Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having completed the Second Book, in which St. Thomas treated of the procession of creatures from God, we must now explain the Third Book, in which he treats of the ordering of creatures toward God as toward an end.

Concerning this, moreover, St. Thomas does two things: first, he sets down a Prologue; second, he executes his intended plan ¹.

The Prologue is divided into two parts: for first it is shown that God has the governance of creatures; second, the division of this book is concluded ².

I. As to the first, presupposing from what precedes that God is the first of beings and the first principle of all things, St. Thomas lays down two conclusions. The first is: God has perfect dominion over the things produced by Him.

It is proved as to the first part thus. God bestows being on others through the choice of His will. Therefore He has dominion over all of His works. — The consequence is proved. Because we have dominion over those things that are subject to our will.

As to the second part, it is proved because He does not need the help of an external agent, nor the foundation of matter, since He is the universal effecter of all being, that is, the producer of all things that are in the thing.

2. Regarding that proposition, We have dominion over those things that are subject to our will, it should be noted that it is understood with respect to that according to which they are subject to our will. For it happens that some things are subject to our will with respect to one thing, but not with respect to another. For example, a house is subject to someone's will as to its use, but not as to the very substance of the house: because it is within his freedom to inhabit the house or not to inhabit it, and to grant its use to another or not to grant it, whence he is the master of the house with respect to use, but not with respect to substance. In the same way, if someone is subject to someone's will as to his direction and governance, that one is his master as to direction and governance: but not as to other things, as not extending universally to all things that are in the thing. Whence this dominion is incomplete and imperfect. But because all things are subject universally to the divine will, with respect to all things that are in the thing; and they are so subject to it that they can be produced through will alone, without the help of another: therefore God has full and perfect dominion over all created things, namely, so that all things occur in reality according to His disposition.

II. The second conclusion is: God is the perfect ruler of all creatures. He first proves this conclusion; second, he shows the diverse modes of God's governance ³.

Now he proves the first part by this reason. God orders things to an end and directs their actions. Therefore He is their ruler. — The antecedent is proved as to things: because each of the things that are produced through the will of an agent is ordered by the agent to some end; since the good and the end is the proper object of the will. But as to actions: because each thing both attains its ultimate end through its own action, and that action must be directed by Him who gave to things the principles through which they act.

He proves the second part: God is perfect in being and in causing. Therefore He is also perfect in ruling.

For the clarity of those things which are said concerning this conclusion, it should be observed that St. Thomas presupposes that to order things to an end by directing operations to the end and by giving them the principles through which they operate is to rule and govern the things themselves. For he assumes this as evident, and as expressing the meaning of the name, as is clear in the Prima Pars, q. 103, a. 1. Whence also in article 4 of the same question, he says that there are two general effects of divine governance, namely the conservation of things in the good, and their motion toward the good. And therefore, from the fact that God orders the things produced by Him to an end, he immediately concludes that He is the ruler of all, having suppressed the major premise, which he omits as evident.

III. In the second place he shows how diverse the effect of this governance is ⁴. And he sets down that it is shown diversely in diverse things. Because some are not only directed, but also direct themselves to the end, according to their own actions; and they are admitted to the attainment of the ultimate end if in their direction they are subject to divine governance; but they are repelled if they act otherwise. — But some are directed only by another. Yet these are in a twofold genus. For some, just as they cannot suffer defect in their natural being, so in their own actions they are unfailingly subject to the governance of the first ruler, and never depart from their order: — supply, unless God works something in them beyond nature or above nature. Of this sort are the celestial bodies, whose motions always proceed uniformly. — But some, just as they can suffer defect in natural being, so also in their own acts: which defect, however, is compensated by some good coming from it. Such, moreover, are corruptible bodies: for these, just as they were founded by God Himself, so are they perfectly subject to His power, although they seem to depart from the order of the first governance.

2. Here two things should be noted. The first is that a thing ordered to an end by another has it from that mover's motion to attain the end, so long as it perseveres under the order of that mover: but when it departs from the intention and motion of the first mover, then it does not attain the end to which it is moved by the agent. For as long as an arrow is subject to the motion of one shooting rightly, it attains the end to which it is directed by the archer: but if on account of some impelling factor it does not remain under the order of motion from the archer, but is deflected elsewhere, it will not be able to attain the end. And the same would happen if the arrow were something moving itself, and moved itself not according to the impetus and motion of the archer, but against such motion, or by some movement deviating from it. For that which is directed to some end by someone must be subject to the motion of the director and follow it, if it is to attain such an end: for nothing can arrive at the end of a superior agent except from the motion of such an agent, since the end and the agent must be proportioned; for a boy never attains the end to which the pedagogue directs him, from such direction, unless he is subject to such direction. For this reason St. Thomas well says that those things which direct themselves to an end, if in their direction they are subject to divine governance, are admitted to attaining the ultimate end from divine governance, but are repelled if they act otherwise.

The second is that corruptible things, although they depart from the order given to them by the first ruler, for example when a tree does not flower at the appointed time, are not on this account removed from divine governance. Both because they are so governed that they can fail and be impeded; and because even from such departure something is elicited by God: and thus, even while such bodies depart from the natural order, God orders the departure itself, substituting some good in place of it. — But concerning all these things there will be a fuller discussion below, when divine providence will be treated ⁵.

Finally, he confirms both conclusions together by the authority of the Psalm, God is a Great Lord, etc., which he diligently explains.

IV. As to the second ⁶, he concludes the intention of this Third Book, and its general division. And he says that, since in the preceding books the perfection of the divine nature and also the perfection of His power were treated, in this Third Book we must treat of His perfect authority or dignity, according as He is the ruler and end of all things.

Concerning this, moreover, we must treat first of God according as He is the end of all things; second, of His governance, chap. LXIV; third, specially of His governance regarding intellectual natures ⁷.