Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From the premises St. Thomas infers one corollary, namely that it is impossible for man's ultimate happiness to be in this life.

I. And he argues first, from the aforesaid, thus. Ultimate happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God, as was shown above. But not in any knowledge that can be had in this life, as is evident from the aforesaid. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Second. In this life the appetite for knowing cannot come to an end, since the more someone understands, the more the desire to understand increases in him: unless there be someone who understands all things. Which has never happened to anyone who was merely human; nor can it even happen, since we cannot know separate substances in this life. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because man's ultimate end terminates his natural appetite, so that, once it is possessed, nothing else is sought.

It should be noted that when we say man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life, we understand this of a mere human being; but not of Christ, who in this life was a comprehensor, or blessed, and a wayfarer. For this reason St. Thomas said that to no one who was merely human has it happened that he understood all things: lest, I say, he exclude Christ, who understood all things. But he himself was not merely human, but also God.

II. Third. In this life there is no certain stability: because infirmities and misfortunes can happen to anyone, by which he is hindered from the operation, whatever it may be, in which happiness is placed. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because when someone attains happiness, he likewise attains stability: as is clear from every conception of happiness. On account of which Aristotle says, in I Ethics, that we do not consider a chameleon happy: that is, one who is varied in life, like a chameleon, an animal that in the presence of any color (excepting, however, certain colors, as Pliny relates, book VIII ¹) changes color. — It is also clear by reason. Because, since the natural desire of man is toward being stabilized in happiness; just as everything that is moved toward an end naturally desires to be stabilized and to rest in it, as is clear from natural things, which do not depart from their natural place except by violence: unless he were to attain stability along with happiness, his natural desire would not be satisfied; and thus he would not be happy.

That stability belongs to beatitude St. Thomas proves in Iª IIae, q. 5, a. 4, besides the reason adduced here, also from the divine vision itself: against the opinion of Origen, who, following the error of certain Platonists, posited that after ultimate beatitude, man can become wretched. Look for it there.

III. Fourth. It is impossible for perfect operation according to speculative or moral virtue to come to man except after a long time: and especially speculative, because scarcely in the final stage of life, and when, for the most part, little of human life remains, can man arrive at the perfect speculation of the sciences. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be perfect in this life, if happiness consists in such an operation. — The consequence is proved. Because it seems unfitting and irrational that the time of generation of any thing should be great, but the time of its duration small. It is proved: both because nature would be deprived of its end for a greater time; and because in animals we see the opposite. It should be noted that, concerning the generation of some animal, it is not unfitting that the time of generation be greater than the time of life: since we see some animal die immediately after being born. But it seems unfitting that such should be the order of nature of some species that, for the greater part, the time of generation should exceed the time of life: for we see, as St. Thomas says, that things which live for a short time are perfected in a short time.

Fifth. It is not possible for man in the state of this life to be entirely immune from evils, not only of the body, but also of the soul: since there is no one who is not at some time troubled by inordinate passions; who does not at some time overshoot the mean, in which virtue consists; who does not fail regarding knowledge or the mode of knowing. Therefore he cannot be happy in this life. — The consequence is proved. Because the perfect good is that which is entirely devoid of any admixture of evil. But all confess that happiness is a perfect good.

IV. Sixth. That he not die, man cannot attain in this life. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because man naturally shuns death, and is saddened by it, even while he reflects upon it.

Note that to this reason another proposition must be understood, which St. Thomas passes over as obvious: namely, that the appetite of a happy man is totally fulfilled.

2. But concerning this reason there is a doubt. Because it seems to be able to be turned back to the opposite, arguing thus. Man naturally shuns death, and is saddened by it. Therefore the happiness of man is not after death. Therefore it is in this life. — The first consequence is proved. Because from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred. For it follows: The happiness of man is after death. Therefore death is ordered to happiness as a necessary means. Therefore it is naturally desired: because, if the end is naturally desired, the necessary means to the end are also naturally desired. Therefore man does not naturally shun it, nor is he saddened by it.

3. To this, the first consequence is denied. And to the proof, the assumption is denied. To whose proof, the second consequence is denied. For it is said, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, in IV Sent., d. 49, a. 1, ad ult. ², that although man naturally desires the end, he nevertheless does not naturally desire those things that are for the end: but he desires them by a rational appetite, by deliberating about them and choosing them. Indeed, it is compatible that something be of itself hateful and repugnant to the natural appetite, and yet be chosen on account of some end: just as the cutting off of a limb is desired on account of health; and yet health is naturally desired, and the cutting off is naturally hated. So too in the matter proposed the end is naturally desired, and everyone naturally shuns death: and yet through death one arrives at the end; and on account of the end itself death is desired and chosen by a rational appetite. From which it is clear that that consequence is null: Death is ordered to happiness as a necessary means. Therefore it is naturally desired, just as happiness itself is.

That consequence would perhaps hold in things lacking reason, because in them there is only a single nature: but not in man, in whom there are in a certain way two natures, namely corruptible and incorruptible. For the will naturally desires the good of both natures: since each is of the perfection of the supposit. Therefore the evil of each of them is contrary to the natural appetite.

V. Seventh. It is impossible in this life to perform any action continuously. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because ultimate happiness consists not in a habit, but in an action: as far, namely, as pertains to the very essence of beatitude.

Eighth. Whatever happiness is posited in this life, it always has sadness naturally annexed to it. Therefore it will not be perfect happiness. — The antecedent is proved. Because the loss of happiness, as being a thing supremely desirable, has supreme sadness. But whatever happiness is posited in this life, it is certain that it will be lost, at least through death; and it is not certain that it must last until death, since many things can happen in this life by which man is totally hindered from the operation of virtue, for instance frenzy, (supply) and this certainty of the loss and uncertainty of the duration of happiness is not without sadness.

Note that this reason differs from the sixth. Because there it was considered that man's appetite cannot be fulfilled in this life, since he naturally desires not to die, and cannot attain this. But here there is considered the admixture of sadness with the good in which happiness would be placed.

VI. To these reasons it could be answered that they prove perfect happiness cannot be in this life: which is indeed conceded, because that belongs only to separate substances, in which there is a perfect intellectual nature. But they do not prove that the happiness which is naturally suited to belong to man, which is imperfect, since in man there is an imperfect intellectual nature, cannot be had in this life.

This response is confirmed from Aristotle, in I of the Ethics. For when he had shown that happiness is in the works of virtue, which are most permanent, he said that those in whom such perfection is present in this life are blessed as men: as if to say that they are not simply blessed, but in a human mode.

VII. But this response, says St. Thomas, does not escape the aforesaid reasons.

And it is argued first thus. It is necessary, when man has arrived at his ultimate end, that his natural desire be set at rest: since irrational things, which man is above in the order of nature, attain their ultimate end so perfectly that they seek nothing else, as is clear in a heavy body and in brutes. But this cannot be in this life. Therefore man cannot attain happiness, insofar as it is his proper end, in this life. Therefore he will attain it after this life.

Second. The natural desire of man is fulfillable: otherwise it would be in vain. But it cannot be fulfilled in this life, as has been shown. Therefore it will be fulfilled after this life. Therefore etc.

Third. Men in this life are not related to the knowledge of truth as existing in the ultimate end, but are always related as moved and tending toward perfection: since those who follow always find ³ other things than those which their predecessors found, as is said in II Metaphysics. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in speculation, through which the knowledge of truth is sought, the ultimate happiness of man in this life seems to consist: as Aristotle himself also proves in X of the Ethics.

Note that this reason holds concerning natural happiness, which is sought through study and exercise in the speculative sciences, of which the philosophers have spoken. For it must be the most perfect knowledge that can be had and acquired through such exercise. And to this knowledge no one arrives in this life. — But it does not proceed concerning supernatural happiness. Because according to this reason it would be proved that not even after this life could man attain happiness: since none of those seeing the divine essence is in the ultimate end of the knowledge of truth, from the fact that no one can comprehend the divine essence. — Unless perhaps we say that everyone seeing the divine essence is in the end of the knowledge of truth as far as the knowledge of created species is concerned, because, as will be said below ⁴, every Blessed one understands all created natures in the divine essence: and also as far as the mode of knowing God Himself is concerned, for there is no higher mode of knowing God than to see Him through His essence. And thus the reason would conclude concerning every end.

Fourth. Man through the speculative sciences, by which we know truth in this life, cannot know all things, not even material things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since that which is in potency tends to go out into act; and our intellect is in potency to all the forms of things: it will not be totally in act, nor in its ultimate end, except when it knows all things, at least these material things.

It is confirmed by the authority of Alexander and Averroes.

2. To the authority of Aristotle, however, it is said that, because he saw there is no other knowledge of man in this life than through the speculative sciences, he posited that man does not attain perfect happiness, but in his own mode. (Supply) He did not, however, posit that the happiness which is the proper ultimate end of man is not perfect happiness; and that he attains his proper ultimate end in this life.

It should be noted, as St. Thomas says in the Fourth Book, in the cited distinction, the same article, question 4 ⁵, that Aristotle, in the book of the Ethics, spoke only of this happiness of man which is a certain participation in true beatitude, according to which man is perfected in the goods of the speculative reason principally, and of the practical secondarily. But the other, which is after this life, he neither asserted nor denied. Therefore what is said in this place, that Aristotle himself posited that man does not attain perfect beatitude in this life but in his own mode, is not to be understood as if he posited that man attains imperfect beatitude in this life, but perfect after this life: but because he posited indeed in the book of the Ethics that man can attain imperfect beatitude in this life, such as, I say, can happen to him in this life; but whether after this life he is going to have perfect happiness, he does not determine.

3. From the aforesaid St. Thomas infers that we are freed from the distress that the illustrious minds of the philosophers suffered: positing, according to the aforesaid proofs, that men can arrive at true happiness after this life, the soul being immortal, when it will understand after the manner of separate substances, as was shown in the second book.

In the last place, from the whole above process concerning happiness, St. Thomas infers the first conclusion principally intended ⁶, namely this: Man's ultimate happiness will be in the knowledge of God after this life, which the human mind will have after the manner of separate substances.