Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

I. Secondly ¹, he shows that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in moral operations, that is, in the acts of the moral virtues: as Diogenes the Cynic posited, and the school of the Stoics ².

1. And he argues first in this way. All moral operations can be ordered to something else: as the act of fortitude to victory and peace, and the act of justice to preserving peace among men. Therefore ultimate human happiness is not in them. — The consequence is proved. Because human happiness cannot be ordered to a further end, if it is ultimate.

Concerning the proof of the consequence, it should be noted that, according to the thought of Aristotle in X Ethic. ³; and of St. Thomas, ibid. lect. 12; and in Qq. de Virtut., q. I, a. 5, ad 8; and III Sent., d. xxxiv, q. I, a. 4; and more clearly in Verit., q. xiv, a. 2, human happiness is twofold: namely, one active or civil, which consists primarily in the act of prudence, by which a man governs both himself and others, and secondarily in the acts of the other moral virtues; the other speculative, which is an act of wisdom, namely the contemplation of the highest truth. Because, however, active happiness is ordered to speculative happiness as a kind of disposition toward it, it is therefore not ultimate happiness simpliciter: although it is the highest good in the genus of the active and civil life. For this reason, therefore, St. Thomas said in this place that human happiness cannot be ordered to something else if it is ultimate, in order to guard himself against active and civil happiness, which is indeed a certain happiness of man, but is ordered to another, and is not ultimate. — For a similar reason at the beginning of the chapter he proposed that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in the operations of the moral virtues: so that, I say, he might give it to be understood that he does not deny that a certain human happiness consists in the acts of virtues of this kind; but that he denies that ultimate happiness is in them, which is the highest good of man simpliciter, and not merely in some genus.

II. Secondly. The modification of passions or of exterior things cannot be the ultimate end of human life: since the passions themselves and exterior things can be ordered to something else. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because moral virtues are for the purpose of preserving the mean in things of this kind through them.

Note, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in many places, especially Iª II^(ae), q. lx, a. 2, that moral virtues are distinguished because some are, as regarding their matter, concerned with passions, as temperance is concerned with concupiscences; while some are concerned with operations, as justice is concerned with buyings, sellings, exchanges, and the like. Therefore it is said here that moral virtues are for the purpose of preserving through them the mean in intrinsic passions, which namely are movements of the sensitive appetite, and not merely inflicted from without; and in exterior operations, and in the things with which exterior operations of this kind are concerned.

III. Thirdly. The good of moral virtue is something established by reason in things other than itself. Therefore it is not the highest good of man, which is happiness. — The consequence is proved. Because man's proper good is according to that which is proper to reason: since man is man from the fact that he is a possessor of reason. But that which reason has in itself is more proper to it than that which it effects in another.

It should be noted, from St. Thomas, III Sent., d. xxxiii ⁴, a. 1, q.^(a) 1 and 2, that the good of moral virtue is the good of reason, that is, the good that is regulated by reason: for reason directs and regulates all human acts; and a human act is good in so far as it is conformed to reason. Therefore it is said here that the good of moral virtue is a good established by reason in things other than itself: namely because in the movements of the appetite and the operations that receive moderation from moral virtue, which are other than reason, good is considered from their order to reason; and the acts themselves that are produced by moral virtue, which are extrinsic to reason, are good in so far as they are conformed to reason.

IV. Fourthly. That according to which man is most assimilated to God is his happiness: since the end of all things is to be assimilated to God, as was shown above. But this is not according to moral acts: since such acts do not belong to God except metaphorically, for the reason that passions or any things of this kind with which moral acts are concerned do not belong to Him. Therefore etc.

It should be noted in this place that, although the highest good of other things consists in some good to which they attain through their own operation, for instance in a heavy body's being down below; this nevertheless cannot be in man. Because that which is the highest good in them, not found formally in God, is that in which they can most be assimilated to God.

In man, however, it is not so. For besides assimilation to God as to an exemplar, with respect to those things which do not formally belong to God, he has within himself that whereby he may be assimilated to Him according to the same ratio of the supreme operation which belongs to God, namely according to understanding and willing, according to which the creature approaches closest to God. Therefore St. Thomas excellently argues that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in moral operations, from the fact that through them man is not most assimilated to God, since they do not belong to God, but he has other things in himself through which he approaches nearer to God and is more assimilated to Him, namely understanding and willing, which are also the most noble divine operations. Whence also Aristotle, in X Eth. ⁵, shows that man's happiness consists most in contemplation because the gods, who are blessed, have this operation alone, and not moral operations: therefore according to it men are most like to the gods.

V. But one doubt occurs. For St. Thomas seems to mean here that no moral virtues belong to God properly, but only metaphorically. In the first book ⁶, however, he said that this is true of the moral virtues that are concerned with passions: but of those that are concerned with operations, such as justice and liberality, he holds that they belong properly to God.

It is answered, from those things which St. Thomas says in the same place; and First Part, q. XXI, a. 1; Iª IIae, q. LXI, a. 5; likewise IV Sent., d. XLVI ⁷, a. 1, that moral virtues of this kind which are concerned with actions can be taken in two ways: namely according as they are concerned with civil human actions; and according as they are engaged with actions absolutely and commonly. In the first way they do not belong to God, as is said in X of the Ethics ⁸: for human justice is concerned with buyings and sellings and deposits and the like; similarly liberality is concerned with givings of money and the like; which are not properly attributed to God. And St. Thomas understands it in this way in this place. — But in the second way they belong to God. And understand it thus above in the first book. For God is the distributor of all natural things, and the bestower of all goods, without recompense, properly speaking. See there in the first book, chap. XCIII.

VI. Fifthly. Moral acts are not the most proper to man among human goods in respect of the other animals, but only intellectual action is: since other animals participate in something of either liberality or fortitude, but not in intellectual operation. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because happiness is man's proper good, and therefore it is to be sought in that which is most proper to man.

Note that brute animals are not said to participate in liberality and fortitude as if those virtues belonged to them: but because they have certain acts similar to the acts of those virtues; to which indeed they are moved not through choice, which belongs to the ratio of virtue, but through natural instinct.

VII. It should also be observed that the Stoics were moved to place happiness in moral acts, as Cicero in the book De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum ⁹ seems to touch upon, because they said that the honorable alone is good: and they said that the honorable consists in virtue, according to which a man is called good.

But their reason is not conclusive. For it is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. v, a. 6; and IIª IIae, q. CXLV, that the honorable can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it divides the human good known to us through experience: as the doctors dividing the good into the useful, the pleasurable, and the honorable seem properly to take it. And in this way that is called honorable which in human affairs is per se eligible, as existing ordered according to reason: and the honorable is the same as virtue. But then it is false that the honorable is man's ultimate happiness itself. Rather it is ordered to happiness itself as to an end: although it also has in itself some ratio of goodness, even if no other good should come to us through it. — In another way it can be taken as it divides the good in common: namely, such that everything that is desired on account of itself is called honorable. And in this way it is false that virtue alone has the ratio of the honorable. Rather, the contemplation of God itself has more the ratio of the honorable: because it is so desired on account of itself that it is in no way desired on account of another; but virtue is so desirable on account of itself that it is also desirable on account of another, namely for the sake of attaining beatitude.