Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

I. Third¹, it is shown that neither are riches the highest good of man.

1. And it is argued first thus. Riches are not desired except for the sake of something else, inasmuch as we use them either for the sustenance of the body or for something else of this sort. Therefore they are not the highest good, which is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else.

Second. Riches are most of all beneficial in that they are spent. Therefore the possession of them cannot be the highest good. — The consequence is proved. Because the possession of those things cannot be the highest good of man which are most beneficial to man in that they are dispersed. — This argument proves particularly concerning the riches that Aristotle, in I Polit.², calls artificial, of which sort is money.

II. Third. The act of liberality and magnificence is more praiseworthy in that money is dispersed than in that it is preserved: a sign of which is that from this the names of these virtues are taken. Therefore happiness does not consist in the possession of money. — The consequence is proved. Because the act of a virtue is praiseworthy from the fact that it approaches happiness.

For the clarity of this argument, it should be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in IIª II^ae, q. cxvii³, that there are two acts of liberality concerning money possessed: one is to use money, which consists in its dispersal; the other is to preserve it for suitable use. Among these acts, the use of money, or its dispersal, is primary, as that to which the other is ordered. Therefore the use of money is more praiseworthy than the preservation of it. And from this St. Thomas intends to conclude that the possession of money is not happiness. Because, if it were so, then that act of liberality which is to preserve money would be more praiseworthy than its use, which is to disperse it: because the act of a virtue is praiseworthy to the extent that it approaches happiness; but preservation approaches more to the possession of money than dispersal, through which one withdraws from the possession of it; whence also Aristotle, in IV Eth.⁴, says that the use of money seems to consist in giving and spending, because taking and preserving are rather possession. But this is clearly false. Therefore happiness cannot consist in the possession of money.

Concerning that proposition, The names of liberality and munificence⁵ are derived from the fact that money is dispersed, it should be considered, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in the place cited⁶, that this name liberality seems suitably to be taken from dispersal: because, when someone disperses something from himself, in a certain way he frees it from his custody and dominion, and shows that his soul is free from affection for it. We can observe this same thing in the Greek language: for liberality in Latin is called in Greek eleutheriotes⁷, which name derives its origin from this verb eleutheroo⁸, and this verb in Latin signifies I make free, which takes place in the very dispersal of money, through which someone frees it from his dominion.

Note that this argument differs from the former: because this one proceeds from the order of the acts of liberality, and from their goodness; but that one proceeds from the utility that accrues to man from money.

III. Fourth. Man is better than riches, since they are ordered to his use. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because the highest good of man must be better than man.

Fifth. Fortune has place most of all in the attainment of riches. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the highest good of man is not subject to fortune: since fortuitous things happen without the application of reason; but man attains his proper end through reason.

2. Concerning that proposition, The highest good of man is not subject to fortune, it is doubted. Because the Philosopher, in II Phys.⁹, says that fortune and happiness seem to be about the same thing.

It is answered from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. XLIX, q. 1, q^a 1, ad 5¹⁰, that fortune and happiness are indeed about the same subject, because neither can be except in rational beings: but they are not about the same object, because fortune is of those things that are done for the sake of something else, when something happens beside the intention; but happiness is not ordered to something else, and is that which is intended by all.

IV. Sixth. Riches are lost involuntarily; they can happen to bad men, who ought to lack the highest good; and they are unstable. Therefore etc.

Note, concerning the first condition posited here, that it is of the nature of the highest good that it cannot be taken away from someone by violence: since, besides the Gospel Law, which posits that the blessed life is eternal, as is clear in Matt. 25¹¹, also according to Boethius¹², and Tully in the book De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, and also according to Aristotle in I Ethics¹³, happiness is a good most self-sufficient per se, and consequently stable and perpetual. For, as Tully says in the same place¹⁴, if there is anything that is to be happy, it must all be placed in the power of the wise man: for, if the happy life can be lost, it cannot be happy. St. Thomas also, in I^a II^ae, q. v, a. 4, proves that beatitude cannot be lost, if it was perfect. Therefore, if riches can be lost through violence, happiness cannot consist in them, and their possession is far foreign to beatitude.

V. But that happiness consists in riches is argued from two things. First, because from V Ethics¹⁵ it is held that money was invented for this purpose, that it might be a guarantor of having whatever a man might wish. But it is certain, according to Boethius, III De Consol.¹⁶, that happiness is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods.

Second, because Aristotle, in I Polit.¹⁷, says that desire concerning money and riches, namely artificial ones, is infinite. But this seems to belong to the highest good, that the desire for it should be infinite.

2. To these St. Thomas answers in I^a II^ae, q. II, a. 1¹⁸. To the first indeed, that Aristotle intends that all saleable things can be had by money, but not simply all things: because spiritual goods, which are not saleable, cannot be had by money.

To the second he says that the infinite desire for money is of one sort, and the desire for the highest good is of another. Because when any temporal goods are possessed, they are despised, and others are desired, from the fact that their insufficiency is more recognized when they are possessed. But the highest good, the more perfectly it is possessed, the more it is loved. Therefore the argument is of no force.