Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown the conditions of beatitude on the part of the intellect and on the part of the object, he now wishes to show its conditions on the part of the act of seeing¹. And he lays down three conclusions². I. The first is this: No created intellect is so low by nature that it cannot be raised to this vision. It is proved first. What is done by supernatural power is not impeded on account of diversity of nature. But the raising to this vision is done by supernatural power: since it is done by God through a light that is connatural to no creature, but exceeds every power of a creature, as was shown above. Therefore etc. The major premise is proved. Indeed by reason: because divine power is infinite. — But from a sign: because in the miraculous healing of a sick person it does not differ whether someone is a little or much infirm. With regard to the major proposition, note that it holds true on the supposition that this does not imply a contradiction in one nature more than in another. For it could not be brought about by supernatural power that a stone should see God: because such a vision is repugnant to a stone, and it implies a contradiction for a stone to see God; for it would be an intellectual and immaterial nature in power, and at the same time also entirely material. But to no created intellect is it repugnant to see God; nor is any contradiction implied when it is said that this or that intellectual nature sees God. Therefore that major proposition holds true in the present matter. 2. With regard to this proposition, In the healing of a sick person it does not differ whether someone is a little or much infirm, it must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Prima, q. cv, a. 8, that this is understood by comparison with divine power. For any made thing whatsoever, in comparison with divine power, is the least. Therefore it is as easy for God to heal from a great infirmity as from a small one. — But by comparison with the power of nature it does indeed differ whether some sick person is healed from a great or from a small infirmity: because it is a greater miracle to heal immediately from a great infirmity than to heal from a small one, because the former exceeds the faculty of nature more. II. Second. The distance that is between the lowest created intellect and the highest is almost nothing in comparison with that which is between the highest created intellect and God: since the former is finite, but the latter is infinite. Therefore it does not differ which intellect it is that is raised to the vision of God through such a light: whether, I say, it be the highest, or the lowest, or the middle. — The consequence is proved. Because what is almost nothing cannot produce a sensible variation. — It is declared by an example. For astronomers use our sight in their demonstrations as the center of the earth, because its distance from the center is almost nothing in comparison with the distance of our sight to the eighth sphere. For the declaration of this argument, it must be noted that the distance of the highest created intellect from God, and the distance of the lowest intellect from the same, agree in this, that each is infinite, since it is of the finite to the infinite: but they differ, because the distance of the lowest is greater than the distance of the highest insofar as the lowest has less perfection than the highest. For it is not unfitting that one infinite be greater than another infinite, as was shown in what precedes³. But nevertheless, because that quantity of distance which the distance of the lowest adds above the distance of the highest, which is nothing other than the distance between the lowest and the highest created, is nothing notable in comparison with the distance of the highest from God, but is almost nothing; just as a finite dimension added to an infinite dimension is almost nothing in comparison with the infinite dimension, and makes no sensible variation: therefore both are reckoned as an equal distance. And on this account, just as the distance of the highest intellect from God does not prevent the highest intellect itself from being able to be raised to the vision of Him through the light of glory: so the distance that is between the lowest intellect and God does not prevent it. And on this this argument is founded. III. Third. Every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance, as was shown above. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a natural desire cannot be in vain. It is confirmed by the authority of Matt. xxii, and Apoc. x⁴. — It is confirmed also by this sign, that in Sacred Scripture the angels are described in the figure of men, either wholly or in part: as is evident from Gen. xviii, and Ezech. 1. IV. But by this is excluded the error of those saying that the human soul cannot attain to the equality of the superior intellects. Note that the opinion which is excluded here seems to be that of Eustratius in the Commentary on VI Ethics. Whence St. Thomas expressly ascribes it to him in II Sent., d. ix, a. 8. It holds true, however, if it is understood with regard to natural operation. For however much the human intellect be raised by the power of nature and by study, it can never attain to the equality of the superior intellects. But if it is understood of the raising through the supernatural light, then it is false: because, as is said in the place cited above, and Prima, q. cviii, a. 8, not only will men attain through grace to the same society with the angels, and to the same manner of seeing God, but also some men will be superior to some angels in beatitude. And with regard to this sense it is reprobated.