Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having shown that happiness does not consist in sensible pleasures, it remains to be shown that it does not consist in external goods either, which are called the goods of fortune ¹. And first, that it does not consist in honors ².

I. And it is argued first as follows. A man's honor does not consist in his own operation, but in that of another showing reverence to him. Therefore happiness is not in honors. — The consequence is clear. Because man's happiness is his most perfect operation, as was shown.

Secondly: and it is the argument of Aristotle, in Ethics I. Honor is for the sake of something else: because no one is rightly honored except on account of some good existing in him. And on this account men seek to be honored, as wishing to have testimony of the good existing in them. Therefore etc.

Note that St. Thomas did not say absolutely that someone is not honored except on account of some good existing in him, but added, rightly. Because virtue alone is the due cause of honor: either, I say, one's own virtue; or another's, which is honored in someone insofar as he represents that person's persona; as is said in IIª IIae, q. LXIII, a. 3. Therefore, if honor ought to be rightly shown to someone, it is necessary that it be shown to him on account of virtue. If, however, someone were honored on account of riches alone, honor would not be rightly shown to him, but evilly and perversely.

Thirdly: and this is also Aristotle's argument. That someone attains honor is not in his own power, but in that of the one honoring. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because happiness is attained through virtues. But the operations of the virtues are voluntary.

2. But this argument does not seem to be conclusive. For just as honor is not in the power of the one honored, but of the one honoring, so neither is the vision of God in the power of the one seeing God, but only in the power of God uniting Himself to the intellect of the creature. But it is clear from what precedes ³ that the vision or knowledge of God is the happiness of an intellectual nature. Therefore, that honor is not in the power of the one honored, but of the one honoring, does not prevent it from being happiness.

He answers that indeed, absolutely speaking, it is not in the power of man to attain beatitude, as though, namely, he could acquire it by his own virtue: but, supposing the divine motion by which He moves the soul, and the determination of the divine will establishing that those who act well attain beatitude, it is in the power of man to arrive at beatitude. But it is not so concerning honor. Because neither absolutely, nor from any supposition that is in act, can a man necessarily attain honor: since it is entirely in the power of the one honoring to honor someone or not to honor him.

And furthermore, the vision of God, although it depends on God as on the first cause of beatitude, is nonetheless the operation of the blessed man. Honor, however, is not an operation of man. Therefore the case is not the same concerning the vision of God and concerning honor.

3. Fourthly. It is better to become worthy of honor than to be honored: since being worthy of honor can belong only to the good, but the evil can also be honored. Therefore honor is not the highest good.

Fifthly. An evil person can attain honor. Therefore etc. - The consequence is proved. Because it is impossible for one to whom the highest good is present to be evil: since the highest good is a perfect good, namely entirely so; and consequently it does not tolerate any evil along with itself.

II. Note that St. Thomas mentions no authors of this position in particular: because perhaps this position had no philosopher as its founder, but seems to be, as is stated in Ethics I ⁴, the opinion of distinguished men, and of those who are suited for practical affairs.

Its foundation, moreover, is that honor is the reward of virtue, as is said in Ethics IV ⁵. But the reward of virtue is happiness, as is said in Ethics I ⁶.

But this argument rests on a false foundation. For honor is not the true reward of virtue, as St. Thomas says in Iª IIae, q. II, a. 2, ad 1; and IIª IIae, q. CIII, a. 1, ad 2. Rather, it is the greatest good that can be given by men: for honor holds the first place in human and bodily things. And for this reason it is called the reward of virtue by Aristotle: not indeed a sufficient one, as is said in the same place ⁷, but such as can be given by men.