Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that God is the end of all things to be obtained by each thing, he now wishes to show that the ultimate end of things is to be made like unto God ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he removes certain doubts, chap. XXIV.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that all things intend to be made like unto God in goodness; second, that they intend to be made like unto him in causality, chap. XXI.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that all things intend to be made like unto God as to goodness; second, he shows that all things nevertheless fall short of the divine goodness, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, this conclusion is laid down: The ultimate end of created things is to be made like unto God.

And it is argued first thus. Things tend toward God as toward an ultimate end so that they may attain his goodness. Therefore they intend, as an ultimate end, to be made like unto God. — The consequence is proved. Because created things, from the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, are established as like unto God.

Notice that St. Thomas takes the antecedent from the preceding chapter. For since it was shown there, in the last argument, that things are ordered to God as to an end so that they may attain him in their own manner; and an end is not desired except insofar as it has the character of good: it follows that things tend toward God himself as toward an ultimate end so that they may attain his goodness.

Secondly. God is so the end of things that he is also their first agent. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because an agent is called the end of an effect insofar as the effect tends toward the likeness of the agent. A sign of this is that the form of what is generated is the end of generation ².

It should be noted that the form of what is generated, since it is like the form of what generates, can be considered in two ways: in one way, absolutely and according to itself; in another way, as like the form of what generates. In the first way it does not belong to it to be its end, namely the principally intended end of generation as it proceeds from what generates, but in the second way: as St. Thomas holds in the Prima Pars, q. xliv, a. 4, ad 2. Now from the fact that the form of what is generated, which is like the form of what generates, as such, is the end of generation, it is clearly argued that what generates and acts intends to communicate itself according to a certain likeness. And consequently, if the agent is posited as the end of its effect, this will be insofar as the effect itself tends toward the likeness of the agent through the reception of a form like unto its form. On this account St. Thomas, to show that an agent is called the end of an effect insofar as the effect tends toward the likeness of the agent, brought forward as a sign that the form of what is generated is the end of generation.

Thirdly ³. All things have being according to this, that they are made like unto God, who is subsistent being. Therefore all things desire, as an ultimate end, to be made like unto God. — The consequence is proved. Because all things naturally desire being. Which is clear, because they also naturally resist corrupting things, and tend thither where they may be preserved.

II. Concerning that proposition, All things naturally desire being, a doubt is raised. For some seem to desire not to be: as is clear in those who voluntarily kill themselves. And in the damned, of whom it is said in Apoc. ix ⁴, Men will desire to die, and death will flee from them, a desire of not being appears. Therefore it does not seem true that all things naturally desire being: for appetite cannot be borne toward the opposite of that which is naturally desired.

III. For the clarity of this difficulty, which is surely not small, it must first be explained how not being can be desired; then the doubt must be answered ⁵.

It should therefore be known first that, since nothing has the character of the desirable except by reason of the good, being does not have it that it is desired except insofar as it has the character of good. But as is said in the Prima Pars, q. v, a. 1; and De Veritate, q. xxi, a. 5; and q. xxii, a. 1, ad 7, according to substantial being something is not called good simpliciter and absolutely, but only secundum quid; according to superadded perfections, however, it is called good simpliciter. From which it follows that substantial being is desirable simpliciter and absolutely if it is joined to due perfections; but taken per se it is desirable only secundum quid. It also follows that human being itself, joined to the privation of due perfections, which is to be in sorrows or malice, or misery ⁶, is evil simpliciter and absolutely, as is said in De Veritate, q. xxii, in the place cited, as opposed to the good simpliciter, although it is a good secundum quid. And therefore it is to be fled simpliciter, although it is desirable secundum quid. Whence the Philosopher says in Ethics IX ⁷, that being is delightful to all, but one must not take a bad and corrupt life, and that which is in sorrows.

2. Secondly it must be observed, from the teaching of St. Thomas in that reply to the seventh argument, that, since to lack evil is a good, as is said in Ethics V ⁸, in desiring it belongs to the same notion to be good and to be taking away and destructive of evil. Similarly, in fleeing and detesting, it belongs to the same notion to be evil and to be destructive of the good. For just as the good is desired, so the taking away and removal of evil is desired; and just as one flees and detests evil, so he flees and detests the removal or destruction of the good. Whence here too ⁹ it is said that corruptible things naturally resist corrupting things. From which it is inferred that not being, insofar as it is the removal of evil, has the character of good and is desirable; but insofar as it is the removal of good, it is not good, but has the character of evil, and consequently is not desirable, but to be fled and detested. Whence, because to be with misery and sorrows, which is being joined to the privation of due perfections, is evil simpliciter and to be fled, although it is a good secundum quid, namely by reason of being itself; not being, insofar as it is the taking away and removal of a miserable and penal life, is good simpliciter, and speaking simpliciter and absolutely, is eligible; although it is evil secundum quid and to be fled secundum quid, insofar as it takes away substantial being. But because being, considered in itself, is a certain good, not being, insofar as it removes being, is evil and to be fled.

From these things the meaning of what is said in the Prima Pars, q. v, a. 2, ad 3, and in IV Sent., d. l, q. ii, a. 1 ¹⁰, is clear, when it is said that not being is not desirable secundum se, but is desirable per accidens insofar as it is the taking away of a penal and miserable life. For it is understood that not being itself, considered in isolation and according to its proper character, insofar as it is the pure negation of being, is not desirable, since it has no character of good, but is only the privation and removal of good: but according as it has conjoined to its notion this notion, that it is the taking away of a miserable and penal life, thus it is desirable, because under that notion it has the character of good, as was clear.

3. Thirdly it must be observed that desiring not being can sometimes be according to right reason, but sometimes contrary to right reason. For if the evil that one flees, and which is removed through not being, is in truth evil simpliciter, and to be fled simpliciter and altogether, as is the evil and misery of the damned, not being can be desired according to right reason, insofar as it is the taking away and removal of such evil. And this St. Thomas seems to intend in IV Sent., in the place cited before. For when he says, answering the question he raised, Whether the damned can desire not being by right and deliberative reason, that they can choose not being according to deliberative reason, because this is better for them than being, it is clear that he is speaking of right reason: otherwise he would not satisfy the question.

If, however, it is not an evil simpliciter and altogether, as something to be fled altogether, but only according to the false estimation of someone, then not being cannot be desired according to right reason insofar as it is the removal of that sort of evil. For he who hangs himself on account of the loss of money chooses not being, but not according to right reason: because he estimates the lack of money to be an evil simpliciter and the highest evil to be fled altogether, on the grounds that he has placed his ultimate end in the possession of money; and yet in truth it is not so. It is similar with others who, from a false estimation of some evil, desire not being.

4. It is therefore had from what has been said, first, that not being, considered per se and in isolation, is not desirable: because it is in no way good.

It is had, secondly, that not being is desirable per accidens, insofar as it is the removal of some evil: because thus it is good per accidens, that is, by reason of the removal of evil, which removal of evil is a certain good.

It is had, thirdly, that not being, insofar as it is the removal of evil, is desirable according to right reason if the evil of which it is the removal is evil simpliciter and to be fled altogether, as is sin and the punishment of the damned.

It is had, fourthly, that if the evil that is taken away through not being is not evil simpliciter nor to be fled altogether, as is the loss of money, then not being, insofar as it is the removal of such evil, is not eligible according to right reason.

IV. But from what has been said one doubt arises. For it seems that in no way can not being be desired more than being under any evil whatever. For that is more desirable which has more of the character of good. But to be in sorrows or misery has something of the character of good: for this includes substantial being itself, which is a certain good. But not being at all, under whatever notion it is considered, has no character of good, because it posits no being. Therefore to be under misery is more to be chosen than not to be at all. And consequently not being is in no way to be desired.

It is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio ¹¹. For he says: Consider how great a good being is, which both the blessed and the miserable will. For it is greater to be and to be miserable than not to be at all.

2. To remove this difficulty, it must be considered that, since not being, considered under any negative notion, as such, does not have the character of good or of the desirable, on the grounds that the character of good is founded upon being; it is necessary, in order that it, considered under a negative notion, have the character of good, that it be resolved into some being and good, by reason of which it is good and desirable. And therefore St. Thomas says, in the Prima Pars, in the place cited before ¹², that not being is not good and desirable except per accidens, namely insofar as a certain being is desired of which a man cannot bear to be deprived. For four things concur in the appetite itself of not being: the first is some being and good desired, say happiness; the second is the evil through which such being is deprived, say misery; the third is the removal of such evil, say of misery; the fourth is not being, which is desired insofar as with it is the removal of such evil. Not being itself, therefore, as the removal of evil, has the character of good and of the desirable: but this belongs to it originally by reason of that being which is first desired, which is good and desirable per se. Whence, although not to be at all, as such, is not good and desirable, whereas to be under misery has something of goodness; nevertheless not being, insofar as it is the removal of evil, includes a certain good, by reason of which the removal of evil is fundamentally and originally desired.

3. To the doubt, therefore, it is denied that to be under misery and sorrow has more of the character of good than not being as it is the removal of misery. To the proof, it is denied that not being, as the removal of misery, has no character of good and denotes no being. For although not being by reason of negation, insofar as it is precisely negation, posits no being, nevertheless fundamentally and radically it posits some being, say happiness, by reason of which to be under misery is repelled, and not being is desired as the removal of a miserable life. On account of which St. Thomas says in the Fourth Book, where cited above ¹³, that not being, although it is an extreme evil insofar as it deprives of being, is nevertheless very good insofar as it deprives of misery, which is the greatest of evils. Whence what our Savior said, Matt. xxvi ¹⁴, concerning Judas, It were better for him if that man had not been born, is understood in the sense that the not being itself of Judas would have been better for him per accidens than being, namely by reason of the evil that would have been removed through not being if he had not been born; the removal of which evil is indeed especially to be desired, insofar as the evil itself, namely eternal damnation, is opposed to happiness, which is especially desirable. — This saying of the Savior also has other expositions, but concerning these it is of no importance to the proposition.

To Augustine it is said, first, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, in the place cited ¹⁵, that he understands that not being cannot be chosen per se, but only per accidens in the manner stated.

It is said, secondly, that it is greater to be and to be miserable than not to be at all, if not being is taken per se, namely for the mere negation of being. But if there is understood together with such not being the removal of the evil opposed to that good which is the origin and foundation of desiring not being, thus not to be at all is greater and more desirable, by reason of that being which is the root and foundation of this sort of desire.

V. But a doubt still remains. For according to this answer, the removal of evil that accompanies not being is not desired except because the good that is opposed to that evil is desired. But this does not seem true in him who desires not being. For all accidental being presupposes substantial being; and when substantial being is removed, all other being is removed. Therefore, if someone desires not to be in the nature of things, he does not desire any other being, by reason of which he might desire not to be. Therefore it is false that not being at all includes some being by reason of which not being is desired.

It is answered that we do not say not being is desirable per accidens by reason of some desired being of which a man cannot bear to be deprived, as is said in the Prima Pars ¹⁶, as if the appetite were borne toward the simultaneity of both, namely that someone should desire that both not to be at all and some being belong to him at the same time, for this would be to desire contradictories; but it is understood that some being that is loved, and of which a man cannot bear to be deprived, is the root and foundation why not being is desirable. For from the fact that someone supremely loves happiness, he supremely detests misery, through which he is deprived of happiness, and cannot bear to be perpetually miserable and deprived of happiness; and therefore, when he sees that he cannot escape misery and the privation of happiness except through not being, he desires not being, in order that he may escape that evil which he especially detests. And thus it is clear that being and the good is the reason and foundation of the desire of not being: for not being is desirable insofar as it is the removal of evil; but the removal of evil is desirable insofar as the evil itself is hated; and evil is hated on the grounds that the opposite good is desired and loved. Whence there is indeed a simultaneity of the desiring of not being and of happiness, but not a desiring of the simultaneity of them.

VI. From these things the answer to the principal doubt is clear ¹⁷. For it is said that the statement of St. Thomas, which is also that of Aristotle in Ethics IX, namely that all things naturally desire being, is understood of being complete with fitting and due perfections, as he himself explains in IV Sent., in the place cited before ¹⁸.

It is also understood of appetite per se. But to this it is not repugnant that some desire not being per accidens, insofar as it is the removal of the evil that deprives of the being naturally desired.

VII. Fourthly ¹⁹. All creatures are images of the first agent, namely God. Therefore they are for the sake of attaining his likeness as for the sake of an ultimate end. — The antecedent is proved. Because every agent acts to produce what is like unto itself. — The consequence is also proved. Because an image is established for this, that it may represent its exemplar through likeness to it.

Fifthly. Something participates in the good to such an extent, to what extent it is made like unto the first goodness, which is God. Therefore all things through their motions and actions tend toward the divine likeness. — The consequence is proved. Because every thing through its motion or action tends toward some good as toward an end.

It should be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, q. vi, a. 4, and De Veritate, q. xxi, a. 4, that things are not called good in order to God in this way, as if they were denominated good from a mere respect to the divine goodness, as medicine is called healthy in order to the health of an animal; but because they have in themselves a goodness which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness. Whence, when it is said here that something participates in the good to such an extent, to what extent it is made like unto the first goodness, it is understood in this sense, that each thing is good to such an extent, to what extent it has a form and intrinsic goodness which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness.