Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The second conclusion is ¹: Those who attain ultimate beatitude from the divine vision will never fall away from it.

1. It is proved first. The aforesaid vision is not in time, but in eternity. Therefore it cannot be lost. — The consequence is proved. Because that which at some time is, and at some time is not (namely through an intrinsic potency), is measured by time, as is stated in Physics IV.

Second. If beatitude did not remain perpetually, the natural desire would not come to rest in it. Therefore it would not be the ultimate end. — The first consequence is proved. Because just as an intellectual nature naturally desires beatitude, so it naturally desires the perpetuity of beatitude: by the fact that it is perpetual, and consequently what it desires on account of itself and not on account of another, it desires as something to be held forever. — The second consequence also is proved. Because a nature of this kind does not attain the ultimate end unless when its natural desire comes to rest.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that one must speak in one way of those things which are sought on account of another, and in another way of those which are sought on account of themselves. For that which is sought on account of another does not have it that it is sought as something to be held forever: because, upon the arrival of that on account of which it was sought, since it is not sought except to acquire something else, it is no longer desired; just as medicine, which is sought on account of health, once health is had, is not desired further. — But that which is sought solely on account of itself, and in no way on account of another, has it that it is sought as something to be held forever, as long as the one desiring remains. Because it has from itself sufficient goodness on account of which it is desired: and therefore, since it is not desired except because it is good according to itself, since it is always good, it is desired as something to be held forever; just as, because health is according to itself a certain good of nature and is sought on account of itself, it is naturally desired as something to be held forever. Most excellently therefore did St. Thomas prove that an intellectual nature naturally desires the perpetuity of beatitude, because, being perpetual, what it desires on account of itself and not on account of another—in which manner it desires beatitude—it desires as something to be held forever.

II. Third. Unless it were so, such a vision would not be present without sorrow, and thus it would not be true beatitude. — The consequence is proved. This vision is most greatly loved by those possessing it: since it is most delightful and most greatly desired. Therefore, if it is known that it will at some time be lost, it is not without sorrow: because what is possessed with love, if it is known that it will at some time be lost, causes sorrow. But, if it is not perpetual, the Blessed know this: because if, by seeing the divine essence, they know the things that are in nature, much more do they know whether that vision is perpetual or not. Therefore etc.

Fourth. Every intellectual substance tends by natural desire to that vision. Therefore it will not fall away from it except through violence. Therefore it will endure forever. — The first consequence is proved. Because what is moved naturally to something as to the end of its motion is not removed from it except through violence: as is evident in a heavy body. — But the second is proved. Because, since nothing is removed through the violence of anything unless the power of the one taking it away is greater than the power of the one causing it; and there is no power that exceeds the divine power, which is the cause of this vision: it is impossible that it be taken away through violence.

Take note that this reason presupposes that this vision will not cease on account of a voluntary subtraction of the divine action, but that the divine essence continually operates toward it in the Blessed, as is evident in the following reason.

III. Fifth. An intellectual substance seeing God cannot cease to see Him, because the power of seeing could be lacking to it, either through this that it ceases to be, or on account of a defect of the light by which it sees: since it is perpetual, and that light is received incorruptibly, from the condition of both the recipient and the giver. Nor because the will to enjoy such a vision could be lacking to it: since it perceives that in it is its ultimate beatitude; just as it cannot not will to be happy. Nor through the subtraction of the object: because that object, which is God, is always in the same manner, nor is He distanced from us except insofar as we are distanced from Him. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because someone does not cease to see what he first saw, except on account of some one of the aforesaid.

Concerning the removal of the second impediment, namely that the will of enjoying such a vision cannot be lacking to the Blessed, just as he cannot not will to be happy, it must be considered that, although in this life beatitude, under the common notion of beatitude, does not move the will of necessity as to the exercise of the act, but only as to the specification of the act, absolutely speaking: nevertheless, as was said above ², from this supposition that it is apprehended practically and proposed to the will under the aspect of being desired for now, all things considered, the will cannot not will; just as the first principle cannot be proposed to the intellect without it immediately assenting to it actually. When therefore St. Thomas says that to the one seeing God the will of enjoying that vision cannot be lacking, just as he cannot not will to be happy: it must be understood while that practical apprehension of beatitude stands. For in this way proportionately the divine essence and beatitude in common correspond to each other: because the divine essence clearly seen necessarily moves the will; and beatitude in common, practically proposed to the will in the manner spoken of, is necessarily accepted.

Concerning the removal of the third impediment, namely that the object of beatitude cannot be subtracted, it must be noted that the object of the vision could be subtracted in a twofold manner: either namely because it is varied in itself, as if what was white should become black; or because, without it being varied in itself, the due proximity is removed, as if the white thing that was previously sufficiently proximate to vision should be placed far away. In order to remove both of these, St. Thomas says that the object of the divine vision is not subtracted, because God is always in the same manner, that is, He has no variation in Himself; and also is never distanced from us.

IV. Sixth: and it is a confirmation of the preceding, with the two following. For it is proved that it cannot fail from the proper will of the Blessed himself. In the fruition of that vision there can be no evil: since it is the highest good to which a rational creature can attain. Nor can it be that it is estimated by him who enjoys such a vision that there is some evil in it, or something better than it: since that vision excludes all falsehood. Therefore it is impossible that the one seeing God should will to lack that vision. — The consequence is proved. Because it is impossible that anyone should will to depart from the good which he enjoys except on account of some evil which he thinks to be in the fruition of that good: at least on account of this, that it is thought to be an impediment to a greater good.

2. To this reason it could be said that he who enjoys God could will to lack that vision, not on account of some evil conjoined to it, nor because it is an impediment to a greater good: but to experience his own freedom, namely whether he could desist for an hour from such vision and fruition.

But that response is nothing. First because this could not be unless because he considered the experience of his own freedom to be a greater good than the divine vision and fruition; and thus he would consider the continuation of such a vision to be an impediment to a greater good.

Second because the one seeing God by natural necessity judges that object, all things considered, to be for then supremely to be loved above all things. Nor is it in his power to suspend such a judgment: because that vision by which he clearly sees God, to which such a judgment of necessity follows, is not in his power. But while that judgment stands by which, by virtue of the divine vision, God is judged for then to be supremely loved, it is clear that the one seeing God cannot judge it to be good for then to suspend the act of fruition to experience his own freedom: because this judgment is contrary to that other judgment.

Therefore this response does not take away the efficacy of the reason.

V. Seventh. The divine substance does not corrupt, but most greatly perfects the intellect. Nor does an act that is exercised through bodily organs concur in its vision. Therefore that vision cannot produce disgust in anyone who previously enjoyed it delightfully. — The consequence is proved. Because disgust with something which someone previously enjoyed delightfully happens on account of this, that that thing makes some change in the thing, by corrupting or weakening its power: as is evident in the operation of the sensitive powers; and in the operation of our intellect in this life, which cannot be completed without organic powers.

VI. Eighth. The divine substance is always seen with wonder by any created intellect: since it does not comprehend it. Therefore an intellectual substance cannot become disgusted with that vision. Therefore neither can it desist from it by its own will. — The first consequence is proved. Because nothing that is considered with wonder can be disgusting: by the fact that desire always remains.

2. Concerning this reason a doubt occurs. Because if the divine substance is seen with wonder by the Blessed, it seems that the desire of the Blessed is not fulfilled. First because, as is said here, as long as something is under wonder, desire still remains. — Second because wonder is with ignorance: and from wonder the desire of knowing the cause which is not known is incited.

For the evidence of this, two things must be considered. One is that, although wonder in us properly implies two things, as can be drawn from Metaphysics I ³, namely that the cause of that which we wonder at is hidden; and in it there appears something through which it seems that the contrary ought to be of that which we wonder at; on account of which a certain desire of knowing the cause is excited, as when we see iron ascend, we wonder: nevertheless, in a broad manner, wonder is sometimes taken for the apprehension of something as entirely exceeding, on account of its magnitude, the capacity of the knower. When therefore it is said here that the divine substance is always seen with wonder by any created intellect, wonder is taken in the second way, but not in the first way. Because, as was argued, the Blessed indeed do not desire the cognition of any thing which they do not have, yet they always see that they are surpassed by the magnitude of the divine majesty, and that their vision falls short of a perfect comprehension of God.

The other is that desire, as is said in I II^ae, q. xxxiii, a. 2, can be taken in a twofold manner: in one way, properly, according to which it implies an appetite for a thing not had; in another way, according to which it implies an intensity of affection, which takes away disgust. When therefore it is said here that, as long as something is under wonder, desire still remains, desire must be taken according to proportion to wonder. For if wonder is taken as it implies cognition of that which we wonder at with ignorance of the cause and the estimation that it ought to be otherwise: thus, as long as something is under wonder, desire in the first way remains; because the one wondering desires cognition of the cause which he does not have. — If however wonder is taken for the cognition of the substance of something as exceeding in its intelligibility the capacity of the knower: thus it is accompanied by desire in the second way, which implies an intensity of affection that takes away disgust. And thus, since this wonder is in the Blessed, because, seeing the divine substance, they do not comprehend it, and know it to be incomprehensible; and are always in this wonder; there remains in them always the desire of enjoying God, that is, an intense affection for the vision of God and the delight following upon it. On account of which it is said concerning the angels, who perfectly know God and take delight in Him, in 1 Peter 1 ⁴, that they desire to look into Him. To this sense therefore does the reason of St. Thomas proceed.

VII. Ninth. This vision cannot cease on account of a change of the divine substance: since it is immutable. Nor on account of a change of the intellect seeing it: since it is elevated in this above all change. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because if any two things were previously united and are afterwards separated, it must be that this happens through a change of one of them: for a relation does not begin nor cease to be without a change of one of the related things. But the created intellect sees God through this, that it is in a certain manner united to Him.

It must be noted, concerning the foundation of this reason, that although any created intellect is according to its nature mutable in some way, yet according as it is elevated to the vision of the divine substance, it is made by God's gift, as to those things which are required for such a vision, entirely immutable. For because, as was said above ⁵, it is elevated to this, that it is of the divine order; but immutability is of the essence of the divine order: therefore, as is said in IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3, ad 4, just as immutability belongs to God by nature, so the Blessed attain stability from the divine gift, so that they cannot be transmuted, namely as to the beatific vision. And thus what is said here must be understood: that an intellectual substance is elevated above all change when it sees the substance of God.

Tenth. No creature can approach God more than that which sees His substance. Therefore it attains the highest immutability: (supply) as to that vision. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the closer something is to God, who is entirely immobile, the less mutable it is and the more persevering. — It is declared by the example of bodies; and by the authority of Aristotle, On Generation II, text 59.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalms; and Isaiah xxxiii; and Apocalypse iii.

Moreover through this the error of both the Platonists and Origen in the book Periarchon is excluded, who held that souls after beatitude could again come to misery.

VIII. But against the aforesaid, insofar as by certain reasons it was concluded that the Blessed cannot will to lack the divine vision; and consequently that the will of the Blessed necessarily wills and loves the divine essence clearly seen, it is argued from Scotus, I Sent., d. 1, q. iv ⁶.

First ⁷. When the elicitive principle does not necessarily elicit, neither does the one having that principle act necessarily. But charity, which is the elicitive principle of fruition, does not necessarily elicit it in the Fatherland: because neither did it necessarily elicit it in this life. Therefore neither does the will necessarily enjoy.

Second. Either the end moves to that act: or the potency. If the end, it is clear that there is no necessity: because it moves necessarily to no created act. — If the will, then thus. A diverse approximation of the patient to the agent does not cause necessity, but a more intense action: as is clear concerning a hot thing with respect to heatable things. But a diverse presence of the known object, say seen and not seen, does not seem to be anything other than a certain diverse approximation of it to the will. Therefore that does not diversify necessity and non-necessity.

IX. It is also argued by others ⁸. First thus. An object which does not fill the whole capacity of the power does not immutably move the will. But God is such an object: since the will loving God is in potency to many other loves. Therefore etc.

Second. That which takes away the freedom of the will is not to be posited. But this immutability of the will takes away its freedom. Therefore etc.

Third. We judge God to be supremely lovable in this life just as in the Fatherland. And yet in this life the will is not necessitated with respect to God Himself. Therefore neither in the Fatherland.

Fourth. Certain cases are posited. The first is: If God should give someone the fruition of Himself for an hour, and certify to him that after that hour he will not have it: it is clear that such a one can will to lack that vision, since it is not impossible for him to conform himself to God in what is willed. — The second is: If God should command the Blessed that he strive to suspend the love by which he loves Him clearly seen: it is clear that such a one will be able to suspend that love. — The third is: If God should be shown to the one seeing Him as future to be his perpetual afflicter, or annihilator, and the like: it is clear that He would be apprehended under the aspect of displeasing; and consequently the will could not will Him. — The fourth is: If someone to be damned should see God, and know some punishment to be future for himself: it is clear that his joy would be diminished through pain. And God could bring it about that he would have so much pain that it would exclude all joy. Therefore etc.

2. It is also argued against this determination because it seems to be against the mind of St. Thomas ⁹. For De Veritate, q. xxii, a. 6, holds that the will is free as to the exercise of the act, namely as to willing and not willing, in any state of nature, and with respect to any object. Therefore in the Fatherland it is not necessitated with respect to God clearly seen as to the exercise of the act.

X. For the solution of the arguments of Scotus ¹⁰, it must be considered that, although God is the object of the created intellect both in this life and in the Fatherland, insofar as He can be known both in this life and in the Fatherland; yet under one aspect He is the object in this life, and under another aspect in the Fatherland. For in this life He is not presented to us except as known obscurely and in an enigma, and through another: but in the Fatherland He is the object as known clearly and through Himself. And because the will is not borne except toward the known good, just as He is known in one way in this life and in another way in the Fatherland, so the will is related to Him in one way in this life, and in another way in the Fatherland. For because here He is seen in a mirror, and not in Himself and in His proper notion; and it is not clearly seen that the notion of the highest good and the ultimate end is contained in Him: therefore the will, which is naturally borne toward the ultimate end proposed to it under the aspect of the ultimate end, is not necessarily borne toward God, nor is it immobilized in Him, because from that knowledge that judgment by which it is judged that He is supremely to be loved does not follow of necessity. But in the Fatherland, because it is most clearly seen that in the divine substance is the notion of the highest good and the ultimate end, the will is necessarily borne toward Him, and has immobility in Him: because that judgment by which it is judged that He so seen is supremely to be willed and loved, is not in the power of the Blessed, since that necessarily follows from the clear vision of that which is truly the highest good and supremely lovable.

2. To the first of Scotus therefore it is said that the minor is false. — To the proof, the consequence is denied. Because in this life the object was not proposed to the will in the way and under the same aspect in which it is proposed to it in the Fatherland. For in this life it is proposed as something known in an enigma and in another: but in the Fatherland it is proposed to it as seen clearly and in itself, and as manifestly known that it is to be loved before all things.

3. To the second it is said that both, namely both the end and the power, move to that act: that is, they concur in this act. And from both in some way necessity arises: from the end indeed, because it is the object most suitable to an intellectual nature, and is of the highest goodness; but on the part of the will, because the will is of such a nature that, when the ultimate end under the aspect of the supremely lovable clearly known is proposed to it, it is necessarily inclined toward it, just as the intellect necessarily assents to the first principles.

When it is proved that it is not from the end, because it does not necessarily move to any created being: — it is said that the end itself is not said to move to a necessary act as if it moves necessarily by way of an efficient cause, and it is not in its power not to act; but because it is of such great goodness that, when clearly proposed to the will as it is in itself, it is apt to incline the will by way of an end so that the will cannot not desire it.

When however it is proved that that necessity does not arise from the will: — it is said that a greater approximation of the patient to the agent can be understood in a twofold manner: either namely according to local distance only, so that those things are said to be nearer which are in places less distant from one another; or according to adherence to the more proper aspect of the agent, so that that is said to approach more to something which adheres according to the aspect more proper to it. If approximation is taken in the first way: thus, admitting the major, which nevertheless is perhaps not true, the minor is denied. — If it is taken in the second way, thus the minor indeed is true: because, while God not seen but known in a mirror is proposed to the will, God adheres to the will not through His essence in Himself, but according to a certain aspect received from creatures; but when He is proposed to the will as clearly seen, He adheres to it according to His very essence, and His proper aspect, which is intimate to it. But the major of the reason is false. Because it is possible for some object, proposed to the will under its proper aspect and essence, to necessitate the will, which does not necessitate it when proposed under an aspect received from other things: just as health perfectly known necessitates the natural appetite, which, not known except in a certain confusion and obscurity, does not necessitate it.

XI. To the first of the other objections ¹¹, the minor is denied. For it is said that some object fills the capacity of the will when nothing else beyond it is left to be desired as the complement of its perfection, as is said in I IIae, q. I, a 5. But God clearly seen is so related to the will. For when the intellectual substance has arrived at the vision of the divine essence, it has the complement of its perfection, and desires no other perfection. — But when it is proved that the will loving God is in potency to many other loves: — the implied consequence is denied. For by the fact that some object sates the will, it is not excluded that it can love something else along with it: but excluded is the love of another thing altogether extraneous to the love of that object, namely, one that in no way proceeds from it and is its complement. For it is said that the Blessed one loving God cannot have a love of any other thing which does not originate from the love of God, but whatever he loves and wills, he loves and wills in order to the divine essence and from its love. And from this it is said that the will's capacity is filled.

2. To the second, the minor is denied. Immutability arising from the natural inclination of the will does not take away its liberty, since the natural necessity of inclination is not repugnant to liberty (by which someone is free from coercion), according to Augustine, V de Civ. Dei ¹², and St. Thomas, Verit., q. XXIV, a. 1, ad 20: but the necessity of coercion does remove it. Because coercion is only from without, whereas natural inclination is from within.

3. To the third it is said first that, given that judgment, even on the way, by which we judge God to be supremely lovable for now, all things considered; and nothing hindering such a judgment; the will necessarily loves Him, and as long as such a judgment remains, that act of the will remains; as was said above ¹³ concerning beatitude taken according to its universal notion.

It is said second, that the will is not rendered immobile in that act on the way as in the homeland, because that judgment on the way is in our power, on account of the obscure and enigmatic knowledge of God. And a man can cease from that judgment, and also from the actual consideration of God: either because such consideration is judged to hinder a better good; or because man grows weary in such consideration, on account of the weariness of the sense powers; or for some other causes. None of which will be in the homeland, where the divine nature is seen most clearly as it is in itself; and where there is no deception, and no weariness, and nothing can be judged to be better than that divine vision. Hence the case is not the same on the way and in the homeland.

4. To the proposed cases ¹⁴ it is said: in general, indeed, that the mind of St. Thomas is to speak of the will of the Blessed as regards what befits it according to itself and according to the common law; not, however, as regards what God can dispose concerning them; because that is accidental to beatitude, and does not befit it per se.

In particular, however: to the first case it is said that indeed then such a one would wish to lack that vision after the hour, because one seeing God cannot be at variance with the divine will. Yet such a one cannot for that hour wish to lack that vision as if loathing it.

To the second it is said that the case is not to be admitted: because God does not command the impossible. But for the Blessed to suspend that love is altogether impossible for him, given that vision and the judgment by which, by virtue of that vision, God is judged at that time to be, all things considered, supremely lovable: because to that love, given those conditions, he is naturally inclined, nor is that love in his power.

To the third case it is said that such a one would not apprehend God under the aspect of the displeasing. For although he sees that He will be his punisher, he does not nevertheless judge Him to be evil: since he sees Him to be the essence of goodness, and able to do nothing save what is best and most just.

To the fourth case it is said that his joy concerning the divine essence clearly seen would not be diminished by that. Rather perhaps there would be no sorrow: because such joy and that punishment are not contrary; just as in Christ the pain of the passion did not diminish the joy of blessed fruition.

XII. To what is lastly adduced from the words of St. Thomas ¹⁵, Capreolus answers, Primo, d. 1, q. III ¹⁶, that the mind of St. Thomas in that place is that the will, with respect to any object whatsoever, can suspend its act in any state in which it can be proposed to it under the aspect of the good of coming forth into act or of ceasing from act. But in the homeland it cannot be proposed under the aspect of the good to cease from the love of God according to itself. Therefore the saying of St. Thomas does not stand in the way of the determination made.

2. But this, always saving better judgment, does not seem to me to be the mind of St. Thomas. For from this response it is absolutely admitted that in the homeland the will is not free with respect to God as regards the exercise of the act: but in the authority adduced St. Thomas seems to deny this, when, counting the state of the Blessed among the states of nature, he says that the will is free in any state of nature with respect to any object whatsoever, in which is also included that it is free toward God seen by the Blessed.

Therefore it could be said otherwise: namely, that since the act of the will follows knowledge, just as we can speak in two ways of the knowledge by which the Blessed know God, namely of beatific knowledge, and of non-beatific knowledge; so we can speak in two ways of the act of the will toward God. For if we speak of that knowledge of God in which the essence of beatitude consists, namely the knowledge of God clearly seen through the divine essence itself, so the will cannot fail to have an act of love about God: because the intellect cannot judge Him at that time not to be loved, and consequently cessation from such love cannot be proposed to the will under the aspect of the good. — But if we speak of the knowledge that the Blessed have of God either from a habit acquired here, or from revelation, or in some other way according to whatever other particular notions, so the will of the Blessed is not necessarily borne toward God thus known: because just as the intellect can cease from that judgment by which it judges that God, as thus known, is to be loved, since it can cease from such knowledge and consideration, and consequently can propose to the will under the species of the good the cessation from that act; so also the will can cease from that act. And just as the intellect is not necessitated in that knowledge to judge God to be lovable as known under that notion, so neither is the will necessitated to love Him. The mind of St. Thomas, therefore, is that even in the state of the Blessed the will is absolutely free with respect to God as regards the exercise of the act, inasmuch as it can freely elicit some act about Him known by some non-beatific knowledge. To this, however, it is not repugnant that, about Him as known by beatific vision, it is not free, but determined, in which way we speak here of the will of the Blessed toward God. And this response even Capreolus himself, in the second distinction, q. 1¹⁷, seems to accept more than the other.