Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

¹

² I bis. To the aforesaid objections, St. Thomas answers.

To the first³ indeed, it is said first, that evil and good are specific differences in moral matters, and primary ones. Because moral matters, since they depend on the will, receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will; just as natural actions receive it from the form, which is the principle of action. But good and evil are spoken of according to an order to an end or the privation of order, as from a primary measure.

It is said secondly⁴ that, since in moral matters some things are called good or evil from the end of reason as from a primary measure, that which in them takes its species from an end contrary to the end of reason is called evil according to its species.

It is said thirdly⁵ that such an end of evil, although it removes the end of reason, is nevertheless some good. This is declared by the example of what is pleasurable according to sense, and similar things. Hence evil, according as it is a specific difference, does not signify something that is evil according to its essence; but something that in itself is good, yet is evil inasmuch as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man. From this St. Thomas intends to deny that evil taken formally, about which the conclusion is understood, is a specific difference; although it is true of evil taken accidentally and concretively.

II. Concerning this proposition, Good and evil are spoken of according to an order to an end or the privation of order, it must be considered that this can be understood either of good and evil in common, or of good and evil according as they are found in actions and habits. If it is understood in the first way, it can have a twofold sense. One is that good and evil are only in those things that are naturally suited to be for an end: good indeed, if it is orderable to the end and suitable to the end; but evil if it is not orderable to the end, but is disproportionate to it. This sense is not true. Because good and evil are not only found in things that are for the end, but also in the end. Indeed, good is principally said of the end: because what is ordered to the end has the character of good only because it is ordered to the good, or lacks the due order to it. — Another sense can be that good and evil are spoken of either according to the concomitance of the end, or according to the negation of such concomitance. For the character of the end accompanies the character of the good, if good is taken absolutely and simpliciter; but such a character does not accompany the character of evil, rather the privation of the end accompanies it; for just as evil taken absolutely is the privation of good, so the privation of the end accompanies it. And this sense is true.

If, however, it is understood in the second way, the sense is that a good act, and a good habit, is spoken of according as it is ordered to an end, namely the due one; but an evil one, according as it lacks order to the due end.

Although, however, what is said here can be understood in both ways, it seems nevertheless that it should be understood in the first way in the true sense, namely concerning good and evil in common. Both because St. Thomas speaks absolutely of the end, and makes no mention of the due end; and because it is more suitably adapted to the premises. For because he had said that moral matters obtain their species from the end, he concludes, because the end and the good accompany each other, and similarly evil and the negation of the end, that therefore good and evil are the primary differences in moral matters, namely the extrinsic ones, from which the intrinsic differences are taken.

III. Concerning the second statement of the response⁶, it should be noted that the end of reason is called the end conforming to the right judgment of reason, which namely is appetible according to the right judgment of reason. But the end contrary to the end of reason is an appetible object that is contrary to what is appetible according to right reason: just as what is pleasurable according to sense, not regulated by reason, is contrary to what is pleasurable according to reason. And because man is man through reason, therefore moral goods, which belong to man inasmuch as he is man, receive goodness and malice from an order to the good of reason or to what is contrary to that good.

IV. Concerning the third statement⁷ two things are to be observed. The first is that good or evil from an order to another, as such, does not have goodness or malice except according to the goodness or malice of that to which it is ordered. And therefore, if that other is in some respect good and in some respect evil, what is ordered to it will in some respect be good, and in some respect will be evil. For according as such an order terminates in a good thing, it will be good, but according as it terminates in a thing having something of malice, it will be evil: for, inasmuch as it is of this kind, it has no goodness or malice except from the goodness or malice of that to which it is ordered. Therefore, since the evil that is a specific difference in the genus of moral matters is something that in itself is good and in some respect is evil, inasmuch, namely, as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man, it is apparent that an evil habit is in some respect good, namely inasmuch as it regards a good; and in some respect evil, inasmuch namely as it regards the privation of the order of reason conjoined to that good.

The second is that something is called evil in two ways, as St. Thomas sets forth in II Sent., d. xxxiv, a. 2, from the mind of Avicenna in his Metaphysics⁸: namely, per se, and per accidens. Evil per se is the privation of good itself abstractly taken. Evil per accidens is both the very subject of such privation, and that which causes it in another. Therefore the evil that is posited as a constitutive difference in moral matters is not evil per se and abstractly, but is evil per accidens and concretively. Which is to say: It is not the privation of good itself formally and abstractly taken, but is the subject and nature to which the privation of good is conjoined. For the positive order to an evil end has conjoined to it the privation of order to the due end, as was said⁹; just as the undue end also has conjoined to it the privation of the due end. Hence it is called evil per accidens and concretively, as is also the end at which it terminates.

2. But a doubt occurs. For if a moral habit and act is specified by the end, it is specified by it either according as it has goodness, or according as it has privation and malice. If inasmuch as it has something of goodness, it follows that the habit and act is not evil: for what expresses an order to something inasmuch as it is good, does not have it from that to be evil. If inasmuch as it has privation and malice, it follows that it is specified by evil per se and abstractly considered. And thus also evil formally and per se taken will be a specific difference in moral matters. Which St. Thomas denies here and in many other places¹⁰.

It is answered that the division is insufficient, if the goodness and malice of the end are taken according to the complete prescinding of one from the other. For an evil habit and act is specified neither by reason of goodness precisely taken by the exclusion of malice, nor by reason of malice precisely taken, but by reason of the one as it is conjoined to the other. For it is specified by the good itself as it is a good underlying such privation and malice; and similarly it can be said to be specified by malice, not absolutely, but inasmuch as it is in such a nature. Therefore St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. xlviii, a. 1, ad 2, that evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is not a constitutive difference, but by reason of the conjoined good; and in II Sent., d. xl, a. 1, ad 2, that evil is a difference according as it is founded upon some end undue to the will, which nevertheless is not entirely devoid of goodness. Here, however, he says that evil, according as it is a specific difference in the genus of morals, does not signify something that according to its essence is evil, but what is good in itself, yet evil to man. From which it is clear that both can be said: namely, both that the undue end specifies by reason of malice according as it is founded in the good, inasmuch namely as the good does not specify except as it underlies malice; and that it specifies by reason of goodness, inasmuch namely as malice does not specify except as it is founded in goodness; so that the one without the other would not specify. But by reason of which of the two it more principally has it to specify, it seems from what is said in the First Part, and in II Sent., d. xxxiv and xl, and similarly in Qu. de Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, that it has this by reason of goodness, although by reason of malice it gives malice to the habit. For St. Thomas intends in the places cited before that evil does not constitute a species by reason of privation, but by reason of that which underlies privation¹¹; and here it is said that the evil that is a specific difference signifies something that is in itself good. This also is harmonious with reason: because, since a species expresses a certain nature and essence, it does not have it to be specified except through that which signifies a nature.

V. To the second objection¹² it is answered that they are contraries according as they are taken in the genus of moral matters. But evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is the privation of good.

Note that evil, if it is taken formally and abstractively, which St. Thomas calls evil inasmuch as it is evil, cannot have the character of a contrary to good, because it is a mere privation, and formally expresses no nature or essence: but it is privatively opposed to it. If, however, it is taken also subjectively, namely for the subject of privation, thus it expresses some essence and nature subject to privation: and thus it can have the character of a contrary. Because therefore evil in moral matters is taken concretively, namely for an act or habit lacking due order and due perfection, St. Thomas therefore says that in moral matters good and evil are contraries.

2. But then a doubt occurs that is touched upon in Qq. de Malo, q. 1, a. 1. For according to that which underlies evil itself, evil agrees with good. Therefore it is not contrary to good by reason of the substrate, but inasmuch as it is evil.

It is answered, and said first, according to him in the same place¹³, and it is from the mind of Simplicius on the Categories¹⁴, that evil is not a privation that consists in having been deprived, as death and blindness; but it is a privation that consists in being deprived, like sickness and ophthalmia, one of which is the way into death and the other the way into blindness. Therefore evil can be spoken of contrarily: because it does not deprive of the whole good, but leaves something of the good, inasmuch as it is founded in the good. For privations of this kind can be called contrary, inasmuch as something of that which is deprived is still retained.

It is said secondly that, although that in which it agrees with the good does not suffice for the character of its contrariety to the good, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety: just as, although that in which black agrees with white does not suffice for their contrariety, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety¹⁵. Therefore it is conceded that moral evil is not contrary to good solely from the character of the substrate: but it is very true that it is contrary from the substrate itself together with the privation. So that, if all underlying good is removed, it will not have the character of a contrary, but only the character of a privatively opposed, indeed of a contradictorily opposed thing.

VI. To the third objection¹⁶ it is said first, conformably to the preceding points, that good and evil, as they are in moral matters, are genera of contraries: because in moral matters either both contraries are evil, as prodigality and illiberality; or one is good and the other is evil, as liberality and illiberality.

It is said secondly that such a moral evil is a genus and difference, not according as it is the privation of the good of reason, from which it is called evil; but from the nature of the act or habit ordered to some end that is repugnant to the end of reason. This is declared by the example of a blind man; and of this difference which is irrational.

Note that the response aims at this, that the argument is not against the determination that was made. Because when it was said that evil is no essence, this is understood of evil formally and abstractly taken; but the proposition of Aristotle is understood of moral evil, which is evil concretively, for it is a habit or act to which some evil is conjoined. But when it is said that evil is a genus and difference, namely a genus of evils, and the difference of moral evil from moral good, not according as it is a privation, but from the nature of the action and habit: understand this, as in the preceding response, that the privation itself is not the genus and difference, but the act and habit, yet according as they underlie such a privation.

It is said thirdly that it could be said that Aristotle did not say that according to his own opinion, just as in many of his logical books he uses examples according to the opinion of others; but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who said that good and evil are the primary genera and primary principles, under each of which he posited ten primary contraries.

It is said fourthly that the statement of Pythagoras has some truth. Because of all contraries one is perfect, the other diminished, having as it were a certain privation mixed in. But all diminution and privation pertains to the character of evil; and all perfection and completion to the character of good. And according to this, good and evil seem to be the genera of all contraries, inasmuch as one seems to be comprehended under the character of good, while the other seems to approach the character of evil.

2. It must be noted here first, that this response¹⁷, namely that Aristotle exemplified in the Categories concerning good and evil as contraries and genera of contraries, was from Iamblichus, as Simplicius recounts on the Categories¹⁸. For because Pythagoras made two coordinations of things, namely one of goods and the other of evils, and said that good and evil are the primary genera and primary principles of those contrary coordinations, Aristotle therefore, following the opinion of Pythagoras, said that good and evil are contraries as genera of contraries.

It must be noted secondly, from St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. xxxiv, in the place cited before¹⁹, that according to that manner by which it is said that good and evil simply and universally taken can in some way be called genera of contraries (which seems to have been the interpretation of Theophrastus²⁰), genus is not taken according to its proper signification, namely for that which is univocally predicated of many differing in species in the quid est; but improperly, as everything that by its commonness encompasses and contains many things can be called a genus. And thus the Porphyrians took the name of genus in that proposition, as Simplicius reports²¹. Hence also Ammonius²² says that these are called genera because they are found in all genera, just as Plato also posited as the genera of beings being, the same, the diverse, motion, and rest; not, however, as if they were genera distinctly set apart from the other ten genera.

It must be noted thirdly, when St. Thomas says that all diminution and privation pertains to the character of evil, that evil is not taken there simpliciter, as in ch. VI he declared that that is called evil simpliciter which is the evil of the subject in which it is, when namely it deprives the subject of that which it is naturally suited and ought to have: for it is not an evil to blackness that it lacks the perfection of whiteness, just as neither is it an evil of man that he does not have wings. But evil is taken universally for the lack in something of a perfection which something of its genus is naturally suited and ought to have.

VII. To the fourth objection²³ it is said first, from the view of Dionysius, ch. iv of De Divinis Nominibus, that evil does not act except per accidens, by reason of the good to which it is conjoined.

It is said secondly that evil is said to corrupt good, not only by acting in virtue of the good, but also formally according to itself: just as blindness is said to corrupt sight because it is the corruption of sight.

Note that the response is this: that if we speak of the corrupter by way of an efficient cause, evil does not corrupt per se, but per accidens. If, however, we speak of the corrupter formally, evil corrupts per se. But it is not necessary that the one corrupting effectively per accidens be so because namely it is conjoined to a power corrupting per se; nor that that which corrupts formally be some nature.

VIII. To the fifth objection it is answered that something is called a greater or lesser evil than another through departure from the good: because in this way privations are intensified and remitted, as is clear in the dissimilar and the unequal. For they are not intensified as if having some essence, like forms; but through the increase of the depriving cause, which makes the subject be further distant from the form. This is shown by the example of darkness, which arises in the air from the interposition of an obstacle.

From these things it is clear that that proposition is false: In whatever things greater and less are found, they must be certain things having an order. For it fails in those things in which greater and less are spoken of through departure from the opposite. — Concerning greater and less, enough has been said in the preceding, so far as pertains to the matter at hand²⁴.

IX. To the sixth objection it is answered that, since being is said in two ways, as is clear in V Metaph., namely according as it signifies the essence of a thing, and according as it signifies the truth of composition; evil and privation are not called being in the first way, but in the second way, inasmuch as by a privation something is said to be deprived, and by evil some thing is said to be evil.

2. For the declaration of this response, it should be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the places cited before²⁵, and from the Commentator, V Metaph., comment 14, that being taken in the first way, and being spoken of in the second way, differ in two ways. First, because being which signifies the essence of a thing, when predicated of something, is a substantial predicate; but being which signifies the composition of the intellect is an accidental predicate.

Secondly, because the first is answered to the question what is it; but the second is answered to the question whether it is. Where it should be noted that whether it is, although it seems at first sight to ask about being in the nature of things, does not however ask about the real being of that about which it is asked whether it is; but it is asked absolutely whether it can truly be affirmed of it that it is in the nature of things, and whether it can ground a true composition of the intellect saying that it is, or affirming something of it, whether it be as something affirmed or as a negation. And therefore, when it is answered that it is, the "is" expresses the truth of the composition of the intellect; and the sense is that true is the composition of the intellect saying that it is in the nature of things, and that it is truly affirmed of something, for instance because it is true that something is deprived, as that a man is blind; so that compositions of this kind have the foundation of their truth in the privation itself. And although in expressions of this kind privations seem to be signified to have some being in reality, nevertheless a certain non-being of the opposite form is signified rather than some being of the privation. Hence Augustine, on that text, Darkness was over the face of the abyss, says that it was so said, Darkness was over the face of the abyss, as if it were said, There was no light over the abyss²⁶. And in book III of De Vita Beata, ch. III²⁷, he says that for some place to have darkness is nothing other than not to have light.

X. But concerning this there is a twofold doubt. First, because the composition of the intellect is not true unless something corresponds to it in reality. If therefore privation has no real being of actual existence outside the intellect, the composition of the intellect saying that privation is will not be true.

Secondly because, as is said in VI Metaph.²⁸, the true and the false are distinguished from the good and the evil, because the true and the false are in the intellect, but the good and the evil are in things. Therefore evil and privation posit some being in things.

2. To the first it is answered, and it is said first, that it is not necessary that something correspond to the composition of the intellect in reality that is real, or has real being outside the soul: for it is evident that to this true composition, Non-being is non-being, nothing real corresponds on the part of what is signified or understood. But it is indeed necessary that the thing understood or signified be proportioned and equated to the composition of the intellect. And this is what is signified when the intellect is said to understand just as it is in reality.

It is said secondly that, if the intellect understood a privation to have positive real being in nature, it would understand falsely: because what is understood would not be equated and proportioned to the one understanding. But it does not understand this when it says that a privation is: rather, only that the privation has being in whatever manner being belongs to it; whether, I say, in the manner of that which has some nature and essence, or in the manner of negations that determine a subject for themselves. Therefore, it is not necessary that some real being of the privation correspond to this composition in reality: but it suffices that it have being in its own manner, namely as a negation whose being consists in the subject itself being such from which it has that it is the foundation of a true proposition, and thus is equated to the composition made concerning itself.

It is said thirdly that there also corresponds to such a composition something real, namely the subject lacking a form, from which the composition has that it is true. For because there is in nature an eye lacking the visual power, therefore this composition is true, Blindness is, and this one, Blindness is in the eye.

3. To the second it is said that, since good and evil pertain to the appetite, which is terminated at the thing outside, good and evil are not primarily in the intellect objectively as known, but in things themselves as terminating the appetite: good indeed per se, but evil per accidens; likewise, good as positing some perfection in the thing, but evil as the removal and privation of a perfection. Hence in De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 20, St. Thomas says that evil is indeed in things, but as a privation, not, however, as something real. Therefore this consequence is not valid: Evil is not primarily in the intellect as the terminus of the intellect, or as known, but in things. Therefore it posits some real being in things.

If, however, the consequence is proved thus: Every being is either real or of reason. Evil is not a being of reason: because it does not belong to a thing, according to you, as it is objectively in the intellect, which is the condition of a being of reason. Therefore it is a real being: — it is answered that the privation of a real being is indeed a real being, not as positing a real being in the thing, but as the removal of a real being; for affirmation and negation pertain to the same genus. But this is not against the response: because it was not denied that privation is a real being after the manner of a negation, but that it formally posits something to be real in things.

Or it should be said that the division adduced is insufficient. For not everything is either a real being or a being of reason: but either a real being; or a being of reason; or a negation of a real being; or a negation of a being of reason.