Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Secondly,¹ it is shown that man's highest good does not consist in worldly glory either.

First, thus. Honor is not the highest good. Therefore, much less is glory. — The consequence is proved. Because glory is sought for the sake of honor: since, according to Cicero and Ambrose, it consists in the celebrity of fame; but men wish to become known with praise for this purpose, namely, that they may be honored.

Yet a doubt occurs. For, as is stated in IIª IIae, in the place cited above in the preceding chapter,² ad 3, glory is an effect of honor and praise. Therefore, it does not seem to be for the sake of honor; rather, honor would be for the sake of glory, just as a cause is for the sake of its effect.

He answers that glory is both an effect of honor and a cause. For from the fact that we bear witness to someone's goodness, it happens that through honor his goodness becomes famous in the knowledge of many, in which glory consists. But from the fact that someone's goodness becomes famous, men are moved to honor him. Therefore, he who seeks glory ultimately orders it toward honor: because he seeks it as a cause of honor, and not as its effect.

2. Secondly. Glory consists principally in praise. Therefore, it cannot be the highest good. — The consequence is proved. Because praise is not attributed to one who has already attained the ultimate end, but rather honor: since praiseworthy things are those according to which someone is ordered to an end.

Note that St. Thomas holds the antecedent to be evident from the definitions of glory set down by him in the first reason: for Cicero defines it thus, that it is frequent fame concerning someone with praise; and Ambrose, upon the Epistle to the Romans,³ that it is clear knowledge with praise. For from these definitions it is apparent that glory pertains to praise.

3. Thirdly. Glory consists in this, that someone is known. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because it is nobler to know than to be known: since knowing belongs to nobler things, but being known belongs even to the lowest.

Fourthly, it is argued from the same basis. Glory consists in this, that someone is known. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since one desires to be known only in good things, it is clear that those goods themselves, on account of which to be known is desirable, are better.

Fifthly. The knowledge of fame, in which human glory consists, is imperfect: by the fact that it has a great deal of uncertainty and error. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is clear. Because the highest good must be perfect: since it quiets appetite.

Sixthly. Glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is clear. Because that which is man's highest good must be the most stable of human things: since a lasting constancy of good is naturally desired.