Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The third conclusion is ¹: The intellect that sees the divine substance contemplates all things not successively, but simultaneously.

I. It is proved first. Vision corresponds to the principle of vision. Therefore, the things that are seen by one species must be seen by one vision. But the intellect seeing the divine substance understands all species of things in it. Therefore, etc.

2. Concerning this proposition, Whatever things are seen by one species must be seen by one vision, a doubt is raised. Because by one species a single intellect can consider at diverse times diverse things from among those represented through that species; and thus it can know them not simultaneously, but successively. Hence, not only do we experience this in ourselves, but it was also said above concerning separated substances ² that they do not know the singulars of one species except when they are in act. But they are in act successively. Therefore, they know them successively. And yet they know all of them through one species, which is the likeness of the specific nature. Therefore, etc.

He answers that that proposition is not understood of just any species, but of that which always in act and distinctly represents all its objects, just as the divine essence represents to the intellect of the blessed all genera and species of things. But the species of our intellect does not always represent distinctly and in act all the things that are knowable through it. And likewise the species of a separated intellect does not always in act represent all the singulars of one species. Therefore, the instances adduced are not against the proposition.

II. Secondly. All those things that are seen through the vision of the divine substance, by which we are blessed, are seen in act: because happiness consists in act, not in habit. Therefore, one is not seen prior to another. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. The ultimate end of the intellect is the vision of the divine substance. Therefore, when it sees the divine substance, it is not moved from one intelligible to another. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because each thing, when it has come to its ultimate end, comes to rest.

Fourthly. The intellect knows all species of things in the divine substance. Therefore, it sees infinite things. Therefore, it sees all things simultaneously. — The first consequence is proved. Because of certain genera, such as number, figure, and proportion, the species are infinite. — But the second is proved. Because unless it saw all those things simultaneously, it would not see all of them: since it is impossible to traverse infinite things.

III. Against this proposition, The intellect sees infinite things in the divine substance, Scotus, in III Sent., d. XIV, q. II ³, holding that the soul of Christ does not see all things simultaneously in the Word, but understands whatever it wills successively, argues in two ways.

First: because it is impossible for a finite power to see infinite things simultaneously with perfect attention: since attention to several objects simultaneously is less perfect.

Secondly: because the perfection of that soul would exceed other souls infinitely.

Thirdly, Adam argues ⁴: God cannot make infinite things to be simultaneously in act. Therefore, neither can they be understood simultaneously by a created intellect: because a created intellect cannot know more things in the Word than God can make.

IV. To the first of these, the assumption is denied, when those infinite things are known by a single species that distinctly represents them. — For attention to several known objects does not diminish the perfection of the knowledge of them except when they are known through several species. In the case at hand, however, those infinite things are seen by the soul of Christ not through several species, but through one, which is the divine essence.

2. To the second, it is said that it is not unfitting for the soul of Christ to exceed other souls by a perfection that is infinite secundum quid: of which kind is the perfection of the knowledge of infinite things. For that is not a perfection that is infinite simpliciter, since it does not know them with infinite efficacy, and other infinite things remain to be known besides those that it knows: but it is infinite only materially and extrinsically, and by an infinity secundum quid; just as the things seen are themselves infinite only secundum quid.

If, however, it is argued, as Adam argues ⁵: That act would be equivalent to infinite specifically distinct acts. Therefore, it would be infinite simpliciter: — it is said that the consequence is false. For although that act would be equivalent to infinite specifically distinct acts, by a distinction more material than formal, yet it would not be infinite simpliciter. Because just as infinite species of numbers are not something infinite simpliciter according to perfection, since they are determined to the genus of number; so neither would those acts of knowledge be infinite according to perfection simpliciter, because they would be determined to the knowledge of number, beyond which many other acts of knowledge are left.

If it is further argued, because the blessed person sees so much the more in God as he knows Him more perfectly; and thus it seems, if he sees infinite things in God, that he knows God infinitely; and consequently that he exceeds other blessed persons infinitely: — it is said, in accordance with the aforesaid, that just as the things he sees in God are infinite only secundum quid, so he sees the divine essence infinitely secundum quid. And thus he also exceeds other blessed persons infinitely secundum quid: just as infinite days exceed finite days infinitely secundum quid, but not simpliciter; because they are not infinite simpliciter, but only secundum quid, since they are determined to the nature of time and of days.

3. To the third, the consequence is denied. And to the proof, the assumption is denied. For actual existence is repugnant to infinite things: but not actual knowledge through one thing that distinctly represents infinite things simultaneously.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Augustine, XV de Trinitate.