Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that human happiness consists in the knowledge of God which the separated soul has in the manner of separated substances ¹; since separated substances are borne into divine knowledge in two ways, namely, by knowing him through their own essences, and by seeing him through his own essence; he now wishes to show in which of these cognitions beatitude consists.

Concerning this, moreover, he does four things: first, he proves that the divine essence is not known through that mode by which separated substances know God through their own essences; second, he shows around the middle of the chapter ² that it has some knowledge of God through that mode; third, he proves in the following chapter that the desire of separated substances does not rest in that knowledge; fourth, in the same chapter ³ he infers the proposed thesis. From these things he wishes to hold as manifest that happiness consists in the knowledge of God by which his substance is seen ⁴.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. Separated substances know God through their substances as a cause is known through an inadequate effect. Therefore it is impossible that they see the essence of God through their essences.

The consequence is proved. Because, since a cause is known from an effect in three ways — namely, as from a medium through which it is known that it is and that it is such, in which mode the effect is known by one cognition and the cause by another cognition; as a medium in which the cause is seen, insofar as the likeness of the cause results in the effect, as a man is seen in a mirror, in which mode both cause and effect are seen by one cognition; and as a medium by which, or as a likeness of the cause existing in the effect by which the effect itself knows the cause, as would be the case with an ark if it had an intellect and knew the art from which it proceeded — through none of these modes can what it is (quid est) be known of the cause, unless the effect be adequate to the cause, in which the whole power of the cause is expressed.

For the clarity of the antecedent, however, St. Thomas says that separated substances see God through their essences as a cause through an effect, not in the first mode, because their cognition would be discursive; but in the second mode, insofar as one sees God in another; and in the third mode, insofar as it sees God in itself.

2. Concerning the matter of this reason it has been spoken in the preceding sections ⁵. This, however, must be noted: that St. Thomas attributes to separated substances two modes of seeing God from their essences, one by which one sees God in another, the other by which it sees God in itself, because, although both substances are a medium of the same nature considered in the nature of each, or materially, it is nevertheless not of the same nature in the character of a medium in this cognition. Because, when one knows God in itself, the very essence of the one knowing is related as an intelligible species, which is the medium by which intellection is elicited; whereas when it sees God in another, the essence of that other is not a medium like an intelligible species, since it is not in the intellect of the one knowing through itself ⁶, but only through its likeness; but it is a medium in the character of an object known in which something else is seen, just as things that are in a mirror are seen in the seen mirror itself.

3. It must also be noted, when St. Thomas says that separated substances know God through their essences as a cause is known through an effect, yet not in the first mode: that through this is excluded the objection of Scotus, II Sent., d. III, q. IX ⁷, arguing that the cognition of an angel is discursive, because it knows the cause through the effect. For it is clear from the things that St. Thomas said, that not every cognition of a cause through an effect is discursive: because the cognition of the cause is not always one and the cognition of the effect another, so that the cognition of one can be the cause of the cognition of the other; but only then when the cause is known through the effect as through a medium previously known and demonstrative of the cause. A separated substance, however, does not know God through an effect in this mode: but either by using its essence as an intelligible species; or by knowing simultaneously in one cognition the effect and the cause, which it knows in the effect itself.

II. Second. The nature of a separated substance is not of the same species as the divine substance. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the intelligible likeness through which something is understood according to substance must be of the same species, or rather its species: as is clear of a house in matter and in the mind of the builder. The reason, moreover, is because through the intelligible species of one nature, what it is is not known of another: namely, as through a proper representative of quiddity.

2. Concerning the proof of the consequence, two things must be noted. The first is that therefore St. Thomas, speaking of the intelligible species, says under a disjunction that it must be of the same species with the intelligible thing, or rather its species, because for his purpose it matters nothing which of them is said. For it suffices for him that it must be of the same species: for, as he was saying, through the species of a man what it is is not understood of a donkey or a horse; similarly also in other things. For just as, unless the one understanding were to become one with the intelligible thing, he would not understand it; so, unless he were to become one according to the specific nature, he would not understand its nature and quiddity; for a likeness according to the same nature is required for the cognition of essence. — Which, however, must be understood: either formally, or eminently. For whether the species through which something is understood be entirely and precisely of the same nature with the intelligible; or whether it contain it eminently: through it the essence of the intelligible can be known. On account of this, since every created form falls short of the divine nature, because it neither contains it eminently, nor is of the same nature with it, but is rather of an inferior order, as is said in the First Part, q. XII, a. 2: the divine essence cannot be known through any created form whatsoever.

But although St. Thomas uses a disjunction, he seems nevertheless to incline more to this, that the intelligible form is the species of the intelligible thing. For the intelligible and its likeness in the intellect can be compared in two ways. In one way, as two singulars of one nature differing according to the mode of being, just as a house in the mind and a house in matter can be called two singular houses, one of which has material being, the other immaterial: and then they are said to be of one species. In another way, as the species and that of which it is the species, just as humanity and man, or humanity and Socrates: and then they are not properly said to be of one species, but one is called the species of the other. This second mode, moreover, seems to be more suitable. Because, since the intelligible species in our intellect, insofar as it is the species of some intelligible, is not limited by the individual conditions and accidents of that nature of which it is the species, although it is individuated insofar as it is an accident received in the intellect: it cannot properly speaking be called an individual of that nature, for the species of man in the intellect is not this man, say Socrates or Plato; but it is compared to the thing outside the intellect as nature to that which has such a nature; just as, if it were posited as separated from all individuals according to being, and subsisting per se as it is separated according to the intellect, as Plato posited, it would not be compared to the things that are of that species as one individual to another, but as nature and species to that of which it is the nature or species. Therefore it is more suitably said that such a likeness is the species of the intelligible thing, than that it is of the same species with it.

3. The second is that St. Thomas did not therefore say absolutely that the likeness of the intelligible by which something is understood is of the same species or its species, but added, through which it is known according to substance, because it is not unfitting that through some likeness which is not the species of the thing understood, it be understood in some way, say with respect to whether it is, and with respect to some common predicates: but it is wholly repugnant that through such a species the thing be known perfectly and quidditatively, which is to know it with respect to substance and essence.

III. Third. Everything created is determined to some genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite. Therefore etc.

Note that the foundation of this reason is that there must be between the species and the thing understood an adequateness, or a containment according to eminence, of the species to the thing understood, so that whatever is in the thing substantially is contained in the likeness and intelligible species intelligibly: otherwise the intelligible, in its quidditative cognition, would not be perfectly united to the one understanding. For from this it is held that a form which is determined to some genus cannot be an intelligible species representing an unlimited essence: because then there would not be an adequateness between the species and the thing understood. Therefore, since every created form is determined to some genus or species, but the divine essence is above every genus, it follows excellently that the divine essence can be known through no created form.

2. From these things it is clear that the response of Aureolus, adduced by Capreolus, IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. v ⁸*, is insufficient. For it consists in this: that it suffices for the intelligible form to be adequate to the intelligible in representing; but it does not have to be adequate in being. And because a form limited to a genus can be adequate in representing to an unlimited nature, although it is not adequate in being, it is therefore false that through a limited form an unlimited nature cannot be known. Whence the act by which the divine essence is seen is limited and finite, and nevertheless it is an express likeness of it, according to Augustine and other saints.

It is clear, however, that this response does not evade the argument. For there cannot be an adequateness in representing knowably some knowable thing unless there is a likeness in nature according to the same character of nature, although not according to the same mode of being. For there cannot be an objective representation in the intellect unless one thing is made from the object in act and the intellect in act, as is clear in III De Anima ⁹. But an intelligible does not become one with the intellect except because the intelligible nature is united to the intellect, although sometimes according to another mode of being than it is in itself. An intelligible nature, moreover, is not united to the intellect through the fact that something else lower than it and more imperfect is in the intellect: but because it itself, according to the same nature, is both in the intellect and in itself, however much it may be varied according to the mode of being. Therefore something in the intellect cannot be equated to the intelligible in representing unless it is equated to it according to the character of nature, insofar, namely, as it is an intelligible form: although it may not be equated to it insofar as it is such an entity which accidentally informs the intellect. For, as St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. II, a. 1, a form existing in the intellect or sense is not the principle of cognition according to the mode of being which it has, but according to the nature in which it communicates with the exterior thing. — Concerning this, namely how the intelligible form is related to the thing understood, enough was said in the second book ¹⁰.

What Aureolus says, moreover, about the act of understanding, that it is a likeness representing the divine essence, is false. To the authorities of the saints it is said that, when they say that the cognition of a thing is its likeness, by cognition they do not understand the act itself, but the principle of cognition, which is the intelligible species; or the word and concept, where a word and concept are formed.

3. It must be noted, however, that this reason differs from the preceding. Because in that one the identity required between the intelligible species and the thing understood was considered: but in this one the adequateness according to nature between them is considered. Just as, moreover, adequateness is founded upon some unity, so this reason is a confirmation of the preceding.

IV. Fourth. It is impossible that any created likeness totally represent God: since every such likeness is of some determinate genus, but God is not. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of some thing is understood, comprehends in representing that thing: as is clear from statements signifying what a thing is, which are called terms and notions ¹¹ and definitions.

It must be noted that this reason also is a confirmation of the preceding. For, having presupposed the adequateness of nature between the species and the thing understood, which was the foundation of the preceding reason, this reason proceeds from the adequateness in representing, which is founded upon the adequateness of nature.

Fifth. The divine essence is its own being. But not the essence of a separated substance. Therefore etc.

Note that this reason proceeds from the same foundation from which the preceding proceeded: namely, that the species and that of which it is the species must be of the same nature, or that the species contains the intelligible itself eminently. That, however, whose essence is not its very being, cannot be of the same nature with that whose essence is its being: because this is subsistent being itself, while that is not subsistent being, but something having participated being; and therefore it falls short of subsistent being itself; and consequently it cannot lead into the quidditative cognition of it.

V. As to the second ¹², St. Thomas shows that through its essence a separated substance has some knowledge of God. And he posits two conclusions ¹³. One of which is: A separated substance through its essence knows concerning God that he is; that he is the cause of all things; that he is eminent over all things; and that he is removed from all things that are, and that can be conceived by the human mind.

It is proved. Because we can in some way reach to this knowledge through his effects, which is the ultimate and most perfect of our knowledge in this life. Which is proved from Dionysius, in the book On Mystical Theology, saying that we are joined to God as to one unknown, insofar, namely, as we know concerning him what he is not, but what he is, we are completely ignorant. — The same is given to be understood in Exodus 20, where it is said of Moses that he approached the dark cloud in which God was.

VI. The other conclusion is: The aforesaid knowledge is more eminent in separated substances than in us.

It is proved first, in general. Because an inferior nature at its highest reaches only to the lowest of a superior: that is, it approaches through a certain participation.

2. Second, it is proved by descending to the particular cognitions which we have concerning God. With respect to the cognition that he is: because separated substances, which know God through themselves, are closer effects, and more express likenesses of God, than the effects through which we know God. By how much more, however, a closer and more express effect of some cause is known, by so much more evidently does it appear concerning the cause that it is.

With respect to the cognition by which it is known that he is removed from all things: because separated substances know more things than we do, and things that are closer to God; and consequently they remove more things and closer things from God than we do. By how much more, however, someone knows more and closer things to be removed from someone, by so much more does he approach to the proper cognition of him: as is clear in the cognition concerning man.

With respect also to the cognition of his eminence: because to separated substances the highest orders of things are known; but we know only certain lowest things among beings. By so much more, however, does someone know the height of someone, by how much higher things he knows him to be set over. It is declared by the example of a peasant and a noble knowing the eminence of a king.

With respect finally to causality, it is proved because it is manifest that the causality and power of some cause is so much more known, by how much more numerous and greater its effects become known.

VII. Against this determination of St. Thomas, the arguments of Scotus could be adduced, in the place cited above ¹⁴, by which he proves that it is possible and reasonable that a separated substance understand God distinctly through some species impressed on its mind. Both because, namely, man in the state of innocence had knowledge concerning God not only in general, but also in particular; and consequently much more a separated substance. — And because Paul was able to remember that which he had seen. — And because the morning knowledge, by which things are seen distinctly in the Word, preceded the evening knowledge in the angels, according to Augustine.

2. But because they are not against the mind of St. Thomas in this place, therefore one must not linger on them much. For St. Thomas does not deny that separated substances through their essences, or through some created form, know God by some distinct cognition, since he says that they know him to be the cause of others, and to be eminent over all things, and also that he is removed from all creatures, which pertain to some proper and distinct cognition concerning God: but he holds that such cognition through their essences cannot be quidditative cognition.

Whence it is conceded that indeed man in the state of innocence had a higher knowledge concerning God than we have; and a separated substance higher than man in that state. Neither cognition, however, pertains to the cognition of what it is.

Concerning Paul, moreover, it is said that through no created form did he see the divine essence; and that after the rapture he remembered the things which he had seen through likenesses of them which remained in him, not through any likeness of God, as is said in De Veritate, q. viii, a. 5, ad 5.

Concerning the morning knowledge according to which things are seen in the Word essentially seen, it is denied that it preceded the evening knowledge, and was before beatitude: although perhaps, according to the mind of Augustine, the morning knowledge by which an angel in some way knew things in the Word imperfectly seen through the essence of the angel itself, preceded its beatitude; as St. Thomas says in De Veritate, q. viii, art. 3, ad 1; and IV Sent., d. xlix, q. ii, a. 6, ad 1.