Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Since it has been shown that God is the end of all things, it remains to be inquired how and in what manner He is the end of created things ¹. Now, to show this, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows in what manner He is the end of all things in general; second, in particular, how He is the end of intellectual substance, in chapter xxv.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that God is the end of all things as something to be attained by each thing in its own mode; second, that all things seek to attain this concerning Him, namely, that they may be assimilated to Him, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. God is the ultimate end of all things in such a way that He is nevertheless prior to all things in being. Therefore, He is the end of all things as something to be attained by them.

For the manifestation of the antecedent, a distinction is made concerning a twofold end: for, I say, there is an end that holds primacy in causing according as it is in intention, yet is posterior in being, as health; but there is another that precedes in being just as in causing, as the higher place, which fire intends to acquire by its motion.

It should be noted, when it is said that a certain end holds primacy in acting, yet is posterior in being, that this is understood of primacy in a genus, or with respect to this particular thing, as health, but not simpliciter. For the end that holds primacy in causing simpliciter is also prior in being, namely God.

II. Secondly. God is at once the ultimate end and the first agent. Therefore, He is an end, not constituted, but pre-existing to be attained. — The consequence is proved. Because an end constituted by the action of an agent cannot be the first agent, but is rather an effect of the agent.

Thirdly. God is the end in such a way that not only is He not constituted by things, but not even is anything acquired for Him by things: since His goodness is entirely perfect. Therefore, He is the end of things in this way alone, that He Himself is acquired by things.

Fourthly. God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as if He acquires anything by His action, but as if He bestows something through it. Therefore, things are ordered to God as to an end not that anything may be acquired for Him, but that they may attain Him from Himself in their own mode. — The antecedent is proved. Because God is not in potency, but in perfect act. — The consequence is also proved. Because it is necessary that things tend toward the end in the same way in which an agent acts for the sake of the end.

III. Concerning the antecedent of this argument, and of the preceding one, a doubt arises. For although God by His action does not acquire anything by which He is intrinsically informed and actuated, He nevertheless acquires something to possess. And thus He seems to act in the production of things to acquire something for Himself: just as a king acquiring for himself a city from a battle is said to act to acquire a city for himself.

It is answered that, although from the creation of things the subjection of the creature to God and His actual possession of it follows, this nevertheless does not increase God's goodness: since He has no need of our goods ²; and all things pre-exist eminently in Him. Therefore, God did not produce them on account of any good to be acquired for Himself, but on account of their good. Hence, as the Master of the Sentences says in the second book, dist. 1, if it is asked why the creature was created, it must be said that it was created on account of the goodness of God, namely, that which is God Himself, and on account of the creature's own utility.