Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The preamble having been set down, St. Thomas approaches the first part of his proposed subject, namely according to the division laid down by him; namely, to determine concerning God according to what He is as the end of all things ¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows that the end of each thing is good; second, that all things are ordered to God as to an end, ch. XVII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that all things act on account of something; second, that the end of each thing is good, ch. XVI.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that all things act for an end; second, that all things act for a good, in the following chapter. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he removes a doubt ².

It should be noted, moreover, that since an end has the character of an ultimate and the character of a cause, in this chapter it is not treated of the end as it has the character of a cause, but as it has the character of an ultimate.

I. Therefore, he first argues thus, to prove that all things act for the sake of an end.

The impetus of every agent tends toward something certain: sometimes indeed toward the action itself; but sometimes toward something made through the action. Therefore every agent in acting intends an end: either the action, when the action does not terminate in something made; or the thing wrought through it, if something is effected through it.

The antecedent is proved. Both because not just any action proceeds from just any power, as is clear in heat and cold; and because actions differ in species according to the diversity of active principles. — The consequence also is proved. Because in things that manifestly act for an end, we say that that is the end into which the impetus—that is, the actual inclination and motion—of the agent tends: because while the agent attains that, it is said to attain the end, and while it falls short of it, it is said to fall short of the intended end, whether it knows the end or does not know it; as is clear in the physician healing, and the man running.

Note, when it is said that an action sometimes terminates in something made, as house-building in a house and healing in health, but sometimes not, as understanding and sensing: that this is understood of something made to whose perfection the operation is ordered; not, however, of something made which is effected on account of the perfection of the operation. For understanding does not have something made through it to whose perfection it is ordered; but it well has something made which is ordered to the completion and perfection of intellection itself. Therefore it is said absolutely that intellection does not have something made through it; but house-building is said to have something made through it, because it terminates in something produced through it, not as in that which is produced on account of the perfection of the operation, but as in that to the perfecting of which the operation is ordered. Whence it is well said that in those things which have some such thing made, the thing made itself is the end; but in those which do not have some such thing made, the operation itself is the end: because, namely, in the former the operation is intended on account of the thing made to whose perfection it is ordered; but in the latter the thing wrought is intended on account of the operation itself, for the sake of whose completion and perfection it is intended.

II. Secondly. In the action of any agent whatever it is to come to ³ something beyond which the agent does not seek anything. Therefore etc.

The consequence is proved. Because in all things that act for an end, we say that that is the ultimate end beyond which the agent does not seek anything, as health with respect to the physician. — The antecedent also is proved. Because otherwise actions would proceed to infinity. Which is impossible: because the agent would not begin to act, since nothing is moved to that to which it is impossible to arrive; but it is not possible to traverse infinite things.

III. Thirdly: and it is a confirmation of the preceding. It is impossible that actions proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary that there be something having been obtained by which the striving of the agent rests. Therefore etc.

The antecedent is proved. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, either something made follows from them, or not. Not the first. Because it is impossible for an agent to begin to make something made for which infinite actions are prerequired: for such a thing is impossible to be, and consequently it is impossible to be made, and thus to make it is impossible. — Nor also the second. Because if the order of this sort of actions is taken according to the order of active powers, as is the order among sensing, imagining, understanding, and willing, inasmuch as one is on account of the other, it is clear that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in active powers, just as neither in the forms of things, from II Metaph., text 10, since form is the principle of acting. If also the order of them is taken according to the order of objects, as is the order in the consideration of a body, a soul, a separate substance, and God, beginning from a body, so that namely the consideration of one is that one may arrive at the consideration of the other: thus there is not a process to infinity; because neither in objects is there a process to infinity, just as neither in beings, since there is one first being, as was proved above.

2. Concerning this reason a doubt occurs. For someone could say that, although there is not a process to infinity in per se ordered objects, just as neither in beings, nevertheless nothing prevents there being a process to infinity in accidentally ordered ones. And thus operations can proceed to infinity: just as, positing the eternity of the world, things would be generated to infinity, and generations would succeed one another to infinity. And thus one agent can produce one action on account of another, and that on account of another, to infinity.

It is answered that it is one thing to speak of actions through which something made is produced; and another of actions from which no thing made follows, of which kind are understanding and sensing. For where something made follows, as in generations, there is indeed a process to infinity with respect to diverse generated things, because singulars can be generated to infinity; but with respect to one object to be produced there cannot be a process to infinity in actions, because its production would never be completed. — Where, however, no thing made follows from actions, there cannot be a process to infinity from a process of formal objects to infinity: because formal objects are not infinite. But there could well be a process to infinity absolutely around material objects, which succeed one another to infinity, if the agent were to endure to infinity. But there cannot be an ordered process to infinity, so that one operation is intended on account of another, and that on account of another, to infinity. And in this way is understood what St. Thomas says here concerning the process to infinity of actions from which no thing made follows. For considerations of diverse singulars of one nature do not have such an order: because the cognition of one of them cannot be the reason for the cognition of another proceeding to infinity, because not all individuals are so ordered that one, as far as it is from itself, is better known to us than another as to the intellect. And similarly it is in all other operations of this sort.

IV. Fourthly. It would follow that active principles proceed to infinity. This is false, as was shown: namely in the preceding reason. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in those things which act for an end, all intermediate things between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to prior things, and active principles with respect to subsequent things.

2. Concerning this reason a twofold doubt occurs. The first is, because it does not seem to be distinguished from the preceding reason. For it was proved also through that one that there is not a process to infinity in actions because there is not a proceeding to infinity in active powers.

The second is, because St. Thomas seems to presuppose what he has to prove, namely that there is some ultimate end of the agent. For this is what must be proved.

3. To the first it is said that this reason is not the same as the preceding, although it has a dependence upon it. Because in the preceding reason it was proved that it is not on account of the infinity of active powers that actions proceed to infinity, because in them there is not a proceeding to infinity: here, however, it is argued that if in actions there is a proceeding to infinity, it is necessary that the powers themselves proceed to infinity, which was shown to be false.

To the second it is said that he does not presuppose what he has to prove. For he intends to prove this universal: Every agent acts for an end. But he does not presuppose this; rather, it is presupposed that in some things which manifestly act for an end, an ultimate end is found: for the healer, as such, has health for an ultimate end. Then, from that which is found in those things which manifestly act for an end, he wishes to deduce the proposition universally. For in them it is manifest that intermediates are ends with respect to prior things, and active principles with respect to posterior things: just as medicine made by a craftsman is the cause of health. And from this it is had that if there is a proceeding to infinity in actions, so that the striving of the agent is not toward something determinate, prior things made will be productive of posterior things to infinity, supposing that the agent acts one on account of another and that on account of another to infinity, and thus there will be infinite active and productive principles.

V. Fifthly. An agent through intellect as well as an agent through nature acts for an end. Therefore every agent does.

The antecedent is proved. As to agents through intellect indeed, because they act pre-conceiving in the intellect that which they attain through action, and from such a preconception they act. For this is to act through intellect. — As to natural agents, however, because just as in the pre-conceiving intellect there pre-exists the whole likeness of the effect to which one arrives through the actions of the intelligent being, so in a natural agent there pre-exists the likeness of the natural effect, from which the action is determined to this effect, as is clear in the production of fire and of an olive.

For the evidence of this reason, as to what it touches upon concerning natural agents, it must be considered that an agent through intellect tends into something determinate according to the direction of the conception itself, because it acts through a conception, which is the likeness of something determinate: for the conception of the agent does not direct except into that of which it is the likeness, because every agent produces a form similar to the form through which it acts, just as a house-builder through the conception of a house is ordered to producing nothing other than a house. And because where the cause is the same, the same effect ought to follow, for that reason, since also in a natural agent there is the likeness of the natural effect, to which the action of the agent is determined through such a likeness, it follows that a natural agent also acts for the sake of something ultimate, and thus acts for an end. For the ultimate that a natural agent intends through its action is the likeness of the form through which it acts; just as the ultimate that an agent through intellect intends is that to which it is assimilated through its preconception: for the impetus of the agent follows the inclination of the form through which it operates. And this is the foundation of this reason.

VI. Sixthly. In an agent through art, and in an agent through nature, sin is found: as when a grammarian does not speak correctly, and when monstrous births are produced. Therefore etc.

The consequence is proved. Because sin is not found except in those things which are for an end: for it is not imputed to anyone as a sin if he falls short of that for which he is not; as it is not imputed to a builder or a grammarian if he falls short of healing, but it is well imputed to a physician.

For the evidence of the foundation of this reason, it is to be understood, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. xxi, a. 1; and De Malo, q. ii, a. 1, that sin, whether in natural things or in artificial things, according to Aristotle, II Physics ⁴, consists in an act which is done for an end, not indeed that the sin of the agent is absolutely not to attain the end, since it happens sometimes that an agent does not attain the end not on account of a defect of nature or art, but from elsewhere, as that nature does not digest iron in the stomach is because it is indigestible, and that a physician does not induce health sometimes happens because either the sick person has an incurable disease, or does something contrary to health: but it happens that an agent sins when it produces an operation not having the due order to the end. For it is imputed to a physician if he falls short of healing when this happens on account of a defect of his operation, because namely he does not operate according to the rule of art: whence if he even introduced health not operating according to the rules of art, he would nonetheless sin, on account of the inordination of the operation. On account of which, when St. Thomas says that a physician sins if he falls short of healing, it is to be understood if the defect of healing arises from this, that he turns aside from the rules of medicine. The foundation, therefore, of this reason is this alone, namely that sin is found only in those things which are for an end; not, however, this, that it consists in the non-attainment of the end absolutely. For whether someone attains the end by operating or not, it is enough for the proposition that wherever sin is found, there order to an end is found.

VII. Seventhly. If an agent did not tend to some determinate effect, it would be impossible for it to act. Because all effects would be indifferent to it: but that which is indifferently disposed toward many things does not operate one of them more than another, unless it is determined to one by something.

To this reason it could be said that an agent acts by many actions, and that it is determined to act something by one action; but because it orders that to another, and that to another to infinity, therefore it does not tend to something ultimate which is its end.

But this response is not according to the mind of the argument. Both because it suffices for the argument that each single action have some determinate effect intended by the agent. For such an effect will be the end of the agent in that action; and thus the agent, inasmuch as it is an agent, in each single action acts for an end, since it acts toward something determinate, and not into what is uncertain; which was intended. — And because it was shown above ⁵ that the actions of an agent cannot proceed to infinity according to the order of one to another.

How, moreover, from a cause contingent to either side an effect does not follow unless it is determined through something, was declared in the first book ⁶.

VIII. As to the second ⁷, St. Thomas removes a certain doubt. For someone could opine that there is some agent not operating for an end, because playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without intention, as the stroking of a beard, do not seem to be for any end.

St. Thomas answers, and says three things. First, that contemplative actions are not for some end; but they themselves are the end. — Secondly, that playful actions are the end when someone plays solely on account of the pleasure which is in the play: but they are for an end when we play so that afterwards we may act more vigorously ⁸. — Thirdly, that actions done without attention are not from intellect, but either from some sudden imagination; or from a natural principle, as an inordination of humors exciting an itch is the cause of that stroking of the beard. And these actions tend to some ends, although outside the order of intellect.

2. Concerning the first statement, it should be noted that from it it is had that, in order for something to act for an end, it is not necessary that its operation be ordered to another as to an end, but it suffices that it itself is the ultimate which is intended by that action. For whether the agent intends something other besides the operation, or the operation itself alone, it is always said to act for an end, that is, on account of something ultimately intended.

3. Concerning the second statement it is doubted, because a contradiction seems to be implied. For the pleasure which is in the operation is other than the playful operation: because it belongs to the appetite, but the operation to another power. If therefore someone plays on account of the pleasure which is in the play, the operation itself is ordered to pleasure as to an end, and consequently the operation itself is not the end. And thus it implies a contradiction to say that the playful operation is the end when someone plays solely on account of the pleasure which is in the play.

The doubt is increased. Because in IIª IIae, q. clxxx, a. 1; and 7, ad 1, it is said that contemplation terminates in the affect. And this also proceeds against the first statement.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. xlix, q. iii, a. 4, quª 3, that the pleasure following upon some operation and the operation itself are not to be considered as two goods, but as one: because from them one perfect operation is made, as from the perfectible and its perfection. And therefore St. Thomas speaks here of the operation and pleasure as of one thing intended by the agent: not, however, as if they are two intended things of which one is intended on account of the other, against which sense the objection proceeds. — Whether, however, if they are considered as two intended things, pleasure is the end, or rather the operation upon which it follows, will be shown below, chapter XXVI.

To the confirmation it is said, for now, that St. Thomas speaks there of operation as it is distinguished from pleasure: according to which mode it can be said that pleasure is in some way the end, although it is not simply the end, as will be shown below. Here, however, he speaks of both as of one intended thing, so that pleasure and operation intended together are not ordered in contemplation or in such a playful operation to another end, but it itself then, conjoined with its pleasure, is the end and ultimate intended thing.

4. Concerning the third statement, it must be observed that St. Thomas means through it that actions of this sort which happen on the spur of the moment are not indeed ordered by the intellect to some end, but are well ordered by nature or imagination to something, as the stroking of a beard to the expulsion of an itch.

From these things is excluded the error of the ancient Naturalists, who remove the final cause from things, and posit that all things are made from the necessity of matter.