Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown in what manner God is the end of all things, he now wishes to show in what particular manner he is the end of intellectual substance ¹. Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he shows that understanding God is the end of the intellectual creature; second, he inquires what sort of knowledge concerning God is its end, ch. XXXVIII; third, he shows the conditions of this end, ch. LI. Because, however, the end of intellectual substance is happiness, concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that understanding God is its end and happiness; second, from this he excludes false opinions concerning happiness, ch. XXVII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he raises certain doubts and solves them, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he proposes that all creatures indeed reach God as their ultimate end, insofar as they participate something of his likeness. Intellectual creatures, however, reach him in a certain more special way, namely by understanding him. Therefore their end is to understand God. — The conclusion is understood of the intellection of God in common, not descending to the knowledge that is had through the essence, or through creatures, or in whatever other way.

It is proved first, however, in this way. The ultimate end of anything whatever is God. Therefore each thing intends to be united to God as to its ultimate end as much as is possible for it. Therefore the intellectual substance tends toward divine knowledge as toward its ultimate end. — He leaves the first consequence as manifest. — But the second is proved. Because something is more closely united to God when it reaches his substance in some way by knowing, than when it attains some likeness of him.

2. But concerning the proof of this consequence a doubt is raised. For it seems false that something is more and more closely united to God by knowing than by participating some likeness of him, speaking of the knowledge of God absolutely, of which St. Thomas speaks in this chapter. For in the knowledge of God that is had by us in the wayfaring state, God is not known except through the species and likeness of some creature. Therefore God in such knowledge is not united to us except through a certain imperfect and deficient likeness of himself received in us, just as he is also united to other things, insofar as the species of the creature that is known by us is a certain imperfect likeness of God. Therefore we are not more united to God by knowing than by participating his likeness.

He answers that here the comparison is not made of the union to God through the reception of God himself by the creature, as if other creatures received some likeness of God, but the knowing substance received the very substance of God, as the objection assumes; but the comparison of the union to God himself is made by way of a certain attainment, according to what is found in I Sent., d. xxxvii, q. 1, art. 2. And thus it is said that something is more closely united to God through knowledge of the divine substance than through the reception of his likeness. For through knowledge, which is an operation of the knower remaining in the knower, the knower itself in some way attains the very divine substance as the object of its operation, although it does not attain it as inhering in it according to esse. But through the reception of some participated likeness of him, the thing does not attain the divine substance, but only a certain likeness of it. And thus a thing is more closely united to God through knowledge than through the reception of any participated perfection whatever.

II. Secondly ². To understand is the proper operation of an intellectual substance. Therefore it is its end. Therefore that which is most perfect in this operation is the ultimate end. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the proper operation of anything whatever is its end: since it is its second perfection. And what is well disposed toward its proper operation is called virtuous and good. — The second consequence is manifest. — But the third is proved. Because to understand God is the most perfect in the genus of this operation: since operations of this sort receive their species from objects, and are known from them; God, however, is the most perfect intelligible.

2. Concerning that proposition, The proper operation of anything whatever is its end, two things must be noted. The first is that the end of a thing can be twofold, as is said in the Fourth Book, d. xlix, q. 1, a. 1 ³: one extrinsic, namely as the ultimate thing toward whose attainment the thing tends; the other intrinsic, namely that operation by which the thing is first united to its extrinsic end. St. Thomas's proposition, therefore, is understood not of the extrinsic end, but of the intrinsic.

The second is that, since the name operation can be taken in two ways, namely as naming action, and as naming every fulfillment of a potency, according as above, in ch. XXII ⁴, operation was divided into action and passion: in this place it is not taken in the first way, but in the second way. For the end of a stone, according as it is naturally moved, is not some action produced by it, but to be in a place below. Whence in IV Sent., in the place cited ⁵, St. Thomas, stating this proposition, says that the end of anything whatever is its proper operation, or it comes to its end through its proper operation. By the name operation, therefore, is understood here the fulfillment of a thing, and the perfection of the thing by which it is first united to its extrinsic end, if it has an extrinsic end. Whence the first proof of this proposition is introduced here, because operation is the second perfection of a thing, that is, the ultimate fulfillment of perfection: for the perfection of a thing is divided into first only, and second. It is true, nonetheless, that a thing having some natural operation that is an action has that action for an end: whence also in II De Caelo, text 17, ⁶ it is said that each thing is for the sake of its operation.

3. Concerning the second proof of the said proposition, note: — since a man is called virtuous and good simpliciter from the fact that he is well disposed and proportioned to his end, that by comparison with which a man is called virtuous and good will be the end of man. And universally each thing has for an end that by comparison with which it is simpliciter called good in its genus: just as good gold is that which has a nature and disposition congruent with its end, to which it is ordained. Since therefore virtuous and good are spoken of in order to proper operation—for virtue is, as is said in II Ethics ⁷, that which makes its possessor good and renders his work good, — which St. Thomas expressed in other words, saying that everything that is well disposed toward its proper operation is called virtuous and good — it is necessary that proper operation be the end of each thing.

4. Concerning that proposition, and especially in operations that are not ordained to some works produced, it must be noted that it is not apparent how these words are immediately joined to the preceding. And therefore either something is lacking, such as this, as also in other operations, and especially etc.: or it ought to be immediately after the first proposition set down at the beginning of the argument, namely after this one, The proper operation of anything whatever is its end. However it may be placed, St. Thomas sets it down for this reason: because even if in some operations there is doubt, namely in those that are ordained to some works produced—for in those the works produced themselves seem to be ends, as was clear above ⁸; yet in those that are not ordained to other works produced, it is more apparent that the operations themselves are ends.

5. Concerning that proposition, Operations of this sort receive their species from objects, note, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. xiv, a. 5, ad 3, that it is understood of the principal object, but not of an object that is known in another. It also has truth concerning the principal object itself by reason of its species existing in the knower, which is the principle of the operation: because every operation is specified from the formal principle of the operation. — From this is removed the contradiction that seems to be in the doctrine of St. Thomas, while sometimes he says operations are specified from objects, but sometimes he says they are specified from formal principles. For the same thing is said in both places: because objects do not specify except insofar as they are the formal principles of the operation through their species; or even through themselves, if in some things that happens.

III. To this reason ⁹ it could be answered, says St. Thomas, that the ultimate end of an intellectual substance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible, yet the best intelligible of each of them is not the best intelligible simpliciter, but according to their grade is the grade of things best intelligible by them. And therefore the happiness of the supreme substance is in understanding the best intelligible simpliciter, who is God: but the happiness of the others is in understanding other lower best intelligibles, according to their grades. And it seems especially concerning the human intellect that it is not its part to understand the best intelligible simpliciter: because with respect to knowing the maximally intelligible it is related as the eye of an owl to the sun.

2. But against this response it is argued by proving that the end of any intellectual substance whatever, even the lowest, is to understand God.

First. The ultimate end of all beings is God, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore also of the human intellect. Therefore to understand God is its ultimate end. — The first consequence is clear. Because the human intellect, that is, the intellective soul, is higher than all things lacking intellect. But a nobler substance does not have a less noble end. — The second consequence also is proved. Because, as was shown above ¹⁰, each intelligent being attains its ultimate end through the fact that it understands it.

Secondly. Things lacking intellect do not rest in likeness to proximate agents, but have for an end assimilation to the highest good, even if they can reach it most imperfectly. Therefore also the intellect, however little it can know concerning God, will have that for an ultimate end, rather than the perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles. — The consequence is proved. Because just as those tend toward God as toward an end by way of assimilation, so intellectual substances do by way of knowledge.

Thirdly. The human intellect desires, loves, and delights more in the knowledge of divine things, even a little, than in the perfect knowledge of the lowest things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because each thing maximally desires its end.

IV. Thirdly, it is argued principally to the conclusion. The intellectual creature is maximally assimilated to God through the fact that it is intellectual: since it has this before other creatures, and this likeness includes all others. And in this genus of likeness it is more assimilated to God when it understands in act than when it understands in habit or in potency: because God is always understanding in act. And in the fact that it understands in act, it is maximally assimilated to God according as it understands God himself: since God himself by understanding himself understands all other things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that through which each thing is maximally assimilated to God is its ultimate end: since each thing tends toward the divine likeness as toward an ultimate end.

Concerning that proposition, The likeness to God in intellectual nature includes all others, it must be noted that, since likeness is agreement in form, the condition of the likeness must be according to the condition of the form. But intellectual nature virtually contains all the formal grades of other things, just as the intellective soul also contains in unity all other forms: for it contains esse, it contains living, it contains sensing, it contains being moved with respect to place. Therefore what is assimilated to God in intellectual nature is assimilated to him with respect to all perfections of being according to which other creatures are assimilated to him. For this reason St. Thomas rightly says that this likeness includes and contains all other likenesses.

V. Fourthly. All practical arts, and every human operation, are ordained to the speculation of the intellect as to an end. All speculation is ordained to metaphysics. Metaphysics, as to those things that precede the knowledge handed down concerning God, is ordained to the knowledge of God as to its ultimate end. Therefore the knowledge of God is the end of all human knowledge and operation.

The first antecedent is proved. Because that which is choiceworthy only on account of another is on account of that which is choiceworthy only on account of itself: since there is no going to infinity in the appetite of nature, otherwise the appetite of nature would be in vain. But all practical sciences and arts and potencies are choiceworthy only on account of another, since their end is to operate. Speculative sciences, however, since their end is to know, are choiceworthy on account of themselves. Nor is there found any action in human affairs, speculation excepted, that is not ordained to another end. Which is maximally manifested from playful operations, which seem to be done without an end: for even they have some due end, namely the refreshment of the mind and greater power for earnest operations; otherwise one would always have to play.

The second antecedent is proved. Because all other speculative sciences depend on first philosophy, as receiving their principles from it, and directed by it against those who deny principles. In all ordained sciences and arts, however, the ultimate end seems to pertain to that which is prescriptive and architectonic of the others: as is clear concerning the art of piloting a ship with respect to shipbuilding.

VI. Concerning this argument there are three things that bring doubt. The first is because it is said that all practical sciences are ordained to work, and speculative ones are choiceworthy through themselves. For this seems false: because someone can learn practical sciences only for the sake of knowing; and someone can learn a speculative science for the sake of gain.

The second is because it is said that every human operation is ordained to the speculation of the intellect as to an end. For this seems false: because a man performs many operations not ordaining them to speculation; nay, thinking nothing about speculation.

The third is because it is adduced as a reason why playful actions are not sought on account of themselves, namely because otherwise one would always have to play. But this reason does not seem sufficient: because, since here speculation is said to be sought on account of itself, it will follow that one must always insist upon contemplation; but this seems false, since no one is found who always insists upon contemplation. Therefore etc.

2. For the evidence of the first doubt, it must be considered that here St. Thomas speaks of practical and speculative science insofar as they are of this sort, and of those things that belong to them per se, but not of those things that happen to them from the intention of the learner. But to practical science, insofar as it is practical, it belongs that it be ordained to some work outside the intellect, as is clear from its definition: for that is called practical science which is about operable things insofar as they are operable; but such knowledge per se implies an order to work, and has a proportion to it, as to that on account of which, as such, it was discovered, and principles were given to us by nature for discovering it. Although, however, work sometimes does not follow from the science itself, it is not on this account prevented from being ordained of itself to work as to an end: just as if health does not follow from medicine, or even medicine is ordained by someone to another effect than to health, it does not follow that medicine according to itself does not have health for an end, and is not ordained to it, insofar as it is medicine. — Similarly speculation, according to its nature, namely insofar as it is speculation, does not have that it is ordained to another as to an end, but is rather sought on account of itself: although some speculation, insofar as it is deficient and imperfect, is ordained to perfection, just as other speculative sciences are ordained to metaphysics as to a more perfect and higher knowledge. — Yet because it is not unfitting for something to belong to a thing from without besides its nature, therefore it is not unfitting that from the intention of the one acquiring science, practical knowledge be sought on account of itself, and speculative be ordained to something else. But this belongs to them per accidens, and besides their nature.

It is said therefore to the doubt that the argument does not proceed against St. Thomas. Because it argues concerning that which is attributed per accidens to these sciences. But St. Thomas speaks of that which belongs to them per se and according to their proper nature.

3. Through this also the solution to the second is clear. For although someone does not ordain his actions that belong to man insofar as he is man and as he is distinguished from others, which namely are regulated by reason, to speculation; yet all according to their nature are ordainable to contemplation, and have a proportion to it either mediately or immediately, insofar as they in some way dispose toward it; either by causing something serving speculation, as playful actions, by which the mind is refreshed and becomes readier for speculation; or by removing the impediments of speculation, as the actions of the moral virtues remove inordinate passions, which are apt to disturb from speculation; and so concerning other actions by which either mediately or immediately a man is helped toward speculation.

4. To the third it must be said that indeed one would always have to insist upon the speculation of the intellect, speaking per se, and the nature of speculation being considered. Both because, as is said in 1ª IIae, q. xxxv, a. 5, ad 3, contemplation according to itself never has the character of evil, since it is nothing other than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect. — And because it is the end: but the end is sought to infinity, as is said by St. Thomas on Rom. XII ¹¹. — And because to the delight that is in considering nothing is contrary, as is said in I Topics ¹² and X Ethics ¹³ (which must be understood per se, as St. Thomas notes in the cited article). Whence the Blessed, who have nothing drawing them back from contemplation, always have leisure for contemplation.

Per accidens, however, it happens that one must not always insist upon contemplation, on account of the various necessities of human life; and because from long and lasting contemplation a man is fatigued, from the fact that for the speculation of this life the work of the sensitive powers must concur.

Play, however, does not have from itself that one must always insist upon it. For even if, as is said in IIª IIae, q. CLXVIII, a. 2, ad 3, the operations of play themselves according to their species are not ordained to some end, as is clear in X Ethics¹⁴, yet the delight that is had in play is ordained to some recreation and rest of the soul. Whence also here it is said that such playful actions, which seem to be done without an end, have some due end, namely by reason of the conjoined delight; and above in this third book, ch. II, it was said that playful actions are sometimes an end, but sometimes are on account of an end; which also must be understood by reason of the adjoining delight.

VII. Fifthly. The end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. Therefore the ultimate end of the whole man, and of all his desires and actions, is to know the first truth, who is God. — The consequence is clear. Because the end and good of the intellect is truth; and consequently the first truth is the ultimate end. — But the antecedent is proved. Because among all parts of man the intellect is found to be the higher mover: which is clear from the order of movers in man. In all ordained agents and movers, however, the end of the first agent and mover is the ultimate end of all, as is clear in an army.

Note that, taking mover commonly, as it extends to moving by way of end and to moving by way of efficient cause, the intellect is the first mover in man, because it moves the will by way of end: which St. Thomas signified when he said that it moves the appetite by proposing to it its object; for the good and the end is the object of the will. But taking mover for moving by way of efficient cause, the will is the first mover, insofar as it moves to operation all other powers of the soul that are rational either by essence or by participation. — In what way, however, the intellect is related to the will in moving by way of end, has been sufficiently said in the first book.¹⁵

VIII. Sixth. There is naturally present in all men a desire to know the causes of the things that are seen, as is evident from the origin of philosophizing; nor does the inquiry cease until it reaches the first cause; and when we have reached it, we judge that we know perfectly. Therefore, man naturally desires to know the first cause as his ultimate end. Therefore, etc.

It must be noted that this argument presupposes that the end of all human inquiry and knowledge is the ultimate end of man, because from the above arguments it is clear that all human acts have an ordination to the speculation of the intellect according to themselves.

IX. Seventh. The human intellect knows universal being, that is, being inasmuch as it is being. Therefore, it naturally desires to know its cause. But this cause is God. Therefore, the knowledge of God is the ultimate end, and the knowledge of whatever other intelligible does not suffice for human happiness. — The first consequence is proved. Because man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. — The second is also proved. Because no one has attained the ultimate end until his natural desire is laid to rest.

2. A doubt arises concerning the efficacy of this argument. For just as man naturally desires to know the cause of common being, so also he desires to know the particular causes of particular things; and just as the natural desire is not laid to rest by the knowledge of any intelligible whatever unless the knowledge of God is also present, so the natural desire is not laid to rest by the knowledge of God alone, who is the universal cause of all things, unless the knowledge of particular causes is also present. Therefore, just as it is argued here that the knowledge of God is the end because, if it is not present, the natural desire is not satisfied, so it could be concluded that the ultimate end of man will be the knowledge of particular causes, because unless that is present along with the knowledge of the universal cause, which is God, man's natural desire is not laid to rest.

It is answered that St. Thomas's argument proceeds assuming the natural order of our knowledge, by which we ascend from the knowledge of lower things to the knowledge of higher things: for instance, from things that are moved we ascend to the knowledge of separated substances, and from the knowledge of them we arrive at the knowledge of God; and the knowledge of lower things is ordered to the knowledge of higher things, and is naturally presupposed to it. For this is the natural order of our knowledge; but not that we descend from the supreme cause to the knowledge of lower things, as if the knowledge of that supreme cause were ordered to the knowledge of lower things. Assuming this order, therefore, St. Thomas's argument proceeds very well. For whatever created intelligible we may know, there still remains the natural desire to know the cause of universal being, which is God; but once that is had, no further knowledge is desired. Therefore, that is the ultimate end, but not the knowledge of any other intelligible. Therefore, the same reasoning does not apply to the knowledge of the universal cause, which is God, and to the knowledge of proper causes. For the knowledge of this universal cause includes, presuppositively, the knowledge of particular causes from which it is caused, just as the attainment of the end presupposes the attainment of the means ordered to the end; and it is not ordered to any further knowledge; and therefore, when it is posited, the desire is fulfilled; but when it is not posited, it is not fulfilled. And on this account it is the ultimate end. But the knowledge of particular causes does not include the knowledge of the first cause as a means ordered to it; rather, it looks by natural order to the knowledge of that first cause as to that which is more perfect. Therefore, although it is posited, the natural desire of knowing is not for this reason laid to rest, but there still remains the desire to know God; just as, when evacuation has been obtained by the benefit of medicine, health is still desired.

Note, moreover, that this argument differs from the preceding one, because in that one it is argued from the fact that God is the first cause of things, while here it is argued from the fact that God is the immediate cause of being inasmuch as it is being.

X. Finally. The more things someone knows, the greater the desire with which he strives to know. Therefore, the natural desire of man in knowing tends toward some determinate end. But this cannot be other than the most noble knowable object, which is God. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which tends more vehemently toward something than before is not moved to infinity, but tends toward something determinate. This is proved from a naturally moved body, and from the argument of Aristotle in I De Caelo, text 44.¹⁶

From the aforesaid St. Thomas infers as a corollary that, because the ultimate end of any intellectual creature is called happiness or beatitude, the beatitude and happiness of an intellectual substance is to know God.

This is confirmed, moreover, by the authority of Matt. 5, John 17, and of Aristotle in the last book of the Ethics.