Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From the premises St. Thomas deduces as a corollary that evil is beside intention in things, and befalls beside the intention of agents¹. And on account of this corollary, he makes a determination concerning the nature of evil.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the nature of evil; second, he infers a corollary, in chapter XV.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows that evil is beside intention, which follows immediately from what precedes; second, he treats of the nature of evil, in chapter VII; third, of its causality, in chapter X.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he raises doubts, in the following chapter; third, he answers them, in chapter VI.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. Evil is distinct from good, which every agent intends. Therefore it happens beside intention: because that which results from an action distinct from what was intended by the agent happens beside intention.

Secondly. An agent intends an end corresponding to its power. Therefore that which results corresponding to a defect of power is beside intention. Therefore so is evil. — The antecedent is proved. Because an agent, according as it acts, so intends the end. But it acts according to what it has of active power, not however according as it suffers a defect of power. — But the second consequence is proved. Because a defect in the effect and action follows upon some defect in the principles of action: as is clear in monstrous births and in limping.

Note, when it is said that a defect in operation and effect follows upon some defect in the principles of action, that a defect of the principle can be understood in two ways. In one way, for the removal of some perfection that ought to be in it for right generation, from whatever altering cause it may arise. In another way, for an impediment of the principle arising from without: just as that fire does not perfectly burn some wood can arise from the interposition of some body preventing the action of the fire from completely reaching the wood; for then there is some defect of the agent, inasmuch as it cannot use its whole power on account of some impeding thing. But it is true that this defect is reduced in some way to an intrinsic defect of the cause: namely, inasmuch as it has a power that can be impeded on account of its imperfection. — In the present discussion, therefore, a defect of the principle is taken generally, whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic. And it is understood of principles not only of action, but also material ones: for when a defect happens in the effect, this arises either from a defect of the agent or from a defect of the matter.

II. Thirdly ². A movable thing by its motion tends to form, but it arrives at privation accidentally and beside intention. Therefore by its motion it intends to arrive at good, but it arrives at evil beside intention. Therefore, since every agent and mover tends to good, evil arises beside the agent's intention.

The antecedent is explained in generation and corruption, where it is agreed that matter does not intend privation, although it is in potency to it: since it is impossible for it to be under privation alone. It is also explained in other motions. — But the first consequence is proved. Because good is according as matter is perfected by form, and potency by its proper act; but evil is according as it is deprived of its due act. — The second is also proved. Because the motion of the movable thing and the moving action of the mover tend to the same thing: since, namely, the act of the mover and of the movable thing is the same, as is said in Physics III ³.

Note, concerning that proposition, Good is according as matter is perfected by form, and potency by its proper act, that St. Thomas cautiously added the word proper. Because the good of a potency is not to be under just any act, but only under its proper act and that which is due to it: just as it is not the good of water to be under heat, but under cold, which is the perfection due to it. For although every form and act is in itself a certain perfection, it is not nevertheless the good or perfection of each thing, taking perfection for that which is due to nature, and according to which a nature is said to be complete in its being.

III. Concerning the things that are said in this reasoning, many doubts arise. The first is that the appetite and intention of matter is nothing other than its receptive potency: as is the mind of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. XVIII, q. 1, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. XXII, a. 1, ad 3. If therefore matter is in potency to privation, and arrives at it through motion together with the form, it follows that the appetite and intention of matter is toward privation. Therefore it includes a contradiction to say what is said here, namely that matter is in potency to privation, and nevertheless, while it is moved, does not intend privation.

2. The second is ⁴ that someone could say that matter, although—because it cannot exist under privation alone—it does not seek privation separately and apart from form, nevertheless seeks and intends it together with form: just as it is simultaneously in potency to both, and simultaneously tends to both.

3. The third is concerning that proposition, Matter cannot be under privation alone ⁵. For it can be argued against it by the arguments of Scotus, who maintains, in II Sent., d. XII, q. II ⁶, that matter can exist without any form.

First. An absolute that is distinct from and prior to another absolute can exist without contradiction without it. Matter is an absolute distinct from and prior to any form whatsoever. Therefore etc.

Secondly. God gives being to matter by means of form, which is not of the essence of matter. Therefore God without form can give being to matter. — The consequence is proved. Because whatever absolute thing God makes in creatures by means of a second cause that is not of the essence of the thing caused, He can make without it.

Thirdly. God immediately creates matter. Therefore He can immediately preserve it, without any other posterior absolute entity.

Fourthly. There is no absolute necessity of connection of matter to form. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because then matter would of necessity determine to itself some form: for what determines to itself some genus determines to itself some species in that genus; and what determines to itself some species of necessity determines to itself being in some one individual of that species.

It is confirmed. Because matter is related contingently to any form whatsoever. Therefore it is also related contingently to the whole genus of form.

It follows therefore from these things that it is not absolutely impossible for matter to be under privation alone.

IV. To the first doubt it is said that the potency of matter to privation does not properly and per se have the character of a receptive potency in comparison to privation itself, since privation formally taken posits no being in matter: but it is called receptive of privation accidentally, inasmuch as it is receptive of a form which it can lose, and inasmuch as it is receptive of another form to which the privation of the form it has is necessarily conjoined. And therefore, when it is said that matter is in potency to the privation of the form possessed, it must be understood accidentally and secondarily, namely by reason of the form to which it is conjoined. But the appetite and inclination of matter is called the potentiality and aptitude of matter toward that which it regards per se, not however the aptitude and potentiality toward that which it regards secondarily and accidentally: because the appetite of a thing regards its perfection, not however the negation of perfection.

V. To the second doubt ⁷ it is said that, if privation were equally regarded by potency along with form, both would have to be simultaneously intended and desired by matter, since it tends to them simultaneously. But because matter does not per se regard privation, but only accidentally, inasmuch as it is conjoined to form, therefore it is not desired per se by matter together with form, but only accidentally, inasmuch as the form to which it is conjoined is desired. But St. Thomas is speaking here of appetite and intention per se, not however of accidental appetite.

VI. For the clarity of the third doubt ⁸, it must be considered that for matter to be able to exist without any form, and consequently only under privation, can be understood in two ways. First, speaking of the absolutely possible, according as that is called possible which does not imply a contradiction. And thus for matter to be able to exist without any form is for it not to imply a contradiction that it be in act and have no form. And because whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done by God, if in that way it were possible for matter to exist without form, God would be able to make it to be without form. — Secondly, speaking of the possible by comparison to natural active power. And thus for matter to be able to exist without any form is to be able by some natural power to be brought about so as to have being without any form.

Scotus therefore held that through divine power matter can have being without form: and that for it to be without form does not imply a contradiction. — But St. Thomas, in the Prima Pars, q. LXVI, a. 1; De Potentia, q. IV, a. 1; Quodlibets, quodl. 3, a. 1, holds, with Averroes, II Physics, comm. 12, and Avicenna, in the second book of his Metaphysics, ch. III, that it implies a contradiction for matter to exist actually without any form, and consequently it is not something doable by God. For then something would be in act without an act; and something would be a being that was not determined to any mode of being. — But because this question has been disputed by other Thomists ⁹, and especially by Capreolus, in II Sent., d. XII ¹⁰, let it suffice for now to respond to the arguments of Scotus.

2. To the first, the major premise is denied when two absolutes have a necessary connection between themselves. For it is not universally true, as is clear in quantity and quality: for quantity cannot exist in nature unless it has some shape; and yet quantity is an absolute something prior to quality. But matter, as to the actuality of existence, has a natural and necessary connection with form. Whence it is indeed true that everything that can exist without another, but not the other without it, is prior to it; but not conversely that everything prior can exist without what is posterior.

It is said secondly that that major proposition, if it has truth, holds only in a prior and posterior both of which express some act: but not in a prior that expresses no act, but pure potency, of which sort primary matter is.

It is said thirdly that, if it has truth, it is understood of separation from any posterior whatsoever divisively, but not conjunctively. For animal, although it can exist without each of its species taken divisively and per se, cannot nevertheless exist without every species of animal conjunctively, so that there would be an animal in the nature of things existing in no species of animal. In the same way, although matter can exist without any form taken particularly, it cannot nevertheless exist without every form conjunctively, so that it would exist in the nature of things subject to no form.

3. To the second, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that the assumption is true of a second agent cause, but not of a formal cause. For whatever God makes by means of an efficient second cause, He can work by Himself alone without the second cause. But not whatever He makes by means of a formal cause can He work without such a cause: for He cannot make a wall white without whiteness, for to be white is to have whiteness. Now, God gives being to matter by means of form as by a formal cause, not however as by an efficient cause. Therefore the reasoning does not follow.

4. And through this the response to the third is clear. For although God immediately creates matter by the removal of a mediate efficient cause, He does not however do so by the removal of a mediate formal cause.

5. To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof of which, the consequence is denied. But to the proof of the consequence it can be answered in two ways. First, that the assumption has truth when two conditions are observed: the first is that such a thing determining a genus to itself be something complete in act; second, that the genus which it determines to itself be essential to it. For thus it is true that everything that determines a genus to itself determines to itself some species of that genus: because, as is said in the Categories ¹¹, what is in some genus is in some species of that genus. But it is not true where either of those conditions is lacking; and it is much less true where both are lacking. In the present case, however, both conditions are lacking: because matter is not a complete being in act, since it is pure potency; nor is form of the essence of matter taken absolutely. Therefore that assumption does not have truth in the present case. — But the reason why matter, which is an incomplete being, being one, does not determine to itself some most special species of the genus of substance nor some individual, is that by reason of its potentiality it is susceptible of diverse forms; and because form is that from which each thing has species, therefore, just as it is in potency to diverse forms, so it is in potency and indifferent to diverse species and to diverse individuals.

It can be answered secondly to the same assumption, speaking of a genus extrinsic to the essence of that potency which determines that genus to itself, that for what determines to itself some extrinsic genus to determine to itself a species of that genus can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it determines to itself in being some determinate species of that genus; in another way, that it determines to itself one or the other of them disjunctively. In the first way, the assumption is false; in the second way, it is true. For the visual power, which determines to itself color as the object of operation, does not determine to itself white determinately and designatively, so that it could not see except white, nor similarly black, or any other color: yet it cannot see unless it sees some particular color, namely either this or that. Similarly this body, say wood, determines to itself place: yet it does not determine to itself this place designatively, so that it could not exist without this place; but it is true that it cannot exist, according to nature, unless it is in this or in that place, enumerating all places. In like manner, it is not necessary that matter, which determines to itself form in being, should determine to itself this form designatively, say the form of man, so that, just as it cannot exist without form, so it could not exist without the form of man: but it is indeed necessary that it determine to itself some particular form disjunctively; for it cannot be in act unless it is under some particular form, namely either this one or that one, enumerating all forms.

Through this the response to the confirmation is clear. For the consequence is false. For that which is related contingently to whatever is contained under a genus taken designatively and determinately—as it is true that matter is related contingently to every form—does not have to be related contingently to the whole genus. Whence according to Scotus himself, II Sent., d. XV ¹², this consequence must be denied: This body can exist without this place and without that place (and so of the others designatively); therefore it can exist without any place. But it is indeed true that that which is related contingently to everything contained under a genus taken vaguely and indeterminately and disjunctively is related contingently to the whole genus. But we do not say that in this sense matter is related contingently to every form. On the contrary, it is related necessarily to it: because it cannot exist without this or that form.

VII. Fourthly ¹³. In agents acting through intellect and any estimation whatsoever, evil is beside intention. Therefore also in agents acting through nature. Therefore in all agents.

The antecedent is proved. In agents of this kind intention follows apprehension: since it tends toward that which is apprehended as an end. Therefore, if it arrives at something that does not have the apprehended form, it will be beside intention: as happens in one who, believing he is eating honey, eats gall. But an agent of this kind tends toward something according as it grasps it under the aspect of good. Therefore, if that at which it arrives is not good, but evil, it will be beside intention. — The first consequence is also proved. Because to tend to good is common to an agent through intellect and to an agent acting through nature.

2. Two things must be noted here. The first is that for something to be apprehended as an end can be understood in two ways: in one way, so that the notion of the end is known to belong to it; in another way, so that it is apprehended as per se desirable, apprehending it, namely, as suitable absolutely, and not as useful for something else. In the first way, it belongs only to those having intellect, whose property it is to know what an end is. But in the second way it belongs even to brutes. On this account St. Thomas said, not only of agents acting through intellect, but also of agents acting through any estimation whatsoever—as namely are brutes, which are moved to their operations by natural estimation—that intention follows apprehension, because it tends toward that which is apprehended as an end. For intention also belongs in some way to brutes, as was explained above in the second Book ¹⁴.

The second is that, although to tend toward the good belongs in different ways to an agent through nature and to an agent through intellect, this is nevertheless common to both, that intention follows the form through which the agent operates. And therefore, just as in an agent through intellect intention follows the apprehension through which it acts, and everything that results that is not conformed to its apprehension is beside its intention; so the intention of an agent through nature follows the form through which the natural agent acts, and everything that happens that is not conformed to the inclination of the agent's form is beside its intention. And therefore, since evil is just as discordant from the inclination of the natural form, which inclines to good, as from the apprehension of the agent through intellect; just as it is beside the intention of the agent through intellect, so it is beside the intention of the natural agent. On this account St. Thomas, in order to show that evil is beside the intention of a natural agent if it is beside the intention of an agent through intellect, very well uses this reason, that to tend to good is common to both agents. Lastly, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, ch. IV of On the Divine Names.