Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Secondly, ¹ St. Thomas shows that the knowledge of God which is had through demonstration does not suffice for human beatitude.

But he notes first that through demonstration a higher knowledge of God is had, and a closer approach is made to His proper knowledge, than through the previously mentioned knowledge, because through demonstration many things are removed from Him, by the removal of which He is understood as distinct from others. For He is demonstrated to be unmoved, eternal, incorporeal, etc.

He notes secondly that, although one arrives at the proper knowledge of a thing not only through affirmations, but also through negations, there is nevertheless a difference between these modes of proper knowledge: because through proper affirmations it is known what the thing is, and how it is separated from others; but through proper negations it is known that it is separated from others, while what it is remains unknown. And such is the proper knowledge which is had of God through demonstrations. — Concerning this mode of knowing God through negations, it was determined in Book I, chapter XIV.

I. These things having been presupposed, the conclusion is proved first ² as follows. Beatitude is a certain common good, possible to come to all men, unless there happens to some an impediment by which they are deprived of it. But few arrive at the aforesaid knowledge, on account of the impediments to this knowledge, which were touched upon in Book I. Therefore etc. — The major premise is proved. Because those things which are of one species arrive at the end of that species for the most part (ut in pluribus), since things that are from nature are either always or for the most part, and rarely fail. But beatitude is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it.

Note, when it is said that all men naturally desire beatitude, that this, in accordance with the things said above, is understood of beatitude taken formally: that is, of beatitude as to the common notion imported by the name of beatitude, which is the notion of the perfect and complete good; for each one naturally desires the completion of his perfection, and his supreme good. But it is not understood of beatitude taken materially: that is, of that to which the notion of the highest good belongs. — Likewise, it is understood as to the specification of the act, but not as to the exercise.

II. Regarding this argument there is doubt in manifold ways. First, concerning the process of the argument. For there seems to be a transition from being (esse) to the possible, and from the possible to being. For in proving the major it is assumed that those things which are of one species arrive at the end of that species for the most part; and it is concluded that beatitude is a good possible to come to all men, unless an impediment happens to some; whereas it ought to be concluded that it is a good at which all or most men arrive. — Similarly, under the major is subsumed a minor of the actual fact (de inesse), namely, few arrive at that knowledge: whereas nevertheless it ought to be subsumed that few are able to arrive at it. — And thus the process seems to be false.

Secondly, because by this argument it would also be proved that even the beatitude which can be had in this life does not consist in the knowledge of God and of separated substances such as can be had: for few also arrive at it. Which is contrary to Aristotle, in I and X of the Ethics. ³

Thirdly, because by this argument it would also be proved that the vision of God through His essence is not human beatitude. For few also arrive at this: according to that of Matt. xx, ⁴ Many are called, but few are chosen.

III. To the first of these it is answered that there is no error in this process. For the major, although it may seem to speak of the possible only, is nevertheless understood also of the actual fact (de inesse). For the sense is that beatitude is a good that can belong to all, that is, from the attainment of which no one is prevented, unless there be some who are deprived, that is, lacking some principle of nature: and consequently more arrive at it at some time. Whence from that proposition St. Thomas gives to understand the sense both of the following and of the preceding propositions. For of that proposition, Those things which are of one species arrive at the end of that species for the most part, the sense is that the greater part of those things which are contained under the species has the potency of arriving at the ultimate end of the species, and has sufficient principles for its attainment, and attains the end itself; just as in other natural things it happens in fewer cases that the effect according to the inclination of the species does not occur. Similarly also this proposition, At the aforesaid knowledge of God to be had through the way of demonstration, few arrive, is to be understood in the same way. For the sense is that, to have the knowledge of God through demonstration, there are few who are not impeded: because there are more in whom there are present impediments to such knowledge, concerning which it was spoken in the first book, than those who lack those impediments.

2. To the second it is said first, that perfect beatitude, even natural, cannot be had in this life: as is clear also from Aristotle, in the places cited before. ⁵ Whence the knowledge of separated substances which is acquired through the speculative sciences is not perfect beatitude, but a certain participation of perfect beatitude.

It is said secondly, that it does not follow from this process that the beatitude possible to be had in this life does not consist in the knowledge of God and of separated substances such as can be had in this life, although few in it are able to arrive at it. For that proposition, Those things which are of one species are able to arrive at the end of that species for the most part, has truth considering nature simpliciter, and concerning the end of nature taken absolutely: but not considering nature according to some determinate state, say according to the state of this life. Whence it is said that, considering human nature in itself, and considering the end of such nature, more can arrive at that end which is the knowledge of separated substances; and more arrive at it, at least after death. It is not necessary, however, that more arrive at that end in this life: because there are many things in this life which impede from the attainment of such an end. If any, however, attain some likeness of beatitude in this life, their beatitude consists in the knowledge of separated substances.

It is said thirdly, that one must speak in one way of those things which are moved by another only to attain the end: and in another way of those things which by their own operation freely move themselves to the acquisition of the end. For in those things which are moved by another only to the end, more attain the end, if they are moved to the end: and because natural things have some principle in themselves through which they are moved to the end by the Giver of nature, therefore for the greater part they attain the end. But in those which move themselves by their own operation to acquire the end, it is true that they arrive at the end for the most part, not indeed absolutely, but if they work toward the acquisition of the end. And therefore, if all men applied themselves to the speculative sciences, and tended toward the knowledge of separated substances possible to be had in this life, for the greater part they would arrive at this end. But because, on account of the occupations of this life, and on account of the labor of study, few work to acquire this knowledge, therefore few arrive at it, and thus few attain the end of rational nature.

3. To the third it is said that this argument concludes concerning the end which can be acquired by the power of nature: as is clear from this assumed proposition, Those things which are from nature are always or for the most part, but fail in fewer cases. But the vision of God through His essence is an end exceeding the power of nature. Therefore it is not necessary that it come to more men, but it suffices that it come to fewer: although all men are called to faith and to glory. — Later ⁶ indeed St. Thomas will show that not even natural beatitude itself, at which all arrive at least after death, is the complete beatitude of man.

IV. Secondly. ⁷ The knowledge of God had through demonstration remains in potency to knowing something further concerning God, or the same things in a more noble way: for later thinkers have striven to add something to the things handed down concerning God by earlier thinkers. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because beatitude, which is the ultimate end, is an act to which potency to a further act is not conjoined: since to be in act is the end of that which exists in potency.

2. But this argument does not seem to conclude. For by it it would be proved that no one seeing the divine essence is blessed: because, since no one of those seeing God comprehends Him, to the vision of any blessed one whatsoever there is conjoined a potency to knowing something concerning God, or the same things in a more noble way.

It is answered that we can speak of potency in two ways. In one way, as it names only the lack of some perfection with an aptitude to receiving it. And thus it is conceded that to the vision of any blessed one whatsoever there is conjoined a potency to a more perfect act. But concerning potency taken in this way there is no discussion in this argument. — In another way, as it names this sort of lack of form and aptitude to it, and beyond this, a tending toward perfection: namely, when that which lacks perfection is moved toward it. And thus potency is taken in this place. For he who knows something of God through demonstration strives to know something further concerning Him, or the same thing in a more noble way; or at least later thinkers strive to add something to the knowledge handed down by others. Which is a sign that to the knowledge had there is conjoined a potency tending and moved to a further act. Now it is said that potency in this way is not conjoined to the vision of the blessed. Because neither is one seeing God according to some degree moved to seek vision according to a higher degree, but his appetite is quieted in that degree of vision which he has; nor does he who later is made blessed seek to add to the vision of another blessed one, since such vision is not had through the inquiry of reason, but through the grace of God. But concerning these things there will be a fuller discussion below. ⁸

V. Thirdly. Manifold error can be conjoined to the aforesaid knowledge: as is clear in many who, knowing something of God through demonstration, while demonstration was lacking to them concerning some things, fell into manifold errors. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because beatitude excludes all misery. But deception and error is a great part of misery: whence all naturally flee from it.

If it be said that some have found the truth concerning God by way of demonstration without the conjunction of error: — it is clear that they were very few. Which is not fitting for beatitude: namely natural beatitude, which is a common end, that is, belonging to all or most.

It should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 21, a. 4; and Secunda Secundae, q. 30, a. 1, that, since misery is opposed to beatitude, but beatitude is the good of an intellectual nature only, it is necessary that misery also, properly speaking, be the evil of an intellectual nature only; whether, I say, it be contrary to its natural appetite, or to its elective appetite. Because therefore error and deception of the intellect is an evil of the intellect itself, and consequently a great evil of man, since through the intellect man is man, therefore St. Thomas said that error and deception is a great part of misery.

VI. Fourthly. The aforesaid knowledge has much uncertainty. Which is demonstrated by the diversity of the sciences concerning divine matters among those who proceeded by way of demonstration. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because beatitude consists in a perfect operation; but for the perfection of knowledge certainty is required, as is clear in I Posterior Analytics.

2. But it seems that the antecedent of this argument implies a contradiction. For if knowledge is had through demonstration, but demonstration causes scientific knowledge (scire), and we are not said to know anything scientifically, as is held in I Poster., ⁹ unless we know that it is impossible to be otherwise, which is to have certain knowledge: it follows that knowledge through demonstration is certain. And thus, to say that the knowledge had of God through demonstration has much uncertainty is to say contradictory things.

It can be answered in two ways. First, that St. Thomas is not speaking in that antecedent precisely of the knowledge of God which is caused through demonstration, because, as is deduced, such knowledge has certainty: but of such knowledge together with other conjoined cognitions, when someone, with the knowledge had of God through demonstration, through discourse and probable reasoning arrives at some other knowledge of God not through demonstration. For when this total knowledge is taken, in it there is much uncertainty: not by reason of the demonstrated conclusion, but by reason of those things which are thought to be so probably.

Secondly it can be answered, according to those things which were said in Book I, chapter IV, that St. Thomas is not speaking of the knowledge which someone has through a true demonstration existing in him, which he knows to be a demonstration, because, as is argued, it is necessary that such knowledge be certain: but he is speaking of the knowledge handed down to others by philosophers through demonstration. For this has uncertainty in him who is taught, although not in the teacher. For although some philosopher hands down conclusions most truly demonstrated, nevertheless many doubt concerning conclusions of this kind, because they are ignorant of the force of the demonstration made: especially when they see diverse and opposite things taught by diverse persons who seem wise. And this seems to be the intention of St. Thomas: against which the objection made has no place.

VII. Fifthly. That knowledge is essentially beatitude, which having been had, there will not remain the knowledge of any knowable thing to be desired. But the aforesaid knowledge is not such: since, it having been had, we desire to know other things not yet known through that knowledge. Therefore etc. — The major premise is proved. Because beatitude is the ultimate end of human knowledge. But when the will has attained the ultimate end, its desire is quieted.

VIII. Sixthly. The intellect seems to be ¹⁰ in potency to all intelligibles. Therefore for its ultimate end, which is beatitude, it is required that it be totally reduced to act. Therefore etc.

The first consequence is proved. Because the end of anything existing in potency is that it be led into act according as is possible: namely, so that that whose whole potency cannot be reduced to act at once, be reduced to act successively, as is the case in primary matter with respect to forms; but that whose whole potency can be reduced to act, be totally reduced to act. But two intelligibles can be at once in the possible intellect according to first act: although perhaps not according to second act.

The second consequence also is proved. Because, having had the knowledge of God which can be had through demonstration, we are still ignorant of many things.

2. Note concerning the antecedent, that the word videtur is not posited as containing doubt: but as signifying the same as is manifest. For it is clear that the intellect is able to know all intelligibles; since it knows primary matter, which is of minimal entity; and God, who is most perfect, and maximally remote from the senses.

It should also be noted, concerning the proof of the first consequence, that, since St. Thomas wishes to prove that it follows that the ultimate end of the intellect is that it be totally reduced to act, he assumes that two intelligibles can be at once in the intellect: whereas nevertheless it seems that he ought to have assumed that all intelligibles can be at once in the intellect. For he does this to show that there is the same reason concerning two totally diverse intelligibles and concerning all. For nothing seems to oppose the fact that many intelligibles can be at once, except that they are forms of the same genus, as regarding the same potency. If however this does not stand in the way of two intelligibles, neither will it stand in the way of all: just as the Philosopher also, in IV Physics, ¹¹ argues, if two bodies can be at once in the same place, that infinite bodies can be at once.

It should also be observed, when he says, although perhaps not according to second act, which is consideration, that he did not on that account add perhaps as if it were doubtful to him whether two intelligibles can be at once in the intellect according to perfect act, since he determined in the preceding things ¹² that they cannot be at once in the intellect in that way: but to show that it makes no difference to his purpose whichever of those opposites is said. For it suffices for him that two intelligibles, nay all, can be in the intellect at once in first act: whatever may be the case regarding second act. Because, since through the knowledge had of God by way of demonstration not all intelligibles are in act, neither in the first, which is habitual science, nor in the second, which is consideration: it follows very well that the ultimate beatitude of man does not consist in such knowledge.