Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The second conclusion is¹: One of those who see God sees Him more perfectly than another. Concerning this conclusion, however, St. Thomas does two things: first, he proves it; second, he responds to a certain tacit inquiry, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first as follows. The light of glory is a principle of the divine vision. Therefore, according to the measure of the light is the measure of the divine vision. Therefore, one sees more perfectly than another. — The first consequence is proved: because the mode of operation follows the form that is the principle of operation. — The second, in turn, is proved: because there can be diverse degrees of participation in this light, so that one is illuminated by it more perfectly than another.

2. But concerning the proof of the first consequence, a doubt immediately occurs. For although the mode of operation follows the form that is the principle of operation, it does not therefore follow that the divine vision follows the mode of the light. For that light is not the principle of operation by way of the form by which the intellect understands, but by way of a certain disposition. Hence there seems to be an equivocation concerning the principle of operation.

He answers that no equivocation is committed here. For by the form that is the principle of operation, St. Thomas does not understand the form completely actuating the subject to operate, but the form actuating the subject initiatively toward the operation, through which, namely, it is rendered capable of the ultimate and principal form. Because, since the subject underlies the ultimate form through which it operates completely according to its mode, the mode of operation is originally regulated by it. And in this way the light of glory is the principle of the divine vision. For because the light itself gives to the intellect the power of underlying the divine essence by way of an intelligible form, and also the power of understanding God, it is the origin of the divine vision. And therefore according to its quantity is the mode of the divine vision originally taken, so far as it is on the part of the intellect. But proximately it is taken according to the mode of underlying the divine essence as an intelligible form, which mode varies in different beings according to the mode of variation of the light of glory.

I said, however, that the light of glory is the origin of the diverse modes of the divine vision so far as it is on the part of the intellect: because also according to the mode of charity does St. Thomas posit, in the First Part², that the mode of the said vision exists. And thus charity is the origin by way of disposing and fitting the soul for the reception of such light. But it is not in the intellect, but in the affect.

II. Secondly. God sees His own substance most perfectly, as being the only one who comprehends it: and thus His vision is the highest in the genus of divine vision. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because where there is a highest, there is a more and a less, according to greater proximity to and distance from the highest. — It is illustrated by the example of heat.

Thirdly. It happens that something is more or less assimilated to God. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because the light of glory elevates to the aforesaid vision from the fact that it is a certain likeness of the divine intellect: (supply) belonging to the same order with it in intelligible being.

Fourthly. Just as some things are prepared for an end in different ways, so they participate in the end in different ways: since the end corresponds proportionally to those things that are for the end. But the vision of the divine substance is the ultimate end of an intellectual substance. And not all are prepared for it equally: since some are of greater virtue, some of lesser, and virtue is the way to happiness. Therefore they participate in the divine vision in different ways.

Note that virtue, which is assumed here for the proof of the second part of the minor proposition, is not taken for the power of the intellect to see God, according to which also the divine vision is diversified: but it is taken for virtue which is an elective habit, by which someone is ordered to happiness by way of merit. For thus it is clear that certain intellectual natures, and indeed certain men also, are of greater virtue, and some of lesser.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of John 14.

III. By this is excluded the error of those saying that all rewards are equal, because the same thing is seen by all, namely the substance of God: hence in Matthew 20, the Lord teaches that the same reward is to be given to those laboring unequally, namely a denarius. For although it is the same thing that makes all the Blessed, and that is given to all as a reward, namely God, of Whom the cited authority is understood, yet not all receive beatitude from Him equally.

St. Thomas repeats this response in I-II, q. 5, a. 2; and in the Fourth Book, d. 49, q. 1, a. 4³; and touches upon it in the First Part, q. 12, a. 6, saying that we can speak of beatitude in two ways: namely objectively, and formally. Objectively, all the Blessed are equally blessed: because the object of any of the Blessed is God, Who alone is the highest good. Formally, however, not all are equally Blessed: because not all attain God equally, but some in a more perfect mode, some in a more imperfect mode, while some see Him more perfectly, and some more imperfectly, as has been shown.

IV. From what has been said, St. Thomas infers that in a certain way the order of bodily movements and that of spiritual movements are contrary. Because of all the former, the first subject is numerically the same, but the ends are diverse; whereas of spiritual movements, namely of intellectual apprehensions and volitions, the first subjects are diverse, but the end is numerically the same.

It should be noted that St. Thomas did not say that these orders are simply contrary, but in a certain way: because they are contrary not in all modes, but in a certain mode. As to the subjects, indeed, they differ. Because of all bodily movements the first subject is the same: since the first subject of all bodily forms is prime matter; and consequently it is the first subject of all bodily accidents. But of spiritual movements the first subject is not the same: because there is not one subject numerically receptive of all intellects. — As to the end, however, they do not entirely differ: because God is in a certain way the remote end of all creatures, and of all operations, as has been shown above⁴; and thus all operations in a certain way agree in one common end. But they differ because they are diversified as to the particular end. For diverse bodily movements are ordered to diverse particular ends: but spiritual movements are directed to one particular end, namely to God. Who is called a particular end insofar as intellectual creatures attain Him in a certain particular mode in which other creatures do not attain Him: for by their operation, namely by intellection and affection, they immediately attain and reach Him, which does not belong to other creatures.