Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that understanding God is the end of an intellectual nature and its beatitude, he wishes now, by ascending through the order of goods, to exclude false opinions concerning beatitude¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he excludes false opinions; second, he concludes the truth by induction, in chapter XXXVII.

Concerning the first he does four things: first, he shows that beatitude does not consist in pleasure; second, that it does not consist in exterior goods, in the following chapter; third, that it does not consist in goods of the body, in chapter XXXII; fourth, that it does not consist in goods of the soul with respect to certain operations of the soul, in chapter XXXIII.

I. As to the first, he shows that beatitude does not consist in sensible pleasures, the chief among which are situated in food and sexual intercourse.

And he argues first thus. The operations which pleasures of this kind follow are not the ultimate end, but are ordered to other ends: as eating is ordered to the conservation of the body, and copulation to generation. Therefore they neither are the ultimate end, nor do they accompany the ultimate end. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because, as was shown, according to the order of nature pleasure is for the sake of the operation, not the reverse.

Secondly. Beatitude does not consist in an act of the will. Therefore much less in pleasures of this kind, which are in the sensitive appetite: since the will is superior to the sensitive appetite.

Thirdly: and it is Aristotle's argument, I Ethics². Pleasures of this kind are common to men and brutes. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because beatitude is man's proper good, and does not belong to brutes except abusively.

Fourthly. Pleasures of this kind do not belong to man according to that which is most noble in him, which is the intellect. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the ultimate end is the most noble of the things that belong to a reality.

Fifthly. Such pleasures consist in this, that man is joined to certain things inferior to himself. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. The highest perfection of man is through his being joined to a reality higher than himself, but not to an inferior one: since the end is better than that which is for the end.

2. Concerning that proposition, The end is better than those things which are for the end, a doubt arises. Because, as was said above³ according to the mind of Aristotle⁴, each thing is for the sake of its operation as for the sake of an end. But the operation is not better than the operator: since it is not subsistent, as the operator itself is.

He answers that, since the end is twofold, namely extrinsic and intrinsic, that proposition is understood of the extrinsic and principal end, to which the thing desires to be joined, and to which the thing is ordered as to its end. The operation, however, is not an extrinsic end, but an intrinsic one, in so far as through it the thing is joined to its exterior end. Therefore it is not necessary that it be in itself more noble than the operator: although it is in some way more noble than it, in so far as it is the attainment of the exterior end.

3. Sixthly. The use of these pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: because otherwise they would impede one another. Therefore they are not in themselves the good of man. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because that which is not good except according as it is moderate is not in itself good, but receives goodness from the moderating principle. — The second is proved. Because that which is the highest good is per se good.

Seventhly: and it is a confirmation of the preceding. To use these pleasures to the greatest extent is not the best: since the excessive use of them is accounted a vice, and is harmful to the body, and an impediment to similar pleasures. Therefore they are not per se good. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because in all things that are predicated per se, the more follows upon the more, if the simply follows upon the simply.

Note that St. Thomas did not say absolutely that in all things in which the simply follows upon the simply, the more follows upon the more, but he said, in all things that are predicated per se: because in those things that are predicated per accidens, that rule, which belongs to the Philosopher, does not hold true. For it is not valid, as is said below, in chapter CXXXIX, White is musical, Therefore more white is more musical. But it is indeed valid, White is disgregative of sight, Therefore more white is more disgregative.

Eighthly. If it were so, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in approaching these pleasures than in withdrawing from them: because acts of virtue are praiseworthy from this, that they are ordered to beatitude. But this is false: as is clear in the act of temperance. Therefore etc.

Ninthly. Through the aforesaid pleasures man is impeded from the greatest approach to God, which takes place through contemplation. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that is the end, namely the intrinsic one, of man, through which there is the greatest approach to God, who is the ultimate end, namely the extrinsic one.

II. From these things, says St. Thomas, the error of the Epicureans is excluded, in whose person Solomon speaks, Eccles. 5, This therefore has seemed good etc., and Wisdom 2, Let us everywhere leave behind etc.; and the error of the Cerinthians, who are also called Chiliasts, as it were Millenarians, because they fable that there will be a thousand years of carnal pleasures after the resurrection. The fables of the Jews and the Saracens are also excluded, who place the rewards of the just in the aforesaid pleasures.

III. It must be noted that of those who place beatitude in pleasure, some have posited that immoderate and excessive pleasures—according to which mode those who use them are called vicious—are beatitude: as the crowd does, which is led to this, as the Philosopher says, I Ethics⁵, because it sees many rulers, who seem to be especially happy, leading a voluptuous life in the manner of Sardanapalus.

2. But others have posited that beatitude consists in moderate pleasure: as Epicurus and Aristippus⁶, and other philosophers who are their followers. For concerning the Epicureans St. Thomas says, I Ethics, lect. 5, that they cultivated the virtues to the highest degree, because they saw that many vices were an impediment to pleasure. Torquatus also says, in Cicero, in the book De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum⁷, that Epicurus held that one cannot live pleasantly unless one lives wisely, honorably, and justly; nor wisely, honorably, and justly, unless pleasantly.

They were moved, however, by these arguments to posit pleasure as the highest good. First, because all things desire pleasure: both children, I say, and infants, and brutes. — Secondly, because pain is the highest evil, and most of all to be shunned. — Thirdly, because all things seem to be ordered to pleasure, even the virtues themselves.

3. But to the first of these it is said, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. II, a. 6, ad 3; and IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. III, a. 4⁸, that although all things desire pleasure, it nevertheless does not follow that it is the highest good: because they do not desire it except because they desire the good with which pleasure is joined. And thus pleasure is ordered by nature to the good: as was evident above⁹ when we were speaking of pleasure. — Cicero also seems to be of this opinion in the place cited¹⁰. For, responding to this argument, he says that nature does not move an infant to seek pleasure, but only to love itself, to wish itself whole and safe. For every animal, as soon as it is born, loves both itself and all its parts.

To the second argument it is answered by denying the assumption. For pain is not the highest evil. Nor is every pain to be shunned: as is clear in the brave man.

To the third it is said that all things are not ordered to pleasure. But indeed pleasure, extending the name of pleasure even to intellectual pleasure, accompanies the act of each and every virtue. — Speaking, however, of bodily pleasure, as Epicurus spoke, it is utterly false that the virtues are ordered to pleasure. Whence it is also false that anything becomes better by the addition of pleasure of this kind: although every good, with the addition of pleasure, is better, in so far as pleasure is rest in the good obtained, and perfects an operation just as beauty perfects youth¹¹.