Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas treated of evil with respect to its nature, he now treats of it with respect to causality ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of the cause of evil itself; second, he shows how it is the cause of other things, chap. XIV. — Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows that evil is not caused except by good; second, that every evil has a cause in some way, chap. XIII. — Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows absolutely that it is not caused except by good; second, particularly that good is its subjective cause, in the following chapter.

I. Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows that good is the cause of evil; second, how it is the cause ².

As to the first, he shows that Good is the cause of evil.

And he argues first thus. If evil is the cause of some evil, it does not act except by the power of the good, as was proved. Therefore good is the primary cause of evil.

It should be noted that from this argument it is clear that St. Thomas does not exclude all manner of causality from evil, but the principality of causality. Which is also made manifest from the third argument.

Second. Evil is not some being. Therefore it cannot be the cause of anything: because every cause is something. Therefore, if evil is caused by anything, that thing must be good.

Notice, when it is said that evil is the cause of nothing, that this is understood of evil taken formally and abstractly: but not of evil spoken of per accidens and concretely ³.

Third. Evil cannot be a cause per se of anything. Because, since every cause properly and per se tends toward its proper effect, evil would tend toward evil. But it was shown above that every agent intends the good. Therefore it will be a cause only per accidens. Therefore evil must be caused by good: because a cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se; but only the good can be a cause per se.

2. Regarding that proposition, A cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se, it should be noted that it is to be understood in the same proportional way as it is understood that an effect per accidens is reduced to an effect per se. In the effect, however, it is not understood as if every effect per accidens of something must be the effect per se of another cause, for this is not universally true: but because either it is itself the effect per se of another cause, or there must be some effect per se of that cause of which it is said to be the effect per accidens, to which it is conjoined. So, therefore, it is not understood that every cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se as if, besides the cause per accidens of some effect, another cause must be given which is the cause per se of that effect; or that every cause per accidens of some effect must be the cause per se of another effect: but because either the cause per accidens of one thing must be the cause per se of another, as happens in a cause which is said to be the cause of something per accidens because that thing is conjoined to its per se effect and is outside the intention of the cause; or because the cause per accidens must be conjoined to something that is a cause per se of something, as happens where something is said to cause another thing per accidens on the part of the cause itself, namely because it is conjoined to the cause per se, just as we say that a musician builds per accidens when it happens that the same person is a musician and a builder. Evil, however, is said to be the cause per accidens of evil, not on the part of the effect, namely because it is conjoined to its effect per se, since evil, as such, has no effect per se: — hence its causality per accidens need not be reduced to causality per se in such a way that it is itself the cause per se of something else — but only because it must be conjoined to something that is the cause per se of some effect, which is good alone.

3. Fourth. Evil can be neither matter, nor form, nor agent, nor end: since it was shown above that both being in act and being in potency are good; and each thing acts according as it is in act and has form; and evil is outside intention. Therefore it cannot be the cause of anything. Therefore etc.

II. As to the second ⁴, St. Thomas shows that Good is not the cause of evil except per accidens. And first, he shows how this is in natural things; second, how it is in voluntary things ⁵.

That it is not the cause of evil except per accidens he proves, because one of two opposites is not the cause of the other except per accidens, as is said in VIII Phys., text 8 ⁶; but good and evil are opposites.

It should be noted that evil and good can be taken in two ways: in one way, according to the general notions of good and evil; in another way, according to particular notions, such as fire and the privation of fire. If they are taken in the first way, thus good is the cause per accidens of the evil opposed to it. And St. Thomas is speaking in this sense here. — But if they are taken in the second way, thus good is not the cause per accidens of the evil opposed to it, but of another evil: just as the goodness of fire is not the cause of the evil of fire, but the cause of the evil of water, and this also per accidens, as is said in the First Part, q. XLIX, a. 1, ad 2.

2. How, however, good is the cause of evil per accidens in natural things, he explains by setting forth a distinction. For in natural things this can be taken both on the part of the agent and on the part of the effect.

On the part of the agent, indeed, as when the agent suffers a defect of power, from which it follows that the action is defective and the effect deficient: as is clear in the weak power of a digesting organ. And because the agent acts both by power and by an instrument, the same judgment applies if the defect of action and effect arises from a defect of the instrument, as happens in limping. In this way, therefore, evil is caused per accidens on the part of the agent, insofar as the agent is of deficient power: because it is accidental to the agent, insofar as it is an agent, that it suffers a defect of power. And from this is verified what is said, evil does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: because evil does not follow from the agent except insofar as it is of deficient power, and according to this it is not efficient.

On the part of the effect, however, evil is caused per accidens both on the part of the matter of the effect and on the part of the form. On the part of the matter, when the matter is not disposed to receive the impression of the agent: as sometimes happens in monstrous births. This is not imputed to a defect of the agent, if it does not transmute undisposed matter to a perfect act: because every natural agent has a power determined according to the mode of its nature, namely for acting upon duly disposed matter. — On the part of the form of the effect, however, evil happens insofar as the privation of another form is necessarily conjoined to some form, and thus the corruption of one is conjoined to the generation of another. But this evil is not the evil of the effect intended by the agent, but of another.

III. Regarding the first mode per accidens, namely that which holds on the part of the agent, when it is said to be verified through that mode that evil has a deficient cause, but not an efficient one, it should be considered that for evil not to have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it proceeds from a cause in no way acting, but according as it ceases from action: in the way in which the sinking of a ship is said to arise from an absent sailor who does not act toward the conservation of the ship. And this sense is not intended here: because here the question is about evil conjoined to an action, or to a produced effect, according as it is referred to the cause of that effect to which it is conjoined; for it is evident that the cause of evil in this way is not a cause by not acting, but by causing the effect to which evil is conjoined.

In another way, that it proceeds indeed from an acting cause, but does not proceed from it according to that whereby it is efficient, that is, through the power by which it acts insofar as it is power and act, but insofar as it suffers a defect of power and thus is deficient in power. And this sense is intended. For this is to say nothing other than that the power by which the cause operates, as to that which it has of entity, is not the reason for the agent why evil follows in its action or in its effect: but the defect of power is the reason for it why that evil follows from it. So that power is indeed the form by which the agent produces the effect to which evil is conjoined: but the effect and operation do not have evil conjoined except because the power of acting underlies some evil and privation. And this is what St. Thomas meant when he said that evil does not follow from a cause except insofar as it is of deficient power, and according to this it is not efficient. For a defect is not the form through which an agent acts, but power: since, as he said above, if an agent were entirely lacking in power, it would not act at all.

It can also be understood in another way that evil does not have an efficient cause even per accidens. For it does not have one that reaches evil itself by its action. Because evil cannot terminate the action of any cause, namely so that through it it receives being: but it has a deficient cause, which, I say, because it has a defect of power, produces an effect to which evil is conjoined.

2. It should be noted, however, from the First Part, the place cited above ⁷, and De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, that the evil of another thing conjoined to the proper and per se effect of an agent is not reduced to some defect of the agent, but to the perfection of its power. For fire by its power intends to introduce the form of fire into matter; and because the corruption and privation of the form that preceded in the matter follows upon the introduction of its form, therefore it causes per accidens the privation and evil of the other form; and the more perfect the fire is in power, the more perfectly, in generating fire, does it corrupt its contrary. But the evil of the proper and per se effect is reduced to a defect of the power of the agent or of the matter, as was said ⁸. Nevertheless, although the cause of this evil is some defective good, a reduction must still be made to some prior cause that is not deficient, but perfect, as is clear in the generation of a monstrous birth: for an evil of this kind, when it arises on the part of the agent, is a defect of the power existing in the seed, and thus the seed, insofar as it is deficient, is per accidens the cause of monstrosity; but the cause of the defect of power in the seed is some altering agent inducing some quality contrary to the quality required for the good disposition of the seed. But the more perfect the power of this agent is, the more it induces this contrary quality and causes a greater defect in the seed. From which it is clear that the proximate agent of a deficient effect is a deficient agent; but the remote agent is a perfect and good agent.

3. But a doubt arises regarding the explanation that was made. For St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8, says that evil simply, taken subjectively and denominatively, produces a corrupted effect not by acting, but by de-acting. Therefore the deficient good, which he calls the subject of evil simply, is the cause of the evil effect through cessation from action. The opposite of which was said ⁹.

It is answered that such a good being the cause of evil by de-acting can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is the cause by in no way acting: and St. Thomas does not understand it in this way. In another way, by acting defectively, that is, by acting with an action lacking its due perfection: and he understands it in this way. For he explains himself in the same place, subjoining: that is, through a defect of active power. For it belongs to the action of the seed that it proceed from a complete power, and be productive of a complete effect. But this is deficient in the action from which a monstrous birth arises: because such an action does not have the perfection of being productive of a complete and perfect effect. And this belongs to it because it proceeds from a deficient power. And thus such an agent is said to be the cause of evil not by acting, but by de-acting, that is, not by acting perfectly, but imperfectly and deficiently. It is clear, however, that this does not contradict the determination that was made.

In the same way, adds St. Thomas ¹⁰, sin also happens in artificial things: namely, just as in natural things.

IV. In the second place he shows how good is the cause of evil per accidens also in moral matters ¹¹. And first, he shows whence the difficulty regarding this arises; second, he shows the truth ¹².

The difficulty is because moral vice does not seem to follow from a defect of power: for weakness of power either totally removes, or at least diminishes, moral vice, because it is necessary that moral vice be voluntary, not necessary. And therefore vice does not seem to be in moral matters in the same way as in natural matters.

It should be noted that moral vice and sin is not said to be anything unless it is voluntary. Therefore a defect entirely preceding the character of the voluntary cannot be the reason that something is a moral evil: because that which has a defect and is evil as proceeding from such a deficient cause is necessarily evil; just as that which proceeds from a defective natural power, insofar as it proceeds from it as it is deficient, is necessarily evil. And therefore, in order for there to be a moral evil, some voluntary defect must precede it, by reason of which the whole is said to be voluntary. On this account St. Thomas said that weakness of power either removes or diminishes moral vice, because such a vice is not voluntary, but necessary: and therefore it merits pardon, but not punishment. — How, however, weakness removes or diminishes the character of sin; similarly also ignorance, which is a defect of the apprehensive power; see in Qq. de Malo, q. III, a. 11; and Iª IIae, q. LXXIV, a. 5; and in other places.

V. In order to remove the aforesaid difficulty, however, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows that the root and origin of moral sin is to be sought in the act of the will; second, he shows how that is on the part of the will ¹³.

As to the first, he says three things. The first is, that as to something evil is similarly in moral matters and in natural matters; and as to something dissimilarly. For as to this they are dissimilarly related, that in natural matters evil is considered in the action and in the produced effect: but in moral matters vice and evil is in the action alone, because the moral virtues are not productive, but active. — From this it follows that moral evil does not follow from the matter or form of the effect, but from the agent alone. And in this it is clearly assimilated to evil in natural matters: because in them some evil arises from a defect of the agent.

The second is, that there are four active principles in moral matters: namely, the executive power in the limbs; the will, which moves the executive power; the apprehensive power judging this to be good or evil, which are the objects of the will, by whose judgment the will is moved; and the apprehended thing, by which the apprehensive power is moved. And thus the first mover is the apprehended thing; the second, the apprehensive power; the third, the will; the fourth, the executive power.

The third is, that the act of the executive power presupposes moral good or evil: because exterior acts of this kind do not belong to morals except according as they proceed from the act of the will. And therefore a defect of this kind of power either totally excuses or diminishes moral vice. — The act also by which the apprehended thing moves the apprehensive power is immune from moral vice: because any object moves a potency according to the natural order. — The act also of the apprehensive power, considered in itself, lacks moral vice: since its defect, namely ignorance, either excuses or diminishes vice, just as weakness does. — It remains, therefore, that moral vice is found first and principally in the act of the will alone: and reasonably so, since an act is called moral because it is voluntary ¹⁴. And consequently the origin of the moral act is to be sought in it.

2. Regarding the first statement, it should be noted that the moral virtues are called active, not also productive, because they are not productive of some extrinsic effect, in the manner of arts, but are directive of operations that remain in the agent: for they produce a right intention and inclination toward the end, as is said in III Sent., d. XXXIII, q. 1, a. 1, quª 2, ad 2.

Regarding the third statement, it should be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. LVIII, a. 1; and III Sent., d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 4, quª 2, that mos, from which the moral virtues are named, signifies a natural or quasi-natural inclination to doing something. And because the inclination in us according to which it is in our power to act and not to act is the inclination of the will, therefore that act alone is properly called moral which is in some way voluntary: and as the act is related to being voluntary, so it is related to being moral. An act is voluntary in two ways, however: in one way, because it is freely elicited by the will, such as willing and choosing; in another way, because it is commanded by the will, but not elicited, such as walking and considering and the like. Therefore the acts that are elicited by the will are essentially called moral. But those that are commanded are moral as to use: for they are not moral according to their species as referred to their proper causes, since they are not acts elicited by the will; but they are moral insofar as they are commanded by the will, and thus participate in something of the voluntary. It follows therefore that, if acts of this kind are separated from the character of the voluntary, and compared only to the potencies from which they are elicited, they are not moral, and consequently in them there can be neither moral good nor moral evil. On account of this, therefore, St. Thomas said of the act of the executive power, and of the act of the apprehensive power considered in itself, that is, without respect had to the will, that in it there is no moral vice. For it is clear that they are not voluntary except according as they are commanded by the will. Therefore, if they are considered according to themselves, with no respect had to the will, moral evil cannot be in them.

VI. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas in Qq. de Malo, q. II, a. 3, holds that some exterior act is evil in itself, such as theft, murder, and the like. And in Iª IIae, q. XX, 1; and II Sent., d. XL, q. I, a. 3, he maintains that the exterior act has a proper goodness belonging to it from matter and circumstances. Therefore it is false that the act of the executive power presupposes moral good or evil, and that it is good only when the act of the will is good, but evil when the act of the will is evil.

It is answered, as can be gathered from the places cited above, and especially De Malo, the same question, art. 2, ad 6, that we can speak in two ways about the goodness or malice of an exterior act: namely, about natural goodness or malice, and about moral goodness or malice. If we speak of natural goodness or malice, then this belongs to an exterior human act in itself, and does not presuppose the act of the will. For since some act is called human insofar as it is according to reason, such an act receives its species from the object according as it is compared to reason: and it is called good if it is about due matter according to the rules of reason, such as feeding the hungry; but evil if it falls upon undue matter, such as stealing another's goods. — If, however, we speak of moral goodness or malice, thus, the will being set aside, the exterior act does not have goodness or malice, namely such that such an act is called fault or sin, or merit: since, as was said above ¹⁵, an act does not belong to mos except insofar as it is voluntary. — St. Thomas is speaking, therefore, in the places cited above, of the goodness or malice belonging to an act in the being of the nature of a human act: but not of moral goodness or malice, of which the discussion is here.

2. But against this reply seem to be the words of St. Thomas saying, De Malo, the same question, art. 3, that the character of evil and sin is found primordially in the exterior act according as it is in apprehension. But sin names an evil of mos. And thus it seems that even the evil of mos, the will being set aside, is in the exterior act.

It can be answered in two ways. First, that St. Thomas does not take the name sin as it signifies fault and demerit, but as every act lacking due perfection can be called a sin, even in natural things. And he seems to understand this when, explaining how such an evil act is primordially evil, he says that this is because it is not clothed with the due circumstances, and from this very fact that it is an evil act, that is, deprived of due mode, species, and order, it has the character of sin.

3. Second, it can be answered that the character of sin being found primordially in the exterior act according as it is in apprehension can be understood in two ways. In one way, that prior formally to the act of the will, it has the character of moral sin. And this sense is not true, nor intended there by St. Thomas, as the objection assumes. Which is evident because he subjoins in the same place that the character of fault and moral evil is completed according as the act of the will is added.

In another way, in that fundamentally and originally sin and guilt are in the apprehended exterior act before they are formally and completely in the act of the will. And this sense is true, and intended by St. Thomas. Because the natural evil of the exterior act, according as it is in apprehension, is compared to the will as an object, from which the will, freely accepting it, has it that it is formally and completely evil in its act. And thus the evil act itself is the foundation whence the act of the will tending into it has it that it is morally evil: for that act of the will is morally evil which is borne toward an evil object and one not regulated by reason. And it is similar to how we say that truth is fundamentally and originally in the thing, but that truth is formally in our intellect. For just as the being of a thing is called truth originally, not because truth is formally in the thing, but because the intellect is formally true from the fact that it is conformed in understanding to the being of the thing itself; so the exterior act, evil according to natural being, is called morally evil fundamentally and originally, because the act of the will, freely tending into it, has it that it is morally evil from the fact that it is borne toward that exterior act which is naturally evil. And just as a thing is not called formally true except by extrinsic denomination, namely because it is adequated to the intellect, which is formally true; so the exterior act, posited in act and in execution through the command of the will, is not called formally evil with moral malice except extrinsically, namely because it proceeds from an evil moral act of the will. And therefore in the same place St. Thomas adds that, if the act of sin is taken according as it is in the execution of the work, namely according as it is formally moral, primordially and primarily guilt is in the will.

It is clear therefore that the objection is not against the response that was given. For it proceeds as if St. Thomas intended, in the cited place, that the exterior act is formally evil in the moral genus prior to the act of the will. But we have shown that this was not his intention.

4. The objections from Scotus, in the second book, dist. xl, and from others, may be seen in Capreolus, in the Second Book, d. xlii. For many of them prove that the goodness of the exterior act in natural being is one thing, and its malice likewise another: which is conceded. But they do not prove that its moral goodness or malice is other than the goodness and malice of the act of the will.

VII. Having shown that the root of moral sin is to be taken in the act of the will, St. Thomas wishes further to show how this is ¹⁶. And first, he touches upon the difficulty that arises concerning this; second, he clarifies the thesis ¹⁷.

The difficulty is that, since a deficient act arises on account of a defect of an active principle, one must understand beforehand a defect in the will before a moral sin. Therefore, that defect will either be natural: and thus it will always adhere to the will, and the will in acting will always sin morally. Or it will be voluntary: and then it will be a moral sin; the cause of which will again have to be sought, and so on to infinity.

St. Thomas answers that a preexisting defect of this kind in the will is not natural, on account of the stated reason; nor casual or fortuitous, because then moral sin would not be in us, that is, in our power; but it is voluntary. But it is denied that it will then be a moral sin.

2. Toward the declaration of this, he says first, that the perfection of the virtue of any second active principle depends on a higher agent. And therefore, when an agent remains under the order of the first agent, it acts indefectibly: but when it is deflected from the order of the first agent, it fails in acting.

He says secondly that, since in the order of moral operations two principles precede the will, namely the apprehensive power and the apprehended object, which is the end; the proper motive of the will is reason and some determinate good, namely the good of reason; but not any apprehensive power whatever, or any good whatever. Therefore, when the will tends into an act moved by the apprehension of reason representing to it its proper good, the due action follows. But when it breaks forth into action at the apprehension of the sensitive apprehensive power, or of reason itself representing a good different from the proper good, moral sin follows in the action of the will.

It follows from these things that in the will a defect of order to reason and to the proper end precedes moral evil: as when, at the sudden apprehension of sense, the will is moved into what is delightful according to sense; or when reason, by reasoning, arrives at some good which is not good now or in this manner, and yet the will tends into it as into its proper good.

He says thirdly, that this defect of the will is voluntary: because it is in the power of the will to will and not to will; and similarly to consider or not consider the reason in act.

He says fourthly that this defect is not a moral evil: because, if reason does not consider, or considers any good whatever, there is not yet a sin, until the will tends into an undue end; which is already an act of the will.

He concludes lastly that, in moral matters just as in natural matters, evil is not caused by good except per accidens.

3. For the evidence of those things that are said here, it must be considered that a second cause does not act except according as it is moved by the first, and therefore the perfection of its virtue is according as it perfectly stands under the virtue of the first cause. But if it happens that the second cause fails in acting solely on account of a defect of the first cause, then the defect in the action of the second cause is not reduced to a defect of the second cause itself, but of the first: just as, when an imperfect and deficient movement occurs on account of a defect of the motive power, while the leg remains in its due disposition, the defect of walking is not reduced to a defect of the leg, but of the motive power alone. But if the second cause fails in acting because it is not perfectly subject to the first cause but is deflected from it, then the defect of the action is reduced to a defect of the second cause, not to a defect of the first: just as the limping of one possessing a perfect motive power is reduced to a defect of the leg not perfectly standing under the motive power. When therefore St. Thomas says that when an agent remains under the order of the first mover, it acts indefectibly, it is understood of a defect that must be reduced to a defect of the second cause itself, and ought to be imputed to it. Yet a defect could happen in the action of the second cause on account of a defect of the first cause: but then it would not be imputed to the second cause, the second cause itself remaining under the order of its prior cause, by which it has it to be moved as by its proper motive.

VIII. Concerning the defect which St. Thomas posits in the will as preceding the morally evil act, first it must be seen how it precedes in the will; second, how it is voluntary ¹⁸; third, how it is not a moral evil ¹⁹.

As to the first, it must be considered that a twofold defect of the will precedes a morally evil act. One is remote, from which the will has it that other defects can be in it and that it can fail in acting, namely being from nothing. But this defect does not suffice for moral evil to be in the will: because, since this defect is natural, and always accompanies the will, the will would always sin in acting. — The other is a proximate defect, namely not standing in act under its proper cause. And this defect is the proximate cause of an evil moral act, in the way in which a negation can be a cause, according to what was determined above ²⁰: for the will proceeding to operation with such a defect sins.

The first defect is never simply an evil of the will, since it is natural to it; and according to itself it precedes the morally evil act in duration. — But the second, when the will does not go forth into operation, does not have the nature of evil simply: because to stand under and to be moved by the apprehension and the proper good is not due to the will always, but only when it proceeds to operation; whence the fact that the will does not stand under apprehension or the proper good when it is not operating is not an evil of it simply. But when the will goes forth into operation not standing under the apprehension of reason or the good of reason, but following sensitive apprehension or enticed by a good that is not the good of reason, then such a defect is simply evil: because it is the privation of an order due to be in the will at that time. If therefore a defect of this kind is considered according as it is not simply evil, it thus precedes moral sin in duration: because it precedes the operating will. But if it is considered according as it is simply evil, it thus does not precede the evil act of the will in duration, but accompanies it. Yet according to reason, we understand the will to be moved by the apprehension of sense or by an undue good, and consequently to lack the due order to its proper motives, before it elicits the act: and thus such a defect precedes the evil act according to reason.

2. As to the second, it must be known that something can be called voluntary in two ways. In one way, because the will is borne into it as into a thing willed through its act: as healing is voluntary in the physician who wills to heal. In this way a defect of this kind is not called voluntary: since it is understood beforehand to every act of the will. — In another way that is called voluntary which is in the power of the will that it be or not be: as an act of the will freely elicited is called voluntary, not because the will wills it by another act, but because it is in the power of the will to produce it or not produce it. And in this way a defect of this kind is called voluntary. For it is in the power of the will to proceed to operation without such an order, or not to proceed: because it is not necessarily drawn by a good contrary to the good of reason, or moved by sensitive apprehension, but is free and disposed to either alternative. And therefore for a defect of this kind one need not seek any other cause than the freedom of the will, as is said in the Second Book, d. xxxiv²¹.

3. As to the third, it is said that a defect of this kind, according as it precedes the evil act in duration, is not a moral evil of the will: indeed, nor a natural one, as has been shown. — But according as it accompanies moral evil and is joined to it, it is thus a moral evil. Hence in De Malo, in the place cited before²², at 13, St. Thomas says that it receives the nature of guilt from this very fact, that the will applies itself to the work with such a defect: because then the good which is privated through a defect of this kind is due to the will and to its act. — But according as it is understood beforehand to the evil act and is considered per se, it thus also does not have the nature of an evil of guilt nor of punishment, just as neither when it precedes the evil act in duration.

When therefore St. Thomas says that a defect of this kind is not a moral evil, it must be understood as considered according to itself and absolutely: but not as it is conjoined with the evil act of the will.

IX. From those things which St. Thomas says here, it is clear that Scotus, in II Sent., d. xxxiv²³, when he argues that the defectibility of the will is not the ground of sinning for the will, does not attain to the mind of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas does not posit that the aptitude for failing is the proximate ground of sinning for the will: but the actual defect, namely when, not standing under the due order, it proceeds to operation.

Similarly when he argues²⁴ that an actual defect is not the cause of an evil of this kind, because then there would be a defect before the first defect of the will, it is evident that he does not follow the mind of St. Thomas. For he does not posit that that defect is morally evil according as it is understood beforehand to the evil act, as has been shown. Nor is it unsuitable, but rather necessary, that before the first morally evil defect there should be another defect not having the nature of moral evil.