Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas set forth the particular conditions of each thing concurring to beatitude, he now manifests the general conditions ¹. And he posits three conclusions ².

I. The first of these is: Through the vision of the divine essence the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life.

It is proved first. The aforesaid vision consists in a certain participation of eternity. And it is a certain life. Therefore, etc.

The antecedent is proved. As to the first part, indeed, thus: In the aforesaid vision there is not any succession. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: because eternity differs from time in this, that time has being in a certain succession, while the being of eternity is all at once. — As to the second part, however, because the action of the intellect is a certain life: (supply) according as life is taken for the operation of that which moves itself to operation.

2. But this reasoning seems to be deficient. Because it assumes that there is no other duration than time and eternity; and therefore, because the beatific vision is not measured by time, it concludes that it is perfected in a certain participation of eternity. But this supposition is false: because another intermediate measure of duration is given, namely the aeviternity; as is clear in the First Part, q. x ³; and in I Sent., d. xix ⁴; and in many other places. Therefore, etc.

He answers that the reasoning concludes the proposed point excellently. Because the intention of St. Thomas in that reasoning is to show that that operation is outside of time entirely, and therefore is measured by another measure, which either is eternity, or a participation of eternity; and therefore it was not necessary to distinguish between the aeviternity and eternity, but he embraced both under the name of eternity.

II. Secondly. The being of the divine substance consists in eternity: or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the vision of it consists in a participation of eternity. — The consequence is proved: because acts are specified by their objects.

Note that from the fact that acts are specified by their objects, St. Thomas intends that the act participates in the perfection of the object: just as each thing is a partaker of the perfection of the form by which it is specified. Therefore, if the vision is specified by eternity, it is necessary that it participate in eternity in some way.

2. But it seems that this reasoning does not conclude. Because through it one would also conclude that through the intellection of the wayfarer someone becomes a partaker of eternal life. For he who considers the definition of eternity has an intellection whose object is eternity. Therefore, if, because the object of the divine vision is in eternity or is eternity itself, the one seeing the divine essence is a partaker of eternal life, it follows that this man also will be a partaker of eternal life.

He answers that the account is not the same concerning one considering the notion of eternity in this life and concerning one seeing the divine essence. Because something can be said to participate in eternity in two ways. In one way, extrinsically only. And thus he who considers eternity participates in some way in eternity extrinsically: inasmuch as by his operation he reaches eternity in some way, although in an imperfect way. But St. Thomas is not speaking of this participation. — In another way, intrinsically, namely as pertaining to the order of eternal things. And thus those seeing the divine essence are partakers of eternity, but not he who considers the notion of eternity in the state of wayfarer: because only he participates in eternity in this way, by knowing eternity, who perfectly intuits the very entity of eternity as it is in itself. For this cannot be unless the intellect is elevated to the order of the divine nature. For it was said above ⁵ that it is necessary for one who perfectly knows something of one order to pertain to that order, or to a higher order. And similarly, since an operation is specified by its object, it is specified in such a way as to pertain to the order of its object when it reaches that object per se, immediately, and perfectly. But when it intuits that object only imperfectly and in another, it is not specified so as to pertain to its order: but only by a certain extrinsic and imperfect specification. For it is rather a certain disposition toward the species of that cognition than something complete in the species.

III. Thirdly. This vision is not in time on the part of that which is seen, nor on the part of that by which it is seen: since each is the divine substance, which is eternal. Nor also on the part of the one seeing: since the being of the intellect is not subject to time, because it is incorruptible. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because if any action is in time, this is on account of some one of those three.

Fourthly. The action of the intellective soul according to which it is joined to lower things, which are in time, is temporal. Therefore its action according to which it is joined to higher things, which are above time, participates in eternity. But the divine vision is such in the highest degree. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved: because the intellective soul is created on the boundary of eternity and time, as is said in the book de Causis, as existing last in the order of intellects, and yet elevated above corporeal matter.

It is confirmed by the authority of John 17.

IV. Concerning those things which have been said, a doubt occurs. For the reasons stated above do not seem to conclude, at least for the greater part, except that the divine vision is measured by some measure above time. But for this it seems to suffice that it be measured by the aeviternity: for the aeviternity is above time, and is a certain participated eternity, as St. Thomas frequently says ⁶; since it is the measure of being that is intransmutable according to itself. Therefore the doubt remains whether those seeing the divine essence are said to be partakers of eternal life because their vision is measured by the aeviternity: or rather because it is measured by some other measure, which is eternity and is above the aeviternity.

V. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, since eternity, the aeviternity, and time are distinguished on the part of the things measured, as is clear in the First Part, q. x⁷, in that eternity measures divine being, the aeviternity measures immutable and incorruptible creatures, while time measures motion and corruptible things; in order to know by what measure any operation is measured, one must see to which order of these measurable things it pertains. Because if it belongs to the order of divine being, it will be measured by eternity; if to the order of immutable creatures, it will be measured by the aeviternity; but if to the order of mutable things, it will be measured by time.

2. It must be considered secondly, that the beatific operation, inasmuch as it is beatific, cannot pertain to the order of mutable and corruptible things: because it is all at once, and cannot fail of itself, but has indefectible being. For the Saints, as is said in IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3, ad ult., from the fact that they will adhere to God, will obtain stability from the divine gift, so that, namely, they cannot be changed.

Nor can it pertain to the order of immutable creatures, on account of two reasons. First, because to that order pertain only subsisting creatures, and those which can be brought about by the natural power of a creature: for things which exceed the natural power of a creature are not contained within the natural order of a creature. But the beatific operation is neither a subsisting creature; nor can it be produced by any power of a creature, so as to be natural to any creature, since it is elicited by divine power and the divine essence, by way of an intelligible form. — Secondly, because the immutability of the beatific operation is one thing, and the immutability of an incorruptible substance is another. For such a substance, although it is immutable according to substantial being, and does not have succession nor prior or posterior according to such being, nevertheless admits with itself mutability and prior and posterior according to the succession of affections and intellections, so that it is truly said to be mutable according to operations. But the beatific operation is not only immutable and all at once as to its being: but it does not even admit with itself any mutation and succession, according to which it may be said to be changed.

It remains, therefore, that such an operation pertains to the order of the divine operation and divine being, as a certain participated likeness of the divine beatitude. For just as the divine operation is immutable in itself, and admits no mutation with itself by which it would be changed, and exceeds all power of a creature, so also does the beatific operation.

3. From these things the answer to the doubt is most clearly evident. For it is said that the beatific operation is measured by eternity, as St. Thomas holds, IV Sent., in the place cited; and in the First Part, q. x, a. 3, and a. 5, ad 1; and Quodlib. X, q. ii, a. 1⁸: but not by time or an instant of time, or the aeviternity, on account of the adduced reasons.

VI. But it must be noted that for the beatific operation to be measured by eternity can be understood in two ways. In one way, that eternity itself according to itself is the measure of such a vision. In another way, that some other measure, higher than the aeviternity but lower than God's eternity, is its measure, which has no other name except that it is called participated eternity. Either indeed could be maintained according to the mind of St. Thomas: because either can be gathered from his words.

Nevertheless it seems to me that it should rather be held, according to his mind, that eternity itself, which measures the divine being, is the measure of the beatific vision. I am moved to this because in IV Sent.⁹, after he shows that it is measured neither by time nor by the aeviternity, he concludes that its proper measure is eternity itself. — And also because, wherever he makes mention of the measure of duration, he never posits more than three measures, namely eternity, the aeviternity, and time. — And further because the beatific vision, as such, pertains to the divine order, as we have shown¹⁰. But we see that all things which are of one order are measured by one measure: for all generable and corruptible things are measured by time; and all created incorruptible things are measured by the aeviternity. Whence it is necessary to say that all things which are of the divine order are measured by eternity.

It must be noted, however, that just as something pertains to the divine order essentially and primarily, as God; but something secondarily and through a certain participation, as the beatific vision, inasmuch as it is not subject to variation and is above every capacity of nature: so also something is measured by eternity per se and adequately, as God; but something as by an exceeding measure and one participated by it, as the beatific vision itself, as such. For since this vision does not pertain to the divine order as equaling the divine perfection, but as participating something of the divine perfection, which is natural to God; it is not unfitting if, inasmuch as it pertains to the divine order, it does not have an adequate measure, but only an exceeding one. Whence St. Thomas, in the place previously cited in IV Sent., ad 3, says that eternity is not communicable to man in such a way as to be his adequate measure, or of anything that is in him. It can nevertheless be communicated to man according to some participation, so that he is a partaker of the eternity by which the divine operation is measured. — But as to what he said, that eternity is its proper measure¹¹: by proper measure he did not understand an adequate measure, but the measure of its order, and by which alone it is measured.

2. If anyone, however, should wish to hold the other side, he could say that, just as the Blessed becomes a partaker of that vision by which God sees Himself so that he has some operation in himself which is a certain participated likeness of that divine vision, so he becomes a partaker of eternity inasmuch as his operation is measured adequately by some measure existing in him which is a certain participated likeness of true eternity. And that St. Thomas comprehends that under the name of eternity. And that it is not necessary that all things which are of one order have one measure, unless they pertain to the same order in the same way. Now, as was said, God and the beatific vision do not pertain to the divine order in the same way.

VII. But against the aforesaid Scotus argues, IV Sent., d. xlix, q. vi¹². First. If it were so, it would follow that an act inasmuch as it is informed is more immutable than the substance of the act itself: since, according to you, the act inasmuch as it is informed is measured by eternity, but according to its substance, is measured by the aeviternity. But this is impossible: because it is impossible that that which belongs to something per accidens be more immutable than that in which it is. Therefore, etc.

Secondly. The eternal, just as it is all at once, so it lacks the potency to not-being. But this belongs to no created thing. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. The beatific operation is not of a more eminent permanence than the intellectual substance. Therefore it is not measured by eternity, but by the aeviternity. — The antecedent is proved: because it is its accident, and consequently less noble.

Fourthly. Just as the vision of God is called eternal in Sacred Scripture, so also the punishment of the damned. But the punishment of the damned is not eternal by any eternity distinct from the aeviternity. Therefore, etc.

VIII. To the first of these it is said first, that St. Thomas does not posit, as Scotus thinks, that the divine vision according to its substance is measured by the aeviternity, but according to its form is measured by eternity, as if its substance and its intrinsic form were two distinct things: but that, although the vision itself is measured by eternity, this does not belong to it inasmuch as it is absolutely an intellection elicited by a created intellect, but inasmuch as it is such an intellection which is the vision of the divine essence; just as we say that something belongs to a man inasmuch as he is rational which does not belong to him inasmuch as he is an animal, although animal and rational are one thing in man.

It is said secondly, that that formation which belongs to that vision is not related to intellection taken absolutely as something entirely extraneous to it according to reality: but as a difference to a genus, which is indeed the same with it according to reality, but according to its formal notion happens to the genus, as rational is related to animal. And that what is related to another accidentally in this way may have greater immutability from its proper notion than that has to which it is understood to supervene according to reason is not unfitting¹³. And thus we say that greater immutability belongs to that intellection by which the divine substance is seen by reason of the difference than by reason of the genus: that is, inasmuch as it is such a vision, than inasmuch as it is an intellection absolutely. Whence the reasoning is not against the mind of St. Thomas.

2. To the second it is said that what is eternal simpliciter lacks every kind of potency to not-being, namely both logical and natural, and both from within and from without. But for what is eternal according to participation, it suffices that it lack a natural potency to not-being, because namely by no power of nature could it fail; and that it lack all mutability from an intrinsic principle. Now in this way a vision of this kind is eternal and lacks potency to non-being. For just as by no power of nature can it be sufficiently produced, so by no power of nature can it fail; nor is there in it, or in its subject, a potency to its privation, inasmuch as it is the beatific vision.

3. To the third ¹⁴ it is said, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. x, a. 3, ad 2, that the divine vision and the punishment of the damned are not eternal in the same way. For although the punishment of the damned, according as it lacks an end, can in some way be called eternal, it is nevertheless not truly eternal, since it is with a certain change, which is repugnant to eternity; for it is said in Job 24 ¹⁵, that they will pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.