Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that true happiness consists in the vision of the divine substance, he intends further to manifest the conditions of this vision¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he manifests in particular the conditions of the things which concur for such a vision; second, he shows the common conditions, cap. LXI. - Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows the conditions of it on the part of the intellect; second, on the part of the object, cap. LV; third, on the part of the act itself, cap. LVII. - Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows what is the form by which the intellect of the blessed sees the divine essence; second, what is required in order that such a form be received in the intellect, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he premises one conclusion necessary for the things which are to be said; second, he declares the proposed matter².

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: It is possible that the substance of God be seen through the intellect, both by separated intellectual substances and by our souls. It is proved. Naturally all minds desire through the intellect to understand the substance of God. Therefore it is possible that they arrive at that knowledge. — The consequence is evident. Because otherwise natural desire would be in vain.

Here it must be diligently noted that St. Thomas does not infer that natural desire would be in vain if the intellect did not see the divine substance: but only if it were not possible for it to arrive at understanding the divine substance. Because the desire of nature is not said to be in vain if it is not fulfilled in some individual: but if there is not in individuals, not deprived of nature, the power and capacity for the fulfillment of such a desire. For if in individuals there were not such a power, the desire of nature would never be fulfilled: but if in them there is a capacity for the desired thing, the desire of nature is sometimes fulfilled in some individual; and this suffices for it not to be in vain and frustrated.

II. But a difficult doubt arises, how the desire of seeing the divine substance is natural: since no intelligible creature can arrive at that vision by its own power, as will be shown in what follows³. Again, since St. Thomas says in very many places, especially I IIae, q. v, a. 8; and IV Sent., d. xlix, q. 1, a. 3, quª 1⁴; and Verit., q. xxii, a. 7, that beatitude, although according to its common ratio it is naturally desired, is nevertheless not desired naturally in the particular, or as regards the particular ratio of that in which the ratio of the highest good is preserved.

III. Some respond⁵ that this desire is not natural to the rational nature considered absolutely, but as it is ordered to beatitude; and on the supposition of the revelation of the effects of grace and glory, of which God is the cause as God is in himself absolutely, not as a universal agent. But this does not seem to be the mind of St. Thomas. First, because, since above, in cap. XLIX, he showed that separated substances know some things about God through their own essences, in cap. L he proves that in such cognition, by which they know God through their own essences, their natural desire does not rest, but is rather incited to see the divine substance: and so a natural desire of this kind follows the cognition by which a separated substance knows God through the essence of the separated substance itself. Now it is certain that the cognition of God, by which God is known by a separated substance through the essence of the separated substance itself, does not presuppose the cognition of the effects of grace and glory. Therefore the desire of seeing God is not called natural from the presupposition of the revelation of the effects of grace and glory, but is natural to the intelligible nature as regards the cognition of the cause from any effect whatsoever. Second, because the argument which St. Thomas adduces in the First Part, q. xii, a. 1, and touched above⁶, to prove that an intellectual substance naturally desires to know the divine substance, is founded upon this, that from the cognition of effects the desire is incited to the cognition of the cause, and the desire does not rest, however much the substance of the effect be known, unless the substance of the cause be known. Now it is certain that this proposition of St. Thomas is not determined to the cognition of the effects of grace and glory, but is extended to the cognition of whatever effects, and to the cognition of every cause. Hence he confirmed that proposition by this sign, that for this reason men began to philosophize. Therefore this natural desire is not born only from the cognition of the effects of grace and glory. Third, because then such a desire would be present only in those knowing the supernatural effects of grace and glory. But this is false: because, as St. Thomas says in this Third Contra, chapters li and lvii, this desire is present in every intellect. Therefore, etc. IV. For this reason it seems to me that it must be said otherwise, always saving a better judgment. For the evidence of which, it must first be considered that, since the natural desire of the intellectual nature, insofar as it is intellectual, is an elicited act of the will, as is had in I IIae, q. x, a. 1⁷; and every act of the will presupposes some cognition of the intellect: the natural desire of the intellectual nature, as such, is said to be that which of necessity follows upon some cognition of the intellect. And in the matter proposed, the natural desire of seeing the divine essence is an act of the will of necessity following, as regards the specification of the act, upon that cognition by which it is known through the effects that God is. For, as St. Thomas touched in the preceding chapter, in the first argument, the cognition by which God is known falls short of the cognition of his substance, and is an imperfect species of cognition: but everything which is imperfect in some species desires to attain the perfection of that species. It must be considered second that, since God is both the first effective cause of all things, and truly is the object of supernatural beatitude, to which the intellectual creature is ordered by divine providence: the vision of the divine essence and nature can be considered in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is the vision of the essence of the first cause absolutely. In another way, insofar as it is the vision of the object of supernatural beatitude: and consequently insofar as such a vision is the highest good of the intellectual nature, to which it is ordered by divine providence as to an ultimate end. Therefore, when it is said that the desire of seeing the divine nature is natural to us, it is understood of nature considered absolutely, with respect to such vision as it is considered in the first way: not however as it is considered in the second way. For then such a desire is contained in that universal desire of knowing by which the cognition of what the cause is is naturally desired, once it is known from the effects that it is. But this is contained in the universal desire of knowing, which Aristotle says, I Metaph.⁸, is natural to us. And so we naturally desire the vision of God insofar as it is the vision of the first cause: not however insofar as it is the highest good. For it can be known naturally that he is the cause of other things: but we do not naturally know that he is the object of supernatural beatitude, and that his vision is the highest good; indeed some say that the highest good consists in pleasure, others however in riches, or in some other created good.

2. To the first in opposition⁹ it is said that natural appetite can be taken in two ways: in one way, for the appetite consequent upon a natural form; in the other way, for the elicited act of the will which of necessity follows upon some apprehension, either as regards the exercise of the act, or as regards the specification only. If natural appetite is taken in the first way, thus it is unfitting that something be naturally desired to which one cannot arrive by the power of nature: because the natural form does not incline to that which exceeds the faculty of nature. — If however natural appetite is taken in the second way, thus it is not unfitting that the appetite be naturally borne toward something to which the intellectual creature cannot arrive by the power of its own nature: for these stand together, that something be naturally desired from the presupposition of some cognition, and yet that one cannot arrive at it by the power of nature alone; but it suffices that those things be had by which nature is capable of such an end and of the things which lead to the end, and that by the help of another it can arrive at it. Hence St. Thomas, on Boetius de Trin., q. ult., a. ult., ad 5, says that, although man naturally inclines to the ultimate end, namely under the common ratio of beatitude, he nevertheless cannot naturally attain it, on account of its eminence, but only through grace. For there are instilled in us principles by which we can prepare ourselves for the perfect cognition of separated substances, not however by which we can attain to it, as is said in that article.

From this it is evident that the vision of the divine essence is called a supernatural end, not because it is not desired naturally in any way, but because it cannot be arrived at from the principles of nature alone: just as all naturally desire the ultimate end and beatitude under the common ratio of the highest and perfect good, and yet no one can arrive by his own power at this ratio of the highest good.

3. To the second it is said that St. Thomas in those places speaks of the natural appetite of the vision of the divine essence insofar as it is the highest good, and as it terminates at God as he is the object of supernatural beatitude: not however as it is the vision of the first cause absolutely. For that vision is not desired naturally in that way, with nature considered absolutely: but only as nature is ordered to it as to an ultimate end; and on the supposition of the revelation that it is the highest good and happiness, as was said in the first book¹⁰.

V. But against this response a doubt still remains. For St. Thomas, in the First Part, q. LXII, a. 2, shows that the angels needed grace in order to be converted to God, because to see God per essentiam is above the nature of any created intellect. But to desire the vision of God per essentiam is a conversion of the appetite into God. Therefore this desire presupposes grace. And so it is not natural.

One can respond to this in two ways. First, from II Sent., d. v, q. II, a. 1, that the saying of St. Thomas is understood of the meritorious conversion of the angel to the ultimate end: not however of the simple desire.

Second, one can respond, in accordance with what was predetermined above¹¹, that St. Thomas speaks there of the conversion into God which is called the love by which God is loved as the ultimate end and object of supernatural beatitude, on account of which all other things are loved: not however of the simple desire by which his cognition per essentiam is desired, as it is the vision of the first cause. And this response, in my judgment, is more to the mind of St. Thomas. For, when he says that the angels need grace in order to be converted into God, he speaks of the conversion into God as he is the ultimate end and the object of supernatural beatitude, that is, of that beatitude which is to be had through grace. But that desire of seeing God which arises from the consideration of his effects is absolutely an inclination toward the cognition of his essence inasmuch as he is the cause of things, in whatever way his essence be seen. Therefore it is not a conversion into God by which God is loved above all things as he is the object of supernatural beatitude, and on account of whom all things are loved. For this conversion there is required a cognition by which it is known that the vision of God per essentiam is the ultimate end promised to us, to which we must direct all our things, and which we are to attain through divine grace. But such a cognition is not had except from divine revelation.

VI. As to the second¹², St. Thomas posits this conclusion: In order that the intellect see the divine essence, it is necessary that it see it through that very essence, so that it is both what is seen, and that by which it is seen.

It is proved. The divine essence cannot be seen through any created species, as is evident from what was said above¹³. Therefore, if it is seen, it is necessary that it be seen through that very essence.

2. But against this conclusion St. Thomas moves a doubt. For that by which the intellect understands something is a form of the intellect, through which it is made in act. But the divine essence is per se subsisting, and can be the form of nothing, as was shown in the first book. Therefore, etc.

He responds, and says first that, just as in substantial or natural being a substance subsisting through itself, which is composed of matter and form, cannot be the form of another, on account of the contraction of the form to that matter; while a subsisting substance which is form only can be the form of another, if its being can be participated by something else, as was shown of the human soul in the second of this work; not however if its being cannot be participated by another, because thus it would be determined in itself through its own being¹⁴, just as material things are through matter: so also it must be considered in intelligible being.

He says second that, since the perfection of the intellect is the true, that intelligible will be as form only in the genus of intelligibles which is truth itself. And because the true follows upon being, only that is its own truth which is its own being.

He says third that it belongs to God alone to be form only in the genus of intelligibles: because he alone is his own truth, just as he is his own being. But other subsistents are not as pure form in the genus of intelligibles, but as having form in some subject: since each of them is true, not truth; just as it is a being, not being itself.

From these the response to the objection is concluded: and it is said that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands; not however the essence of any other separated substance.

But when it is urged that God cannot be the form of anything: - it is responded that this is understood according to natural being, not however according to intelligible being. The reason of the diversity is, because in the first way it would follow that, united with something, it would constitute one nature: which cannot be, since the divine essence, perfect in itself, is in its own nature. In the second way, however, this does not follow: because the intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute some nature, but perfects it for understanding; which is not repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence.

3. Concerning this which is said of the subsistent which is form only, that, I say, if its being could not be participated by another, it would be determined in itself through its own being, just as material things through matter: it must be noted that these words can have a twofold sense. One is, that by that very being such a subsisting thing would be individuated, just as material things are individuated by signate matter, so that being in it would be the principle of individuation, just as signate matter is the principle of individuation in material things. And it is not understood in this way. For according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, separated substances are individual of themselves, not however through something superadded: as is evident wherever he speaks of this matter¹⁵. - The other is, that it would be incommunicable and individual from this, that its being could not be participated by another. And this sense is true, and this is intended. For, as it is of the mind of St. Thomas in Qu. de Spiritualibus, a. 8, ad 4 and 13, and as was shown above in the second book¹⁶, a form separated from matter is individuated by this, that it is not born to be in something.

4. This response is confirmed, because it agrees with the things which are said in Sacred Scripture. For according to this manner we shall see God face to face, as is promised to us in I Cor. XIII, because we shall see him immediately, just as a man whom we see face to face: not however because we are to see him in a bodily manner, since neither is God himself a body, nor can bodily sight be except of bodily things. - We shall also be like to God, and partakers of his beatitude, from this manner of seeing, as is said in I Ioan. III: because God himself also understands his own substance through that very substance. - We shall also eat and drink upon the table of God, as is promised in Luc. XXII, insofar as we shall enjoy the same happiness by which God is happy, seeing him in that manner by which he sees himself. And so of the food and drink which is taken at the table of Wisdom, of which mention is made in Proverb. IX, we shall partake.

VII. Concerning this declaration of how the divine essence is united to the created intellect after the manner of an intelligible species, which St. Thomas also posits in Qu. Verit., q. VIII, a. 1; and IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. II, a. 1, it must be diligently considered that the intelligible species is posited here to constitute the intellect in act for no other reason than because it perfects it for understanding: that is, because from its union to the intellect the intellect is made able to elicit the act of understanding about that which is objectively represented to the intellect through it, which without it it could not. And because it is not repugnant to the divine essence to be so united to the intellect that through it the intellect is able to understand it, therefore it is fittingly said that it is united to the intellect as a form in intelligible being.

Yet the intelligible species of some thing understood is united to the intellect differently: and the divine essence. For the intelligible species is united to the intellect and actuates it in intelligible being, not through itself immediately, but through its real being, which is distinct from it: for the intelligible species is not its own being, just as neither is the quiddity itself of which it is the species that being which it has outside the intellect. But the divine essence, existing in the intellect after the manner of an intelligible form, actuates the intellect not through something else distinct from it which is its formal effect, but through itself: because it is not distinguished from its being, but is its very being both in the intellect and outside. Hence just as the intellect is said to be in act through an intelligible species in the genus of intelligibles insofar as it has from it some real being, by the reception of which it is made able to understand through the species; so it is said to be in act through the divine essence insofar as from it, without another intermediate being, it has that it be able actually to understand, as from a formal principle of intellection. From which it is evident that the divine essence is not so said to be united to the intellect in intelligible being as a form, as if it gave to the intellect formally some being which is called intelligible: but because it is to the intellect through itself the reason and formal principle of understanding. Hence St. Thomas, responding to a certain argument by which it was argued that God is seen through some created likeness, Prima, q. XII, a. 2, ad 3, says that, just as other intelligible forms, which are not their own being, are united to the intellect according to some being by which they inform the intellect itself and make it in act; so the divine essence, which is being itself, is united to the intellect making it in act through itself.

VIII. But concerning the aforesaid response of St. Thomas certain doubts occur. The first is about the substance of the response: which consists in this, that the divine essence cannot be the form of anything according to natural being, but according to intelligible being it is not repugnant to it to be the form of the intellect. For against this seems to be the argument of St. Thomas by which he proves against the Commentator, and III de Anima¹⁷, and in the second book of this work¹⁸, and in very many other places, that we cannot understand through an intellect if the intellect is posited to be a separated substance. For he argues by this foundation, taken from Aristotle, II de Anima¹⁹, because that by which something operates must be its form, namely giving to it formally being. Therefore, with St. Thomas, these do not stand together, that something be the principle of operating for something, and not be its form according to being. Therefore the divine essence cannot be to the intellect the reason of understanding unless it be united to it according to being, as a form giving being to the intellect. Therefore those things do not stand together which St. Thomas says here: namely that the divine essence cannot be the form of anything according to natural being; and that it is to the intellect a form by which it understands.

The second doubt concerns this which he said, that it belongs to no separated substance to be the intelligible form of the intellect. For this seems to be repugnant to what he said above in the second book²⁰, namely that a separated substance understands itself through itself, so that it is what is understood, and that by which it is understood.

The third doubt is concerning what was said, that the intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute some nature. For this is contrary to what St. Thomas says elsewhere²¹, following the mind of Aristotle, namely, that the intellect in actu is constituted.

The fourth doubt is concerning what is said in expounding the Apostle's saying, that we shall see God face to face, inasmuch as we shall see him immediately, in that manner by which he will be seen through his essence as through an intelligible form, just as we see men face to face. For this metaphor does not seem to be suitably expounded. For when someone sees a man face to face, he does not see the man in such a way as if the man were the visible form by which the eye sees, but he sees through a species caused by him in the eye. Therefore, by the fact that we will see God through the divine essence itself, it is not suitably expounded that we will see him face to face.

IX. To the first of these it is answered first, as was answered in the second book, chapter LIX²², that the mind of St. Thomas in that reply is that that by which something operates as by a power of operating, or as by a first and principal principle distinct from the operator, must be its form giving esse to it. But he was not speaking of that by which something operates as by that which perfects the power for operating, in which way we say that the divine substance is the principle by which the intellect sees it. — But although it is not necessary that that by which something operates as by a complement of the power be its form in esse, it is nevertheless necessary that it have some union with it: for if it were entirely separate, it could not be for it a reason for acting. For the divine essence too is united to the intellect of the Blessed inasmuch as both are in the soul: the divine essence indeed as operating in it intrinsically, in which way God is said to be in things; but the intellect as its property. Likewise the essence of an angel, by which the angel understands himself, and his intellect, are united to each other, inasmuch as the intellect is a property of the essence, and is rooted in it, and has from it all its power of understanding.

It could be answered second that that proposition of St. Thomas is true of that by which something operates whose esse is distinguished from its essence, and does not of itself have another real union with the operator: because such a form does not actuate something extrinsic except by formally giving esse to it. But the divine essence is not such a form; on the contrary, it is its own esse. Therefore through itself it can actuate the intellect unto understanding, without giving esse to it formally.

2. To the second doubt it is said that St. Thomas in this place is speaking of a separate substance with respect to an alien intellect: for it cannot be the intelligible form of an alien intellect, since it is not truth, as St. Thomas was saying, but having truth. But with respect to its proper intellect, it is not unfitting that it have the character of an intelligible form, although it is not truth: because the natural union itself of the essence with the intellect suffices for the intellect to understand through it; just as an essence composed of matter and form cannot be for another a principle of being, but certainly for its own supposit, to which it is naturally united.

3. To the third doubt it is said that the mind of St. Thomas in those words is that from the intelligible species and the intellect there is not constituted some one nature distinct from both, just as from substantial form and matter there is constituted a composite in some way distinct from both: but not that there is not constituted some one thing which is the intelligible species and the intellect as they are united unto one operation, which one thing we call the intellect in actu.

4. To the fourth it is said that that interpretation of the metaphor is most fitting. For St. Thomas presupposes that every cognition which is had of God through whatever intelligible species of our intellect is a mediate cognition of God, by which, namely, God is seen in another thing seen: because every created form existing in our intellect represents in objective esse the created thing, of which it is the adequate species, before it represents God, and thus the intellect tends through the known created thing into divine cognition. On this account, if some cognition of God is to be in us of him immediately, it is necessary that it be through the uncreated form, which is the divine essence. Hence concerning the cognition of God, an immediate cognition of God and a cognition of God through his essence are taken for the same thing. The metaphor therefore consists in this, that just as a man seeing another man face to face sees him without another known medium through which he is seen, so in the Fatherland we shall see him immediately, which will result from the fact that we will see him through the divine essence: although the metaphor, in that which was brought forward, has some dissimilarity to that to which it is attributed; for it is not necessary that there be a likeness in all respects in metaphorical expressions.