Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Lest anyone should think, on the occasion of the preceding conclusion, that creatures imitate the divine goodness in such a way that goodness belongs to them in the same manner as to God, St. Thomas wishes to show that they so imitate the divine goodness that they nevertheless fall short of it ¹. And he says that, although all things tend to be assimilated to God insofar as he is good, since they tend toward him as toward the ultimate end, and good is what properly has the character of an end: nevertheless creatures do not attain goodness in the manner in which it is in God, but imitate it in their own manner.

I. And he touches upon a twofold difference of the divine goodness from the goodness of a creature. The first is ² that the divine goodness is simple, as it were wholly consisting in one, insofar as the divine being itself contains all perfection, and is his perfect goodness. Hence for God to be and to be good simply are completely identical ³. A created thing, however, does not possess its perfection and goodness in one, but in many: because what is united in the highest is found multiplied in the lowest. For creatures do not reach the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things; and by how much a creature according to its goodness is more distant from the first goodness, by so much does its perfect goodness require greater multiplicity; although it is otherwise if it cannot attain perfect goodness. Hence, although every creature is good insofar as it is, it cannot nevertheless be called good simply if it lacks the other things that are required for its goodness: just as a vicious man is good in a qualified sense, namely insofar as he is a being or insofar as he is a man, yet not good simply, but rather bad.

From these things it follows that, since every thing tends toward the likeness of the divine goodness as toward an end, it is ordered to God as to an end not only according to substantial being, but also according to the things that accidentally belong to it pertaining to its perfection, and even according to its proper operation.

II. The second difference is ⁴ because God is his own goodness, since he is his own being: but no creature is its own being and its own goodness, but is good by participation in goodness, just as also by participation in being itself it is a being.

And in this participation too there are many degrees. For a simple substance, which is form and act, participates in goodness and being in act according to that which it is ⁵. But a substance composed of matter and form participates in goodness and being in act according to something of itself, namely according to its form ⁶.

Likewise in this degree, namely of composite substance, a diversity is found as to being itself and goodness ⁷. For heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter, have matter that is not in potency to another form, and consequently they do not have privation of form joined to it; just as privation of form is joined neither to that which is form through its essence, nor to that whose essence is its very being. Nor is there in them a mutable good having an admixture of the opposite evil: since motion cannot be where there is no potency to something else. — But lower bodies, whose form does not fill the whole capacity of the matter, have matter in potency to another form: and therefore privation of form is joined with the form itself. Wherefore in bodies of this kind there is a mutable good, having an admixture of the opposite evil. And these hold the lowest degree in goodness, just as also in being.

Furthermore, among the parts of a composite substance of this kind an order of goodness is found. For the form, which is act, is good in itself; the composite substance, which is in act through the form, is good according as it has form in act; but matter, which is a being in potency, is good according as it is in potency to form.

If someone, however, should say that matter is not good except in potency, because it is also not a being except in potency: — it is answered that the account is not the same concerning being and good: because being is said absolutely; but good also consists in an order. Therefore, although matter cannot simply be called a being from the fact that it is potentially a being, in which an order to being is imported; it can nevertheless simply be called good, on account of the very order to the end and the good ⁸. From which it appears that the good is in some way of wider scope than being ⁹, according to that saying of Dionysius, chapter 4 of De Div. Nom., The good extends to existing and non-existing things.

III. Concerning the first difference between the divine goodness and the goodness of a creature ¹⁰, which is Augustine's in book VIII of De Trin.¹¹, when it is said that, by how much more a creature is distant from the first goodness, by so much its perfect goodness has greater multiplicity, although it is otherwise if it cannot attain perfect goodness, it must be observed that by perfect goodness St. Thomas seems to understand any created goodness according to its perfect mode; but by imperfect goodness, according to its imperfect mode. And the meaning is that, by how much more a nature is distant from the first goodness, by so much does the goodness that is found in a higher nature and in a lower nature receive greater multiplicity in the lower nature itself: just as, because knowing sensible and intelligible things is a perfection found in man and in a separated substance, it is found in a separated substance, which is less distant from the first goodness, unitedly, namely through a single power, which is the intellect; but in man, who is further removed from the divine goodness, it is found multiply and dividedly, namely through sense and intellect. Hence in things of this kind there go together closeness to God according to goodness, and nearness according to simplicity: for things that are simpler have greater closeness to the divine goodness. For this reason St. Thomas says that substances close in goodness to the highest good, which is altogether simple, are equally, that is simultaneously, near to it also as to simplicity. Where, however, lower things cannot reach the goodness and perfection of a higher nature, but have a certain imperfect perfection proper to themselves, it is not necessary that, by how much more a nature is distant from the first goodness, by so much more it has its imperfect goodness multiplied: rather, goodness can be more manifold in a nature closer to the divine goodness and more perfect. Hence in things of this kind closeness in goodness to the highest good and nearness to it in simplicity do not go together: since something is found nearer to God in simplicity, and yet is more remote in goodness, as St. Thomas gives the example of the elements and animals and men; for the elements, because they cannot reach the perfection of knowledge and intellect, but have an imperfect goodness, are indeed closer to God as to simplicity, and have their goodness more united, and yet are not closer to God as to goodness than animals and men; rather, animals and men, since they are more perfect, are closer to God as to goodness, although they have their goodness more divided and multiplied. Therefore St. Thomas added: although it is otherwise if it cannot attain perfect goodness.

IV. Concerning what is said in the same difference, that a man stripped of virtue and subject to vices is not good simply, but rather bad, yet is good in a qualified sense, namely insofar as he is a being and insofar as he is a man, it must be observed that the phrase insofar as he is a man can make a twofold specification: namely substantial only; and substantial together with the accidents completing the goodness and perfection of a man. Here therefore it is taken insofar as it specifies the substance of a man precisely: but not as it specifies the goodness of a man completed and perfected by the accidents required for a man's goodness. For it is true to say of a ruined and wicked man that he is good as to the substantial goodness of a man: because he lacks nothing of the things that are required to constitute the species of man, and thus he is good insofar as he is substantially a man. But he is not good as to all the things that are required for the perfection of a man, both substantial and accidental: since he lacks virtue, which completes a man's absolute goodness. Hence it is not true that he is good insofar as he is a man, that is, as to all things required for the complete goodness of a man: otherwise it would be true simply and absolutely to say that he is good, which St. Thomas denies.

V. In the second difference ¹², which is that of the author of the Book of Causes¹³, concerning that proposition, A creature is called a being by participation in being itself, it must be considered that this can have a twofold sense. One is, that from being itself it is called a being as from that from which the name of being is imposed, yet not as from the thing principally signified by the name of being: as if we were to say that this substance is called a stone from the hurting of a foot (laesione pedis) ¹⁴. And thus it is true that every creature is called a being by participation in being itself, but not through its essence: because the name being was imposed from being, which in a creature is distinguished from the essence of the thing.

Another sense is, that it is called a being from the participation of being as from that which is primarily and principally signified by the name of being. And this also is true of being taken participially: but of the same taken nominally it is not true. For as was clear in the first book ¹⁵, of being taken participially the abstract is being (esse): but of being taken nominally the abstract is essence. And because a concrete name primarily and principally signifies its abstract, being taken participially primarily and principally signifies being (esse); but being taken nominally primarily and principally signifies essence. And therefore something is called a being according as being is taken participially, through participation in being itself; but it is called a being taking being nominally, not through participation in being, but through its own essence.

Therefore the proposition of St. Thomas is understood both of being taken nominally, as to that from which the name is imposed: and of being taken participially, as to that which it primarily and principally signifies.

VI. Concerning that proposition, A simple substance, which is form and act, participates in goodness and being according to that which it is ¹⁶, it must be observed that this is not so understood as if the very substance of the form were its goodness and its being: but because, whereas composite things have being and goodness from something else formally, namely from the form, which is a part of the composite, the form itself does not have being and goodness from another form, but being results from it immediately, with no other form intervening.

VII. Concerning that saying, A composite substance participates in goodness and being in act according to something of itself, namely according to its form ¹⁷, it must be observed that the sense is not that in a composite the only part that is form has being and goodness, but not the composite itself, and that the composite is denominated a being and good from its part, just as a man is denominated curly from the curliness of his hair: but the sense is that the whole itself is indeed good and a being, as that which has being and goodness, but nevertheless it receives being itself and goodness itself from its part, namely from the form, from which being primarily comes to it.

VIII. Concerning those things that are touched upon in the difference of the goodness of heavenly bodies and lower bodies ¹⁸, there is doubt in many ways. First ¹⁹, because three principles of natural things are posited by the Philosopher in I Physics²⁰: namely matter, form, and privation. But the heaven is a natural being. Therefore these three must be in it. Therefore it is false that privation is not joined to the matter of the heaven.

Secondly ²¹, because it seems contradictory that the heaven should have matter, and yet not have a mutable good. For as the Commentator argues in I De Caelo, comment 13, if a heavenly body is composed of matter and form, it follows that it is generable and corruptible. — Likewise because, as is had from I and VII Metaph.²², matter is that through which something is able to be and not to be.

Thirdly ²³, because it does not seem possible to preserve in lower substances that there is a mutable good with an admixture of the opposite evil, as is said here. For opposites are not simultaneously in the same subject.

IX. For the clarity of the first doubt, it must be considered that Aristotle in I Physics investigates the principles of natural things insofar as natural things come to be through generation and transmutation: as is clear in the same place, text 68 ²⁴. Therefore those principles are to be sought in natural things as to that being according to which they are transmutable. If, however, they have some being not subject to transmutation, those principles are not to be sought concerning that being. But the heaven according to its substantial being is ungenerable and incorruptible. Therefore it is not necessary from the things said by Aristotle in I Physics to posit these three principles in the heaven, as they are ordered to substantial being. And thus it is not necessary that privation be joined to the matter of the heaven. — It is nevertheless necessary from another cause that matter and form be in the heaven, namely because it is a corporeal substance: for a corporeal form must be in some receptive subject, and that is matter.

X. To the second ²⁵, it is said that there is no contradiction, if the words of St. Thomas are considered. Because, although the heaven has matter, that matter is nevertheless not in potency to another form, nor is it subject to the privation of another form, from which it is that something is transmutable.

To the argument taken from the Commentator, whatever the opinion of the Commentator about the matter of the heaven may have been, it is said that, if a heavenly body were composed of form and matter existing in potency to another form, or existing under the privation of another form, it would indeed be generable and corruptible. Now, St. Thomas does not say that the matter of the heaven is of this kind, but that it is neither in potency to another form, nor subject to privation. Therefore that does not follow from the fact that matter is posited in the heaven.

Similarly to the confirmation from Aristotle it is said that he is speaking of matter subject to privation, which is the principle of transmutable things insofar as they are substantially transmutable.

2. But against this reply a doubt is raised by the procedure of Aristotle in XII Metaphysics, text 30 ²⁶. For he argues first, that the substance that moves with an eternal motion must be always moving in act. Next, that it must be a substance that is act, but not one that is in potency: because what is in potency happens not to be. From which he further infers that it must be without matter. — For from this it is argued thus. If there were some matter that was not a principle of corruption, it could not be argued that something entirely lacks matter from the fact that it cannot not be. But Aristotle concludes that the first substance is immaterial from the fact that it cannot not be, especially according to the exposition of St. Thomas. Therefore all matter is a principle of corruption. If therefore matter is posited in the heaven, it follows that the heaven is corruptible in itself.

3. It is answered, and it is said first, that Aristotle from that procedure does not mean to conclude that the first substance is entirely immaterial, but only that it is immaterial through the lack of matter that is in potency to non-being. For this suffices for his purpose, by which he wishes to show that it must be eternal. Hence, when he concludes that its substance is act, he does not intend that it is an entirely simple form, but that there is nothing in its substance that is in potency to another being.

It is said secondly, that that the first substance itself is entirely immaterial, Aristotle has from another foundation, namely from the fact that it is the first mover entirely immobile: for everything that has matter is mobile ²⁷.

And thus it is established that that procedure of Aristotle does not prevent matter from being in something and yet its being incorruptible, when its matter is not subject to privation nor in potency to another being, just as is found in the heaven.

XI. To the third ²⁸, it is said that form and privation, likewise good and evil, can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the common and general notions of form and privation, or of good and evil. In another way, according to particular notions: insofar, namely, as this is such a form and this such a privation, and this such a good, but this such an evil. If they are considered in the first way, thus they are opposites: insofar as the notion of form and the notion of privation of form, likewise the notion of good and the notion of evil, are opposite notions. But in this way it is not unfitting for opposites to be simultaneously in the same subject: insofar as in the same subject there can be something to which the notion of form belongs, and something to which the notion of privation belongs. — But if they are considered in the second way, thus not every privation is opposed to every form, nor every evil to every good, but to a determinate form a determinate privation is opposed: for to the form of air the privation of the form of air is opposed, but not the privation of the form of water. And according to this consideration, a form and a privation that are opposites cannot simultaneously be in the same subject: but certainly a form and a privation that is not opposed to it can be simultaneously. — Therefore the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood of evil and good, not according to opposite particular notions, but according to general notions. For it is not unfitting for such opposites to be simultaneously in the same subject.

XII. Concerning what is said, that matter, although it is a being in potency, is nevertheless a good not in potency, but simply ²⁹, a doubt arises. First, because this seems to contradict the things that are said in this chapter. For it was said that, although every creature is good insofar as it is, it cannot nevertheless simply be called good if it lacks other things that are required for its goodness. But from this it is argued thus. A being in act from being itself, other perfections being removed, is not called good simply. Therefore much less is a being in potency, and lacking all act, called good simply.

Secondly ³⁰, because in De Verit., q. XXI, a. 2, ad 3, it is said that matter is good in potency, but not in act, just as it is a being in potency and not in act. — The same is said in the First Part, q. V, a. 3, ad 3.

XIII. For the clarity of this doubt, two things must be considered. The first is the difference that St. Thomas posits here between being and good: namely this, that being is said absolutely, but good also consists in an order; and therefore matter from the fact that it is potentially a being cannot be called simply a being; but certainly, on account of its order to being and to the good, it can be called simply good. Where it must be observed that good and being differ, because the name of being is said only of those things in which its formal signified is found: for that alone is a being, as that which is, to which it belongs to have being. But the name of good is said not only of that in which the notion of good is formally found, but also of that which has a relation to the good: just as healthy is said not only of an animal, in which health is formally found, but also of medicine and food and urine, which have a relation to the health of the animal. Wherefore St. Thomas says, De Verit. q. XXI, a. 1, that primarily and principally that being is called good which is perfective of another in the manner of an end. But secondarily that is called good which is leading to the end, as the useful is called good, or which is naturally suited to attain the end: just as also healthy is said not only of that having health, but also of that effecting, preserving, and signifying it. Good therefore is said primarily of that which is an end, and of that which already obtains the end, not on account of an order that it has to the good, but because it is perfect in itself and formally good. It is also said of something not from the fact that it is perfect in itself, but from the fact that it has an order to the good, as tending toward it. For this reason St. Thomas said that being is said absolutely, but good also consists in an order: because, namely, good is said not only of that which has being and perfection in act, but also of that which tends to perfection; but being is said of that which formally in itself contains entity and being.

The second is that the good simpliciter can be understood in two ways. In one way, for that which is formally good, namely as having in itself the complement of goodness: as we say that an animal is healthy simpliciter, but medicine is not healthy simpliciter. In another way, for that which is called good absolutely and without addition: as we say absolutely not only that an animal is healthy, but also that medicine is healthy. In this second way, therefore, St. Thomas takes the good simpliciter when he says that prime matter is good simpliciter. For in quantum it expresses an order to the good, it is not called good with this addition, in potency, as it is called a being not absolutely, but in potency; rather, it is called good absolutely and without addition.

2. To the first objection to the contrary, therefore, the consequence is denied. For matter can be called good absolutely in quantum it expresses an order to the good: because, in quantum it is of this kind, it has whatever belongs to its perfection, although it lacks act and a goodness formally inhering in it. For it is not called good, as we have explained, as having goodness, but as ordered toward goodness.

Secondly, it can be said that the statement of St. Thomas is understood of that which is called good as having goodness in itself, but not of that which is called good as ordered toward goodness.

XIV. To the second ³¹ it is said that matter can be considered in two ways: in one way, precisely according to itself, in quantum it is pure potency, that is, a substance lacking every act that is intrinsic and essential to it; in another way, in quantum it underlies an order and an aptitude and an inclination toward the good. In the first way, it is good only in potency: and thus is understood what is said in the cited places. In the second way, it is good in act: and thus is understood what is said here. Whence also in the First Part, after the words adduced, St. Thomas adds another reply, saying that, according to the Platonists it could be said that prime matter is non-being on account of the conjoined privation, but nevertheless it participates something of the good, namely the very order or aptitude to the good. — Concerning this, it was also spoken of above, in chapter xi.

XV. Concerning that which is said, that the good is in a certain way of wider scope than being ³², it should be noted that we can consider the scope of the good and of being in two ways: in one way, with respect to those things of which they are predicated formally and intrinsically; in another way, with respect to those things of which they are predicated in whatever way. In the first way, being and the good are of equal scope, and are convertible according to supposits. But in the second way, the good is of wider scope: because the name of being is said only of those things in which the ratio of being and of the good is formally found; but the name of the good is said also of that in which the ratio of being and of the good is not formally found, namely of that which has an order to being and to the good. And because the scope of any common term is properly taken with respect to those things of which it is intrinsically and formally predicated, but not with respect to those of which it is predicated extrinsically, therefore St. Thomas did not say absolutely that the good is of wider scope than being, but added in a certain way.

2. But against what has been said, St. Thomas seems to be in De Verit., q. xxi, a. 2, ad 2, and the Prima, q. v, a. 2, ad 2. For he says that the good does not extend to non-beings that are beings in potency, according to predication. Therefore the good is not of greater scope than being, because it is not posited to be of greater scope except because it is said of being in potency.

He answers that the statement of St. Thomas is understood of formal and intrinsic predication. For thus it was said that it is not predicated of matter and of being in potency, but only extrinsically, as healthy is predicated of medicine.

It should be noted, however, that in the First Part and in the Questions on Truth, St. Thomas interprets the statement of Dionysius with respect to causality. For because the good has the ratio of an end, and toward an end even those things that are not in act are moved, therefore the causality of the end—which is to be desired as that for love of which other things are desired and come to be—extends even to non-existent things.