Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having shown that happiness consists in none of the aforesaid things, St. Thomas concludes that it consists in the contemplation of God¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he premises certain conclusions; second, he infers the proposed thesis².

I. The first conclusion is: The ultimate happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth.

It is proved in two ways. First, by induction through all the things in which happiness can seem to consist. And it is argued thus: It does not consist in the goods of fortune. — Not in the goods of the body. — Not in the goods of the soul as to the sensitive part; nor as to the intellective part according to moral acts, or according to acts of prudence and art. — Therefore, in the contemplation of truth.

It should be noted that the acts of the moral virtues are posited as pertaining to the intellective part, not because they are acts elicited by the intellect, since they are acts of the appetite; but because they are acts regulated by reason, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite of man, in which are the moral virtues that are concerned with the passions, is subject to reason; while the intellective appetite, in which are the virtues that are concerned with operations, is directed by reason.

2. Secondly, it is argued from the conditions of true happiness, which Aristotle sets down in books I and X of the Ethics. Contemplation of truth is proper to man. — This is not ordered to another thing as to an end, since it is sought for its own sake. — Through this man is conjoined to higher substances by likeness, since this alone of human operations is in God and the separate substances. — Through this he is conjoined in some way to higher things by knowing them. — For this man is more self-sufficient, as needing little aid from exterior things for it. — To it all other operations seem to be ordered as to an end. For artificial things that are necessary for life are ordered to the sound health of the body, which is required for the perfection of contemplation. Likewise, through the moral virtues, and through prudence and art, one arrives at rest from perturbations, namely, of the interior passions; and the governance of the whole civil life is ordered to rest from exterior passions; which rests are required for contemplation. — Therefore, etc.

3. It should be noted first, from St. Thomas, Iª II^(ae), q. iv, a. 6, that a good disposition of the body is required for the contemplation of truth both in this life and in the heavenly homeland: not indeed as contributing to the very operation of beatitude, but as excluding infirmity, which could impede it.

It should be noted secondly, when it is said that man is more self-sufficient for the contemplation of truth, that although, as is said here, all arts and all human offices seem to serve those who contemplate truth, yet man does not of necessity need the help of all of them in order to contemplate, but has through himself the power of contemplating, and needs exterior things only for the sustenance of the body. In the active life, however, he needs them not only for the sustenance of the body, but also for the works of virtue: for the liberal man, for the act of liberality, needs riches which he can bestow upon others; and so of many other moral virtues. Therefore it is said here that man needs exterior things little for the contemplation of truth; and that he is more self-sufficient for this, namely, than for the operations of the active life, which he cannot perform unless he abounds in exterior things.

II. The second conclusion is: The ultimate happiness of man does not consist in the contemplation that is according to the understanding of principles, namely, first principles.

It is proved: Both because it is most imperfect, as being most universal, and containing the knowledge of things in potency.

And because it is the principle, but not the end of human study, as proceeding from nature, and not through the study of virtue³.

Note that the knowledge of first principles naturally known can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it is of the principles themselves per se; in the second way, as it is in some way the knowledge of conclusions virtually contained in them. When therefore it is said here that that knowledge is most imperfect, it is not understood as it is of the principles themselves according to themselves: for thus it is most perfect, since it is most certain and most evident. But it is understood as it is of the conclusions contained in them: for thus it is a universal and potential knowledge, but not actual and distinct. And therefore in respect of conclusions it is most imperfect.

III. The third conclusion: The ultimate happiness of man is not in the contemplation of truth according to the sciences that are about the lowest things. It is proved: Because it is necessary that happiness be in the operation of the intellect in comparison with the noblest intelligibles.

Note, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. III, a. 6, that a thing is not perfected by anything lower than itself except insofar as in it there is some participation of a higher thing. Whence, since sensible things are lower than the intellect, the intellect is not perfected by their forms insofar as they are such forms, but insofar as there is participated in them something similar to something that is above the intellect, namely, the intelligible light, or something of this sort. Since therefore the ultimate happiness of man signifies the most perfect knowledge of the intellect, by which it is perfected by some intelligible, it is impossible that it consist in the science that is about the lowest things, that is, about sensible things, which are lower than the human intellect. And in this consists the reason for the conclusion.

IV. From the aforesaid conclusions St. Thomas infers the conclusion principally intended, namely, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the contemplation of wisdom, which, I say, is according to the consideration of divine things. From which it is further established, by way of induction, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the contemplation of God: which was shown above by many arguments.