Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

¹

² I bis. Having set forth the objections against the determination made above, St. Thomas proceeds to their solution, in his own order ³.

Now for the solution of the first argument, he premised four points.

The first is that the character of evil in any substance is in a privation taken strictly and properly, namely one that is of what it is naturally apt to have and ought to have, but not in the privation of what it is not naturally apt to have, or ought not to have: just as for a man it is an evil if he does not have hands, but not if he does not have wings, or does not have blond hair.

The second is that the privation of a form, compared to matter, is not its evil, but it is indeed the evil of the nature whose form it is: just as the privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire, but not for matter. Because, although matter is naturally apt to have all forms, yet none is due to it, since without any one of them it can be perfect in act: yet each of them is due to some one of the things that are composed of matter.

The third is that, since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to be except according as they are in a subject, if a privation is an evil in comparison to the subject in which it is, it will be an evil simpliciter. But if not, it will be an evil not simpliciter, but of something.

The fourth is that the evil of an action is the privation of the due order or commensuration in the action, when and according as it ought to be in it. And such a privation is an evil simpliciter: because to every action there is due some order and some commensuration.

II. For the evidence of the first and second points, it should be noted that that is said to be due to something which is required for its integrity and perfection, such that without it the thing is not said to be perfect in nature according to its species. Now this can be something belonging both to the essence of the substance and also to some accidental completion and perfection: for it is due to man that he have a rational soul; and that he have hands, if he is to be called a perfect man in nature. And therefore the privation of this is called the evil of man: for a man lacking hands is imperfect, and thus some evil is said to be in him.

2. For the evidence of the third point, it must be considered that, since form has the character of good inasmuch as it gives being, as is said in the First Part, q. 5 ⁴, the privation opposed to it has the character of evil inasmuch as it takes away some being. Therefore, to see how a subject's being under a privation is an evil simpliciter or not simpliciter, one must look to the way in which form and privation are related to being itself. On this account St. Thomas, in order to show how something is said to be an evil simpliciter, takes the mode of being of a privation and of the habit opposed to it.

For because the form to which privation is opposed as such, and privation, have being only in a subject—speaking with a sound sense concerning privation, for it is said to have being in a subject because it denies form and being of the subject, but not because it properly has being of itself: for privation, even commonly taken, is the lack of form in some subject—therefore according as it is related in diverse ways to the subject, in diverse ways a subject's being under such a privation is an evil. For when it deprives the subject in which it is of a form due to that subject, then it is an evil of the subject; and therefore it is evil absolutely for a subject to be under such a privation, just as absolutely speaking, without any other addition, it is evil for a man not to have a hand, because to lack a hand is an evil in comparison to man. But when it does not deprive the subject of a form due to it, then it is not an evil simpliciter for the subject to be under such a privation, since that privation is not an evil as it is compared to that subject: for that is said to be the evil of something simpliciter which, compared to it, is an evil, but not that which is an evil compared to another; just as also that is said to be the good of something simpliciter which is good in comparison to it, but not that which is good in comparison to something else only. Yet it can be the evil of something: just as, because to lack the substantial form of air is not an evil of matter, since it does not remove a form due to matter, in accordance with the aforesaid, for matter to lack the form of air is not an evil absolutely, but is an evil of air, because from the fact that matter does not have the form of air, the nature of air is removed.

III. These things having been presupposed, St. Thomas answers the objection that was made ⁵. For as to natural things, it is said first that not everything that is outside of intention is casual and in the fewer cases. For natural corruption and some privation, which are outside the intention of the generator, always follow generation: although privation is sometimes not an evil simpliciter, but of something, as has been said.

It is said secondly that it is not universally true that evil is as in the greater number of cases. For a privation that deprives of something due to the generated thing is an evil simpliciter and casual, as when monstrous births occur: for this does not follow of necessity upon what is intended, but is repugnant to it.

It is said thirdly that the evil of an action follows upon a defect of the active power, and is outside the intention of the agent having the defective power. But it is not casual when the agent either always or frequently suffers such a defect: because it follows of necessity upon an agent so failing. But it is casual when such a defect rarely accompanies the agent.

2. As to voluntary things, it is said first that sometimes evil is not casual, but sometimes it is casual. For when the particular good that is intended in the action has joined to it the privation of the good according to reason either always or frequently, as the inordination of adultery is joined to the pleasure intended from the use of another's woman, evil does not follow casually. But when sin follows as in the fewer cases, the evil is casual: as when someone, shooting at a bird, kills a man.

It is said secondly that goods of this sort, to which privations of the good of reason follow, are intended as in the greater number of cases because more people live according to sense, for the reason that sensible particulars, in which operation consists, are more manifest to us and move us more effectively: and upon more sensible goods there follows the privation of the good according to reason.

IV. For the evidence of the things said here, so that it may be known when evil happens in the greater number or in the fewer cases, it must first be seen how this is in natural things; second, how it is in voluntary things ⁶.

As to the first, it should be known from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. 63, a. 9, ad 1; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 5; II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, and d. 34, a. 3, ad 2, that in natural things evil can be considered either with respect to the whole of nature, or with respect to some determinate species in nature. Whichever way evil is considered, it is in the fewer cases. With respect indeed to the whole of nature, it is clear: because it is only in corruptible things, which, if they are considered in the character of continuous quantity, are much smaller than the celestial bodies; for all corruptible bodies taken together are of much smaller quantity than the celestial bodies are. With respect also to a determinate species it is clear: because an action always turns out according to nature unless it is impeded; but an impediment happens rarely. Hence we see that monsters turn out for the lesser part in nature.

It must be noted, however, that although a defect of nature and of its operations in a whole species happens for the lesser part, yet in some single singular a defect of action can happen for the greater part, on account of a defect of the power or of the instrument: as is apparent in one who limps, and in one who generates monstrous offspring for the greater part. And in this sense is understood what St. Thomas says in this place, that evil follows always or frequently in natural things when the agent, namely the singular one, either always or frequently suffers a defect of power.

V. As to the second ⁷, it is said first that in the angels evil was as in the fewer cases. Because for the greater part there followed an operation according to the suitability of nature, which in them is only one and intellectual: just as natural action also for the greater part follows according to nature.

2. It is said secondly that in human beings, considering the whole nature of the species as to things that can be made, evil is in the fewer cases: because art operates in the manner of nature⁸, and thus fails in the fewer cases, just as nature does too.

But as to moral actions and things to be done, evil is in the greater number of cases. Because, since sensible particulars are multiplied more, and are known to more people, and move more than pleasurable things according to reason, more people follow pleasurable things according to sense, which for the greater part have joined to them the privation of the good of reason. On account of which in them is the evil of man inasmuch as he is man: since he is man through reason, and consequently it is due to man, inasmuch as he is man, to operate according to reason. And in this sense is understood what Aristotle says in II Topics⁹, that evil turns out as in the greater number of cases; and what St. Thomas says in this place, that the reason why more people intend goods to which privations of the good of reason are joined is that more people live according to sense.

3. It is said thirdly that, considering one individual and singular, if there is in him a will perfected through the habits of the virtues, evil turns out in the fewer cases: because habit inclines in the manner of nature, which fails in the fewer cases. But if the will is deformed through habits of vices, evil turns out as in the greater number of cases: because through habits of this sort a man is conformed to brute animals, which for the greater part follow the impulse of nature, as Boethius says in IV De Consolatione, prose 3. And thus, since operations proceeding from a habit of vice are the evil of man inasmuch as he is man, because they are contrary to reason, it follows that such a one for the greater part works evil. Also if the will is perfected by no habit, since, as such, it is related indifferently to either; and evils happen in more ways than goods; it is bent toward evil in more cases than toward that which is perfectly and totally good; especially on the supposition that nature is vitiated through sin.

4. It is said fourthly, according to the mind of St. Thomas in De Potentia, the place cited, that although the evil both of nature and of morals, comparing the effects to a common cause, sometimes turns out for the greater part, whether nature is considered in universal, or in some singular agent; yet if the effects are compared to their proper causes, evil is never found except in the fewer cases. For although a monstrous birth, compared to the generative power, is absolutely a certain evil of nature, inasmuch as it does not follow the order of nature; yet compared to a generative power failing in such a way, it is not an evil, since it is according to the inclination of its own proper principle; but a non-monstrous birth will be an evil of that power so failing, because it turns out outside its inclination. And since that turns out rarely, it follows that the proper effect of that cause fails for the lesser part, and thus for the lesser part evil turns out, compared to its proper cause. Similarly an operation concerning what is pleasurable according to sense, compared to man absolutely, is evil: yet compared to the sensible appetite and the sensitive nature, which is its proper cause, it is found good, since it is according to the inclination of such a nature; just as also in brute animals following sensible appetite it is good. Therefore in operations of this sort concerning sensible things, as they are referred to the sensitive nature and the sensible appetite, evil is in the fewer cases, because for the greater part they agree with the sensible appetite: although, as they are referred to reason and the rational appetite, or to man absolutely, evil is in them for the greater part; in which sense we spoke above¹⁰.

From these things is clear the understanding of what St. Thomas says in this place, namely that evil always or frequently happens in operations proceeding from a failing agent, when such defects always or frequently follow the power of the agent. For this is understood by comparing the action itself to the power of the agent absolutely, say motion to the motive power: because then, if a defect accompanies it for the greater part, the evil of the action will follow for the greater part. But if the comparison of the action were made to the power as it is under such a defect, in which way it is the proper cause of the defective action, then such an action will not be evil as lacking due order: since for it, as proceeding from a cause so failing, it is not due to have the perfection that it lacks; just as neither is it an evil for a man to lack the perfection of wings, since it is not due to the integrity of man to have wings.

5. It must be noted, however, that in this whole digression we are speaking of evil simpliciter, in the sense that St. Thomas explained here: and not of the evil of something else only¹¹. Because if we were speaking of evil of this sort, evil follows every action, both natural and voluntary, for the greater part. For a morally good operation that is according to reason is accompanied by the privation of the pleasurable good according to sense, which privation is the evil of the sensitive appetite: and the generation of the introduced form is accompanied by the privation of the cast-off form, which is the evil of the corrupted nature. On account of this St. Thomas said that evil, namely so taken, turns out either always or for the greater part in actions, and does not turn out in the fewer cases and by chance.

VI. To the second objection¹² the answer is made by denying the consequence: because evil is both voluntary and outside of intention. For intention is only of the ultimate end, which one wills for its own sake: but will is also of that which one wills for the sake of another, even if simpliciter one would not will it. This is shown by the example of one throwing merchandise into the sea for the sake of safety, where the throwing of the merchandise is willed per accidens. And similarly malice is said to be willed not per se, but per accidens: as someone wills an inordinate action on account of a sensible good.

2. It must be noted, concerning that response, that St. Thomas makes a distinction between the intention of something and the volition of it. Because the will and appetite intend that toward which they are inclined for its own sake: for intention is properly an act of the appetite concerning the end; but the end, as such, is willed for its own sake. But volition is not only of that which we will for its own sake, but also of that which we will for the sake of another: just as we will both health and medicine. Therefore to say that evil or malice is not intended, but is outside of intention, and yet is willed per accidens, is to say that it is not willed for its own sake, but is nevertheless willed for the sake of another.

3. It should be noted secondly that what is willed per accidens can be taken in two ways. In one way, that it totally escapes the knowledge of the one willing, and yet is joined to what is willed per se: as one willing to drink something sweet, not knowing that it is poison, is said to will poison per accidens. And such is said to be willed entirely per accidens. — In another way, because it indeed falls under the knowledge of the one willing, but yet he does not will it except inasmuch as he wills some good to which it is joined; nay, if he could separate the one from the other, he would will the one without the other: as he who wills to throw merchandise into the sea for the sake of his own safety does not will the throwing of the merchandise except because he wills his safety, which he cannot attain without the loss of the merchandise; and if he could attain safety without the loss of the merchandise, he would not will their loss.

Therefore evil is never willed for its own sake. But sometimes it is willed entirely per accidens: as, when someone wills to shoot an arrow toward a place through which men are not accustomed to pass, if it happens that by shooting the arrow he kills a man, he is said to have willed the killing of the man entirely per accidens and in no way per se, neither, I say, primarily, nor secondarily for the sake of another. — But sometimes it is not willed per accidens entirely, as if, namely, the deformity and deordination of the willed act were not known: but it is willed per accidens as per accidens is distinguished against primarily and per se, as it is the same as through another; as, when someone wills to attain the pleasure that is in adultery, knowing that the privation of the order of justice is joined to it, he wills that deordination on account of the pleasure, inasmuch as he wills the pleasure to which that evil is necessarily joined, and he prefers to incur that evil rather than lack such pleasure. And in this sense the Philosopher says that malice and sin are sometimes voluntary. For not only is that voluntary which we will for its own sake, but also that which we will for the sake of another, although taken in itself it would not be voluntary, as is said in I-II, q. 6, a. 6¹³. And on account of this, as is said in Questions on Evil, q. 1, a. 3, ad 15, man in things of this sort is not excused from sin, although the evil is not intended for its own sake: because in order that the evil be imputed to him, it is sufficient that it be willed for the sake of another, although it is not willed for its own sake.

Now what I said, that the killing of a man from the shooting of an arrow is willed entirely per accidens by one not considering that it ought to happen, is not contrary to what St. Thomas says in De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, ad 15, namely that, while some accident is joined to the effect as in the fewer cases and rarely, it is not necessary that the agent intending the effect per se intend in any way the effect per accidens. For St. Thomas takes an effect to be intended per accidens there when it is intended from knowledge: but not as that is said to be intended per accidens which is joined to what is intended per se even if it is not known to be joined to what is intended per se.

VII. To the third objection¹⁴ he answers that privation is not intended per se and separately from form, but per accidens, inasmuch as it is joined to form, which is the end of generation, just as corruption is also always joined to generation. This is declared by the example of the corruption of water and the generation of air.

2. Concerning this response two things are to be noted. The first is that intention is sometimes taken properly: and thus it is only of that which is the end and is intended per se. But sometimes it is taken for the inclination of the appetite toward anything whatsoever. When therefore it is said here that nature intends both, namely both the end of generation and the end of corruption, at the same time, intention is taken commonly, but not properly. For although it is one and the same act by which something is inclined to the end and to that which is toward the end, as such, yet that is called intention with respect to the end, but not with respect to what is ordered to the end. Hence there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas when in the preceding response he said that evil is not intended, but only willed, while here he says that privation, which is a certain evil, is intended at the same time with form: for there he took intention properly, but here commonly. — Or we can say that evil cannot be intended by a proper act terminated at it; but it can well be intended by an act that is terminated at the good to which the evil is joined.

3. Note secondly that both particular generating and corrupting nature and universal nature intend first and per se generation and the form of the generated; but per accidens they intend corruption, and the privation of the preceding form in the matter, because there cannot be generation except through the casting off of the preceding form. For air acting on water, and likewise the celestial power, intend the generation of air, as is said here, absolutely and simpliciter, but they do not intend the corruption of water except because it is necessarily joined to the generation of air: for if nature could generate air without the corruption of another nature, it would do that. On account of this St. Thomas says that nature does not intend the end of corruption separately from the end of generation, but intends both at once. — But what St. Thomas sometimes says, that corruption is of the intention of universal nature, but is against particular nature¹⁵, is to be understood of the particular nature that is corrupted: because neither per se nor per accidens does a nature, as far as it is from the ratio of its form, intend its own corruption. It is not, however, understood of the nature corrupting another nature while generating what is like itself: for such a nature, as has been said, together with generation intends corruption per accidens, just as universal nature also does.

VIII. From these answers St. Thomas deduces that it is manifest that evil simpliciter is entirely outside intention in the works of nature; but evil not simpliciter, but for a certain thing, is intended by nature secundum accidens.

For the understanding of those things which have been said, note, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. xxxvi, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, that the intention of nature is twofold: one primary, the other secondary. The primary intention is the inclination of nature absolutely toward what is like itself and conformed to it according to all its perfection. But the secondary is toward what is like itself as far as can be done, on the supposition that the primary intention is frustrated: just as also in artificial things the primary intention of the artisan is to make from the given matter a work conformed in every part to the art; but the secondary is, on the supposition that he cannot attain the first intended end, to make from that matter something like the art as far as he can. Corruption therefore and every defect are against the primary intention of nature: because nature by primary intention intends being and perfection. Yet some defect is of the secondary intention of nature. For when nature cannot bring the effect to a greater perfection, it leads it to a lesser: as when it cannot make a male, it makes a female, which is a misbegotten male, as is said in XVI De Animalibus¹⁶. What St. Thomas says therefore, that evil simpliciter is entirely outside intention in the works of nature, as monstrous births, is to be understood as being outside the primary intention of nature: not, however, as being outside the secondary intention.