Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having shown that things intend to be assimilated to God with respect to goodness, St. Thomas now proves that they intend to be assimilated to him with respect to causality ¹.

Now, there can be a twofold sense of this intent. One, that every created thing is inclined toward causing something, and toward this: that in causing it may be assimilated to God. The other, that a created thing which is the cause of another, through the fact that it causes something else, tends into the divine likeness. Now, although each sense in some way contains the truth, and can be adapted to the text: — for each thing in act seems able through its form to cause something, as St. Thomas seems to hold in I Ethic., lect. 10 ² (although not every thing can cause something similar to itself in species), and consequently is inclined toward causing, and intends in this to be assimilated to God; likewise each agent, while it acts, intends in acting some likeness to God — nevertheless, the second sense seems rather to be intended in this place, as far as can be established from the arguments.

Concerning this, however, St. Thomas does two things: for first, he proves the proposition; second, toward the end of the chapter ³, he shows that this assimilation to God in causing is a higher perfection of a thing ⁴.

I. With respect to the first, he argues first thus. Created things tend into the divine likeness through their operation. Therefore, in this they intend the divine likeness, in that they are a cause to other things. — The consequence is proved. Because through its operation one thing becomes the cause of another.

For the clarification of this argument, it must be noted that here operation is not taken generally, as in the following chapter, but only for transient action. Whence the sense of the antecedent is that each thing through its action intends to be assimilated to God. Likewise the other proposition is true in this sense, namely that through its action one thing is the cause of another. The sense of the argument, therefore, is that a created thing tends into the divine likeness in causing precisely because it causes through its action; and through action it intends to be assimilated to God, as through the complement of its perfection.

II. Secondly. Things intend to be assimilated to God insofar as he is good. But he, out of his goodness, bestows being on others: since each thing acts insofar as it is perfect in act. Therefore, things generally desire to be assimilated to God in that they are causes.

Note that the word generally placed in the conclusion can be distributed for all created things absolutely; and it can be distributed for all things having a causative power over others. And in both ways, according to what we said at the beginning, it can be verified. It seems, however, following the explanation given, that it distributes for active causes only: so that the sense of the argument is that, since God out of his goodness gives being to things, created things that are causes of others imitate the divine goodness by causing; and while they intend to cause, they intend the likeness of the divine goodness.

III. Thirdly. To be a cause of others is good. Therefore, in that things are causes of others, they intend the divine likeness. — The antecedent is proved. Because, since only the good is per se known ⁵ and caused, each thing, through the fact that it is the cause of another, is ordered to the good. But an order to the good has the character of good. — And the consequence is proved. Because according to every good toward which something tends, it intends the divine likeness: because created good is from a participation in the divine goodness.

IV. Fourthly. Things intend into the likeness of God just as an effect into the likeness of an agent. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because an effect tends into the likeness of an agent not only with respect to its species, but also with respect to this, that it be a cause of others: since an agent intends to assimilate the patient to itself not only with respect to being, but also with respect to causality, as is evident in natural effects; and it is of the same character that an effect tend into the likeness of an agent, and that an agent assimilate the effect to itself.

Concerning this last proposition, it must be noted that, although some things can be said to be of the same character in many ways, nevertheless in this place to be of the same character is taken for that which is one being inferred from the other and vice versa: so that to be of the same character is the same as to be of mutual argumentation, that is, that one is deduced from the other and vice versa; just as if we were to say that it is of the same character that man is risible and that he is rational, because namely one is the cause of the other, and from one the other is inferred and vice versa. For because man is rational, therefore he is risible, and from the fact that he is rational, it is inferred a priori that he is risible; and conversely from the fact that he is risible, it is inferred a posteriori that he is rational. So in the matter at hand, that an agent intends to assimilate the effect to itself by its action is the cause of the effect tending into the likeness of the agent, and they mutually infer one another. Therefore it is well said that they are of the same character.

Concerning that proposition, An agent intends to assimilate the patient to itself with respect to causality, it must be noted that it is not understood universally of every agent, and of the same character of causality. For if it is understood of the same causality according to species, it is understood only of an univocal agent. For such an agent causes in the effect an active principle of the same character with its own active principle: just as a generating man causes in the generated man a generative power of the same character with his own, and therefore assimilates the effect to himself in causality of the same character. — But if it is understood of causality in common, thus it is extended even to equivocal agents: for each agent gives to its effect, which is a being in act, a form, which is the principle of some action; and consequently assimilates it to itself in some way with respect to causality. But, although this is so, St. Thomas's proposition is nevertheless understood of a patient that is naturally suited to be the cause of another: for the sense is that an agent intends to produce an effect like to itself in acting, if such an effect is naturally suited to be the cause of another.

V. Fifthly. Through the fact that something is the cause of another, it tends into its own perfection: since each thing is then most especially perfect when it can make something like to itself, — as you must understand in a nature that is naturally suited to make something like to itself, — as is evident in that which shines and can illuminate. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because each thing tending into its own perfection tends into the divine likeness.

Note that this argument differs from the third argument, because there to be a cause is considered as it is simply, absolutely good, as importing an order to the good; but here it is considered to be a good as the perfection of the agent. Therefore they are formally distinct arguments.

VI. With respect to the second point ⁶, he proves that to tend into the divine likeness in that which is to be the cause of others is a higher ⁷, that is, nobler perfection of a thing. And he proves it from two considerations. First, because a cause, insofar as it is such, is higher than that which is caused. — Second, because this perfection belongs to a thing last: since each thing is first perfect in itself before it can cause another. — It is also confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, in chapter III of the Celestial Hierarchy.

It must be noted in this place that this perfection which is to be the cause of another can be considered in a twofold way in order to other perfections. In one way, by prescinding this perfection from the others formally. And thus this perfection is not simply nobler than the others, but only secundum quid. For it is simply nobler to have a complete nature and substance than to have the relation of a cause with respect to another, if one is prescinded from the other: although this perfection is nobler secundum quid, insofar, namely, as it is completive of the perfection of the thing, and is compared to the preceding perfections as act to potency.

In another way, it can be considered not by prescinding it from the others, but rather including all the others, insofar as it presupposes all the other intrinsic perfections of the thing. And thus to be the cause of others is the noblest perfection of a thing: insofar as a thing, before it causes, does not have the complement of its perfection, but lacks something of its perfection, speaking of a thing that acquires something of perfection from its causality; whereas while it is the cause of a thing, it has the complement of its perfection. St. Thomas therefore takes the proposition in the second sense, although in the first sense also it has truth secundum quid.

VII. It must be noted, however, that although we have explained this chapter concerning the causality of the efficient cause, which St. Thomas seems rather to intend, it could nevertheless also be explained concerning every causality: namely, that every created thing in causing, in whatever way it causes, intends the divine assimilation, insofar as through its causality it is in some way perfected. And thus we will say that even matter, in that it receives and suffers, which is its operating, as is clear from the following chapter, tends into its own good and into the divine assimilation. But this seems to approach less closely to the intention of St. Thomas.