Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The second conclusion is ¹: A created intellect, even if it sees the divine substance, does not however know all things that can be known through the divine substance. Concerning this St. Thomas does two things: first, he proves it; second, he removes a certain doubt ².

It is proved first thus ³. Through the divine essence other things are known just as an effect is known from a cause. Therefore it is not necessary that a created intellect, by seeing it, see all things that can be seen through it. — The consequence is proved. Because only then is it necessary that, some principle being known, all its effects be known through it, when the principle is comprehended by the intellect: because then it is known according to its whole power. But a created intellect cannot comprehend the divine essence.

2. For the evidence of the antecedent, two things are to be noted. One is that, although the divine essence is for a created intellect seeing God a means of knowing after the manner of an intelligible species, it is nevertheless not only in that way a means of understanding creatures, but also as a known means in which another thing is known: because the Blessed, seeing the divine essence, know some effects of God in it as known and seen. Therefore it is said in the antecedent that through the divine essence something is known just as an effect is known from a cause: for an effect is known from a cause when, the cause being known, the effect itself is known, — not making, for now, a difference between being known in the cause, and being known from the cause.

The other is that we can understand in two ways that things other than God are contained in Him according to cognoscible being: in one way, as things are in a mirror; in another way, as an effect is in a cause. But these two ways differ, because things represented through a mirror have distinction in it, for the image of Sortes in the mirror is one thing, and the image of Plato another: but effects contained in a cause have no distinction in the cause, but there is one power of the cause productive of them all. The first cannot be said of God, if we speak properly, as St. Thomas says, Verit., q. VIII, a. 4; and q. XII, a. 6: because things in God, who is most simple, have no distinction; and if sometimes the Doctors say that the divine essence is a mirror, it is said metaphorically, and is understood as to this only, that things can be seen in it, not however as to this, that they have distinction in it. But the second is fittingly said: because God is the cause of all things cognoscible per se, and all things are united in Him as contained in one most simple power. Because therefore each thing, just as it is in something, so is it known in it; since all things are contained in God as effects in a cause, it is most fittingly said that they are known through the divine essence just as an effect is known from a cause.

3. Nor does the argument of Scotus and of others avail against this, who say that all things are seen in God as in a mirror, because all things are represented distinctly through the divine essence, as through a mirror. — For it is said that it is false that all things are represented distinctly through the divine essence as things are represented through a mirror. For a mirror represents distinctly, not only from the part of the thing represented, but also from its own part, insofar as things have distinction in it. But through the divine essence things are represented distinctly, not indeed from the part of the divine essence, as if they had distinction in it: but from the part of the things themselves, insofar as there is nothing in any thing by which it is distinguished from other things that is not most clearly represented through the divine essence.

II. Against this argument, insofar as it is founded on this, that if an intellect seeing the divine essence saw all things cognoscible through it, it would comprehend it, it is argued first by Aureolus and Gottifredus ⁴. To know all things in God can occur both extensively and intensively. And from the first comprehension does not follow, but from the second: because the perfection of cognition is considered per se according to intensity. But the cognition of all things in the divine essence can be only extensive, and not intensive. Therefore from the cognition of all things in God the comprehension of it is not necessarily inferred.

2. Secondly it is argued by Scotus, Tertio, d. XIV, q. II ⁵. If two things inhere in one subject in a certain order, so that one is the whole reason why the other inheres; if one seeing the first does not comprehend that in which it inheres, much less will one seeing the second comprehend it, as is clear of two passions inhering in an ordered way in one subject. But intensive infinity inheres in God, and this is the reason that all things are in Him. And from seeing intensive infinity the comprehension of God does not follow, as is clear. Therefore from seeing all things in God, the comprehension of God does not follow.

3. Thirdly, by the same author it is argued ⁶. One knowing one effect in the Word neither comprehends the effect, nor the Word as it is its cause. Therefore neither, however many effects are known, is the Word comprehended. Therefore etc.

III. Against also the assumption for the proof of the consequence, namely that only then, some principle being known, are all its effects known through it, when it is comprehended by the intellect, Scotus argues ⁷, insofar as it is implicitly included in it that, when more effects are known in the cause, the cause itself is known more perfectly.

First, because a cause, insofar as it is a cause, receives no perfection from the caused thing.

Secondly, because, some principle being taken as known in some degree, either through it, its cognition not being increased, some conclusion can be known: or not. If so, the proposition is had. If not, therefore the principle in this degree is not a principle.

It is confirmed. Because the knowledge of what a thing is is not perfected by the knowledge that it is. Therefore etc.

IV. For the solution of the first, it must be considered that we must speak in one way of the cognition of God's effects in themselves: and in another way of the cognition of them in the cause. For if all such effects were known in themselves, and not in the divine essence, the divine power would be known perfectly and comprehensively only extensively: because it would be known only as to its extension to all its effects. For to know a cause as to all its causality from the cognition of the effects, is to know it perfectly and to comprehend it as to the extension of causality: which is to comprehend the cause extensively insofar as it is a cause; but it is not to comprehend intensively the essence of the cause itself, which is to know it only as much as it is cognoscible.

But if all God's effects are known in the divine essence, so that the seen essence is the reason for seeing, to know all things in God extensively is impossible, unless God is known intensively only as much as He is cognoscible: which is not without comprehension. But the reason for this is that, since the effects producible by God are infinite in species, for the reason that, any species being given, He can produce a more perfect species, and, that being given, another more perfect, and so on to infinity; and it is necessary that, the more such effects are known in the known cause, the more perfectly the cause be known, just as the more conclusions are known in one principle, the more perfectly the principle is known: it is necessary that with the cognition of the infinite divine effects God be known most perfectly, and be known only as much as He is cognoscible, which is to comprehend Him and to know Him perfectly intensively. Just as if, the truth of one principle being known, all the conclusions virtually contained in that principle are known in it, the principle itself is also known perfectly as much as it is cognoscible, and therefore is comprehended; and it does not stand together that all the conclusions virtually contained in it be known extensively in the known truth of the principle as in a reason for knowing, and yet not be comprehended, or not be known perfectly intensively in the principle itself; since the clarity of the cognition of the conclusion comes from the resolution to its principles.

V. Then to the first argument it is denied that all God's effects can be seen in Him, known infinitely extensively, and not be seen infinitely intensively. Because just as clear knowledge of a conclusion is had through the resolution into its principles, namely when it is seen to depend necessarily on the principles; so clear knowledge of effects is had through the resolution to all their causes. And therefore just as, when the necessity of all the conclusions contained in the principle is seen in the principle, the principle itself is known as much as it is cognoscible, and thus the conclusions are known perfectly as they are cognoscible: so, when all its effects are seen in the first cause together with all their causes, all the effects are seen infinitely intensively, that is, with an infinitely intensive vision; insofar as the cause itself in which they are known is known only as much as it is cognoscible, and therefore the effects are known through it only as much as they are cognoscible.

2. To the second it can be responded in two ways. First, that the major has truth only in those things which have the same mode of being in a third: but not when they have a diverse mode of being. But intensive infinity and the effects of God do not have being in Him in the same way: because infinity inheres formally; but the effects virtually. On account of which, the essence being known, intensive infinity is known: but, it itself being known, not all the effects in it are known.

It can be responded secondly that intensive infinity and extensive infinity can be seen in God in two ways: in one way, materially; in another way, formally. It is seen materially when that entity is seen which is infinity. And thus all who see the divine essence see both infinities: because His infinity is nothing other than His essence. — But it is seen formally when it is seen under the ratio of infinity: when the divine essence is known as having infinite perfection without limitation to some determinate degree of being, and as having a productive power of infinite effects without a term beyond which nothing else could be produced. But this can be known in two ways. In one way, as to the that-it-is only: and thus all who see God see the infinity of God both intensive and extensive; for even this many philosophers knew from the consideration of sensible things: for they proved that God is of infinite power and of infinite perfection. In another way, as to the distinct cognition of each infinity: and thus the Blessed know neither infinity. For to know the intensive infinity of God in this way is to know particularly and distinctly all the degrees of perfection contained in it, which are infinite, according as one is formally distinguished from another: just as to know the perfection of the intellective soul distinctly and perfectly is to know in it distinctly all the degrees of being contained in it in unity, namely the degree of life, the degree of the sensitive, and the degree of the intellective. But to know distinctly the extensive infinity of God's power is to know all its habitudes to whatever effects are to be produced. But none of these belongs to one seeing God. Because from each mode of cognition the comprehension of the divine substance follows: for from infinite cognition ⁸ the comprehension of the power follows; but from the comprehension of the power the comprehension of the essence follows, since power is proportioned to essence.

Therefore to the argument, the minor is denied as to this part, namely that to the cognition of intensive infinity in this second way the comprehension of God does not follow. — But if in the first or second way: the minor is conceded, and the whole argument. For just as from the cognition of intensive infinity materially taken, or also formally taken as to the that-it-is only, the comprehension of God does not follow; so also to the cognition of all the effects in God through His power extensively known materially, or also formally as to the that-it-is, it does not follow that the divine essence is comprehended. Therefore, taking both infinities proportionally, in the same way comprehension follows, and non-comprehension.

3. To the third, the assumption is denied, if the effect is known as to all things which are naturally suited to belong to it through the divine power, in which way it is referred to God as to a cause. For thus both the effect is comprehended, and the Word insofar as it is its cause: namely proportionally to the effect itself. Which is for the Word to be comprehended not simply, but secundum quid: just as to know all the effects producible by God in the Word is not without the simple comprehension of the Word itself.

VI. To the first argument of Scotus against the assumption for the proof of the consequence ⁹, it is said first, that we do not say that the cognition of the principle receives perfection from the cognition of the conclusions; and similarly that the cognition of the cause receives perfection from the cognition of the effects; but we say that one cognition accompanies the other. Because the more perfect the cognition of the cause is, the more effects are known in it: and conversely, the more effects are known in the cause, the more perfectly the cause is known.

It is said secondly, that this has truth when the cause and principle is the per se sufficient reason for knowing the effect, with nothing else required: in which way we say that the divine essence is the per se sufficient reason for knowing its effects. For then it is impossible that in the cause known in the same way, now more, now fewer effects be known: since the same thing, remaining the same, always does the same, speaking of a per se sufficient cause. Therefore the cognition of more effects in the cause presupposes a more perfect cognition of the cause, although it does not cause it.

2. To the second it is said that no conclusion can be newly known through the principle known in that degree, unless the cognition of the principle is increased. For since that conclusion is not seen in the principle thus known from the beginning, it is a sign that that cognition of the principle is not the per se sufficient reason for knowing the conclusion.

When it is argued against, because then the principle in that degree would not be a principle: — the consequence is denied of a habitual principle. For although through that principle thus known that conclusion is not known, there is nevertheless in it that from which it can be known through it if it is known in a more perfect way. — But of a principle actually principiating and causing, it is conceded that it will not be a principle with respect to that conclusion.

3. To the third it is said as to the first. For we do not say that the cognition of what a thing is is perfected by the cognition that it is: but we do say that the cognition that it is cannot be more perfect through the cognition of what it is, as through a sufficient and precise cause, unless a more perfect cognition of what it is is presupposed.

VII. Secondly ¹⁰. The divine intellect exceeds every created intellect. Therefore it knows more things than a created intellect can know. Therefore it knows more things through the divine essence than a created intellect can see through it. — The first consequence is proved. Because the divine intellect exceeds every created intellect. But the higher an intellect is, the more things it knows, or the more rationes of things. — The second is proved: because God knows nothing except by the fact that He sees His essence.

Concerning the proof of the first consequence, it must be noted that St. Thomas said under a disjunction that the higher intellect knows more things, or more rationes of things. Because it is not simply necessary that a higher intellect know more things: for all separate substances know the same things by natural cognition, and yet one is higher than another. But it suffices that it either know more things, or more rationes, that is, more intelligibles and more predicates about the same things.

VIII. Thirdly. No created intellect can comprehend the divine power. Therefore it cannot know all the things to which the divine power extends. But all the things to which the divine power extends are cognoscible through the essence of God. Therefore a created intellect, seeing the divine substance, does not see all things that can be seen in God's substance.

The antecedent is proved. Both because the divine power is infinite. — And from the comparison to the divine essence.

But the first consequence is proved: because from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred: for to know all things to which some power extends infers comprehending the power itself.

Note, from the conclusion of this argument, that St. Thomas takes for the same thing a created intellect's knowing all things that can be known through the divine substance, which was proposed at the beginning of the chapter; and its knowing all things that can be known in God's substance, which is concluded here. For as was said above ¹¹, those seeing God through the essence see some things through the essence itself not only as through an intelligible species, but also as through something known in which other things are seen. And thus to see through the divine substance, and to see in the divine substance, are taken for the same thing.

IX. Fourthly. An intellect seeing God does not know those things which depend on His simple will. Therefore it does not know all things which God sees through His essence.

The consequence is left as known, from the fact that it is certain that God knows through His essence those very things which depend on the will of God.

But the antecedent is proved thus. The proper object of the intellect is the quod quid est, that is, the substance of a thing, as is said in III de Anima. Therefore whatever the intellect knows about some thing, it knows through the cognition of the substance of that thing. Therefore what cannot be known through the cognition of the substance of a thing must of necessity be unknown to the intellect. But what someone wills cannot be known through the cognition of his substance: since it is not borne toward the willed things entirely naturally. Therefore what someone wills cannot be known by any intellect: except perhaps through some effects; or through the cause, just as God knows our wills by the fact that He is the cause of our willing; or by the fact that someone manifests his will to another. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Indeed by reason: because no cognitive power knows any thing except according to the ratio of its proper object; as appears in sight. But by sign: from the fact that in the demonstration through which the proper accidents become known to us, we take the quod quid est as the principle, as is said in I Posteriorum. — But that the intellect knows the substance of some thing through accidents, as is said in I de Anima: this happens to it insofar as its cognition arises from sense. Whence it has place only in natural things: but not in mathematical things, in which namely demonstrations proceed a priori and from the cause.

2. For the evidence of the antecedent, it must be considered that, since what is willed by someone can be considered in two ways, namely both materially as to its own entity, and formally insofar as it has the ratio of the willed; it itself can be known by us in two ways, either I say materially as to its entity, or formally insofar as it is willed. If it is taken in the first way, thus it is not unfitting that we know something that someone wills: for I can know the house that someone wills and desires. But if it is taken formally, thus what someone wills cannot be known, except in those assigned ways ¹². For even if I know the house that someone wills, I nevertheless do not know that it is willed by him, except from some effect, or from his manifestation. Therefore the antecedent is to be understood of things willed by God formally, which are not known once the substance of God is seen: for one seeing God does not from this see His very willing this or that.

3. Concerning the proof of the antecedent, it must be considered that we can speak in two ways of the order of the known: in one way, according to itself; in another way, as to us. According to themselves, the accidents of a thing are known through the substance itself: since the substance is more known according to itself than the accident. But as to us in some things it is the converse: because we receive cognition from the senses, whose role it is to know the extrinsic accidents of a thing. Therefore the proof of St. Thomas proceeds according to the order of the known according to themselves, not however as to us: because a created intellect seeing God, which is principally intended here, seeing some things in God in an ordered way, sees according as in those things there is an order according to themselves.

It should also be noted that the argument intends to conclude from the impossibility of our intellect in the state of the way, not indeed an impossibility, but a non-necessity in the Fatherland. For from the fact that our intellect in the state of the way cannot, from a knowledge of someone's substance, know what he wills, on account of the non-natural dependence of volition upon substance, it intends to hold that it is not necessary that one who sees someone's substance see what he wills. And thus it is not necessary that one who sees the divine substance see what God wills: since God wills many things freely, which St. Thomas in this place calls willing by simple will, and consequently the volition of these things does not have a necessary dependence upon the divine substance. He does not, however, intend through this to exclude that one seeing the divine substance can through it see some willed things: because, since the divine essence is known by the divine intellect as the exemplar, or as the intelligible ratio of the things willed, that essence itself can also, by the will of God, be united to the created intellect as the exemplar and ratio of some willed things insofar as they are willed by Him. And thus through the divine essence some things can be known that depend upon the simple divine will.

4. Concerning that proposition, The will does not tend toward its willed objects altogether naturally, it should be noted that St. Thomas added the word altogether: either because toward some of its willed objects the will tends naturally, — for it naturally wills the ultimate end, and to be and to live, and other things that pertain to the integrity of nature; but toward other willed objects it is freely disposed, insofar as it can accept and reject them. And therefore it is not disposed altogether naturally toward its willed objects, but partly naturally and partly freely, namely with respect to diverse objects. And thus the will differs from another principle which is nature: for nature tends naturally toward all its objects. — Or because the created will, although it is borne naturally toward something as to the specification, is nevertheless not so as to the exercise of the act, considered from the condition of nature alone.

X. As to the second point,¹³ St. Thomas removes a certain objection. For someone could object against the aforesaid conclusion as follows. The divine substance is something greater than all other things distinct from Him. But the created intellect can see the substance of God. Therefore much more can it understand all other things.

He answers, however, that since things can be known in two ways, namely in themselves, and in their cause; it is greater to understand the divine substance than whatever else besides it that can be known in itself; but it is of a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and its effects in it, than the divine substance without knowledge of the effects in it; because the divine substance can be seen without its comprehension, but for all things to be understood through it cannot occur without its comprehension.

2. For the evidence of this response, it must be considered that to be known in itself is to be known through a proper species, which is primarily representative of itself, and not of something else: and consequently it is to be known not by the mediation of another known object. But to be known in another is to be known through the species of another: and consequently it is to be known in another known object, previously represented through a species. Therefore the divine essence, and all its effects, can be known in two ways. In one way, such that the divine essence is known through a proper species, which is itself; and similarly all its effects are known through a proper species, whether one or many. And then without doubt the divine essence is greater in the ratio of knowable than all its effects: since all effects, even taken together, because they have a received and created being, do not equal the divine essence, which is subsistent being itself, in knowability, just as neither in entity. And on that account it is greater to know the divine essence in itself, than all its effects in themselves and not in the essence itself. — But if the divine essence per se is taken as known through itself, and all effects as known in the essence itself, all the divine effects known in the essence are something greater in the ratio of knowable than the divine essence itself known without its effects. And thus it is greater to know all the effects of God in the divine essence itself, than to know the essence itself without knowledge of the effects: because the essence is known more perfectly if all its effects are known in it, than if it is known without knowledge of its effects. Whence, just as the essence of God is more perfectly knowable according to all its rationes that are included in it perfectionally, than itself taken according to one ratio alone, for instance according to the ratio of wisdom; and on that account it is greater to know it according to all rationes of this kind than according to one only; so it is more perfect to know all things in it, than to know it without its effects being seen in it.

Whence, to the objection made, it is clear that it is false that the divine essence per se is something greater in the ratio of known object, than all effects known in it, as such; and that it is greater to know it alone than to gaze upon all its effects with it; of which knowledge of effects we are speaking in the present context.

XI. But because it was said that the divine essence is something greater than all its effects, according as each of them is known in itself, it seems to follow, if we can know the divine essence in itself, that we can know all its effects at least in themselves, although they cannot be seen in the divine essence: because he who can know a greater intelligible can know a lesser intelligible, as is said in III De Anima.¹⁴ If this indeed be conceded, it seems to follow that the divine essence will be able to be comprehended: as was argued if they were known in the divine substance. For if all the effects of the divine power are known, His power is known perfectly and is comprehended: as is clear in the third argument brought forward above.¹⁵ But upon the comprehension of the power follows the ability to comprehend the essence: because power follows essence.

2. It is answered, as far as is evident from the aforesaid third argument, and De Verit., q. 20, a. 5, that not only can all divine effects not be known in the divine essence, but not even in themselves, namely distinctly. — I say distinctly: because nothing prevents their being understood confusedly, according as they agree in something common.

When, however, it is proved because one knowing a greater intelligible can know a lesser intelligible: — it is said first, as St. Thomas glosses in De Verit., q. 8, a. 4, ad 17, that that authority of Aristotle is understood when the intellect knows the greater intelligible perfectly, but not if it knows it imperfectly. Now, it is established from what was said above¹⁶ that the intellect seeing God does not know Him perfectly, since it does not comprehend Him. Therefore the argument does not follow.

It is said secondly, as is held from Qu. Verit., q. 20, a. 5, ad 1 and 4, that that proposition is true if the lesser can be offered per se to the intellect. Now, all things producible by God cannot be offered per se to the intellect: just as it cannot be that everything possible to be produced by God has been made, because then His power would be limited to creatures existing in act.

XII. From this response of St. Thomas¹⁷ the solution of a certain argument of Godfrey is clear, who argues that from the knowledge of all things in the divine essence the comprehension of the essence does not follow: because, he says, all things other than God, if they were posited, would not equal the infinite being of God.¹⁸

For it is clear from the aforesaid that all things, according indeed as they can be known in themselves, do not equal the infinite being of God: yet according as they can be known in the divine essence, because both they and the divine essence are then taken together as one object, they equal it.

XIII. Against the aforesaid conclusion¹⁹ the same Godfrey argues, in VI Quodlib., q. 3,²⁰ as does Durandus, proving that the Blessed at least see the essences of all createable things, although they do not see all things absolutely.²¹ First. The created intellect clearly seeing the divine essence sees in it all things that are naturally and of necessity represented. Such are all the quiddities of things possible to be produced. Therefore etc.

Secondly. Every creature in God is the creative essence.²² Therefore they are equally disposed to be seen through the creative essence.

2. Scotus also, in the place cited before,²³ argues thus. Any intellect is receptive of any vision in the Word divisively. Therefore also conjunctly at once with respect to all objects. Therefore etc. The first consequence is proved. Because if two can be present together because they are not opposed, infinite such things can also be present together.

3. It can also be argued from the words of St. Thomas. The Blessed know of God what He is. Therefore they know all things to which His power extends. Therefore they know all things producible by God. — The antecedent is that of St. Thomas, Verit., q. 8, a. 1, ad 8; and IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 3.²⁴ — But the first consequence is proved. The Blessed see what God is. Therefore they see distinctly all His essential grades of perfection: otherwise they would not know Him quidditatively. But when all His perfectional grades are known, they know all things to which His power extends: since His power extends as far as there are grades of perfection in Him imitable by a creature. Therefore, if they see what God is, they see all things to which His power extends.

XIV. To the first of these, the solution is clear from what was said above.²⁵ For the major premise is false. For in order that the intellect seeing the divine essence see all things that are naturally represented through it, any union whatsoever of it to the intellect, and any knowledge whatsoever of it, does not suffice, but it is required that it be united to the intellect according to its whole power. This, however, does not belong to the created intellect: since it is not united to it except by the mediation of some finite participation in the light of glory, but the intellect attains it more or less according as it participates more or less in the light of glory. Therefore it is not necessary that everyone seeing it see all things naturally represented through it: just as neither does one seeing a mirror see all things represented through the mirror, unless he comprehends the mirror with his sight.

2. To the second, the consequence is denied. For although all things in God are the creative essence, insofar as the essence of God itself is the ratio and likeness of all things, yet the essence itself is not united to the created intellect as the ratio of all things, but as the ratio of some; and to one intellect it is united as the ratio of more, but to another as the ratio of fewer.

3. To the third, which is that of Scotus, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said first, that it presupposes a falsehood, namely that more things are seen in the divine essence by multiple visions. For we say that the divine essence, and all things that are seen in it, are seen by a single vision.

It is said secondly, that the reason why two things can be known in the divine essence is not because the visions of them are not opposed, but because the positing of them is not accompanied by any impossibility. But the fact that all producible things are known in the divine essence is accompanied by one impossibility, namely that the divine substance is comprehended by a created intellect. Therefore some determinate and finite things can be known in the divine essence, but not the infinite things producible by God: just as for two divisions of a continuum to be given in act is not repugnant, but it is indeed repugnant for all its possible divisions to be given at once; because upon the second follows this impossibility, that the infinite will be in act; but upon the first no impossibility follows.

4. To the last point it is said that for the Blessed to know of God what He is can be understood in two ways. In one way, because they know Him through a proper intelligible form, immediately representing His essence and quiddity to the intellect. In another way, because they know His essence as to all the grades of perfection contained in it by eminence, with a distinct knowledge: in that way in which we say that we know what man is, because we know distinctly all the genera and all the differences that are essentially predicated of him. When therefore St. Thomas says that the Blessed see what God is, he intends it of the knowledge of what He is in the first way, but not in the second way. For the Blessed do not see distinctly all the divine perfections, which are infinite: although they see that simple essence immediately, containing infinite perfections unitedly and simply without any distinction. In this the knowledge of the Blessed differs from the knowledge of the way. For in the state of the way God is not seen by us through a proper form that immediately represents His essence to the intellect, but through the form of a creature, which immediately represents the creature, in which God is known as a cause in an effect. Therefore the knowledge of the way is not called knowledge of what He is, but the knowledge of the Fatherland is rightly so called.

To the sense, therefore, in which the antecedent is conceded, the first consequence is denied. — To the proof, the consequence is also denied, when it is proved because otherwise they would not know Him quidditatively. It is denied concerning quidditative knowledge in the first way. For to that knowledge of what He is it is not required that all the perfections of the divine essence be seen distinctly, but it suffices that the essence itself be seen immediately in itself through a proper form, and not in another known object. Whence in IV Sent., where cited above, ad 5, St. Thomas says that God will not be seen by the Blessed as a thing is seen through its definition, whose essence is comprehended.