Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having seen that we cannot understand substances in this life through those modes that the aforesaid philosophers posited, it remains to inquire whether there is any mode by which we can understand them in this life. Concerning this, moreover, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows what has been said; second, he removes a certain doubt, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that we cannot understand such substances in this life; second, he inquires whether we can understand them at any time ¹.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he brings forward the argument of Themistius by which he proves that we can understand separate substances; second, he responds to it, and at the same time confirms his own proposition ².

I. As to the first, Themistius argues in the third book of his Paraphrasis, chapter 50 ³, as follows, by an argument a fortiori (a minori). Separate substances are more intelligible than material things: since they are intelligible of themselves, whereas material things become intelligible through the agent intellect. Therefore, if our intellect grasps these material things, much more is it naturally fitted to understand separate substances.

Note that this argument is said to be a minori: because it seems a lesser thing that our intellect should grasp less intelligible things than that it should grasp more intelligible things; and yet it grasps the former.

II. To this argument St. Thomas responds that it must be judged according to the diverse opinions concerning the possible intellect. And he says first that according to the opinion of Averroes, who posits that it is a substance separated from the body, the argument proceeds rightly: because, since it then has no necessary relation to material things, those things which are more intelligible in themselves will be more intelligible to it. But nonetheless, granted this, it follows that we understand separate substances from the beginning: since from the beginning we understand through the possible intellect. But this is evident to be false. And although Averroes strives to avoid this inconvenient consequence according to what was said above concerning the conjunction of the agent intellect, it is nevertheless clear from the premises that those things are false.

Concerning this opinion of Averroes, it must be considered that the possible intellect is said to have a necessary relation to material things when it can know nothing except from material things; but it is said not to have a relation to material things when it does not have a dependence on them in understanding. When, therefore, it is posited as entirely separate from matter, and consequently as having no necessary relation in understanding to material things, then the object connatural to it will be an intelligible separated from matter of itself, as agreeing with it in its mode of being. Therefore, those things that are more intelligible in themselves will, according to Averroes, be more intelligible to it: just as, because we posit that the intellective soul is conjoined to matter according to esse, we say that those things are more intelligible to it which are less intelligible in themselves, namely material things, which by the work of the agent intellect become understood in act.

2. He says secondly that if it is posited that the possible intellect is not separate, but is conjoined to the body according to esse, since from this it has a necessary relation to material things, it does not follow, if separate substances are in themselves more knowable, that on this account they are more knowable to our intellect: because, as was shown above, separate substances cannot be understood through understood material things.

This response is confirmed from the words of Aristotle, II Metaph., text 1, who says that the difficulty of understanding those things happens on our part, not on theirs: that is, it does not arise from the fact that those things are less intelligible than other things intelligible to us, but from the weakness of our intellect, because, since it is united to the body according to esse, it is bound to material things.

3. In this response St. Thomas touches upon the first argument for proving that the intellect united to the body cannot understand separate substances, namely this one: Separate substances cannot be understood through understood material things. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because the conjoined intellect cannot arrive at the knowledge of other things except through material things.

It must be noted, however—since St. Thomas concludes in this argument that separate substances can in no way be understood by the conjoined intellect—that this mode of understanding is not taken on the part of the thing known, as if he meant to conclude that we understand nothing about separate substances; for he does not intend to show this. Rather, the mode is taken on the part of the knower; and the meaning is that the conjoined intellect has no mode by which it can understand the quiddities of separate substances in themselves.

III. The second argument for the same is this ⁴. Separate substances have not been made understood in act through the agent intellect, but only material things. Therefore the possible intellect extends only to material things.

The consequence is proved: because a passive potency is in potency only to those things to which its proper active potency can attain, since to every passive potency there corresponds an active potency in nature, lest it be in vain. This is demonstrated in vision. But the possible intellect, which is a power that is in some way passive, has the agent intellect as its proper agent. This is demonstrated from the words of Aristotle in III De Anima.

2. Concerning that proposition, To every passive potency there corresponds an active potency in nature, it should be noted that passive potency can be taken in two ways. In one way, for every receptive potency of any form: in which way an obediential potency can also be called a passive potency. And the proposition of St. Thomas is not understood of such a potency. For to an obediential potency there does not correspond any active potency in nature, that is, a potency of a creature, since it is not a potency toward a natural form; but it suffices for this, that it not be in vain, that there is some agent capable of reducing it to act, which is the divine agent. — In another way, it can be taken for a potency only receptive of a natural form. And the aforesaid proposition is understood of such a potency. For unless an active potency in nature corresponded to such a potency, it could not be reduced to act naturally; for a passive potency, as St. Thomas says, is not reduced to act except through an active potency. And consequently, the passive potency would be in vain if no natural active potency corresponded to it.

It should also be noted, when it is said that the intellect is a power in some way passive, that St. Thomas added the word "in some way" to make it understood that the possible intellect is not entirely a passive potency, like primary matter, but is in some way a passive potency and in some way an active potency. For inasmuch as it receives a species from its object, it is a passive potency; but inasmuch as, having been made in act through the species of the object, it produces an act of understanding, it is in some way an active or productive potency, as we showed above ⁵.

3. This argument is confirmed by the example of Aristotle, who says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the bat is to the light of the sun.

But against this example Averroes says that Aristotle intends to show through it the difficulty of knowing separate substances, but not the impossibility. Whence he argues that it is not impossible to know them, because otherwise they would be in vain, just as if there were some visible thing that could be seen by nothing.

St. Thomas answers that this consequence is frivolous. Because, although they were never understood by us, they would nevertheless be understood by themselves, and thus they would not be intelligible in vain; just as the sun is not visible in vain, although it cannot be seen by a bat, since other things can see it.

St. Thomas himself, in II Metaph. ⁶, adds another reason for the falsity of that consequence, saying that the cognition of our intellect is not the end of separate substances, but rather conversely. Therefore it does not follow that they are in vain if they are not understood by us: since that is in vain which does not attain the end for which it is.

IV. Concerning this consequence of Averroes and the response of St. Thomas, many Averroists labor, wishing to show that it is necessary, and that the response of St. Thomas is null.

For John of Jandun, in III De Anima ⁷, explains it in two ways. First, thus. He says that it is not presupposed by the Commentator that the end of separate substances is to be understood by us, as St. Thomas seems to understand in II Metaph.; but he presupposes that they are naturally knowable by us, because they are contained under its first and adequate object, namely under being, and consequently that they are a natural motive object of our intellect. Then he deduces the consequence thus: Separate substances are naturally knowable by us. Therefore, if we cannot naturally know them, they will be in vain. The consequence is proved: because an active potency to which no passive potency in nature corresponds is in vain; but the intelligible is the motive object of the intellect.

Secondly, he deduces it by holding that, although to be understood by us is not their principal end, it is nevertheless their secondary end: since they act primarily on account of themselves, and secondarily on account of other things, as is said in II De Caelo, Comment 21. Therefore, if they cannot be understood by us, it follows that they are in vain as to their secondary end. And thus nature would have acted to no purpose.

2. Others, such as Roger ⁸, in his Treatise On the Intellect, sent to the Blessed Thomas as a reply to his treatise against the Averroists, deduces that consequence thus: Our intellect cannot understand separate substances. Therefore they are simply unknown. Therefore nature has acted to no purpose.

The first consequence is proved. Our intellect cannot understand God. Therefore none of the intermediate intelligences can understand Him: because if God is not receivable in the greatest receptive subject in the genus of abstract things, such as our intellect is, neither is He receivable in a less receptive subject of that genus. Therefore none of the intermediate intelligences can understand an intermediate intelligence, and consequently neither can it understand itself. Therefore they are simply unknown: because they are neither understood by the first intellect, since it understands nothing outside itself; nor by themselves; nor by our intellect. Therefore they are idle. And thus it follows, from first to last: Our intellect cannot understand separate substances. Therefore they are idle.

3. Others say that it was not the mind of Averroes to prove that it is possible for separate substances to be understood by us, but that we sometimes understand them. For he presupposes that they are apt to be understood simply by every intellect; and that our intellect is naturally fitted to understand them. Then thus: If our intellect did not sometimes understand separate substances, then that which in itself is naturally fitted to be understood by a mutual aptitude—namely, both on the part of the intelligible and on the part of the intellect—would not be understood by another. Therefore nature would have acted to no purpose.

V. But that these modes do not rescue the argument of the Commentator is easy to see. The first deduction, indeed, evidently assumes a falsehood, namely that separate substances are naturally knowable by us, speaking of the cognition of them in themselves, that is, through their proper species; for we are speaking of this in the present matter. — And when it is proved because they are contained under the adequate object of the intellect, the consequence is denied. For it is not valid: This is contained under the adequate object of our intellect. Therefore it is knowable by our intellect through its proper species. For it suffices that it be known in whatever way. Because although being is the adequate object of our intellect, inasmuch as everything contained under being is in some way knowable by our intellect, and conversely; nevertheless it is not the proportionate object, so that it can be perfectly comprehended as to all things contained under it; rather, such an object is the quiddity of a material thing.

To the second deduction of the same mode, it is said first that the intellection of separate substances is neither their principal nor their secondary end. Because they were neither principally produced on account of our knowledge of them, but on account of the divine goodness as on account of an extrinsic end, or on account of the good of the universe as on account of an intrinsic end; nor did the Author of nature order their production to this, that they should be understood by us, since our intellect cannot arrive at knowing their essences through sensible things, from which it receives knowledge. And although they do something by a secondary intention for our sake, it does not follow that our knowledge is the secondary end of them considered according to their nature, but that we are the secondary end of some operation of theirs.

2. To the deduction of Roger, the first consequence is denied. As to its proof, all the intermediate consequences are denied, whatever may be the case regarding their consequents. The first indeed, because it does not follow, if our intellect cannot understand God, that the intermediate intelligences cannot understand Him either: since our intellect is pure potency in the genus of intelligibles, but the intermediate intelligences are not, as was shown in the second book ⁹.

The proof of that is also null. For the most receptive subject in any genus can be understood in two ways: either, namely, that which is most remote from the act of that genus and is most in potency, as primary matter can be called the most receptive in the genus of material things; or because it is most proportioned to the form, as an organic body can be called the most receptive of the soul. If the most receptive in the genus of abstract things is taken in the first way, the assumption is denied: for it is consistent that something is receivable in that which is more in act, and is not receivable in that which is less in act; just as the rational soul is receivable in an organic body, and yet is not receivable immediately in blood, or in undisposed primary matter. — But if the most receptive is taken in the second way, it is denied that our intellect is the most receptive of the divine form in the genus of abstract things; on the contrary, the higher an intellect is, the more receptive it is of that form.

The second consequence is also false. Because an intermediate intelligence does not naturally understand God through a form adequate to Him; and yet it understands itself and the other intermediate intelligences.

Furthermore, the last consequence does not hold. Because, granted that intermediate intelligences are understood neither by us nor by themselves, they are still not entirely unknown: because they are understood by the first intelligence. And when it is argued that the first intelligence understands nothing outside itself: this is false, and contrary to Aristotle, as was shown above ¹⁰; and, according to some, contrary also to the Commentator himself, since all beings, in his view, are contained in the mind of the first being as artificial forms in the mind of the artisan, as he says in XII Metaph., comm. 18 and 36 ¹¹.

3. To the third mode, it is answered: and it is said first, that it is false that the Commentator wishes to prove that we sometimes understand separate substances, and not that this is not impossible. For from his own words it is expressly clear that this is contrary to his intention. For he says ¹²: But this does not demonstrate that to understand abstract things is impossible, as to look at the sun is impossible for a bat. For if it were so, then it would have acted in vain, because it would have made that which in itself is naturally understood, not understood by another. For what he says, "for if it were so", cannot be referred except to what he had said before, for which he wishes to assign a reason. But he had said that that example of Aristotle did not demonstrate the impossibility of knowing separate substances. Therefore that antecedent also must be understood of the non-impossibility of knowledge.

It is said secondly that from the very words of the Commentator it is apparent that he does not presuppose those things which that author says. For the Commentator himself, earlier in this same first comment, shows what he understands by understood in itself naturally. For he distinguishes it from that which is made understood in act by the agent intellect. But that which is made understood in act by the agent intellect is said to be understood in act because it has, through the agent intellect itself, the condition by virtue of which something has the capacity to terminate an act of the intellect, namely abstraction from matter. Therefore, he says that something is understood in act according to its nature in this way: because it is naturally abstract from matter, from which it has the property of being of an intelligible nature; but not because it has a natural relation to this or that intellect. And thus it is clear, when the Commentator argues that nature would have acted in vain because it would have made that which is in itself naturally understood not understood by anything, that he does not presuppose that separate substances are naturally intelligible by any intellect whatever, but that they are of an intelligible nature through themselves. And because, granted that they are not understood by our intellect, they can be understood by another intellect; and also our knowledge is not their end; therefore, according to St. Thomas, it does not follow that nature would have acted in vain concerning them.

VI. As to the second principal point ¹³, St. Thomas shows whether the human intellect can at some time know separate substances. And he says two things. The first is that, if the intellect is posited to be a material power, generable and corruptible, it can in no way understand separate substances: because it will be impossible for it to be separate, and it is determined to understanding material things.

The second is that, if it is posited as incorruptible and independent of matter according to esse, although it is united to the body, the obligation to understand material things happens to it from its union with the body. Therefore, when the soul is separated from the body, it will be able to understand immaterial things through the light of the agent intellect, which is a likeness of the light existing in separate substances.

VII. Concerning this determination of St. Thomas two things are to be done: first, his position must be clarified; second, certain objections that are made against it must be answered ¹⁴.

As to the first, it must be considered that a thing can be known in two ways: in one way, through another known thing; in another way, through itself. And in both ways it can also be known in two ways: in one way, perfectly; in another way, imperfectly. A thing is known through another known thing when it is known, not through its proper species that immediately represents it to the intellect, but through the species of another known thing, from the cognition of which the intellect comes to the knowledge of it; but it is known through itself when it is known through a proper species immediately representing it to the intellect. It is known perfectly when it is known either through its proper species or through some known thing that represents it as to its ultimate differences: as when through the species of man we know perfectly what man is, and through an effect adequate to the cause we know what the cause is. But it is known imperfectly when the intellect is led, neither through the species nor through another known thing, to knowing the ultimate differences of the thing, but only to the knowledge of some predicate, whether substantial or accidental.

2. When therefore St. Thomas affirms of the separated intellect what he denies of the conjoined intellect with respect to separate substances, this difference must be taken not as to all things, but as to some mode of knowledge.

For in this our conjoined intellect and separated intellect agree, that neither the conjoined nor the separated intellect can know separate substances perfectly and quidditatively. The conjoined intellect, indeed: because, as was argued above ¹⁵, and in the Prima Pars, q. 88 ¹⁶, and De Anima, q. 16 ¹⁷, and on Boet. Trin., q. 4 ¹⁸, and II Metaph. ¹⁹, sensible things, from the knowledge of which the conjoined intellect arrives at the knowledge of separate substances, cannot lead the intellect to the knowledge of what they are (their quod quid est); since they are neither their adequate effects, nor are they perfectly assimilated to them, but rather are very dissimilar, because they are material, and the separate substances are immaterial. — The separated intellect, however: because, as is held in the Prima Pars, q. 89, a. 2, and in the Disputed Question on the Soul ²⁰, the species of separate substances are higher than the intellective power of our intellect, just as a naturally separate substance is higher than the nature of the soul.

They differ, however, first, because the conjoined intellect cannot know separate substances in themselves, that is, through proper species immediately representing them to the intellect: since these cannot be caused in the intellect by way of sense, from which all intellectual cognition derives its origin. But the separated intellect can do this: because it understands through species infused into the intellect by the divine light ²¹.

They differ, secondly, because the cognition of the separated intellect concerning separate substances, although it is not perfect and quidditative, is nevertheless higher and more perfect than the cognition of the conjoined intellect concerning them: because the very species through which the separated intellect understands represent them more perfectly than do sensible things, by which the conjoined intellect is led by the hand into knowledge of them. Hence it is probable that our separated intellect understands more things concerning separate substances, and more clearly, than the conjoined intellect: for instance, that it knows certain conditions by which one is distinguished from another, according as mutual conversation and mutual intellectual locution require, even though it does not perfectly comprehend their quiddities on account of the weakness of its intellectual power; just as a certain man of duller sense knows another man with respect to certain proper accidents by which he distinguishes him from other men, even though he cannot discern and penetrate by sense his individual conditions. For it must be said that the souls of the damned see the demons, in whose company they have sadness.

Now, what I have said—that the separated intellect understands separate substances in an imperfect manner—is to be understood of the intelligences, but not of souls: because, as St. Thomas says in the previously cited place of the First Part ²², one separated soul perfectly knows other separated souls with respect to specific nature, since they are of one genus. — Likewise, this is to be understood of natural cognition. For with respect to beatific cognition, the separated soul, in seeing the divine essence, perfectly and quidditatively knows separate substances.

3. From these things it is clear that the mind of St. Thomas in this place, as is explained in other places ²³, is that the conjoined intellect cannot know separate substances in themselves, that is, through proper species existing in it, but the separated intellect certainly can do this; not, however, that the conjoined intellect cannot know them perfectly and quidditatively, while the separated intellect certainly can. And if he should at some time be found saying that the conjoined intellect knows them with respect to that it is quia est, but not with respect to what it is quid est, leaving it that the separated intellect knows them with respect to what it is: by the cognition of what it is he does not mean a perfect cognition that extends to the ultimate differences of a thing, but a cognition by which the intellect intuits the thing in itself, and not in some effect. For in this way the very substance of the thing is seen, and not only the effect from which one arrives at the cognition of it: hence it is said that through this cognition what it is is known, because the substance, which is signified by what quid, is known. But by that cognition by which a thing is known through an effect, the thing is said to be known with respect to that it is: just as demonstration through an effect and a posteriori is also called by Aristotle, in I Poster. ²⁴, a quia demonstration.

VIII. But a doubt arises. For if it is natural to the separated intellect, insofar as it is separated, to understand through species infused into it by the divine light, as St. Thomas says in the First Part ²⁵, it seems fitting that such species be infused into it as are proportioned to its power and through which it can perfectly understand things: for to other separate substances also there have been given species proportioned to their powers. Therefore, the separated soul will understand other separate substances perfectly and quidditatively.

2. To this it is said, first, that, speaking with respect to the requirement of nature, intelligible species through which it might perfectly understand separate substances cannot be given to our separated intellect. Because, since intelligible forms are received in the intellect according to the mode of the intellect itself, just as it is universally true that whatever is received in another is received according to the mode of the recipient ²⁶; and our intellect, however separated, is of a lower and more imperfect order than separate substances: it is necessary that separate substances be received in it intelligibly in a more imperfect mode than they are in themselves naturally; and consequently that the intellect apprehend them in a more imperfect mode than they are knowable in themselves. Hence the infused species are indeed proportioned to the power of our intellect, insofar as, just as its power is for understanding separate substances imperfectly, so species are given to it that imperfectly represent them to its intellect: it is not, however, fitting that species be given to it through which it may understand them perfectly, because this is not suitable to its nature.

It is said, secondly, that the case is not the same with our intellect and with the intellect of the intelligences. Because, since all the intelligences are of one order, each one of them is naturally suited to understand the others perfectly. Therefore, species are given to them that perfectly represent the other intelligences to them. But our intellect is of an order inferior to the intelligences, as has been said. Hence just as, because our intellect is of an order inferior to separate substances, it does not know them perfectly, nor does it receive species perfectly representing them; so, because the intelligences are of an order inferior to God, they do not know Him perfectly by natural cognition, nor do they receive any species that perfectly represents God to them.

IX. But it should be noted, when St. Thomas says ²⁷ that the separated soul understands separate substances through the light of the agent intellect, that this is not to be taken as though the very light of the agent intellect by itself were sufficient for this kind of intellection, without the addition of some intelligible species; or that the agent intellect by its light makes separate substances understood in act by causing their species in the possible intellect, as is the case regarding material things: but because, as is said in Qu. de Anima, a. 15, ad 9, through the possible intellect the soul will receive species flowing from higher substances, while through the agent intellect it will have the power to understand. For in the conjoined soul the agent intellect does two things: for it both makes intelligibles in potency to be intelligibles in act, and it gives the possible intellect the power to understand by way of a certain light, so that the soul's power of understanding is both from the possible intellect and from the agent intellect. But in the separated soul it does not make intelligibles in act: since in it there are no phantasms, which are required together with the agent intellect to make intelligibles in act. St. Thomas added this, however—that the separated soul understands separate substances through the light of the agent intellect—in order to show that the soul does not lack the power by which it can understand separate substances through the influx of species from a higher light: since it has in itself a certain likeness of the intellectual light existing in separate substances, received from the common cause of both, namely God; although, while it is conjoined to the body, on account of corporeal motions and sensible occupations, it is held back from being able to receive this kind of higher influx.

2. It should also be observed, when St. Thomas says that the obligation to understand material things happens to the human intellect insofar as it is united to the body, that this happens accidere is not taken as the same as to happen accidentally: for per se and naturally, not per accidens, the obligation to understand material things belongs to the conjoined intellect, just as it is natural to it to be united to the body; as St. Thomas shows in many places, and as was shown above in the second book ²⁸. But it is taken as the same as to belong and to be fitting: for such an obligation to material things is fitting for and belongs to the soul according to that state in which it is united to the body, but not according to the state in which it is separated from the body.

X. As to the second point ²⁹, against this determination of St. Thomas it is argued by some ³⁰ in a twofold manner. First: to understand separate substances is the most noble operation of the human soul, as is clear from Ethics I and X. And the human body is its proper matter. Therefore, by union with the body it is not hindered from the cognition of separate substances. — The consequence is proved: because no form is hindered from its most noble operation on account of its union with its proper matter.

Secondly: the generation of one species is not hindered by the body except because the body has a disposition contrary to the disposition required for its generation. But the human body has no disposition contrary to the disposition that the reception of intelligible species from a higher influx demands. Therefore, through union with the body the reception of such species is not hindered. Therefore, neither is the cognition of separate substances hindered through such a union.

It is confirmed: the good simpliciter of any nature is not hindered on account of the good simpliciter of the same nature. But to understand separate substances is the good simpliciter of human nature. And its union with the body is also its good simpliciter. Therefore, etc.

XI. To these things it is said, first, that if the arguer intends to argue concerning perfect and quidditative cognition, it is denied that to understand separate substances in this way is the highest perfection of the human soul, and that it is its perfection simpliciter. Indeed, it is no perfection of it: since, as was said above ³¹, to know them quidditatively is impossible for it, naturally speaking.

Likewise, it is conceded that it is not hindered from that cognition by union with the body: for a thing is not said to be hindered except from that which can belong to it.

2. If, however, he intends to conclude that the conjoined intellect can intuit separate substances through proper species just as the separated intellect can: then to the first point it is said, first, that the Philosopher is not speaking of that cognition of separate substances which is had through their species, but of that which is acquired from sensibles. And regarding this it is conceded that the intellect is not hindered from union with the body: indeed, it is helped by such a union.

It is said, secondly, that although to understand separate substances through infused species is the most noble operation of the human soul, insofar as to understand through conversion to higher things, as St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. 89, a. 1, is nobler than to understand through conversion to phantasms; and also insofar as it is the clearest knowledge that can be had by the human soul concerning the most noble things: nevertheless, this cognition is not natural to the soul simpliciter, but only insofar as it has separated existence, as is said in Qu. de Anima, q. 1, ad 7, and q. 17, ad 2 ³², and in the First Part, in the place cited. Therefore the consequence is denied.

To the proof of this, it is said that, although no form is hindered from its most noble natural operation through union with its proper matter, nevertheless through such a union it can be hindered from its most noble operation that is beside its nature, of which sort the said operation is. Nor is it unfitting for a form to be united to matter although it is hindered from some noble cognition belonging to it beside its nature, when from such a union it acquires a more perfect and distinct cognition concerning other things than if it were not united. But thus it is in the human soul. For, as St. Thomas explains in the previously cited places ³³, if the soul did not receive cognition from sensibles by way of the senses, but understood through species proportioned to separate intelligences, it would have only a confused and imperfect cognition concerning things.

3. To the second point, the major premise is denied. Because the reception of some intelligible form in the soul can be hindered by the body, not on account of the contrariety of the body's disposition to the disposition that that form requires, but because from union with the body the soul has a natural order to material things and phantasms, so that it can understand nothing except from sensibles and phantasms. For the mode of operating of each thing follows its mode of being, since each thing operates according as it is in act, as was shown above ³⁴.

The minor premise could also be denied. For to understand through conversion to higher things requires separation from matter: a sign of which is that certain revelations are made to those who are sleeping and alienated from the senses which do not occur to those using sense. But the body is something material, and it draws the soul to a certain materiality in some way.

4. To the confirmation, it is denied that to understand separate substances in that manner is a good simpliciter of the soul: but it is a good of the soul according as it has separated existence. Which separated existence, indeed, as is said in the First Part, in the question adduced, is not natural to the soul, but beside nature.

XII. The arguments of Scotus in I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, could also be adduced, by which he shows that we can in this life know separate substances with respect to what it is: but because he concedes that separate substances cannot be perfectly known by us in this life, although we can have some proper and substantial concept of them; and St. Thomas holds this same thing, and the difference is only in words, because that cognition in Scotus is called a cognition of what it is, although it is imperfect, whereas in St. Thomas it is rather called a cognition that it is; therefore there is no need to resolve his arguments.

For other things that could bring difficulty in the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding this matter, see above in the second book ³⁵.