Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Thirdly, ¹ it is shown that human happiness does not consist even in the knowledge of God held by all ² through faith (which surpasses the knowledge of Him held through demonstration in this: that through faith we know certain things about God to which demonstration cannot attain on account of their loftiness, as was said in the First Book).

I. It is proved first as follows. In the knowledge of faith there is found the most imperfect operation of the intellect on the part of the intellect (though not on the part of the object), since the intellect does not grasp that to which it assents by believing. Therefore happiness does not consist in such knowledge. — The consequence is proved. For happiness is a perfect operation of the intellect.

For the evidence of the antecedent, it must be considered that, since the operation of the intellect is as it were a certain medium between the intellect and the object, it receives a certain goodness and perfection from both: from the object, indeed, inasmuch as the operation of the intellect is more perfect in its species to the extent that it is more perfectly terminated at the formal object; but from the intellect its perfection is taken inasmuch as the intellection through which the object is seen more clearly and evidently is more perfect, because it participates more of the light residing on the part of the intellect. The act of faith on the part of the formal object is therefore supremely perfect: because, as is held in IIª IIae, q. 1, a. 1; and De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8; and III Sent., d. 24, a. 1, ³ its formal object is the first truth, which exceeds every other intelligible formal aspect. But on the part of the intellect, it is imperfect: because neither through the natural light of the intellect nor through the light of infused faith is that which is believed seen in particular, namely, such that the intellect sees and clearly apprehends that which is believed to be true by seeing the relation of the predicate to the subject; although the light of faith makes the intellect see that the things that fall under faith are to be believed, as is said in IIª IIae, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 and 3; rather, the intellect adheres to the particular credibile by the command of the will inclining the intellect to its assent. This is therefore what St. Thomas says: because, I say, in the knowledge of faith there is found the most imperfect operation of the intellect on the part of the intellect, since the intellect does not grasp—that is, does not comprehend nor clearly and openly see—that to which it assents by believing. For the intellect sees first principles immediately by its own light; but demonstrated conclusions it sees from principles upon which it knows them to depend; but believed propositions it sees neither immediately in themselves from its own light or from the superadded light of faith, nor through resolution to something seen and apparent to the intellect. And on that account the knowledge of them is most imperfect on the part of the intellect.

II. Secondly. The will holds the primacy in the knowledge of faith: because the intellect assents through faith to the things proposed to it because it wills, but not drawn of necessity from the very evidence of the thing. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the ultimate happiness of man does not consist principally in an act of the will.

For the evidence of the antecedent, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IIª IIae, q. 2, a. 1; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2; ⁴ and De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, that faith agrees with the intellect (which is the habit of first principles) and with science (which is the habit of demonstrated conclusions) in this: that the intellect is as totally determined through faith to one part of a contradiction as it is through the habit of principles and through the habit of conclusions. But they differ with respect to the cause of the determination. For concerning first principles, the intellect is determined by the principles themselves and the natural light of the intellect: because once the terms are known, their truth immediately appears and is manifest to the intellect. But concerning conclusions, the intellect is determined in virtue of the first principles: from that reason itself, I say, by which the conclusion is shown to depend on the truth of the first principles, which reason compels the intellect to assent to the conclusion. And thus, in the knowledge both of first principles and of conclusions deduced from them, the intellect is determined from the very evidence of the thing, and from the reason that it has within itself. But concerning the things that are of faith, the intellect is immediately determined, not from anything existing in the intellect, but from the very will of the believer, who chooses determinately to adhere to one part, because there is some reason by which it is judged good and fitting to assent and adhere to the speaker and revealer—namely, because the revealer is worthy of belief and would not deceive. This reason, indeed, inasmuch as it shows that it is good for the proposed thing to be adhered to, suffices to move the will and to incline it to choose to assent to that thing determinately, although it does not suffice per se to move the intellect to assent, since it produces no evidence of the thing. The will, however, having been moved in this way by that reason, commands the intellect firmly to adhere to this part determinately—for instance, that God is three in persons and one in essence. On that account, therefore, St. Thomas most fittingly says that in the knowledge of faith the will holds the primacy. Whence Augustine also says ⁵ that a man can do other things unwillingly, but believe only willingly.

It must be noted, however, when St. Thomas says in the proof of the antecedent that the intellect assents to the things that are of faith because it wills, that this is an improper expression, though customary among philosophers. For properly speaking, the intellect does not will, since the intellect and the will are distinct potencies: rather, the intellect is said to believe because it wills inasmuch as it is moved to believe by the command of the will. Whence it will be said properly that a man believing through the intellect assents to the things that are of faith because he wills; but improperly the intellect believes because it wills, inasmuch as a man believes through the intellect moved by the will.

III. Thirdly. ⁶ There is a certain knowledge of God in man higher than the knowledge of faith: whether the man proposing the faith sees the truth immediately, as we believe of ⁷ Christ; or receives it immediately from one who sees, as we believe the Apostles and Prophets. Therefore etc.

The consequence is evident. Because human happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God.

— The antecedent is proved. A believer has a knowledge more similar to hearing than to vision: since he grants assent to the things proposed to him by another, which he himself does not see. But one would not believe someone proposing unseen things unless he judged him to have a more perfect knowledge of them than he himself has. Therefore, since that judgment is not false—since faith cannot be false—it will be that the one proposing has a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. But there is no process to infinity, such that this one hears from another, and that one from another, to infinity: for then the assent of faith would be in vain and without certitude, because one would not arrive at something first and certain that would bring certitude of faith to those who believe; which does not belong to faith. Therefore one must arrive at someone who sees the things that he proposes. Therefore etc.

2. Concerning that proposition, Faith has a knowledge more similar to hearing than to vision, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IIª IIae, q. 1, a. 4, and III Sent., d. 24, a. 2, that those things are said to be seen by the intellect whose essence is presented to the intellect, and which either move the intellect to knowledge of themselves from themselves, or through another thing known from itself by the intellect: but the things concerning which faith is are not present to the intellect according to their essence, as moving the intellect per se or through another known thing. Therefore the knowledge of faith is not intellective vision, speaking properly of vision; although in a broad sense it can be called vision, inasmuch as all knowledge can be called vision. And on that account it is not likened to bodily vision, but is rather likened to hearing: because by hearing we know things that, since they are not present to us, are recounted to us; and similarly through faith we adhere to things that we do not see with our intellect.

IV. Concerning the progression of this argument, however, a doubt immediately arises. For someone could say that, although in the knowledge of things proposed by another to be believed and not seen, one must arrive at someone having clear knowledge of them, nevertheless it is not necessary that that first one having evidence of such things be some man, but rather God, from whom some man—say, Moses or whatever other prophet—first and immediately received the knowledge of faith, and he proposed the things to be believed to others, and those to others, until it reached us. And thus the final consequence does not hold, namely, Therefore there is a certain knowledge of God in man higher than the knowledge of faith; but rather that God's knowledge of the things proposed to us to be believed is higher than our knowledge of faith.

V. For the evidence of this difficulty, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IIª IIae, q. 5, a. 1, and De Veritate, q. 18, a. 3, that, since faith is from hearing, as is said in Rom. 10, ⁸ just as hearing and speaking are twofold—namely, exterior or bodily, and interior and spiritual—so faith is twofold. One that arises in the hearts of the faithful through exterior hearing: namely, when God proposes things to be believed to others through certain men. And this is the faith that belongs to us, or to the common state of the faithful, from the fact that we adhere to the revelations made to the Prophets and Apostles, who drew the faithful to faith by their preachings. — Another is that which arises in some through spiritual speaking, by which God reveals the things to be believed to some through internal inspiration, using the ministry of no man: such is the faith of the Apostles and Prophets, who were instructed by God Himself through intrinsic illumination concerning the things to be believed, which they were to teach to others.

Both kinds of faith agree in this: that each has the divine truth for its formal object; on account of which there is said to be one faith of the moderns and of the ancients. — They also agree because each is an enigmatic knowledge: inasmuch as through neither of them is the divine essence, or the first truth, seen; neither, I say, through itself nor through natural reason.

They differ, however, first, according to a certain nobility arising from the mode of receiving. For it is nobler and higher to receive the knowledge of faith from God through internal illumination than through the mediation of men through exterior speech: because through the first mode God is more present to man, and man approaches more closely to God; and on that account he has, under enigmatic knowledge, a less obscure knowledge of the things that he believes, and one more firm and stable, than through the second mode. — They differ, secondly, as is evident from what St. Thomas says in the same place in IIª IIae, in that, although with respect to that which is formal in the object of faith, faith is in all the faithful in common, inasmuch as in the things of faith all inhere in the first truth, assenting to them because they are revealed by God; nevertheless, with respect to the things that are materially proposed to be believed, there is a difference: because the first ones, who were instructed divinely through intrinsic illumination concerning divine things, were able to know certain things about the divine mysteries with a manifest and open knowledge that we, by the sole light of faith, cannot know except by believing; just as in the present state certain things are believed by one which are manifestly known by another, as that God is one.

VI. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that we can interpret the progression of St. Thomas in two ways. First, such that he wishes to deduce that one must arrive at some knowledge of God in man higher than all knowledge of faith, as one through which all things handed down through faith are clearly seen. And in this way he does not seem to intend. For he himself does not posit that the first ones who received faith through internal illumination, like the Apostles and Prophets, as also the angels before confirmation, and man before sin, had a clear and evident knowledge of all things that fall under our faith: although, as we have said, he posits concerning Adam before sin, and concerning the angels before confirmation, that it can be said that they openly knew certain things about the divine mysteries which we hold through faith. Likewise, they did not receive faith from another man: and consequently it is not necessary to reduce their faith to some higher knowledge of God in man than the knowledge of faith is; rather, it is necessary ultimately to reduce the faith of all to divine knowledge and divine wisdom, from which the divine mysteries have reached us.

2. Secondly, we can interpret that one must arrive at some knowledge of God in man higher than the faith that all the faithful commonly have in the present state. And in this way he seems to understand it. Both because at the beginning of the chapter he shows that he is speaking of the knowledge by which God is known by all through faith; ⁹ and because he deduces that one must arrive at some first thing that is certain from itself—that is, not from the report of another man—concerning the things that are believed, and that brings certitude to other believers. But for this it suffices that there be someone who received the knowledge of faith from God through internal illumination. For just as he who hears something immediately from another is said to have certitude from himself that that one said it, because he does not receive it from another, but heard it through himself; while he who did not hear it immediately from him, but from another who heard it, is not said to be certain from himself that the first one said it, but believes the one narrating that he heard it: so those who hear the things of faith from other men saying that they are revealed by God do not have certitude from themselves concerning them as revealed by God, but only believe those who preach them; but those who received them from God through internal illumination know with certainty from themselves, in virtue of the divine light infused in them, that those things were revealed to them by God; and from this the faith of others has certitude, and there is no process to infinity.

St. Thomas therefore wishes to maintain that there is some knowledge of God in man higher than the knowledge of faith which the faithful commonly have, namely the knowledge of the first ones to whom the revelation of faith was made by God. For that is more perfect, because it was also made by a more abundant light; and more certain, in that they knew manifestly that those things which they knew and preached had been revealed to them by God; and also because they had clear knowledge of some things concerning which we have only faith; and because, as being closer to God, they were able through that illumination to know many things manifestly about the divine mysteries and effects which we cannot.

Whence St. Thomas, explaining that there is some knowledge of God in man higher than faith, declares it by a disjunction: whether, he says, the man proposing faith sees the truth immediately, as we believe of Christ; ¹⁰ or receives it immediately from one who sees, as we believe of the Apostles and Prophets. As if to say: However faith reaches us from men; whether, I say, immediately from Christ Himself clearly seeing the things that He proposes to us to be believed; or from men who do not have evidence of all the things that they propose to us, but receive knowledge of them from someone having evidence, such as the Apostles and Prophets are: it is necessary that one arrive at a man having a more perfect knowledge of the things that he proposes to us to be believed than the common state of men has through faith. For if he himself has evidence of these things that he proposes, it is clear that his knowledge is higher. But if he does not have clear knowledge, but receives it immediately through internal illumination from him who has clear knowledge: it is also clear that his knowledge is higher than ours, as being closer to clear knowledge, and consequently less obscure in some way, and more firm and stable, and more separated from the movements of doubt.

3. It is clear, therefore, that the objection is not against the intention of the argument. For St. Thomas does not intend to deduce, as the objection supposes, that one must arrive at the knowledge of a man seeing clearly and manifestly all the things that we believe: but absolutely, that one must arrive at some knowledge of man more perfect than our faith (that which, namely, belongs to our state); whether that be the clear vision of the things that we believe, as is in Christ; or whether it be caused by the clear vision of them through internal inspiration, as was in the Apostles and Prophets.

VII. It must be observed, however, that when it is said, whether the man proposing faith sees the truth immediately, or receives it immediately from one who sees, that word immediately can be construed in two ways. In one way, such that in the first clause it determines that participle proposing, so that the sense is that the one proposing immediately—for instance, Christ, who immediately proposed faith to the Apostles and also to the Jews—sees, that is, openly and clearly knows, the truth of the things that we believe; while in the other it determines the word receives, so that the sense is that the one proposing faith receives knowledge immediately from the one having clear knowledge, and not through the mediation of men to whom the revelation of the things to be believed was previously made. — In another way, that it determines in both propositions the one who sees: so that the sense is, whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, or receives it from him who sees immediately. Although each sense can be adapted to the text, the second nevertheless seems to me more fitting, since according to it, in both instances immediately refers to one intention.

— For which it must be known, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the cited question of De Veritate, ¹¹ art. 1, ad 1, and art. 3, that to know truth concerning God happens in two ways. In one way, through the divine essence itself united to the intellect: as is in the blessed. In another way, through some intellectual species: whether it be a species received from creatures, or one caused by God in the intellect. The first is called immediate knowledge, because namely it is not through some species that is a likeness of God, as through a medium: but the second is called mediate, because it is through the mediation of such a likeness. The first is also a clear knowledge of the truth, because through it the very essence of God is seen, concerning Whom the truths are known; but the second is enigmatic and obscure, because that likeness through which the knowledge is does not represent God perfectly, but imperfectly and deficiently.

The sense of St. Thomas's proposition is therefore that there is some knowledge of God in man higher than the knowledge of faith that is commonly held: whether the man proposing the things to be believed knows the truth by seeing the divine essence itself through itself, and consequently by seeing clearly and openly the truth of the things that he proposes, like Christ, who, since He was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehensor, saw the divine essence itself; or whether he knows the truth, not indeed by seeing the divine essence, and consequently not by seeing clearly, but by receiving knowledge from one seeing it, like the Prophets and Apostles, who knew the truth of the things that they proposed to us to be believed through some spiritual likeness of divine wisdom (by which God knows both Himself and other things) impressed by God in their minds.

2. It must also be observed that the Apostles received the knowledge of faith in two ways from one seeing the divine essence: namely, from Christ, who was blessed, through bodily hearing; and from God through internal illumination, when they received the Holy Spirit. But St. Thomas seems to speak here of the knowledge of the Apostles according as they received it from God, but not according as they received it from Christ: because that knowledge of God in a wayfarer man alone is higher than common faith which is received through interior inspiration and through a likeness of divine wisdom impressed upon the mind. Whence he also places them in the same rank with the Prophets, who it is agreed received such knowledge from God alone, but not from man; and in the Questions on De Veritate, cited above, ¹² he says that in the Apostles and Prophets faith arose through interior hearing.

VIII. But a doubt arises. For our faith is also infused in the mind of every believer; and it is a certain spiritual light. And thus it seems that the faith of the first ones who handed down the faith to us is not higher than our faith because they had it through internal inspiration, while we do not.

The answer is that two things are required for faith: namely, that the credible things which a man ought explicitly to believe be proposed to him, and the assent of the believer to the things that are proposed. As to the second, our faith and the faith of the first believers agree: for in both there is an infused habit by which man firmly adheres and assents to the things proposed to be believed, and by which the intellect is illuminated to know that those things are to be believed. But as to the first they differ: because to us, to whom the things to be believed are proposed by men through bodily hearing, meaningful spoken words are presented externally, which are signs of those things that we ought explicitly to believe; but to those who receive the knowledge of such things from God through internal inspiration, there is presented not an external spoken word, but a sign of the divine essence, namely, a spiritual likeness of the divine wisdom, by which the things explicitly to be believed become known. Hence St. Thomas, De Verit., q. 12, a. 1, ad ult. ¹³, establishes the difference between prophecy and faith, because prophecy perfects the intellect in itself, and therefore it is necessary that the prophet be able to inspect distinctly those things concerning which he has been instructed; but faith perfects the intellect in relation to the affection, whence it has nothing except that through it the intellect is disposed to assent to those things which God commands to be believed. And thus it is not necessary that one having the habit of faith distinctly know all credible things.

From which it is clear that, although both our faith and that of the ancients, by which we firmly adhere to the things of faith, are caused by God in the mind of the believer and are a kind of light making us know credible things in general, namely, that they are to be believed; nevertheless, the things which we ought explicitly to believe were proposed to them in a higher mode and by a higher light, namely, by the light of divine wisdom participated by their minds, which can be called a kind of prophetic light; but to us they are proposed by a sensible spoken word devised by our intellect. And on this account their knowledge is higher, as being firmer and more stable than ours, and also in some part more manifest, inasmuch as through that internal illumination their mind was extended to knowing more divine mysteries, and knew the individual things to be believed less obscurely and distinctly. Hence the adduced consequence does not hold.

IX. Fourthly ¹⁴. The knowledge of faith does not quiet desire, but rather inflames it: because everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because desire is quieted through happiness.

Lastly. Through the knowledge of faith, the thing believed is not made perfectly present to the intellect, since it is of absent things, as is evident through the Apostle, II Cor. 5. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because knowledge concerning God is called the end inasmuch as it conjoins to the ultimate end of things, namely, God. — St. Thomas adds that God is nevertheless made present to the affection through faith, since the believer voluntarily assents to God. Which the Apostle signifies in Eph. 3.

It should be noted that a thing is said to be perfectly present to the intellect when it is presented to the intellect according to its essence, either through itself or through its perfect and adequate likeness. But it is said to be present to the affection when the affection is inclined toward it through love. Because therefore God, about whom certain things are believed, is not presented to the intellect through his essence, but rather the affection of that intellect is inclined toward him, as willing to assent to those things which are spoken by him, which would not be unless the affection were inclined toward God; therefore it is rightly said here that through the knowledge of faith the thing believed is not made perfectly present to the intellect (although, I say, it is made present imperfectly), but rather through faith God is made present to the affection. — It could also be said that through faith God is made present to the affection consequently: inasmuch as from faith one is inflamed into the love of God.