Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that the end of every thing is good, he consequently intends to show that God is the end of all things ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that God is the end of all things; second, he shows how things are ordered to this end in diverse ways, in chapter xxii.

Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows that God is the end of all things; second, he shows how He is the end, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he sets down this conclusion: All things are ordered to one end, which is God.

It is proved first. Good, inasmuch as it is good, is an end. Therefore the highest good is the end of all things in the highest degree. But this is only one, namely God. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because nothing tends toward anything as an end except inasmuch as it is good.

Regarding the antecedent and its proof, it must be noted that the phrase inasmuch as specifies the formal character of the foundation of the final cause. For nothing has the character of an end belonging to it—namely, that it be that on account of which something is or comes to be—except because it is good. And therefore it is necessary that good, inasmuch as it is good, that is, considered absolutely according to the character of the good, be the foundation of the character of an end.

Regarding the first consequence, it must be considered that in the highest good the entire character of goodness is preserved in act, so that whatever is contained potentially under the character of the good is all contained in the highest good actually and perfectionally. For if there were any goodness not found in Him, He would no longer be the highest good. And therefore, just as the good, taken according to the common and absolute character of good, which St. Thomas calls the good inasmuch as it is good, is the end in the highest degree and the end of all things: so also that which is the highest good must be the end of all things and an end in the highest degree, that is, not by dependence on another end, but primarily and per se.

II. Secondly. The highest good, which is God, is the cause of goodness in all good things. Therefore He is the cause of every end's being an end. Therefore He is the end of all things in the highest degree. — The antecedent is proved. Because the maximum in any genus is the cause of all the other things of that genus. — The first consequence is proved. Because whatever is an end is of this sort inasmuch as it is good. — The second consequence is also proved. Because that on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so.

Thirdly. God is the first cause in the order of final causes, since He is highest in the order of goods. Therefore He is more the end of each thing than any proximate end. — The consequence is proved. Because in any genus of causes the first cause is more a cause than a second cause.

Fourthly. All things are ordered under God as preceding ends under an ultimate end. Therefore the end of all things is God. — The antecedent is proved. Because all things are found ordered in diverse grades of goodness under one highest good. But the good has the character of an end. — The consequence is proved. Because in all ordered ends the ultimate end is the end of all preceding ends. This is illustrated in the order of healing.

Note that, although it belongs to the character of an end that it be a term of appetite, it nevertheless does not belong to its character that it be the ultimate term simpliciter; rather, it suffices that it be ultimate either simpliciter or in relation to something. Therefore there is found an ultimate end, which is ultimate simpliciter; and a proximate end, which is a certain ultimate in comparison to that which comes to be on account of it. On this account it is not unfitting that one end be ordered to another, inasmuch as it is not the ultimate simpliciter that is sought, but is sought on account of another. And thus it is not unfitting that one end be the end of another end.

III. Fifthly. The highest good, which is God, is a common good, since the good of the universe depends on Him. But the good by which any thing is good, namely intrinsically, is the particular good of itself and of other things that depend on it. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a particular good is ordered to a common good as to an end, just as the good of a part is on account of the being of the whole. And therefore the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man.

2. To the proof of the consequence one might perhaps respond that a particular good is indeed ordered as to an end to a common good that is constituted out of particular goods, but not to a common good by community of causality, in the way that God is a common good, since such a common good is not constituted out of particular goods. And therefore the argument does not follow.

But this response does not destroy the argument. For whether a common good is constituted out of particular goods or is not constituted out of them, a particular good is always ordered as to an end to the universal good. For when a universal good is constituted out of particular goods, then the being of the particular good is ordered to the being of the universal good. But when such a universal good is not constituted out of particular goods, but is the cause of all particular goods, every particular good exists for the sake of participating in the universal good. For unto this the highest good and universal agent, which is God, produces particular goods: so that He may diffuse and communicate Himself according to a certain likeness and participation—not indeed that the communication itself of divine goodness is the ultimate end of God as agent, but because goodness itself is the end out of whose love God acts, and He wills to communicate it to creatures, as is held in Qq. de Potentia Dei, q. iii, a. 15, ad 14.

IV. Sixthly. Whatever the supreme agent, namely God, acts for, He acts on account of His own end, and to His end all the ends of secondary agents are ordered. Therefore whatever things are made by Him, mediately or immediately, are ordered to God as to an end. Therefore all beings are as well. — The antecedent is explained from the order of ends, which follows the order of agents. — The first consequence is proved. Because the end of the divine will is the divine goodness, which is God Himself. — The second is also proved. Because, as was proved in the second book, nothing can exist that does not have being from Him.

It must be noted that, just as the causality of an efficient cause is to effect and produce, so the causality of a final cause is to be appetible and desired, as is said in Verit., q. xxii, 2: namely, as that to which another is ordered, and out of love of which something is produced or preserved by an agent. Therefore, just as the order in acting causes is considered according as one moves another effectively to act, and that one moves another, and so on; so the order in ends is considered according as this thing appetible and desired is the cause that another is appetible and desired, and that is the cause that still another is appetible. But to be appetible and desired on account of the appetite for which another is sought, is to be that into which another is ordered. And therefore, just as to be the first agent is to be the agent from whose motion all agents act, so to be the ultimate end is to be the end to which all other ends are ordered. On this account, St. Thomas, wishing to explain how the order of ends follows the order of agents, makes it manifest from the fact that, just as the supreme agent moves all secondary agents, so to the end of the supreme agent the ends of secondary agents must be ordered. For to the first and supreme agent corresponds the supreme end, which is the ultimate end simpliciter; and to secondary agents correspond secondary ends.

V. Seventhly. God is the productive cause of all things. Therefore He is the end of all things. — The consequence is proved. Because the ultimate end of every maker, inasmuch as he is a maker, is himself. For we see in ourselves that what is made is always referred to the good of the agent, either useful or pleasurable or honest.

Note first that this argument differs from the preceding one, because there the argument proceeded from the order of ends, but here it proceeds from the condition of an agent inasmuch as it is an agent.

It must be noted secondly that St. Thomas added in the proof of the consequence the phrase inasmuch as he is an agent in order to give to understand that an agent considered according to its substance is not the end of itself, but only inasmuch as it is an agent. For God according to His entity, as such, is not the end of Himself, since He is ordered to no end. Similarly, a particular agent is not the end of itself according to its substance, since its substance was produced on account of something else by some agent.

2. But a twofold doubt arises concerning this argument. The first is: if every agent acts on account of its own good, inasmuch as it is an agent, it follows that something other than God is the good of God Himself. But this is false, since it was shown above ² that God is His own goodness. Therefore the argument is null.

The second doubt is that from that proposition, The ultimate end of every maker, inasmuch as he is a maker, is himself, the opposite of what is intended seems to follow. For if every agent, as such, is the ultimate end of itself, it follows that God is not the ultimate end of all things, because of one thing there is only one ultimate end.

3. For the clarity of the first, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. 1, q. ii, a. 1, and de Potentia Dei, in the place cited above, that, since an end is twofold, namely of the work and of the worker, in this God agrees with other agents: that He operates on account of something other than Himself as on account of the end of the work, just as other agents do, inasmuch as every divine work is ordered to something—just as creation is ordered to the being of the creature if it is considered formally, namely under the character of action. As to the end of the worker, however, which is the end principally intended by the agent, God in one respect agrees with other agents and in another respect differs. He agrees indeed in this: that He operates on account of His own good just as they do. But He differs because to other agents, from the fact that they are deficient and therefore something can be added to their goodness, it belongs to act on account of the desire for an end, which is to act to acquire some good for oneself, at least to acquire likeness to God in acting, as is the mind of the Commentator, XII Metaph., text. 36³; but to God, who is infinite goodness, and consequently to whose goodness nothing can be added, it never belongs to act on account of the desire for a good, as though He were acting to acquire some good for Himself, but it belongs to Him to act only on account of the love of the end and of the proper goodness that He has in Himself. For from the fact that He most perfectly loves His own goodness, He wills that it be communicated in the manner that is possible, namely according to its likeness. He acts, therefore, on account of His good willed and loved, but not on account of a good desired and to be acquired, as creatures do.

4. To the second doubt it is said first that a secondary agent is the ultimate end of itself inasmuch as it is an agent, not simpliciter, but in a genus. God, however, is the ultimate end of all agents simpliciter, as will be shown below ⁴.

It is said secondly that a secondary agent is the ultimate end of its action, not as the ultimate and principal good willed, but among those things by which it wills to acquire good through its action, because it wills also the good of another inasmuch as it is referred to its own proper good. God, however, is the ultimate end as the ultimate and principal good, for the attainment of which creatures are ordered.

VI. Lastly. The ultimate end is the first cause of all things. Therefore God is the ultimate end of all things. — The antecedent is proved. Because the end holds the primacy among the other causes, and from it all causes have that they are causes in actu, since an agent does not act except on account of an end, and from the agent matter and form come to be in actu the matter and form of this thing. A posterior end is also the cause of a preceding end's being intended as an end. — The consequence is proved. Because to be the first cause of all things must belong to the first being.

It must be noted, when it is said that the posterior end is the cause of the prior end, that this is understood of posterior and prior in execution, but not of posterior and prior in the intention of the agent. For the posterior end in execution is prior in intention, and from this it has that it is the cause of the prior end; for, as is said here, nothing is moved toward a proximate end except on account of the last end, namely the one intended.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Prov. 16: The Lord made all things for Himself etc.; and Apoc. the last chapter: I am Alpha etc.