Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Because certain objections can be raised against the aforesaid determination, by which some have been moved to hold that the divine essence is never seen by any created intellect; — which both takes away the true beatitude of the rational creature, and contradicts the authority of Sacred Scripture; and for that reason is to be rejected as false and heretical — lest any occasion for doubting be left to anyone, St. Thomas wishes to exclude them¹.

I. The first objection is this. The divine substance exceeds every capacity of the created intellect, more than the intelligible exceeds the capacity of sense. Therefore by no supervening light can the created intellect be raised to seeing it. — The consequence is proved. Because sight cannot by any supervening light be raised to those things that exceed its natural faculty. It is answered that the divine essence is not outside the faculty of the created intellect as if it were something altogether foreign to it, as sound is foreign to sight and an immaterial substance to sense, since it is itself the first intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual cognition: but as exceeding its power, in the way in which excellent sensibles are outside the faculty of the senses, as is clear from II Metaphysicae.

Note that the reply consists in this, that the divine essence can be understood to exceed the capacity of the created intellect in two ways. In one way, as in no way contained under its adequate and first object: as sound exceeds the capacity of sight. And then the assumption is denied: for the divine essence is contained under being, or even under the intelligible, which is the object of the intellect. — In another way, as contained indeed under its object, but disproportionate to it: in the way in which an excellent visible thing is said to exceed the capacity of some sight. And then the consequence is denied. Because a power can be strengthened by some disposition so that it may be able to reach such an exceeding object, which it could not reach by its own power. — But the proof of the consequence is worthless: because it proceeds about the excess in the first way, in which the intelligible exceeds sense.

2. Concerning this proposition, God is the first intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual cognition, note, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. LXXXVIII, a. 3; and super Boet. Trin., q. 1, a. 1², that this is not said as if God were the first thing understood by us in order of duration, and that through Him, once known, we understand other things: but because He is first in dignity and intelligibility among the things contained under what I call the intelligible, and He is the cause of the cognitive power by which we understand.

3. From this reply it is clear that that objection of Scotus is worthless, by which he argues that, if the created intellect by the power of its nature cannot see the divine essence because of the excess of its mode of being over the mode of being of the intellect, the Blessed will never see God, because no power can be raised above its adequate object³. For it is clear that, although the intellect is raised by the light of glory to see the divine substance, it is not however raised above its adequate object: but it is raised to something contained under its adequate object that was naturally disproportionate to it, just as an excellent visible thing is disproportionate to sight.

II. The second objection is this. That light is infinitely distant from God: since it is something created. Therefore by it the created intellect cannot be raised to that vision. It is answered by denying the consequence. Because that light does not exalt the created intellect to such a vision on account of its closeness to the divine substance, but on account of the power which it obtains from God for such an effect, although it is infinitely distant from Him in being. But this is not unfitting: because it does not unite to God in being, but only in understanding. The meaning of this reply is that the light of glory does not raise the created intellect to the vision of God because it is not infinitely distant from God, as the created intellect is distant: but because it has the power of uniting the intellect to God, by way of a disposition, in intelligible being: which power can belong even to something infinitely distant from God in being. Therefore from the fact that it is infinitely distant from God in being, it does not follow that it cannot raise the intellect to such a vision by way of a disposition. For neither is the infinite distance of the divine essence from the created intellect in natural being the reason why it cannot be naturally seen by the created intellect: but the disproportion in intelligible being is, because namely the created knower and the divine essence are not of the same order, but the divine essence belongs to a higher order. Such disproportion, however, is removed by the light of glory, inasmuch as it makes the created intellect be of the same order with the divine essence in intelligible being: as namely making it to be the proper power, and the proper and proportioned recipient of the divine essence by way of an intelligible form.

III. The third objection is this. Every intellectual substance, from the very fact that it is intellectual, bears the divine likeness. Therefore it suffices for the divine vision. — The consequence is proved. Because the light of glory is supposed to suffice, because it is a likeness of the divine substance. It is answered by denying the consequence⁴. And to the proof it is said that the intellectual substance is not a likeness in the same way as the light of glory, which is a likeness in this respect, that it leads to the seeing of the substance of God. Because, since every created substance falls short of divine simplicity, it is impossible that it have its whole perfection in the same thing, as God has it. Therefore in the created intellectual substance the light by which it is beatified with the divine vision is one thing; and any light by which it is constituted in the species of its nature, and by which it proportionately understands its own substance,⁵ is another.

2. Note that, since not every likeness is related in the same way to the divine substance — which the diversity of the grades of natures indeed demonstrates — not every likeness of the divine nature leads to its vision, but some: namely that which was instituted by God for this, that it bring about such a vision, by way of a disposition supervening on the created intellect. Therefore this does not hold, *An intellectual substance is a likeness of the divine substance. Therefore it itself suffices for the divine vision. Because not any likeness whatever suffices for this, but a certain determinate mode of likeness: namely that it be, from its very nature, a natural disposition for receiving the divine essence by way of an intelligible form. Which mode indeed can belong naturally to no created intellectual substance. From this reply the answer to the objection made in the preceding chapter against the first argument is clear.

IV. The fourth objection is this. That light is created. Therefore there can be some created intellect which will see God by its connatural light. - The consequence is proved. Because nothing prevents what is created from being connatural to some created thing. It is answered by denying the consequence. Because, since this vision exceeds every natural power, the light itself by which the created intellect is perfected for such a vision must also be supernatural. - From this it is clear that the assumption for the proof of the consequence is false.

2. For the evidence of this reply, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book of the Sentences, d. XLIX, q. II, a. 6; and in Verit., q. VIII, a. 3, that, since for the vision of the divine essence it is required that it be united to the intellect by way of an intelligible form; and, because it exceeds the capacity of the created intellect, the light of glory is posited, raising it, by way of a disposition, so that it may be capable of such a form: just as the form itself is supernatural, so must the light itself be supernatural, because the ultimate disposition to the form and the form are of one order, as regards naturalness and supernaturalness; since, if the form is natural, the disposition must also be natural; but if the form is supernatural, the disposition must also be supernatural. Therefore, although the light of glory can be communicated to the created intellect, it cannot however be so communicated to it that it is connatural to it. Whence St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. XII, a. 5, ad ult., that it could not be natural to a creature unless the creature were of the divine nature, which is impossible: as the ultimate disposition to the form of fire cannot be natural except to one having the form of fire. Whence it is false that everything created can be connatural to some created thing. For there are many created forms, such as grace, charity, and things of this kind, which cannot be born from the principles of any creature: and consequently cannot be connatural to any creature.

3. From this the reply to the argument of Scotus⁶ is clear, arguing that, if by the light of glory the intellect becomes sufficient to see God, it will be possible by some created form to see God naturally, because even a blind man supernaturally enlightened sees naturally. — For it is clear that the consequence is worthless. Nor is there a likeness between the case of a blind man supernaturally enlightened and the case of one having the light of glory supernaturally. Because the visual power is a natural form, which namely is connatural to man according to his nature, although in this man it is supernaturally caused: but the light of glory is a supernatural form. What, however, belongs to something from a supernatural form is not said to belong to it absolutely naturally: although it can be said to be in some way natural to it inasmuch as it has such a form, or, as it underlies such a form; as it is natural to hot water, inasmuch as it is hot, to heat, although from the heat itself water does not have it that it heats by the power of its own nature. It might perhaps be said that, although the light of glory in essence cannot be a natural form of a created thing, since it is proper to God; yet nothing prevents the light of glory by participation, which is created light, from being connatural to some creature. — It is answered that neither taken in essence nor in participation can light of this kind be connatural to a creature. For since according to its nature it has it that it is the ultimate disposition for receiving the divine essence by way of a form, in whatever grade, even the lowest, it be considered, it cannot be connatural except to that to which the divine essence is a connatural form: since, as has been said, form and disposition are of one order as regards naturalness; just as the ultimate disposition, however minimal, to the soul cannot be natural except to that whose natural form is the soul itself.

V. The fifth objection is this. God is infinite. Therefore He cannot be seen by the aforesaid light. - The consequence is evident. Because the infinite, as such, is unknown. It is answered that, although the infinite taken privately, such as quantity, is unknown, because it lacks form, which is the principle of cognition; the infinite however taken negatively, which is a form subsisting per se not limited by matter, in which way God is infinite, is in itself maximally knowable. - About the matter of this reply enough has been said in what precedes⁷.

VI. The sixth objection is this. There is no proportion of the created intellect, even perfected by the light of glory, to the divine substance: since an infinite distance still remains. Therefore etc. - The consequence is evident. Because there must be a proportion of the knower to the thing known. This objection differs from the second. Because there the argument was drawn from the distance of the light of glory from God: here, however, it is argued from the distance of the intellect perfected by such light to God, and from the disproportion arising from such distance. It is answered that there is not indeed between the created intellect and God a proportion according to some commensuration, namely so that one measures the other in a quantitative way, according to the proportion of double or triple or the like. There is nonetheless between them a proportion in the sense that proportion signifies any relation of one to the other, whether of matter to form, or of cause to effect: (Supply) such proportion, however, suffices for the vision of God.

2. For the evidence of this reply, it must be noted that the light of glory can be considered in two ways: in one way, inasmuch as it is a created accident, informing the intellect according to some natural being of its own; in another way, inasmuch as it is the ultimate disposition to the reception of the divine essence by way of an intelligible form. In the first way, it is of far another order than the divine essence is: since it is an entity not only inferior to the divine nature, but also to every substance. In the second way, it is of the same order with the divine nature, as being the ultimate disposition to it. Just as the disposition to a substantial form, inasmuch as it is indeed an entity having accidental being, is not of the same order with the form itself: inasmuch, however, as it is the ultimate disposition to it, it is of the same order; for they accompany one another inseparably, for, given such a disposition in matter, it is necessary that the form be given; and given the form, it is necessary that the disposition itself be given. For it is not unfitting that something, inasmuch as it is such an entity, be of one order; inasmuch, however, as it looks to another, be of another order: as the vision of the divine essence, inasmuch as it is an act of the intellect and a finite entity, does not have the nature of the highest good; inasmuch, however, as it is a certain union with the highest good and its attainment, it has the nature of the highest good. The light of glory therefore, inasmuch as it is the ultimate disposition to the reception of the divine essence, is of the same order with it, and belongs to the same mode of being: although, inasmuch as it is this accidental entity, it is of a lower order. And therefore, while it disposes the intellect to so sublime a form, it raises it to the divine order, and makes it proportioned to the divine nature, with that proportion which is required between the knowing and the known, for which nothing else is required than that the intellect be born to receive the intelligible by way of a form in intelligible being, and that the intelligible itself be born to be so received in it. For this reason St. Thomas says, in the places cited above⁸, that by the light of glory the rational creature is made deiform, according to that of I Io. III⁹, When he appears, we shall be like him: inasmuch namely as it has a form belonging to the divine order. Nor does this stand in the way, that the divine essence is its own being, not however the light of glory: - because, although the things that belong to the same order by way of principal forms are related in the same way to their own being, and have a proper being of the same character; yet the things that belong to the same order, one by way of a principal form, the other by way of a disposition to the form, need not have a proper being of the same character, but the order and proportion of disposition and form between them suffices; because a disposition is not said to be of that order from its own being, but from its order to the form of that order. Just as substantial forms of one order have being in the same way; but the ultimate disposition to a substantial form does not have being in the same way as regards its own being, since it has accidental being. For it is not said to be of the same order, and to belong to the same mode of being with the substantial form, because it has being and a mode of being of the same character with it: but because it ultimately disposes to a form having such a mode of being.

3. From this reply of St. Thomas the solution to the argument of Durandus ¹⁰ is clear, arguing that the light of glory does not render the intellect proportioned from being disproportionate, because the object exceeds the intellect infinitely even with the light of glory. — For from what has been said it is clear that this infinite distance does not prevent the intellect from being proportioned to the object by way of the knower to the thing known. For although the light of glory does not remove the infinite distance which is between the created intellect and the divine essence, it removes however the disproportion which was between them. And this suffices for the created intellect to become able by it to understand it: because distance alone in natural being does not hinder cognition, but the disproportion of the object to the power; which happens when the object is above the order of the object proportioned to the power and perfectly knowable by it.

VII. Besides these objections, there are the arguments of Scotus, in the Third Book of the Sentences, d. xiv, q. I ¹¹; and in the fourth, d. xlix, q. xi ¹², against the aforesaid conclusion. Which, although they can easily be solved from the things aforesaid, are nonetheless to be adduced, so that their solution may be clearer.

He argues therefore first, thus. The light of glory is required for the divine vision either so that by it the intellect is receptive of the vision: or so that it is active. Not the first. Both because in no way is an act received through a habit. — And because the receptive subject ordered to many forms is maximally ordered to the most perfect. But beatitude is the most perfect of the forms to which the human soul is ordered. Therefore the soul is maximally ordered to it. Therefore it receives it immediately.

Nor even the second. Because neither on account of the object. Because, since it is in itself maximally intelligible, it suffices by itself. And also because that would be a species of the object, which he does not posit. — Nor on account of the power. Both because the intellect itself perhaps behaves there merely passively. And because a habit is not simply a principle of acting, but of acting in such a way. — Therefore etc.

2. Secondly ¹³. In the soul there is a passive power naturally receptive of beatitude. Therefore some natural active power corresponds to it. Therefore a supernatural light is not required.

3. Thirdly. The light of glory, like any accident, is more imperfect than the intellectual nature is. Therefore there can be some intellectual nature which will see God by its purely natural powers. — The consequence is proved. Because a lower perfection can be contained unitedly in a higher perfection.

4. Fourthly. Whatever God can do through a second efficient cause, He can do without it. But the light of glory is posited to effect the vision. Therefore etc.

VIII. To the first it is said, first, that the light of glory is not required so that the intellect be receptive of the vision: but it is required precisely for this, that it be receptive of the divine essence by way of an intelligible form, as was made clear above¹⁴.

Whence the first proof, which proves that it is not required for receiving the vision, is not against the mind of St. Thomas.

To the second proof, inasmuch as by it it could be concluded that it is not required for receiving the divine essence: — the consequence is denied: because the mode of maximality is changed into a mode of immediacy. For it does not follow that, if the soul is maximally ordered to receiving the divine essence, it receives it without a mediating disposition.

2. It is said, secondly, that the light of glory is required also for eliciting the act of vision, not indeed on account of the object, as if it were not a sufficient intelligible: but inasmuch as the power of the intellect is strengthened by it in the way said above¹⁵, without which it could not concur with the object in eliciting such a vision.

Nor however do we say this as if such a light and the intellect were two partial agents of this vision, as Durandus objects ¹⁶: but because the light itself is for the intellect the reason of acting by way of strengthening the power for that which without it it could not do. And in this sense the saying of St. Thomas in Quodlibet VII, a. 1 ¹⁷ is understood, where he says that the light of glory does this with respect to the divine essence in the intellect which it does with respect to other intelligibles, which are not light only, but at once the species of the thing understood and light. For since the intelligible species has two, namely both that it perfects the intellect, and that it makes the intellect be one with the intelligible, for the intellect informed by the intelligible species, which is called the intellect in act, is the same as the thing understood in act; the light of glory does what the intelligible species does, not indeed as to the second, but as to the first; for it perfects the intellect for seeing God to such a degree that it does not need another created likeness, but the intellect is made efficacious by the light itself to elicit the vision of God, together with the divine essence itself united to it through itself.

To the first proof to the contrary, it is denied that the intellect behaves merely passively with respect to this vision. Rather, just as, while it is informed by a natural intelligible species, it concurs actively in the understanding of that which is represented to it through the species; so, while it is informed by the divine essence through the light of glory, it concurs actively in the vision of that essence itself.

To the second, it is denied that a habit or disposition, supervening upon the intellective potency, is not a principle of acting simpliciter with respect to some determinate operation: for it is evident that the intelligible species of a stone is for the intellect the ground simpliciter of understanding the stone. So also the light of glory strengthens the intellect so that it can attain to the divine vision, to which it can in no way attain by its own power.

IX. To the second ¹⁸, the antecedent is denied. For although in the soul there is a capacity to receive the divine vision insofar as it is an intellectual nature, nevertheless it is not a capacity receptive of it from a natural agent alone, but is receptive of it with the concurrence of the divine nature uniting itself to the intellect as an intelligible form, and elevating the intellect so that it can elicit that vision. And thus it is called an obediential passive potency, rather than a natural one.

2. To the third it is said that the light of glory, although, insofar as it is a created accident, it is more imperfect than an intellectual substance; nevertheless, insofar as it belongs to the divine order, as the ultimate disposition to the divine essence in esse intelligibili, it is more perfect than any created intelligible substance. Therefore it cannot be contained unitively in a created substance. For, as is clear from the foregoing ¹⁹, a natural property of a superior nature, although it is an accident, cannot be communicated to an inferior nature so that it may have it naturally, unless it is transferred into the superior nature: because, as a property of a superior nature, it belongs to a superior order.

3. To the fourth it is said that God can indeed produce without an intermediary effective cause every action that He produces by means of another cause: yet He cannot produce it without that cause in such a way that that second cause is said to operate through that operation. For in this way it is conceded that God can of Himself, without the light of glory, and even without a created intellect, produce that entity which is the vision of the divine essence: yet He cannot produce it in such a way that the intellect sees the divine essence through it, unless the created intellect itself concurs, being sufficiently disposed to produce the vision, and elevated through the light of glory to receive the divine form itself and to elicit such a vision.

X. It must be observed, however, that those who say that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God have now been condemned by the Church in the Clementine Ad nostrum, de Haer. ²⁰.

Nor is the gloss of Aureolus valid ²¹, who says that by the light of glory there is understood a supernatural second act, and not something having itself in the manner of a habit. For it is evident that the Church willed to determine that which was called into doubt among theologians concerning the light of glory. But it is manifest that the theologians were speaking of such a light as a certain disposition requisite for seeing the divine essence, and not of a supernatural second act. Therefore the determination of the Church must also be taken in this sense.

Likewise, the very words of the text are repugnant to this exposition. For the position saying that the soul does not need the light of glory elevating it to see God is condemned.

XI. Finally, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. XIII, a. 2; and q. XX, a. 2; likewise ST II-II, q. CLXXV, a. 3, ad 2, that the light of glory can be had in two ways. In one way, in the manner of a connatural and permanent form made: — I call it made connaturally, not as proceeding from the principles of nature, but as fixed in the subject and inclining in the manner of nature, in that way in which we say that a habit inclines in the manner of nature. In another way, in the manner of a transient passion. In the first way the Blessed in the Fatherland are illuminated by the light of glory. In the second way certain ones who, existing in this life, saw the divine essence were illuminated: as Augustine holds concerning Moses and Paul ²². But in no way can anyone see the divine essence unless he has been illuminated by the light of glory in one of those ways.

Moreover, what St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. II, a. 7; and De Veritate, q. X, a. 11, that it can miraculously be brought about by divine power that some created intellect having only the dispositions of the wayfarer is elevated to seeing God through His essence, must be understood through the exclusion of a supernatural form having itself in the manner of a connatural and permanent form: not, however, of a disposition having itself in the manner of a transient passion. For the created intellect can miraculously see God, although it does not have the light of glory in the manner of a permanent form: but it cannot see God if it does not have the disposition supervening in the manner of a transient passion.

There are certain other objections of Aureolus, recounted by Capreolus in IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. IV. But because they are not directly against the mind of St. Thomas, and their solution is clear from the preceding, let them be set aside for the present.