contains everything desirable; and which before all things, as the ultimate end, was desired; and in the attainment of which the essence of beatitude consists; and also because in it is the inevitable reason and cause of the fulfillment of whatever desire; just as the desire to have a thing of one who has not yet obtained money is in a certain way said to be quieted, when he knows that he, whenever he wills, can obtain the money.

VI. But then another doubt arises. For perfect happiness requires the perfect quieting of desire both on the part of the desirable object, and on the part of the desirer: since every natural motion tends toward rest, but happiness is the terminus of appetite. Therefore, if in the separated soul there is not a total quieting of desire on the part of the desirer, it will not have perfect happiness.

It is answered that we can speak of the perfect happiness of the Blessed in two ways: in one way, as to the essential perfection of happiness; in another way, as to the essential and concomitant perfection together, according as beatitude names a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods⁷. If we speak of the first perfection, thus the separated soul is perfectly blessed: because it sees God, in whom the essence of beatitude consists, nor does there remain in it any desire with respect to this. If, however, we speak of its perfection in the second way, thus it is certainly conceded that it is not perfectly blessed. Whence St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. 49, q. 1, a. 4,⁸ holds that after the resurrection the beatitude of the Saints will be increased extensively, insofar as the soul will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in the good of the body. Indeed, he also holds that in some way it will be increased intensively, not indeed by seeing God more perfectly on the part of the object, but because from union with the body its operation will be more efficacious. Also in the fourth book of this Contra Gentiles, chap. 79, he says that the separated soul does not yet have perfect happiness, because its desire is not yet totally quieted.