Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that the happiness of an intellectual substance consists in the contemplation of God, he wishes now to show in what kind of knowledge of God it consists ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he shows in what knowledge of God happiness does not consist; second, in what knowledge it consists, toward the end of chapter 50 ².

Concerning the first, he shows first ³ that happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God that is commonly possessed by the majority. And he does two things: first, he explains the conclusion; second, he proves it ⁴.

I. As to the first, he says that by the common knowledge of God he means a certain confused knowledge that is present in almost all people: either because, according to some, it is known that God is as something self-evident; or, what is more true, because by natural reason it seems necessary that there be some orderer of the things we see. Who, however, or of what sort he is, and whether there is only one orderer of nature, is not immediately had from this common consideration. — This is explained by the likeness of the knowledge of the soul from its movement and other operations.

This knowledge of God, therefore, St. Thomas says does not suffice for happiness.

2. It should be noted, first, that St. Thomas touches upon two opinions concerning the being of God, adduced above in Book I ⁵: of which one said that that God is cannot be demonstrated because it is self-evident to us, just as the first principles of demonstration are known to us; while the other said that it is not self-evident to us. And because the first opinion is false and the second true, St. Thomas therefore says, The second is truer. Because, however, both opinions agree in this, that some knowledge of God is common to almost all, he therefore adduced both for the confirmation of his proposition.

It should be noted, second, that he did not say that this confused knowledge of God is present in all, but in almost all: because this actual knowledge is removed from some on account of an impediment of the sensitive powers. For there are some in whom a defect of reason is present, because they have ill-disposed internal sensitive powers, as is evident in the insane, and this actual knowledge is not present in them. But it seems to be present at some time in all who use reason. For there is no one of this sort in whom there is not at some time the consideration that there is some governor of the universe. Whence also Cicero, in Book I of the Tusculan Disputations ⁶, says that there is no race so savage, and no man so monstrous, whose mind has not been imbued with an opinion of the gods.

II. As to the second, it is argued first as follows. This knowledge admits the admixture of many errors: as is evident from the fact that some have said that the celestial bodies are gods; others that the elements themselves are gods, as being those by which, according to them, other things are ordered, and whose movements and actions belong to them from no orderer; while others have said that men who order others are gods. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is clear. Because happiness must be a perfect operation.

Secondly. Human acts are not ordered to this knowledge as to an end: rather, it is present in all almost from the beginning, namely, from the use of reason. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is clear. Because happiness is the end of human acts.

Note that it is of the nature of happiness, since it is the ultimate end, to be the ultimate perfection, to which man strives to attain by his well-done works. Therefore, from the fact that that confused knowledge is present from the beginning, as proceeding from nature, St. Thomas excellently argues that human happiness does not consist in it.

Thirdly. From the fact that someone lacks the aforesaid knowledge, he appears most blameworthy, and is regarded as foolish: according to that of the Psalm, The fool hath said, etc. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because no one appears blameworthy on this account, that he lacks happiness: rather, those lacking it and striving toward it are praised.

Note that to lack happiness is not blameworthy if it is taken in itself, as is evident in living men, and in infants dying in original sin alone, inasmuch as they are particular persons. And St. Thomas understands it thus. To lack happiness, however, by one's own fault, as happens in the damned, is blameworthy, by reason of the conjoined fault, which is voluntary.

Fourthly. Such knowledge is most imperfect: because knowledge of this sort is that through which a thing is known in potency only, since proper characteristics are contained in common ones potentially. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because happiness is a perfect operation; and the supreme good of man must be according to that which is in act, and not that which is in potency; since potency perfected through act has the character of the good.

Note that the final words, namely, potency perfected through act has the character of the good, are adduced as the reason for the preceding proposition. And the meaning is that the supreme good of man is not that which is in potency, because that which is in potency, as such, does not have the character of the good, since it lacks act, from which something has that it be good; but it has all perfection and goodness inasmuch as the potency is perfected through act. For it is argued thus: What is in potency, as such, does not have the character of the good, but only what has act. Therefore, what is in potency cannot be the supreme good: for the opposite of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent.