Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
After St. Thomas has shown that evil is not caused except by good, if some evil has a cause, he now intends to show that every evil must have some cause per accidens 1.
And he argues first as follows. Evil is in a good as in a subject. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. For everything that is in a subject is caused either from the principles of the subject or by some extrinsic cause.
Secondly. Evil is in a subject that is in potency to it and to its opposite. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is clear. — But the consequence is proved. For that which is in potency to opposites is not established in the act of any one of them except through some cause: since no potency makes itself to be in act.
Note concerning the antecedent that it is not universally true, as is said in De Veritate, q. 21, a. 2, ad 1, that every subject of a habit can also be the subject of a privation: because sometimes a habit is present by nature and cannot be separated from the subject. But it is indeed universally true that every subject of evil is also receptive of the opposite good. And therefore he did not say that every subject of a form is in potency to the form and to its opposite, which is privation; but conversely that the subject of evil is in potency to both opposites. For since evil is the privation, as he says, of that which one is naturally fitted and ought to have, it is necessary that, if evil is in any subject, that subject be in potency both to the evil and to the good opposed to it, such that it is receptive of both.
Thirdly. Evil is always present contrary to the nature of that in which it is: since it is the privation of a perfection that ought to be present. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. For what comes to something contrary to its nature comes to it from some other cause: as is clear in the upward motion of a stone, and in water that is heated.
Fourthly. Every good besides the first has some cause. Therefore every evil also has a cause per accidens: because every evil follows upon some good, just as corruption follows upon generation.