Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Since it was determined in the preceding chapter that happiness and beatitude consist in the intellection of God, in this chapter St. Thomas wishes to remove certain doubts by which it might seem to someone that it consists rather in an act of the will ¹. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he raises the doubts; second, he proves that beatitude cannot consist in an act of the will ²; third, he answers the objections ³.

I. As to the first, five arguments are brought forward by which it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will rather than in an act of the intellect.

The first is: The object of the will is the good, which has the nature of an end; and the true, which is the object of the intellect, does not have the nature of an end except insofar as it is good. Therefore, man does not attain the ultimate end through an act of the intellect, but rather through an act of the will.

The second is: The ultimate perfection of an operation is pleasure, as is clear from Ethics X. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because a perfect operation is the ultimate end.

The third is: Pleasure seems to be desired for its own sake in such a way that it is never desired for the sake of something else. Therefore, it is the ultimate end. Therefore, etc.

The fourth is: More people seek pleasure than knowledge. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because in the appetite for the ultimate end all agree to the highest degree, since it is natural.

The fifth is: The will is a higher potency than the intellect, because it moves the intellect to the end. Therefore, the action of the will is nobler than the action of the intellect. Therefore, etc.

II. As to the second ⁴, St. Thomas proves, these arguments notwithstanding, that it is impossible for man's ultimate happiness to consist in an act of the will ⁵.

And he argues first thus: Beatitude belongs to an intellectual nature according to that which is proper to it. Therefore, it consists substantially and principally in an act of the intellect rather than in an act of the will. — The antecedent is proved: because beatitude is the proper good of an intellectual nature. — The consequence is proved: because the intellect in itself is proper to an intellectual nature; but the will, insofar as it is an appetite, is not proper to it, but only insofar as it depends on the intellect, since appetite is present in all things, yet diversely according to as they are diversely related to cognition, as is clear by running through appetites and natures.

It should be noted that the will has it that it is an appetite, in which it agrees with the appetite of other things; and it has it that it follows upon the intellect, in which it differs from the appetite of other things; for a natural appetite follows upon a natural form, but a sensitive appetite follows upon a sensitive form. Therefore, although the will is proper to an intellectual nature, it nevertheless does not have it that it is proper to it insofar as it is an appetite absolutely, but insofar as it is an intellectual appetite. Hence its whole propriety to an intellectual nature is from the intellect, just as the propriety of a natural appetite to a natural thing is from the natural form, and the propriety of the sensitive appetite to an animal is from sense. On that account St. Thomas rightly says that the intellect in itself—that is, not because of dependence on any other power—is proper to an intellectual nature, but the will is proper to it according as it depends on the intellect.

III. Secondly. The first object of the will precedes every act of it. Therefore, its act cannot be the first willed. Therefore, it cannot be beatitude. — The antecedent is proved: because in all potencies that are moved by their objects, the objects are naturally prior to the acts of those potencies, just as a mover naturally precedes being moved. But the will is such a potency, since it is moved by the appetible. — The first consequence is clear. — The second consequence is proved: because the first willed is the ultimate end, which is beatitude.

It should be noted that, since beatitude can be taken in two ways—as was clear above—namely, with respect to the common notion of beatitude, which is the notion of the supreme good, and with respect to the particular notion of that in which the notion of the supreme good is preserved: when it is said that the first willed is the ultimate end, which is beatitude, beatitude is taken not only with respect to the common notion of the supreme good taken per se and absolutely, but also with respect to the particular notion of that in which the notion of the supreme good is preserved. For here St. Thomas speaks not of priority of duration, but of priority of perfection. But the most perfect appetible and willed thing is that in which the notion of the supreme good is found, taking supreme good as extending both to the ultimate extrinsic end of the intellectual creature, which is God, and to the ultimate intrinsic end, which is the attainment of that extrinsic end. And this is called the first object of the will and the first willed, on account of which all other things are to be willed. And this naturally precedes every act of the will, just as every object naturally precedes the act of the potency that it moves, namely by that priority by which it is said naturally prior from which the consequence of subsisting is not convertible ⁶. Therefore, since nothing is naturally prior to itself according to the same notion, it follows very well, as St. Thomas deduces, that an act of the will cannot be beatitude itself, which is the first willed.

IV. Thirdly ⁷. In all potencies that can be turned back upon their own acts, the act of that potency must first be borne toward some object, and afterwards be borne toward its own act, as is clear in the intellect, which understands some object before it understands that it understands. Therefore, the first willed cannot be willing itself, but some other good. Therefore, neither can it be essential beatitude. — The second consequence is proved: because the first willed of an intellectual nature is beatitude itself, for it is on account of this that we will whatever we will.

V. To this argument it could be said from the words of Scotus in IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. IV ⁸, that indeed the act of the will is not the first willed, but this is the object ad extra; and consequently it is not the completely ultimate end on account of which we will all things. And this the argument concludes. Yet this does not prevent the act of the will itself from approaching closer to the simply ultimate end outside than the act of the intellect does, and from this possessing that it is the ultimate intrinsic end and the intrinsic essential beatitude.

Secondly, this argument could be reproached as sinning through the fallacy of equivocation ⁹. For when it is said that the first willed is not willing itself, because the potency is borne toward some object before it is borne toward its own act, the first willed is taken there by priority of duration. But when it is subsumed that the first willed is beatitude, the first willed is taken by priority of perfection; which is clear because there is adduced as the reason that on account of this we will whatever we will; for this is the condition and notion of the most perfect willed thing.

2. But to remove this response of Scotus, it should be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. XI, a. 3 ¹⁰, and IV, d. XLIX, q. III, a. 4, qa. 3 ¹¹, that since the ultimate end is twofold—namely, one extrinsic, which is ordained to no end whatsoever, and the other intrinsic, which itself is also ordained to no further intrinsic end; and the intrinsic end is a certain attainment of the extrinsic end, or the operation that first unites to the exterior end—these two ends taken together have the character of one willed thing, insofar as the one is the reason for willing the other. And therefore each has the character of a first willed in its own order. For when someone wills money as the ultimate end, he wills simultaneously money and the attainment of money, or the possession of it insofar as it is the attainment of it, so that both money and the attainment of money have the character of one willed thing; and just as with him money is the first willed, so also is the attainment of it—the one as the extrinsic end, the other as the intrinsic.

So also in true beatitude, and the true ultimate end, the will wills simultaneously God and the attainment of Him, nor does it will God as its ultimate end to be acquired by it except by simultaneously willing the attainment of Him insofar as it is the attainment of Him. Hence both together are the first willed: God indeed the first extrinsic willed; but the attainment, insofar as it is such, the first intrinsic willed.

From this it follows very well, as the argument concludes, that an act of the will cannot be the ultimate intrinsic end, let alone the extrinsic one, arguing thus: The ultimate end, both intrinsic and extrinsic, is the first willed, because both together are that on account of which we will all things, either explicitly or implicitly. But an act of the will is not the first willed; therefore, it is in no way the ultimate end. — The minor is proved: because the first thing toward which a potency that reflects upon its own act is borne is not the act of the potency itself, but something else toward which the act is borne as toward an object; for every act of this kind must have some object distinct from itself to which the potency has an order, and toward which it is borne through the act itself, as is clear by running through all potencies of this kind. But the object of the will is the willed and appetible. Therefore, the will must will something else before its own act. And thus its act cannot be the first willed.

It is clear, therefore, that the response of Scotus does not weaken the argument of St. Thomas, and that the argument itself very well concludes that an act of the will cannot be the ultimate end, even the intrinsic one.

3. To the second objection, it is answered that by the first willed St. Thomas understands not the first in duration only, nor the first in perfection as such, but the first according to nature absolutely. But such is said to be that which is presupposed to other willed things in such a way that, if the others are posited, it is posited, and if it is removed, the others are removed. And in this sense each proposition is true. For it is true that willing cannot be the first willed, because it presupposes another willed thing, namely the object at which willing itself terminates. For if willing is posited, there must be something at which it terminates; and if no object is posited at which it terminates, willing itself cannot be posited; for every act and operation must terminate at some object, since it receives its species from it. — Similarly, it is true that the first willed is beatitude—the first, I say, according to nature—because no previously willed thing is presupposed on account of which one wills beatitude, but whatever one wills, one wills on account of beatitude itself, either explicitly or implicitly; since the power of the ultimate end is preserved in every willed thing, just as the power of the first efficient cause is preserved in all second efficient causes.

Now when it is said that the reason adduced for the second proposition proves concerning primacy according to perfection: it is said that indeed from that reason it can be concluded that beatitude is the first willed by primacy of perfection, because primacy of perfection in efficient and final causes accompanies primacy of nature; for the first efficient cause according to nature, which is presupposed to all others, is the most perfect of all efficient causes; and the simply first willed, to which all willed things are ordained as to an ultimate end, is the most perfect willed thing. Nevertheless, from that reason it can also be concluded that beatitude is the first willed by priority of nature: for by nature we will that on account of which we will all things prior to any other things. And it is adduced by St. Thomas to conclude this. For from the fact that on account of beatitude we will whatever we will, it is clear that beatitude is not ordained to any further end, and that all things willed by us tend toward it as toward the ultimate end; in which consists the notion of the first willed according to nature.

4. It should be observed, however, that this argument differs from the former, because in the preceding one it is proved that an act of the will is not the first willed from the natural order between the object and the act of the will considered absolutely insofar as it is an act; but in this argument the same thing is proved from the order between the object and the act of the will insofar as it too can have the character of a willed thing.

VI. Fourthly. True beatitude differs from false beatitude on the part of the intellect, but not on the part of the will: since the will is disposed in the same way in loving or desiring or taking pleasure, whatever it may be that is proposed to it as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely; but whether it is truly or falsely the supreme good differs on the part of the intellect. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because each thing has the truth of its nature according to those things that constitute its substance, just as a true man differs from a painted man by those things that constitute the substance of a man.

2. But this argument seems to fail. For when it is said that true beatitude differs from false beatitude on the part of the intellect, it is understood either that it differs from something pertaining to the intellect as from a form, or that such a difference is known through an act of the intellect. If it is taken in the first way, then that proposition will be denied by those who hold that intrinsic beatitude is an act of the will. For, according to them, true beatitude is not distinguished from false beatitude by something pertaining to the intellect, but by that which pertains to the will.

If, however, it is understood in the second way, the consequence is false, and the proof is null, if it is argued thus: Each thing has the truth of its nature according to those things that constitute its substance; but true beatitude is known to be distinguished from false beatitude through the intellect, and not through the will; therefore, that which pertains to the intellect is of the essence and substance of beatitude, and not that which pertains to the will. — Again, the consequence is denied, because it is argued from un-syllogized propositions.

3. It is answered that the argument concludes very well if it is understood properly. For it is said that that proposition, "True beatitude differs from false on the part of the intellect," is understood in the first sense, namely that it formally differs from the false by something pertaining to the intellect. And although Scotus would perhaps deny it, it is nevertheless true, and can be proved, if the nature of the intellect and the will is considered. For the evidence of this, it should be considered that, since the object of the will is the apprehended good, and the will is not borne toward an object except according as it is proposed to it through the intellect, and according to that notion under which it is proposed to it: it makes no difference, as far as the will is concerned, whether that which is proposed to it as the supreme good and beatitude is in truth the supreme good or not; because, provided it is offered to it under the aspect of the supreme good, toward which aspect it has a natural inclination, it is borne toward it by accepting it. And therefore judgment concerning true beatitude cannot be taken from the will itself, as though the will were borne toward that which is truly beatitude by loving it and delighting in it, but did not delight in that which is not true beatitude. But judgment concerning true beatitude is rightly taken from the intellect itself. For since beatitude and the supreme good is the perfect good and the highest perfection of an intellectual creature insofar as it is intellectual, that is truly the beatitude and supreme good of man which is truly his perfect good and highest perfection insofar as he is an intellectual nature; but that which is not truly such a perfection is not truly his supreme good. But an intellectual nature has it that it is called intellectual from the fact that it has an intellect. Therefore, true beatitude formally differs from false beatitude from its order to the intellect. And thus it is clear that, if beatitude must be posited to consist essentially in an act of the intellect or in an act of the will, it is rather to be posited in an act of the intellect. And this is the intent of St. Thomas's argument.

VII. Fifthly. Neither desiring, nor loving, nor taking pleasure is happiness itself. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved as to all its parts. For it is not desire: because desire is of what is not possessed, which is contrary to the notion of the ultimate end. — Nor is it love: because it is one thing to possess the good that is the end, and another to love it; since before possessing it is imperfect, but after possessing it is perfect; for a good is loved even before it is possessed, and love of what is possessed is more perfect from the fact that the loved good is possessed. — Nor also is it pleasure: because it is caused by the fact of possessing the good.

2. It should be noted first that in this argument it is presupposed that formal and intrinsic happiness consists in the attainment of the ultimate extrinsic end, or of the object of such happiness. This is expressly posited in I-II, q. V, aa. 1 and 4; likewise in IV Sent., d. XLIX, ¹² a. 1, qa. 2. For, with this presupposed, it is clear that it is repugnant to the notion of the ultimate end—namely, the formal and intrinsic end, as is said here—that it be an act terminating at that which is not yet possessed. For an act that is of what is not possessed, insofar as it is such, is not the attainment of the extrinsic end, since the attainment of a thing implies a certain possession of it. And on that account desire, which terminates at what is not possessed, and love of an absent thing, cannot be the ultimate intrinsic end, which we call happiness. But love which is of what is already possessed, and pleasure which is caused by a thing already possessed and owned, cannot be the very attainment of the end, which is the ultimate end, but presuppose it, since they presuppose the presence and possession of the beatific object. And thus it is clear that the argument of St. Thomas is excellent.

3. To it, however, Scotus responds, in the place cited above ¹³, that indeed through the act of the will which is desire there is no attainment of the end; yet it is denied that through love which is of a present thing there is not such an attainment of the end. On the contrary, it is said that through love there is an attainment of the end first by primacy of perfection, although through the intellect there is some attainment of it prior by priority of generation.

But this response does not remove the argument of St. Thomas. First, because to love is not to attain the thing loved, neither, I say, primarily nor secondarily; since love is also of an absent thing, and when it is of a present thing, it is nothing other than a certain complacency of the appetite in the present and possessed thing. But such complacency is not the attainment of the thing, but is caused by it; and it is so much the greater, the more perfect the attainment of the thing loved is, and the greater the real union of the lover and the thing loved is.

4. If, however, the statement of St. Thomas in I-II, q. XXVIII, a. 1, ad 3 is adduced, where he says that love is more unitive than cognition: it is said first that there a comparison is made of our cognition on the way to love.

It is said secondly that love is more unitive causally, as is clear in that article, because love causes the lover to seek to unite the thing loved to himself.

It is said thirdly that love is more unitive formally according to the union of affection; for formally it is the very union according to the adaptation of affection to the beloved, as St. Thomas shows in the same place ¹⁴. But here we are speaking of real union, which takes place through the attainment of the ultimate extrinsic end; for each thing strives to unite to itself really its ultimate end. But such a union takes place according to the intellect, insofar as the divine essence is united to the intellect of the blessed, not through a likeness, but through itself. It does not, however, take place through love, except perhaps insofar as love includes that union through the intellect. Hence the cognition by which the blessed see God is more unitive than the love of Him, precisely insofar as it is such.

VIII. Sixthly ¹⁵. Pleasure is not the ultimate end. Therefore, much more so neither is any other act of the will.

The antecedent is proved in three ways. First, because it is not to be desired in itself, but has this from the operations that it follows. For that pleasure is good and desirable which follows good and desirable operations; but that is to be avoided which follows bad operations. And consequently it cannot have the character of the ultimate end.

Secondly, because in natural things pleasure is for the sake of operation, and not conversely, as is clear in the use of food and sexual acts, of which the one is ordained to the preservation of the individual, the other to the preservation of the species. But the right order of things agrees with the order of nature, because the order of nature is without error, just as also the order of things absolutely.

Thirdly, pleasure seems to be nothing other than the resting of the will in some fitting good, just as desire is an inclination toward attaining some good. Therefore, it is not the ultimate end, but something accompanying it. — The consequence is proved from natural things, which themselves are also both inclined toward their ends and rested when the end is already attained; for the end of the motion of a heavy body is the resting of the inclination by which it was tending toward its proper place. For nature would not give an inclination if it principally intended that the inclination be rested; but it gives it so that it may tend toward its proper place, which having been attained, as an end, the resting of the inclination follows.

2. Concerning the consequence of this argument, which St. Thomas does not prove, it must be noted that because pleasure most of all draws the appetite to itself—which seems to belong to the ratio of the ultimate end—and is concomitant with every attainment of a suitable good, it seems most of all to have the ratio of the ultimate end among all acts of the appetite. Hence even Aristotle, in Ethics X,¹⁶ leaves it in doubt which pertains more principally to beatitude, namely knowledge or pleasure. On that account St. Thomas leaves it as manifest that if pleasure is not the ultimate end, much less are the other acts of the appetite the ultimate end, concerning which this seems less true.

IX. Concerning the first proof of the antecedent, doubt is raised.¹⁷ For although pleasure is to be desired on account of good operations, this nevertheless does not prevent it from being desirable for its own sake as an end. For it is not to be desired from such operations as from an end—which would remove the ratio of an ultimate end—but as from a cause in some way productive of it. Hence St. Thomas says in ST I-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, that pleasure is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, if "for the sake of" signifies a final cause; but it is desirable for the sake of something else if "for the sake of" signifies a moving or formal cause.

Concerning the second proof, a doubt also arises¹⁸ from St. Thomas in ST I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2. For there he holds that according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of pleasure. But it is clear that a brute animal is moved to its operations according to the instinct of nature. Therefore, in natural things, operation is for the sake of pleasure, not vice versa. The opposite of this is assumed in this argument.

To the third proof Scotus answers¹⁹ that if pleasure is taken for a passion of the appetite which is a perfection supervening upon the operation, it is conceded that it follows the attainment of the end, not only first in generation, but also first in perfection, because it follows the act of loving or enjoying the end when seen. And thus it is conceded that this is not the ultimate end. But if it is taken for an act elicited by the will that quiets it, it is denied that it follows the first attainment of the end by a primacy of perfection; rather, it is thus the first attainment of the end, although it follows some attainment of the end, that is, its presence through the intellect.

X. To the first of these, it is said first that something can be called good and desirable in two ways: in one way, in the esse of nature; in another way, in the genus of morality. In the first way, the goodness of a thing is considered absolutely, according as it is in itself. In the second way, it is considered in relation to right reason: for that is called morally good which is conformable and proportioned to right reason, and is desirable according to right reason. This proposition, therefore, "Pleasure is not to be desired according to itself, but on account of the operations which it follows," is to be understood in the genus of morality, not however according to the esse of nature. For in this way it is true that of itself it is not to be desired, because of itself it does not designate any good in accord with reason or discordant from it, but it has from the operations that it is conformable or difformable to it. In the esse of nature, however, it is good and desirable according to itself. On account of which St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 4²⁰ that pleasure, insofar as it is pleasure, names a certain good.

It is said secondly that something can be called desirable for its own sake in two ways. In one way, because it is not ordered to another further and altogether different end for the sake of acquiring which it has to be desired. In another way, because from its own proper ratio it has the goodness on account of which it is desired, and not by reason of some desirable thing to which it is conjoined. But both are required for the ratio of the ultimate end: namely, both that it not be ordered to a further end, and that of itself it have sufficient goodness and desirability both in the esse of nature and in the genus of morality. For it is clear that God, who is the extrinsic ultimate end, has both conditions; and likewise the knowledge of God which is had in the fatherland, which is neither ordered to another further intrinsic end, nor is good and desirable from some intrinsic thing to which it is conjoined as its disposition, but is desirable of itself. The pleasure of the blessed, however, although it is not ordered to another altogether extraneous end, because it concomitantly accompanies the ultimate end, nevertheless lacks the second perfection: for it does not have from its proper ratio that it is morally good and desirable, but by reason of the operation which it accompanies. Hence in ST I-II, q. 34, a. 3, ad 3, St. Thomas says that pleasure does not have it that it is the best from the fact that it is pleasure, but from the fact that it is a perfect rest in the best. The argument of St. Thomas therefore proceeds well. For he proves that pleasure is not the ultimate end from the defect of the second condition which must be present in the ultimate end: namely, because from its proper ratio it is not to be desired morally, but from the ratio of something conjoined, to which the pleasure itself follows.

XI. To the second²¹ it is said that the order between the operation and the pleasure of brute animals can be considered in two ways: in one way, in comparison to the establisher of such an order; in another way, in comparison to the sensitive appetite of the brute animals themselves. If it is compared to the establisher of nature and of such an order, thus pleasure is attached to operations for the sake of the operations themselves, but operations are not established for the sake of pleasures. For the establisher of nature, intending the preservation of the individual and the multiplication of individuals in the same species, in order that animals may devote themselves to operations through which individuals are both preserved and multiplied, attached pleasures to them by which they might be allured to the aforesaid operations. — But if they are compared to the appetite of brute animals, whose object is the delectable good according to sense, thus on the contrary through the appetite itself operations are ordered to pleasures, inasmuch as brute animals seek operations for the sake of pleasures. — St. Thomas speaks, therefore, in this place of that order by comparing it to the intention of the one establishing nature and the order; but in the cited place he speaks of that order by comparing it to the sensitive appetite.

2. But this response seems not to satisfy. For brute animals are not moved by themselves to their operations, but are moved by natural necessity, according to an inclination given to them by the giver of nature. Therefore, the order of brute appetite is not contrary to the order of the intention of the one establishing nature, but fulfills his intention. Therefore that distinction is null.

It is answered that the intention of the one establishing nature in an order of this kind is twofold: one is primary and principal; the other is secondary. The primary and principal intention is that individuals and species be preserved through operations; and for this purpose pleasure is attached to operations. The secondary intention is that they seek operations from the appetite for pleasure; and for this purpose a natural inclination was given to brute animals to seek operations for the sake of pleasures. Just as if we were to say that a law proposing rewards for virtuous operations primarily and principally intends that man devote himself to virtuous works, and to this end it orders the reward; but secondarily and accessorily it intends that man, allured by the reward, seek virtuous operations for the sake of attaining the reward. The given distinction, therefore, is to be understood by comparison to the primary intention of the establisher of the order, and by comparison to the sensitive appetite, which is moved according to the secondary intention of the establisher. And thus it is clear that, although brute animals are moved according to an inclination given to them by the establisher of nature, nevertheless the order preserved by their appetite is distinguished from the order primarily and principally intended by the establisher of nature, as an order secondarily intended is distinguished from an order principally intended, and ordered to it.

XII. To Scotus's response to the third argument,²² it is said that it does not invalidate the argument of St. Thomas. For it assumes one false thing: namely, that formal and intrinsic beatitude essentially consists in the most perfect conjunction to the extrinsic end which is most perfect extensively. But this is false. For it is one thing to speak of beatitude with respect to its all-inclusive perfection, both essential and accidental; it is another thing to speak of it with respect only to its essential and specific perfection, and with respect to the most perfect operation in itself which is in beatitude. For vision and the pleasure accompanying vision itself are both required for its all-inclusive perfection; but to its essential and specific perfection only the vision of God through essence belongs; and consequently only the perfect union, by which namely the soul attains God in himself, as existing through his essence in the soul. But the union which is through an act of the will follows upon beatitude, and perfects the union itself. On account of which, if—whether through what is possible or through what is impossible—pleasure were separated from vision, the one seeing God would indeed be essentially blessed, but not completively, because he would lack the perfection accompanying beatitude.

Hence against Scotus's response it can be argued thus. That which formally follows upon and presupposes the ultimate end is not the essence of intrinsic and formal beatitude. But the act of the will which Scotus calls quieting presupposes the ultimate end, or formal beatitude. Therefore it is not the essence of such beatitude. — The minor is proved. The will cannot elicit an act that quiets it unless both ends have been attained by the will, namely both the extrinsic and the intrinsic: because it was being moved to both ends simultaneously while, willing God, it desired that he be united and conjoined to itself; but motion does not cease unless the end is attained. Therefore the act elicited by the will that quiets it presupposes the attainment of both ends. Therefore it presupposes formal beatitude in the blessed.

2. If it is said that the same operation is here perfectly attaining the extrinsic end and quieting, as Scotus says:²³ on the contrary. It is presupposed first that every act of the will terminates at some object, and that the object of the quieting of the will is a present good. This is the mind of all philosophers. — It is presupposed secondly that the object of desire while it is absent, and of the quieting of the will while it is present, is the same; for this is clear in every appetite. — Then thus. The act of desire was concerning the ultimate end not only extrinsically, but also intrinsically and formally: because the blessed one, before he was blessed, desired not only God, but also the attainment of God and union with him according to himself. Therefore the object of quieting is also not only the extrinsic ultimate end, but also the intrinsic end, which is formal beatitude. Therefore the quieting act itself is not formal beatitude, but presupposes it present in the blessed. The first consequence is clear through the second presupposition. The second consequence is also clear through the first.

XIII. Seventh principally it is argued.²⁴ The ultimate end of an intellectual substance is God. Therefore that operation of man is substantially his beatitude through which he first attains to God. Therefore it is understanding, not however an act of the will. — The first consequence is proved. Because if some exterior thing is the end of any thing, that operation of it is said to be the ultimate end through which it attains that thing: as is clear in those who have money as their end. — The second is also proved. Because we cannot will what we do not understand.

2. To this argument, according to Scotus, in the place cited above,²⁵ it can be answered that the word "first" can imply either a primacy according to generation, or a primacy according to perfection. If it implies a primacy according to generation, the first consequence and what was assumed for its proof are denied. If it implies a primacy according to perfection, the ultimate consequence is denied: because, although understanding precedes willing according to the order of generation, nevertheless through it man does not first attain God by a primacy of perfection, but through an act of the will.

3. Against this response it can be argued from the things said above.²⁶ Because namely, not that attainment which is more perfect, aligning itself on the part of the will, as the complement of perfection, has the ratio of essential formal beatitude; but that which is first in the order of generation, through which nevertheless the end is perfectly attained, and which is the cause of all other conjunctions and their measure.

For it is proved, first, from the example adduced. Because if the end of the greedy man is money, the very first attainment of the money, by which he has the money itself in itself, is the intrinsic end, and not something pertaining to the will: for we say, as soon as he has attained the money in itself, that he has arrived at his end.

It is also proved by reason. That attainment is beatitude into which the will is borne both through desire and through quieting, as into the ultimate intrinsic end willed simultaneously with the extrinsic end. But this precedes in the order of generation every attainment whatsoever posited through an act of the will. Therefore etc. — The minor is proved. The object of the quieting of the will is presupposed to be present to the one willing before he is quieted: because the will is not quieted unless the end toward which it was moved has been attained. But that attainment into which the quieting of the will is borne as into the ultimate end is its object. Therefore it is presupposed to be present. And thus by way of generation it precedes the union which is said to come about through the act of quieting.

— The same reason, moreover, holds for every act of the will that requires a present object.

Do not think, however, that the vision of God is on this account a more imperfect act than pleasure because it is prior in generation. For that which is prior in generation is more imperfect when it is only prior in generation. But when it is prior not only in generation, but also in effective or formal causality, then it is more perfect. And thus it is concerning vision, which is prior in generation and causality to pleasure: just as the soul is said to be prior to its potencies, and a subject to its proper passions.

XIV. As to the third part of this chapter,²⁷ St. Thomas answers the objections adduced at the beginning of this chapter.

To the first²⁸ indeed he answers from the preceding that this argument rather concludes the opposite of what is intended. For from the fact that happiness, because it has the ratio of the highest good, is the first object of the will, it does not follow that it is substantially an act of the will; rather, it follows that it is not an act of the will, as was deduced above.²⁹

It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, q.ª 2, and Quodlibet VIII, a. 19,³⁰ that beatitude being in the will can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is its object: and thus it is conceded that it is in the will, since it is the highest good and the ultimate end, and the good and the end is the object of the will. In another way, that it is some act of the will. And thus it has been said that beatitude essentially cannot be in the will, but is rather in the intellect. Hence to be the object of the will does not infer being an act of the will. And therefore, St. Thomas conceding in this place that happiness is the object of the will, and consequently that it is in the will objectively, denies that consequence, "Therefore it is an act of the will," or, "Therefore it is in the will formally and subjectively": rather, as he says, the opposite follows.

2. It must also be noted that from this is had the solution to one argument of Scotus, in the place cited before,³¹ by which he argues that the will is more immediately borne toward God as toward the ultimate end from the fact that the ultimate end, insofar as it is such, is the object of the will. For it is clear that it certainly follows that the will is more formally borne toward God under the ratio of the ultimate end than the intellect: because the ratio of the ultimate end is what is formal in the object of the will, not however in the object of the intellect. It does not follow, however, that it is more immediately borne toward him: because the will is not borne toward its proper object unless it has first been apprehended and known through the intellect, and proposed to the will through the intellect under the ratio of the good. And therefore the act of the intellect is terminated primarily, and consequently more immediately, at God under the ratio of the ultimate end—namely, as into a known thing—than the act of the will is terminated at him. For since the formal object of one potency can be the material object of another potency—just as color, which is the formal object of sight, is a material object contained under the object of the intellect—one potency can be borne primarily and more immediately into the formal object of another, insofar as it is materially terminated at it, than the potency whose formal object it is can be borne. But it is very true that the potency whose formal object it is, is borne into it more formally than any other potency.

XV. To the second³² it is answered that something is the perfection of something in two ways. In one way, as already having its species: just as habitation is the perfection to which the species of a house is ordered; and in the definition of a house this must be posited if the definition is to be perfect. In another way, as for having the species: just as the substantial principles of a house, which are ordered to constituting it; and the buttresses, which contribute to its preservation; and beauty, through which the use of the house is more suitable. The first perfection of a thing is its end, just as habitation is the end of a house, and the proper operation of any thing, which is, as it were, its use; but the second is not, rather the thing is its end. This is shown in matter and form, which constitute the species; in health and the nutritive power, which preserve the nature of an animal; also in the beauty of the body and strength, which adorn the species, and concerning which it is said in Ethics I that they organically serve happiness. — Pleasure, therefore, is the perfection of an operation not in the first way, namely as if the operation were ordered to it according to its species; but in the second way, because namely it is ordered to the operation; so that, I say, on account of pleasure we may apply ourselves to the operation more attentively and more fittingly. Hence it perfects the operation as bloom perfects youth, as is said in Ethics X, which it is clear is for the sake of the one in whom youth is present, and not vice versa. Therefore it does not follow that pleasure itself is the end.

2. For the clarity of this response, which is most beautiful, one must consider first that this distinction concerning a twofold perfection is to be understood in this way: that one is the perfection of a thing already constituted in its species, for the sake of which namely the thing itself is constituted in its species, and to which the constituted species is ordered, just as habitation is the perfection of a house, and the operation of a thing is its perfection: for this perfection presupposes the species constituted, and has the ratio of an end, because on account of that perfection the thing is made. But another is the perfection which is ordered to having the species itself: either, I say, to simply constituting it; or to fittingly adapting and adorning it. And it is manifest that such a perfection is not the end: because the thing constituted in its species is not ordered to it, but on the contrary the perfection itself is for the sake of the species and the perfection of the thing. And thus it is clearly evident that pleasure, since it is the perfection of an operation in the second way—which namely is for the sake of the operation—is not the end of the operation; but on the contrary the operation is its end; for it exists so that the operation may be continued, and that it may be done more attentively.

It must be considered secondly, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in ST I-II, q. 33, a. 4, that the ultimate end can be taken in two ways: in one way, for that on account of which all things are done; in another way, for a good supervening completively, so that the end is the same as the ultimate complement of perfection. From the fact, therefore, that the pleasure which is in beatitude is the perfection of the operation following and accompanying it, it follows that it is the ultimate end in the second way, not however in the first way, concerning which end the discussion presently turns.

3. It must be noted, however, when St. Thomas says that habitation would have to be placed in the definition of a house if the definition ought to be perfect, that, as is said in I Sent., d. 1, in the literal exposition;³³ and II Sent., d. xxvii, a. 2, ad 9, definition is twofold: one kind which encompasses the whole being of a thing, according as it is constituted from all the causes, and has an order to all of them; and another kind which does not encompass all the causes, but one only or several. The first is the most perfect; the second, however, is less perfect. Because, therefore, he posited that habitation is the end of a house, he therefore said that, if it ought to be defined most perfectly, habitation must also be placed in its definition: for the end of a thing is one of the causes that concur in the being of the thing. But if it is defined imperfectly, it is not necessary that habitation be placed in its definition, but it can be defined through each one of the other causes, per se or with another cause.

XVI. To the third objection³⁴ he answers by denying the consequence. Because delight accompanies the ultimate end; and from this, namely, it has that it is not sought by men on account of something else, although it is not the ultimate end.

2. But immediately from that response a doubt arises. For the opposite of what was said in the preceding response seems to be stated. For there it was said that delight in comparison to operation is similar to the perfection that is ordered to the species of a thing, and that the thing is the end of such perfection. From which it appears that delight is sought on account of something else. Here, however, it is said that men will delight not on account of something else.

3. For the clarity both of the response of St. Thomas and of this doubt, two things must be observed. The first is, that two things are required for the nature of the ultimate end. One is that it is not sought on account of something else; the other, that all other things are ordered to it as to an end; for the end is that on account of which something is done and desired. Therefore, although it belongs to something not to be sought on account of something else, if all other things are not sought on account of it, it does not have the nature of an ultimate end. On account of this St. Thomas very well said that delight being sought by men not on account of something else but on account of itself is not a sufficient sign that delight is the ultimate end, as if he were to say:—That indeed is a condition required for the nature of an ultimate end, yet it is not its total nature, but besides it something else is required, namely that on account of it all other things are desired and done.

The second is, that, as is said in the Fourth Book, d. xlix, q. iii, a. 4³⁵, delight, and the operation which it follows, are related not as two goods, but as one good, inasmuch as delight is the perfection of the operation. For just as from perfection and perfectible one perfect thing is made, so from operation and delight one perfect operation is made, which is happiness. Hence it is that, just as the ultimate and most perfect operation of man is ordered to no other intrinsic perfection of man, so neither is delight, which accompanies and perfects it. Therefore it is not customary to ask why someone wills to be delighted. For in those things that are joined to the end, as is said in the same article, ad 3, such a question is not made, since it immediately appears that they are desirable, just as is also the end whose perfections they are.

Yet, although delight is not sought on account of something else separated from it as to be acquired through it, it is nevertheless ordered to the operation which it accompanies as to an end: just as also every perfection superadded to a species, which namely pertains to its preservation or beauty, is ordered to the species itself as to an end, as St. Thomas said above³⁶. And therefore delight is sought on account of the operation to which it is joined, inasmuch as one desiring his own perfect operation also desires delight, without which the operation is not completely perfect.

4. To the objection, therefore, it is said: that there is no contradiction. Because when it is said that delight is ordered to operation as to an end, and consequently that it is sought on account of something else, it is understood that it is ordered to something to which it is joined as to an end, and consequently according to itself has that it is sought on account of that. When, however, it is said that men do not will delight on account of something else, it is understood that they do not will it—speaking of the delight that accompanies the vision of God, or that pertains to happiness—on account of some other intrinsic end separated from it. Whence St. Thomas said in the response that, although delight is not the ultimate end, it is nevertheless accompanying the ultimate end, and from this has that it is not sought on account of something else, as if he were to say: Because it is joined to the ultimate end and accompanies it, therefore it is not sought on account of acquiring another end separated from it; yet it is not the ultimate end, because it is ordered to another end, which it accompanies. It is evident, moreover, that these things include no contradiction.

XVII. To the fourth³⁷ the answer is made by denying the antecedent, concerning the delight that is in knowing, concerning which namely the discourse is at present: although it is true of sensible delights, which more people seek than the cognition of the intellect, and than the delight following it; because the things that are exterior, that is, sensible things, are more known to the majority.

How sensible delights are more powerful with respect to us than spiritual ones, although simply speaking spiritual ones are more powerful than bodily and sensible ones, St. Thomas shows by many arguments in IV Sent., d. xlix, q. iii, a. 5³⁸.

XVIII. To the fifth³⁹ the answer is made by denying the antecedent. For the proof of which it is said first, that the intellect moves the will primarily and per se: because the will, inasmuch as it is such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good. The will, however, moves the intellect as it were per accidens: inasmuch namely as understanding itself is apprehended as a good, and thus is desired by the will, from which it follows that the intellect actually understands.

It is said secondly, that even in this very thing the intellect precedes the will. Because the will would not desire to understand unless the intellect first apprehended understanding as a good.

It is said thirdly, that the will moves the intellect after the manner of an agent: but the intellect moves the will after the manner of an end. The agent, however, is posterior in moving to the end.

2. For the clarity of this response, it must be considered first that, although the intellect and will can be compared in two ways, namely absolutely according to their essential notions, and in the nature of mover and moved; yet because the adduced objection does not argue the nobility of the will above the intellect except inasmuch as it has the nature of a mover, therefore St. Thomas in the response makes no mention of the nobility of the one over the other except inasmuch as they are considered in the nature of mover and moved. And he holds that even in this the intellect is simply prior to the will, whereas the will is prior to the intellect only secundum quid. In the First Part, however, q. lxxxii, a. 3; and Verit., q. xxii, a. 11, he compares these potencies according to their proper notions, and shows that the intellect, even according to its proper notion, is simply more noble than the will, while the will is more noble than the intellect secundum quid.

It must be considered secondly, that the intellect, existing in act with respect to the good, moves the will not through something else by which it may be moved as such, but through itself, inasmuch as it has the nature of the object of the will. For the will, and any appetite following cognition, has per se to be moved by its object, which is the apprehended good, in the manner in which it is said to be moved by an object: for this, namely to move the appetite, belongs to the apprehended good from its own notion and from its own form. Therefore St. Thomas says that the intellect moves the will primarily and per se, that is, through its proper form, and not through something else to which by priority from itself it belongs to be a sufficient motive of the will. The will, however, does not have from itself that it can move the intellect to understanding, but inasmuch as it is moved by another, namely by the intellect. For it is necessary that the will be moved first to desiring understanding itself by the intellect apprehending understanding under the aspect of good and proposing it to the will, before it moves the intellect to actual consideration. And therefore St. Thomas says that the will moves the intellect as it were per accidens: not indeed entirely per accidens, but as it were, because it moves in some way through another, inasmuch namely as it is first moved by the intellect itself to the desire of understanding itself; and unless it were moved to a desire of this kind, it would not move the intellect.

It must be considered thirdly that, although causes are causes of each other, as is clear in II Phys.⁴⁰ and V Metaph.⁴¹, nevertheless that which moves according to a more noble manner of causing another is said to be simply more noble than it inasmuch as it is causative and motive, although secundum quid it can be called less noble, that is, according to that manner of moving by which it is moved by it: just as, because the causality of the form is more noble than the causality of the matter, form is simply more noble than matter in the nature of a cause, but is less noble than matter secundum quid, inasmuch as it is materially caused by it. So also, because the causality of the end is first among all causalities, therefore, if something moves another after the manner of an end and is moved by it after the manner of an efficient cause, it will be simply more noble and higher than it inasmuch as it is motive, although it is less noble secundum quid, that is, inasmuch as it is moved by it efficiently. On account of this, because the intellect moves the will after the manner of an end, while the will moves the intellect after the manner of an efficient cause, St. Thomas concludes that in the nature of a motive absolutely the intellect is simply higher than the will, while the will is higher than the intellect secundum quid.—How, moreover, the appetible and the intellect move the will after the manner of an end, was shown in the First Book, chapter XLIV⁴².

3. It must be considered lastly, for the declaration of the premises, that the vision of God can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely, as to its entity; in another way, inasmuch as it is the attainment and possession of the ultimate extrinsic end, which is God. When therefore St. Thomas says that the vision of God is essentially happiness, he speaks of the vision not as to its substance absolutely, because as such it does not have the nature of the highest good, since it is an accident of the intellect and a finite good; but inasmuch as it is the attainment and possession of the highest good, because as such it has a certain infinity, and has the nature of the highest intrinsic good, and consequently has the nature of the ultimate formal end of the creature.

4. From what has been said it is clear that, although the reward corresponds to merit, inasmuch as a greater reward is given to greater merit, yet merit and reward are not of the same potency: but merit is attributed to the will, which is the principle of acting and meriting, while reward is attributed to the intellect, to which it belongs to receive; for merit consists in acting, but reward in receiving. It is nevertheless the same supposit that merits and that receives the reward.

XIX. Against this conclusion⁴³, proved in many ways in this chapter, many arguments are adduced by Scotus and others, which Capreolus, in the Fourth Book, d. XLIX, q. II; and the First Book, d. 1⁴⁴, extraordinarily resolves. Therefore they are to be passed over by us.

Let it suffice for now to know that some of them prove that the will, and some act of it, is more noble than the intellect and its acts in the state of the way, which we do not deny: as when it is argued from the fact that charity is more noble than the intellectual habits; and from the fact that according to Anselm, in the book Cur Deus homo, it is a perverse order to will to love so that you may understand⁴⁵. For these things are true for the state of the way, which is the state of merit, in which charity holds the first place, as the first motive for meriting; but they are false for the state of the homeland, which is the state of reward.

2. Nor is the argument of Scotus in the Fourth Book, d. XLIX, q. IV⁴⁶ valid, by which he argues, from the fact that in the state of the way charity is more perfect than the intellectual habits, that the capacity of the will is greater than the capacity of the intellect even in the homeland: for the reason that the capacity is the same in the way and in the homeland, or at least they are proportioned to each other.

For it is said that the nobility of charity above the intellectual habits in the state of the way does not argue a greater capacity of the will even in the way: because the fact that it is perfected here by a more noble habit than the intellect is not from a greater capacity. For the capacity of the intellect is simply greater than that of the will, since the intellect is naturally apt to receive into itself the divine essence after the manner of an intelligible form, and the light of glory after the manner of a habit: but its capacity cannot be filled in the way, whereas the capacity of the will can be filled.

When, however, it is said that the capacity is the same in the way and in the homeland, or proportioned: the answer is that certainly the capacity of each one of these potencies is the same in the way and in the homeland, if it is considered simply: because through a variation of state the nature of the intellect or will is not varied, upon which their capacity is founded. If, nevertheless, it is considered as to reduction to act, the capacity of the intellect is not the same in the way and in the homeland: because in the way, according to the condition of the state of the way precisely, it can be reduced to act with respect to other perfections, but not with respect to the divine essence after the manner of an intelligible form, and with respect to the light of glory after the manner of a permanent habit; in the homeland, however, it can be reduced to act with respect to these, nay rather it is in fact actuated in the homeland. Whence the capacity of the intellect, absolutely speaking, is greater than the capacity of the will: but that capacity of the intellect cannot be filled in the way, as the capacity of the will is filled, which even in the way receives charity, which is its supreme perfection, comprehending under the name of charity both the act and the habit at the same time.

XX. But against the aforesaid things I would adduce only one doubt from those things which Capreolus touches upon⁴⁷. For certain people argue thus. According to the Philosopher, II Prior Analytics⁴⁸, and VIII Ethics⁴⁹, that whose opposite is worse is itself better. But the hatred of God, which is opposed to the love of Him, is worse than ignorance, which is opposed to the cognition of God. Therefore also the love of God is better than the vision of God. Therefore the essence of beatitude consists more in the love of God than in the vision of Him: since beatitude consists in the most perfect act.

2. For the clarity of this, it must be considered that to love God and to know God can be considered in two ways. In one way, through the inclusion of one by the other, but not conversely: according namely as to love includes to know, but to know does not include to love. In another way, by prescinding one formally from the other: namely considering each according to its proper notion, by which it is distinguished from the other.—Likewise, we can compare these to each other in three ways: either namely absolutely; or for the state of the way; or for the state of the homeland.

If we speak of these acts according as one includes the other and not conversely: thus, although the argument does not conclude, because that rule does not hold in those things of which one includes the other and not conversely; it is nevertheless conceded that to love God, which includes to know God, whether it is taken absolutely, or as it is in the way, or as it is in the homeland, is more perfect than to know, as including to know itself and something more. But above we did not speak in this way of the act of the will, as, I say, it includes the vision of God: because we did not speak of happiness as to every perfection of it by way of extension, but of them as they are formally distinguished; and we proved that vision is more the essence of beatitude than any act of the will.

3. If, however, we speak of them according to the prescinding of one from the other: it is said first that, absolutely speaking, to know is better than to love, other things being equal; because, as St. Thomas said above⁵⁰, the intellect is simply more noble than the will, since it moves the will primarily and per se, and moves after the manner of an end, which is the first of causes. Whence to know God is compared to loving as a cause to an effect: it is clear, moreover, that a cause is more noble than its effect.—When, however, it is argued that hatred of God is worse than not knowing God: it is said that it is not argued according to the mind of that rule. Because it is understood that that is better whose opposite is worse than the opposite of the other taken according to the same nature of opposition. Now, it is said that the opposite of cognition is not taken here according to the same nature of opposition by which hatred is opposed to love. For to this hatred is opposed contrarily; but to cognition ignorance is opposed privatively, or by way of negation. Whence if the opposites are taken in the same way, so that namely the opposite of love is not to love, just as the opposite of cognition is taken as not to know, it is false, absolutely speaking, that the opposite of love is worse than the opposite of cognition: nay rather it is worse to be ignorant of God than not to love Him, because it is the privation of a greater perfection.

It is said secondly, that love in the way is preeminent in a certain respect over cognition, namely in moving to the action of merit: as is said in I II\textsuperscript{ae}, q. iii, a. 4⁵¹. But we are not speaking in this place of these things according as they are in man in the way. Therefore it is not against the mind of St. Thomas.

It is said thirdly, that in the homeland, in the manner in which St. Thomas considered these acts in this place, namely as it is the vision of God through His essence, and as it is the love and dilection of God seen through His essence, the argument does not follow, but fails just as it failed against the first statement, because the opposites are not taken in the same way. For if the opposite to the love of God is taken privatively, just as ignorance is taken privatively, the privation of the vision of the divine essence is worse than the privation of love, because it deprives of a greater good than love is. Whence also the essential misery of the damned consists not in the privation of divine love or delight, but in the privation of the divine vision.

XXI. But further against the aforesaid conclusion⁵² the words of St. Thomas bring difficulty in the First Part, q. lxxxii, a. 3; and cviii, a. 6, ad 3, where he holds that the love of God is preeminent over the cognition of Him: for the reason that with respect to higher things love is preeminent over cognition and is better than it, since the will is borne to the thing as it is in itself; whereas the action of the intellect consists in this, that the notion of the thing understood is in the intellect; higher things, however, are in a more noble way in themselves than in the soul. Since therefore beatitude essentially consists in the most noble operation of man, as is of the mind of Aristotle, X Ethics⁵³; it seems from the cited authority that beatitude essentially consists in an act of the will, and not in an act of the intellect.

2. Scotus also argues, in the place cited above⁵⁴, from these words, that an act of the will is simply more noble than an act of the intellect. From which it similarly follows that beatitude essentially consists in it.

He argues, moreover, first, thus⁵⁵. An act of the will with respect to higher things is more noble than an act of the intellect. Therefore the former in its genus is more noble than the latter in its genus.—The consequence is proved. Because, if the best is more noble than the best, both the genus is than the genus, or the species than the species: as is had in III Topics, chapter IV⁵⁶.

Secondly. That act is more perfect which joins to a more noble object. But an act of the will joins to a more noble one than an act of the intellect. Therefore etc.—The minor is proved. Because it joins to the thing as it is in itself, whereas an act of the intellect joins to the thing as it is in the knower: but the beatific object is simply more noble in itself than as it is in the knower.

XXII. To this authority of St. Thomas, Capreolus answers, I Sent., d. 1, q. 1⁵⁷; and similarly other Thomists; that it is to be understood of the love of God and the cognition of Him in the state of the way, where God is known by the intellect through deficient similitudes; not however in the homeland, where God through His essence is united to the intellect of the blessed.

But that answer, although it easily avoids this difficulty, nevertheless does not seem to me to be according to the mind of St. Thomas. For in the First Part, q. 108, in the passage cited, he speaks those words while answering the argument by which it was argued that the order of the Seraphim was unfittingly placed by Dionysius above the order of the Cherubim. For, since the name Seraphim is assigned from love, while the name Cherubim is from knowledge; and knowledge is prior to love: it seems that the order of the Cherubim was to be placed in the higher position, but the Seraphim in the lower. St. Thomas therefore removes this objection by denying that the knowledge of God is prior to the love of God. Rather, he says, this love is preeminent over knowledge, just as is the love of all things that are higher than the knower himself: although the knowledge of those things that are lower than the knower is preeminent over their love. Now it is clear that the orders of the angels were ordered by Dionysius not as they are on the way, but as they are in the fatherland. For, according to the mind of Dionysius himself, St. Thomas distinguishes the first hierarchy from the others ⁵⁸ by the fact that they know the reasons of things immediately in God, and in this hierarchy he says that the Cherubim know the divine secrets supereminently.

Secondly, also in II Sentences, d. 9, a. 7, he says that from the beginning of creation there was in a certain manner a distinction of orders, not however according to their ultimate completion, but it is through a diverse gratuitous gift as through a formal and completive principle: and dist. 5, q. 2, a. 2, to 3, he says that the orders are distinguished according to their degree in the essential reward. And, in short, from the procedure of St. Thomas where he speaks of the ordering of the angels, it is evident that he distinguishes the orders in them according to as they are in the state of beatitude.

Since, therefore, he posits that the love of God is preeminent over the knowledge of Him according as the Seraphim are denominated from love, but the Cherubim are denominated from knowledge, it manifestly remains that the words of St. Thomas are to be understood concerning love and knowledge of this kind, not only according as they are on the way, but also according as they are in the fatherland.

XXIII. Wherefore it seems to me that one must answer according to the determination of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 82, a. 3; and De Veritate, q. 22, a. 11, where he speaks absolutely, not restricting himself to the state of the way or to the state of the fatherland.

It must be considered therefore first, that the eminence of one operation over another can be regarded in two ways: in one way, simpliciter; in another way, secundum quid. An eminence of this kind is considered simpliciter when it is considered on the part of the formal objects in themselves: and in this way that operation is worthier and more excellent than the other whose formal object is in itself nobler and higher than the object of the other. But an eminence of this kind is considered secundum quid when it is considered on the part of the things in which their formal objects are found: and in this way that operation is said to be worthier than the other whose formal object is found in a higher and worthier thing.

It must be considered secondly, as is according to the mind of St. Thomas in the passages cited above, that, since the action of the intellect arises from the fact that the intelligible is received in the intellect, but the action of the will arises from the fact that the will is inclined toward the thing itself as it is in itself; if the thing that is understood has a nobler esse in the intellect than in itself, the knowledge of that thing is preeminent secundum quid over the love of it; but if, on the contrary, the thing that is loved has a nobler esse in itself than in the intellect, love is preeminent over knowledge.

2. It is said therefore first, that the knowledge of God simpliciter and in itself is higher than the love of Him, as it is love: because its formal object, which is the true, is nobler than the good, which is the formal object of love. For the intellect tends toward God formally under the aspect of the true; but the will tends toward Him formally under the aspect of the known good; and the aspect of the true is nobler than the aspect of the known good, as is explained in the First Part, in the passage cited. Hence the statement of St. Thomas assumed in the objection is not to be understood of this preeminence, which is namely a preeminence simpliciter and in itself.

It is said secondly, that by an eminence secundum quid the love of God is preeminent over the knowledge of Him in whatever state: because God, since He is higher than any created intelligent being, has esse more perfectly in Himself than in any created intelligent being. And the words of St. Thomas are to be understood in this sense. For the love of God, even in the fatherland, is preeminent secundum quid over the knowledge of Him, inasmuch as He Himself, as He terminates the act of love, has esse in a nobler mode than as He terminates the act of knowledge: for He terminates the one as He is in Himself, but the other as He is in the intellect in some mode.

And thus it follows, according to the sense of that reply of St. Thomas, that, because the love of God is preeminent secundum quid over the knowledge of Him, the order of the Seraphim, which is named from the love of God, is higher than the order of the Cherubim, which is denominated from knowledge.

XXIV. But against this reply a threefold doubt arises. The first is, because it seems false that in the fatherland God has a nobler esse in Himself than in the intellect: since He is in the intellect of the blessed, not through some likeness, but through His own essence.

The second is, because the orders of the angels, the Seraphim and the Cherubim, seem to be placed according to that which belongs to love and knowledge simpliciter and in itself: and not according to that which belongs to them secundum quid. If therefore knowledge is preeminent over love simpliciter, the argument which St. Thomas intends to answer will not have been satisfied by the fact that the love of God is said to be preeminent over the knowledge of Him, if he intends this concerning an eminence secundum quid.

The third is, because that operation concerning God seems simpliciter better which unites more to God: for beatitude, which is the noblest perfection of the intellectual creature, consists in the most perfect union with God. But the love of God unites more to God than the knowledge of Him: for St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 108, in the article cited ⁵⁹, seems to intend this when he says that the Seraphim exceed in that which is supreme of all things, namely being united to God; and in the preceding article, to 5, he had said that the name Seraphim is assigned from the excess of charity. Therefore the love of God is simpliciter, and not only secundum quid, better than the knowledge of God.

XXV. To the first of these it can be said that, although God is through His own essence in the intellect of the blessed, it is not thereby precluded that He has esse in Himself in a more perfect mode than in the intellect. For the esse of God existing in the intellect of the blessed can be considered in two ways: in one way, in relation to the very essence of God existing in the intellect; in another way, in relation to the intellect, to which the divine essence is united after the manner of an intelligible form. In the first way, the esse of God in the intellect of the blessed, and in God Himself in Himself, is equally perfect. But in the second way, it is more perfect in God according as He is in Himself than as He is in the intellect: because, as is said in De Veritate, q. 8, a. 2, to 3, the divine essence is not joined to the intellect of the blessed according to its whole mode, but according to the mode of the intellect; and, as is said in art. 4, to 2, the created intellect is not joined to the divine essence according to the whole capacity of the divine essence itself. Likewise in IV Sentences, d. 49, q. 2, a. 4, to 2, it is said that the intellect of one blessed person stands under the divine essence more perfectly than the intellect of another. And in art. 5, to 4, it is said that the divine essence, which is the reason of all things, is not joined to the intellect of one seeing God as it is the reason of all things, but as it is the reason of some things.

Because, therefore, God has esse more perfectly in Himself than in the intellect in relation to the intellect, namely as He actuates it in intelligible esse; and knowledge arises from the fact that the intelligible is in the intellect after the manner of actuating it in intelligible esse; but love is terminated to the thing as it is in itself: for that reason it is very well preserved that even in the fatherland love is preeminent over knowledge by an eminence secundum quid.

2. To the second it is said first, that the ordering of the orders of the Cherubim and Seraphim is fittingly taken according to the eminence secundum quid between the love of God and the knowledge of Him, and not according to their eminence simpliciter. Because these operations are considered in the angels, not according to their relation to the formal objects themselves in themselves, which are the true absolutely and the good absolutely, but according to their relation to these as they are in God: since the orders of the first hierarchy are distinguished from their relation to God, in whom they immediately see all the reasons of things. Now it has been said that the eminence between love and knowledge that is on the part of the things in which the true and the good are found, is an eminence secundum quid.

It is said secondly, that in that eminence secundum quid there is also included the eminence simpliciter of the Seraphim over the Cherubim: inasmuch as the excellence of the love of this order over the knowledge of the Cherubim includes also a more excellent knowledge of God. For just as they love God more ardently, so they know Him more perfectly: as St. Thomas says in the passages cited above ⁶⁰.

3. To the third it is said that the love of God does not unite more to God by a real union simpliciter than does the knowledge of Him in the fatherland, but only secundum quid, inasmuch, namely, as it accidentally completes the perfect union which is through knowledge, as ultimately supervening upon it. Yet in itself it is not a union causing God to be in Himself in the blessed, but it is only a union according to affection, which imports a certain complacency in the thing possessed and united, and a certain adaptation of the affection to the thing loved. Hence St. Thomas, in the Fourth Book, d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, to 5, says that through affection a man is more perfectly united to God than through the intellect, inasmuch as the union that is through affection supervenes upon the perfect union that is through the intellect, perfecting and adorning it.

XXVI. To the first argument of Scotus ⁶¹ it is said that the rule of the Philosopher is understood of those things of which one is nobler than the other simpliciter, and not only secundum quid. Now, it has been said ⁶² that the love of God is not nobler than the knowledge of Him simpliciter, but only secundum quid. Therefore it does not follow that love according to its genus is nobler than intellection.

2. To the second it is said first, that an object is twofold, namely material, and formal: just as the formal object of sight is color, because all things are referred to sight under the aspect of the colored; but the material is this or that colored thing. Similarly, the formal object of the will is the good, because all things are referred to it under the aspect of the good: but the material is this or that good. The formal object of the intellect also is being or the true: but the material is this or that being, or this or that true.

It is said secondly, that one must speak in one way of the acts of one potency: and in another way of the acts of diverse potencies. Because since the acts of diverse potencies are distinguished according to their formal objects, their nobility is to be considered according to the nobility of the formal objects: just as to understand is nobler than to sense, because the intelligible is nobler than the sensible. But since the acts of one potency are distinguished only through material objects, they have their distinction in nobility from the nobility of the material objects themselves: just as to see white is nobler than to see black, other things being equal.

Therefore the major premise of Scotus, if a comparison is made between the acts of diverse potencies, has truth concerning the act uniting to a nobler formal object: but not concerning that uniting to a nobler material object. Now, the act of the will does not unite to a nobler formal object than does the intellect, but only to a nobler material object. For, as St. Thomas explains in the First Part, q. 82, cited above ⁶³, the formal object of the intellect is nobler than the object of the will, as being simpler and more abstract: for the act of the intellect is terminated to the true formally, but the act of the will to the known good. Therefore the minor premise, in the sense in which the major is true, is denied. — When, however, it is proved because the act of the will is terminated to the thing as it is in itself, whereas the act of the intellect is terminated to it as it is in the intellect: it is said that those modes of being are taken as conditions of the material object terminating the act of the intellect and the will; but not as diverse formal aspects of the objects.

If, however, in the major premise a comparison is made between acts pertaining to the same potency, thus the major is true also concerning the act uniting to a nobler material object. But then it is not to the point: because it is clear that the acts of the intellect and of the will are not acts of one potency, but of diverse potencies.