Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

¹

² I bis. Because from the arguments of the preceding chapter ³ someone might think that our prayers ought always to be heard by God, St. Thomas wishes to exclude this false opinion.

Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he shows that it is not unfitting if the petitions of those who pray are not always granted by God; second, from what has been premised, he gathers the principal intent of the preceding chapter ⁴; third, he excludes certain errors ⁵.

II bis. He shows the first by running through the above-mentioned reasons. First. From the first reason it is held that God fulfills the desires of the rational creature inasmuch as it desires the good. But what is asked is not always a true good, but an apparent one, and truly an evil simpliciter. Therefore such a prayer is not capable of being heard—understand this to mean out of God's mercy. For sometimes it is heard unto vengeance, as St. Thomas says in IIª IIae, q. 83, a. 16, while God permits the sinner to fall further into sins. Whence Augustine says ⁶ that God sometimes graciously denies what He grants when angry. This reason is touched upon in Jas. 4.

Secondly. The same is held from the second reason. Because God moves to desiring. But the movable thing is not led to the end of the motion by the mover unless the motion is continued. Therefore, if the motion of desire is not continued through the urgency of prayer, it is not unfitting if the prayer does not attain its due effect. This reason is drawn from Luke 18 and 1 Thess. 5.

Thirdly. The same is held from the third reason. For it was shown that God fittingly fulfills the desire of the rational creature inasmuch as it approaches Him. But one approaches God through contemplation, and devout affection, and a humble and firm intention. Therefore, where these are lacking, the prayer is not capable of being heard: namely, as far as the merit of the prayer is concerned. This reason is drawn from the Psalm and Jas. 1.

Fourthly. The same was shown from the nature of friendship in the fourth reason. Therefore he who turns away from friendship with God is not worthy that his prayer be heard. This reason is drawn from Prov. 28 and Isa. 1. — From the same root it proceeds that a certain friend of God is not heard: namely, when he asks on behalf of those who are not friends of God, as is held in Jer. 7.

Concerning that proposition, He who turns away from friendship with God is not worthy that his prayer be heard, it should be noted that this is not said as if no sinner were heard by God: because even sinners are sometimes heard, as is the mind of Augustine on John ⁷ and Chrysostom on Matthew. ⁸ But because, although he is sometimes heard, this is nevertheless not as it were out of justice, but out of pure mercy. Whence St. Thomas did not say that his prayer is not capable of being heard, but that he is not worthy to be heard: as if to say that he does not merit to be heard, although God sometimes hears him out of mercy.

Fifthly. It is argued from the same foundation. Sometimes someone, out of friendship, denies what is asked by a friend, because he knows this to be harmful to him, and that the contrary is more expedient for him, as is evident in a physician. Therefore God also sometimes does not fulfill the petition of those whom He especially loves, so that He may fulfill what is more expedient for the salvation of the one asking. Whence He did not take away the thorn in the flesh from Paul, for the preservation of humility, as is held in 2 Cor. 12. — It is confirmed by the authority of Matt. 20, Rom. 8, and Augustine to Paulinus and Therasia.

III bis. From the premised reasons, it should be noted that four conditions of prayer are touched upon, which, when all are present, it is always heard, and if any of them is lacking, prayer does not always have the efficacy of impetration. These conditions are indeed touched upon in the Gloss on Luke, on that parable, Which of you shall have a friend, etc. ⁹: namely, that it be asked piously, perseveringly, for oneself, and what pertains to salvation. For the first, third, and fourth reasons show that a certain prayer is not heard on account of a defect in the first condition: either, namely, because a good useful for salvation is not asked for, but something contrary to salvation; or because other conditions required on the part of the one praying inasmuch as he is praying are lacking, ¹⁰ which are explained in the third reason; or because charity is lacking, which is not to pray piously; for, as St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 7, quaestiuncula 3, to the last: that which is called piously includes all the circumstances of virtue by which the act is ordered on the part of the agent. — On account of a defect in the second, the second reason shows that prayer is sometimes not heard: namely, because it is not asked perseveringly. — On account of a defect in the third, the fourth reason, in its second part, shows that someone is not heard: namely, when he prays not for himself, but for another. — The fifth reason, moreover, shows that someone is not heard on account of a defect in the fourth condition: namely, because what is useful for salvation is not asked for, nor yet is that asked for which is manifestly contrary to salvation. — Where, however, all the aforesaid conditions are present, God always hears the man, as St. Thomas says in the article cited above, and also in IIª IIae, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2: and not only the just man, but also the sinner.

If, however, it is asked how the prayer of a sinner can have conditions of this kind, since he is not in charity, and consequently does not pray piously: — it is said from the teaching of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, where cited above, ad 1, and IIª IIae, in the same question, a. 16, ad 2, that the sinner cannot pray piously as if his prayer were informed by the habit of piety (which by another name is called religion): he can nevertheless pray piously in that he asks for something pertaining to piety, namely when he asks for something that is not opposed to God and salvation, but something that pertains to the honor of God and the utility of his own salvation; just as someone is also sometimes said to will and do what is just, although he does not act from the habit of justice.

IV bis. Regarding the second, ¹¹ the conclusion of the preceding article ¹² is confirmed from what was said above, by the following reasoning. Prayers and desires are causes of those things that are done by God (namely, of some of them). Therefore prayers are efficacious with God. Nor do they nevertheless undo the immutable order of divine providence. Rather, that this be granted to such a petitioner falls under such an order. — The consequence is proved. Because divine providence does not exclude other causes: rather, it orders them to the execution of the order established in Himself.

It is confirmed. Because to say that on account of that immutability one should not pray to obtain something from God is similar to saying that one should not walk to reach a place, nor eat to be nourished. Which things are clearly absurd.

V bis. Regarding the third, two errors are excluded. ¹³ The first is of those who said that there is no fruit of prayer. Which error belonged both to those who entirely denied divine providence, as the Epicureans did; and to those who withdrew human affairs from divine providence, as certain Peripatetics do, namely Averroes, according to the opinion of St. Thomas; ¹⁴ and to those who posited that all things subject to divine providence happen of necessity, as the Stoics judged. For from all these it also followed that all worship of the deity was done in vain. This error is touched upon in Mal. 3.

VI bis. The second error is of those who say that the divine disposition is changeable by prayers. Which was the error of the Egyptians, who said that fate is changed by prayers, and images, and fumigations.

Certain authorities of Sacred Scripture seem to favor this error: Isa. 38, concerning the revocation of Hezekiah's death; and Jer. 18; and Joel 2.

But to these St. Thomas answers: and he says, first, that if they are understood according to the surface, they lead to the conclusion that the will of God is mutable; that something (namely real) comes to God in time; and that some things that happen temporally in creatures are the cause of something existing in God. Which things are manifestly impossible; and they are opposed to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which contains ¹⁵ infallible and express truth; namely Num. 23, 1 Sam. 15, and Mal. 3.

He says, secondly, that the error which occurs in these matters arises from the fact that the difference between the universal order and the particular order is not considered: although the order is all the more common as the cause is more universal. The difference between these orders, however, is that nothing prevents some particular order from being changed through prayer, or through some other way, since outside that order there is something that can change it; but the order depending on the universal cause, which is God, cannot be changed, because outside this order nothing can be posited through which it could be overthrown. Therefore, because the Egyptians reduced the order of human affairs to celestial bodies, they said that fate, proceeding from the stars, could be changed by certain prayers and rites: for outside celestial bodies, and above them, there is God, who can impede the subsequent effect of celestial bodies. But the Stoics, referring the order of all things to God as cause, posited that the order instituted by God could by no means be changed: but in this they departed from the consideration of the universal order, in that they posited that prayers are useful for nothing, as though the wills and desires of men were not included under that universal order. For if they are included under that order, just as through other causes, so also through these, from the divine ordering, certain effects follow. Whence it is the same to exclude the effects of prayers and those of other common causes.

He says, thirdly, that prayers are not efficacious as though changing the order of divine disposition, but as existing under such an order.

He says, fourthly, that through the efficacy of prayer the particular order of an inferior cause can be changed, by God's doing, under whom the necessity of the order of an inferior cause is contained, as instituted by Him.

He says, fifthly, in response to the aforesaid authorities, that through the prayer of the pious God is said to turn or to repent, not as though His eternal disposition were changed: but because through it something of the order of inferior causes instituted by Him is changed. Whence Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, although He sometimes changes His sentence: not that, namely, which expresses the eternal disposition, but that which expresses the order of inferior causes, according to which Hezekiah was to die, and a certain nation was to be punished for sins ¹⁶.

He says, sixthly, that this change of sentence is called repentance figuratively, inasmuch as it holds itself after the likeness of one repenting: just as He is also metaphorically said to be angry.

2. Concerning the position of the Stoics, note that St. Thomas does not reprove it in this, that it posited that the order of divine providence cannot be changed: — for, as is evident from what has been said, ¹⁷ this is most true, and corroborated by the authorities of Sacred Scripture — but he reproves it as to this, that it posited that prayers are useful for nothing. For in this it manifestly erred: because just as other particular causes are contained under the order of divine providence, inasmuch as God ordained that He would produce some effects through their mediation; so also prayers are contained under the order of divine providence, as causes through whose mediation God ordained that He would do certain things. Whence Gregory, in the book of Dialogues, ¹⁸ says that those things which holy men accomplish by praying were so predestined that they might be obtained by prayers. From which it is clear that prayers are efficacious so that the order of divine providence concerning some particular effects may be put into execution.

Those things, however, that pertain to the immobility of the divine will were explained above in the first book ¹⁹. Therefore there is no need to linger over them.