Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Because it has been shown that one of those seeing God sees more perfectly than another, someone could ask whether the inequality is so great that there is no multitude of things which all see; or rather whether there are some things which are seen by all in the divine essence. Therefore St. Thomas wishes to respond to this question ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows what those things are which are seen by all in the divine essence; second, he removes a certain doubt, around the middle of this chapter ².

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: Anyone seeing the divine substance knows all the genera and species and powers, and the whole order of the universe.

It is proved first. The natural appetite of the intellect is to know all the aforesaid things: as human study directed toward each of these demonstrates ³. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the natural appetite of an intellectual substance seeing the divine substance must be wholly at rest: since the natural appetite of any thing is at rest when it has reached its ultimate end.

Second. The intellect is raised by the light of glory to see the substance of God, which is the highest in the genus of intelligibles. Therefore much more is it perfected by the same light for understanding all the other intelligible things which are in the nature of things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved from the difference placed between intellect and sense, III de Anima. Namely, because the intellect, after it has understood what is more intelligible, will be able to understand other intelligibles not less but rather more: since it is not corrupted nor impeded by its object, but only perfected. This, however, does not belong to sense with respect to the sensible: because it is corrupted or weakened by excellent sensibles.

Note that if some intellectual light manifests a greater intelligible, it is not of course necessary that the lesser intelligible also be manifested by the same light, so that it be seen in the greater; but it is quite probable that the light raising the intellect to see the divine essence, which is the most excellent intelligible, born to represent all things most clearly, also raises it to see the species and natures of all natural things, which are the effects of that divine substance, in which the divine goodness shines forth.

II. But a doubt occurs concerning this argument. For from it there seems able to be concluded not only that the Blessed see all things pertaining to the order of the universe, but that they see absolutely all things. For all things producible by God are less intelligible than the divine essence, just as also are all the aforesaid things.

It is answered that this argument is adduced to exclude the response which could be given to the preceding argument. For someone could say that, although the natural desire of the intellectual nature is to know all the aforesaid things, it is nevertheless impeded from the knowledge of them because of the excellence of the divine essence which is seen, just as sense is impeded by excellent sensibles from knowing the less sensible things. But this response is excluded by this argument, as is clear from the very process of the argument. Therefore from it there cannot be concluded that the Blessed see absolutely all things in God: but only that the excellence of the divine intelligible does not impede the Blessed from seeing in God those things which they naturally desire to know.

III. Third. What is required for the perfection of natural being is required also for the perfection of intelligible being, or even more. But the perfection of intelligible being is when the intellect has reached its end, namely, seeing God: just as the perfection of natural being consists in the constitution of things ⁴. Therefore God manifests to the intellect seeing Him all things which He produced for the perfection of the universe. — The major premise is proved. Because intelligible being is not of lesser compass than natural being, but perhaps of greater: since the intellect understands even negations and privations, which do not have natural being.

It should be noted that the argument consists in this, that when the intellect has reached its end, which is to see the divine substance, it will have the complement of perfection in intelligible being. But the perfection of the intellect in intelligible being is to understand. Therefore, when it has reached seeing God, it will have complete knowledge of the whole of intelligible being: otherwise it would not have reached its ultimate end, since there would still remain something for it to understand. But all things which pertain to the perfection of natural being pertain also to the perfection of intelligible being: since each thing is intelligible insofar as it is a being in act. Therefore it must see all things pertaining to the being of nature.

Fourth. Anyone seeing God sees Him so perfectly that his whole natural capacity is filled, indeed exceeded. Therefore he sees all things to which his natural capacity extends. Therefore etc. — The second consequence is proved (for the first is manifest). Because the natural capacity of any intellect extends to knowing all the aforesaid things.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Lord, Exod. xxxiii; and by the authority of Gregory.

IV. It should be noted that this authority of Gregory in IV Dialogorum, namely, What is it that they do not see who see the one seeing all things? St. Thomas seems, from the fact that he adduces it for the confirmation of the aforesaid, to interpret not of all things absolutely, but of all genera, species, powers, and the order of the universe. In the First Part, however, ⁵; and in Verit., q. viii, a. 4 ⁶, he interprets it with respect to the sufficiency of the medium: because the divine essence is, as far as in itself it is, a sufficient medium of demonstration of all things. — He adds also in the Qu. Verit. ⁷, another exposition: namely, that it can be understood of those things which pertain to the substance of beatitude. For, as he says there, ad 12, although no knowledge of a creature is of the substance of beatitude as beatifying, some knowledge of a creature nevertheless pertains to beatitude as being necessary for some act of the Blessed: for instance, for the governance of those who are committed to his care; or for praising, such as the creatures from which the perfection of the universe consists. But this exposition is almost the same as the one which is given here.

V. As to the second, St. Thomas removes a certain doubt which seems to arise from the aforesaid ⁸. For it was said in the preceding ⁹ that those seeing God do not see all things. Here, however, it is said that they see all things. And so contradictions seem to be said.

He answers that there is no contradiction, but both are true, if rightly understood. For if by all things are understood those things which pertain to the perfection of the universe, thus those seeing God see all things: as is clear from the arguments adduced above. He rehearses, however, one argument, which perhaps seemed to him more subtle, namely this: because, since the intellect is in a certain way all things, whatever pertains to the perfection of nature pertains also to the perfection of intelligible being. Hence, according to Augustine, super Gen. ad litt., such things were made not only through the Word of God so as to subsist in their proper nature, but also in the understanding of the angel, so as to be understood by them. These, however, are the natures of the species, and their properties and powers: since the intention is borne toward the species of nature. Therefore to know these pertains to the perfection of the intellectual nature. Therefore this is attained in final beatitude through the vision of the divine essence. Through the knowledge also of the natural species are known the individuals existing under the species: as is clear from what was said above concerning the knowledge of God and of the angels.

If, however, by all things are understood all things which God, by understanding His essence, knows: no created intellect sees all things in the substance of God. For it does not see all things which God can do and will never do. Nor does it see the rationales of all made things, as is said in Eccle. viii. Finally, it does not see all things which depend on the will of God alone: such as are predestination, election, justification, and the like. — The first two are proved, because the one could not be without comprehension of the divine power, which was shown above to be impossible: and it is shown also by the authority of Job XI. The other, however, could not be without comprehension of the divine goodness and divine wisdom: because, since the rationale of made things is that the goodness of God be diffused in things, someone would know the rationales of all things if he knew all the goods which can come to be in created things according to the order of divine wisdom; which would be to comprehend the divine goodness and also¹⁰ wisdom.

• The third, however, is proved by the authority of the Apostle, I Cor. II.

VI. Concerning the aforesaid two, two doubts occur. The first is that St. Thomas in the First Part, q. XII, a. 8, ad ult., says that to know singulars is not of the perfection of the created intellect, and that the natural desire of the rational creature is not borne to this, leaving that those things are not seen in God. — Here, however, the opposite seems to be said: for he says that by the knowledge of the natural species the individuals existing under such species are known by the intellect seeing God.

The second doubt ¹¹ is, that here it is said that the created intellect cannot know all the rationales of made things. — In the previously cited place, however, it is said that the natural desire of the rational creature is to know all those things which pertain to the perfection of the intellect: and these are the species and genera of things, and their rationales, which anyone seeing the divine essence will see in God.

VII. To the first of these it is answered that singulars can be considered in two ways. In one way, with respect to their individuated nature, according to which they are contained under the species; and with respect to those things which belong to them according to the natural order of the universe. And in this sense St. Thomas wishes here that they be seen by the one seeing God through the knowledge of the natural species. And this indeed is probable. Because just as separate substances, as was shown above, by seeing the species through natural knowledge see all the individuals of it existing in act, for the reason that the intelligible species of the specific nature is also their likeness: so, since the knowledge of the Blessed is not inferior to the natural knowledge of a separate substance, it is fitting that those seeing through the divine essence, which is the likeness of all things, some nature and species, see through it all the individuals of that nature.

In another way they can be considered with respect to those things which come to them from divine ordination; or also those things which pertain to the will of the creature itself. And in this sense he understands in the First Part. Hence he said conjointly that to know other singulars, and their thoughts and deeds, is not of the perfection of the created intellect. For thus it is true that those seeing God do not see all men by seeing all the things which happen to them day by day from divine ordination, and all their thoughts. And likewise they do not see all things to which other singulars are ordered by divine institution, but of those they see only as much as the perfection of beatitude requires: as is said in de Verit., where above ¹²; and in the Fourth, d. XLV, q. III, a. 1.

Now the perfection of beatitude requires this, that they see those things which pertain to themselves, such as are the vows and prayers and devotions of the men who are devoted to them and implore their aid ¹³, and other things of this kind. Hence they know some singulars, with respect to those things which pertain to their own will and to divine ordination, but not all: although they know all those things insofar as they are singulars of this nature, and with respect to those things which belong to them according to the order of nature. Hence also the opinion of Gregory in the XII book of Moral.¹⁴, which St. Thomas approves in the previously cited place ¹⁵ more than the opinion of Augustine in the book de Cura pro mortuis agenda ¹⁶, is to be understood in this way. For when he says that those who see the clarity of God within are in no way to be believed to be ignorant of anything which is outside, it is to be understood of those things which pertain to the order of nature: not, however, of absolutely all things which belong to singulars in any way whatever.

VIII. But a doubt remains, whether the Blessed see in the divine essence all singulars, both present and future: or only those which are present. For if it be posited that they see even future singulars, this seems to be against the mind of St. Thomas. First, because here it is said that they know individuals existing under the species. But it is clear that future things do not exist under the species. — Second, because in the First Part, q. XII, a. 8, ad ult., he holds that they do not know those things which are not yet. — Third, because in the First Part, q. LXXXIX, a. 8, he holds that they see all the present things which are done here, like the angels.

If, however, it be posited that they know only singulars that are present: since present things make succession, it follows that in the beatific vision there will be succession and change; which is against Augustine, at the end of de Trinitate ¹⁷.

IX. To this it can be said that both parts can be upheld. For we can, first, hold that the Blessed see only the present things which are done here, according to those things which are said in the First Part, q. LXXXIX.

And when it is urged that then there would be succession and change: — it is said first that succession in the beatific vision can be understood in two ways: in one way, extrinsically; in another way, intrinsically. If it be taken intrinsically, it does not follow that there is succession there: because there is only one act of beatific vision always remaining, which is neither intensified nor remitted, although some singulars are not seen earlier and are seen afterwards. Just as, if an angel be posited to consider through the species of man the human nature and its singulars, with the same vision enduring and in no way varied in itself, he can see some men whom he did not see before: because, before they existed, they did not participate in act in the human species, so that they could be seen together with it; after they have been produced, however, they participate in act in the human nature. — If, however, it be taken extrinsically, it is not unfitting that there be succession in a vision of this kind insofar as it is terminated at singulars: that is, that those singulars terminate such a vision successively. — And if it be argued, because more things cannot be known in the cause unless the cause be known more perfectly: — it is said that this is true of those things which are known in the cause per se, not, however, of those things which are known in the cause insofar as they participate in act the thing known per se: because then it suffices that what previously did not participate in it, now participate in act. And so it is with singulars: for they terminate that vision, not per se, but insofar as they participate in the species; and earlier they are not in act, but afterwards they are.

It is said second that that happens without change of the vision itself in itself: but only through the change of the singulars themselves.

2. We can, second, hold that the Blessed, in the way in which they know singulars in God, see not only present, but also past and future things all at once, namely without that extrinsic succession: for the reason that that vision is measured in some way by eternity; and the species of things are seen through the divine essence, which is the likeness of both the species and all singulars.

It does not obstruct, however, first, what is said here. Because it is understood of singulars existing under the species for any difference of time.

It does not obstruct, second, what is said in question XII of the First Part. Because that is understood of the species which will never be, but can nevertheless be produced by God.

It does not obstruct, third, what is adduced from question LXXXIX of the First Part. Because, although it is said there that they know all the present things which are done here, about which the question was raised in that place, it does not nevertheless say that they see only present things.

3. Although the first response can perhaps be upheld (which I do not assert), according to those things which were said in book I, cap. XV, it nevertheless seems to me that the second is more to be embraced in the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in the Qu. Verit., q. VIII, a. 12, ad 2, speaking of the blessed angels, he says that with respect to the vision by which they see things in the Word, they are indifferently disposed to knowing present and future things. In the immediately following chapters, moreover, he holds that of those things which are seen in the divine essence, one is not seen earlier and another later, but all are seen at once and in one single act.

X. To the second doubt ¹⁸ it is answered that in this place the rationales of things are called the intelligibles which can be known about things, namely all things which the intellect can understand to be in things. These, however, are in a double difference. For some are those which necessarily accompany the nature and quiddity of the thing: such as are the natural powers and properties of the thing. And such can be known from the perfect knowledge of the quiddity. And of these St. Thomas understands in the First Part: hence he also said here that the Blessed know the natures and powers and proper accidents of all species. — Some, however, are those which belong to things according as they are subject to divine providence. And such are not known once the nature and quiddity of the thing are known. And of these St. Thomas speaks here, when he says that the Blessed do not know all the rationales of made things. For these rationales are the habitudes fitting made things in order to the end which is divine goodness. Hence, speaking of these rationales, St. Thomas says that the rationale of a made thing is taken from the end which the agent intends: for that is true of the rationale fitting the thing as it was made and ordered to some end. To know, therefore, all the possible habitudes and ordinations to befit created things as they are subject to divine providence, would be to know all the degrees of divine goodness by which it can be diffused. Which would be to comprehend the divine goodness. Since this is impossible, it is impossible that all such rationales of created things be known, which can befit them from divine providence and wisdom.

XI. Finally, concerning those things which were said in this chapter, it should be noted that in this place St. Thomas spoke indifferently of all the Blessed, because he determined those things which belong to all. For this is common to all the Blessed, that they see all things pertaining to the perfection of the nature of the universe, but they do not see all things which God, by seeing His essence, knows. — In other places, however, namely Verit., loco praeallegato ¹⁹; and q. xx, a. 4; and Tertio, d. xiv ²⁰; and IV Sent., d. xlix ²¹, ubi supra, he posits a certain difference between the soul of Christ and the other Blessed. For he wishes that the soul of Christ knows all things which God knows with the knowledge of vision, namely those things which have being for some difference of time, whether they pertain to the being of nature, or to the being of grace and the order of divine providence and predestination. Hence it knows also all singulars, and all the singular acts of all, and the hidden things of the heart. Others, however, know more or fewer of the aforesaid, according as they see the divine essence more perfectly or more imperfectly.

He adds, moreover, one thing in IV Sent. ²², namely: Nothing prohibits saying that after the day of judgment all the Blessed will know all the aforesaid things which God knows with the knowledge of vision: not indeed by seeing the divine essence, because then all would be equally blessed; but some indeed in the divine essence, others, however, through revelation from the soul of Christ seeing all such things, and from the other higher Blessed. Which indeed will come about not through new illuminations, but through the continuation of the illumination: just as if we imagine the sun at rest illuminating the air. Hence in Apoc. xxi ²³ it is said that the clarity of God will illuminate the city of the Blessed, and its lamp is the Lamb.