Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The preamble having been set down, St. Thomas approaches the first part of his proposed subject, namely according to the division laid down by him; namely, to determine concerning God according to what He is as the end of all things ¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows that the end of each thing is good; second, that all things are ordered to God as to an end, ch. XVII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that all things act on account of something; second, that the end of each thing is good, ch. XVI.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that all things act for an end; second, that all things act for a good, in the following chapter. — Concerning the first he does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he removes a doubt ².

It should be noted, moreover, that since an end has the character of an ultimate and the character of a cause, in this chapter it is not treated of the end as it has the character of a cause, but as it has the character of an ultimate.

I. Therefore, he first argues thus, to prove that all things act for the sake of an end.

The impetus of every agent tends toward something certain: sometimes indeed toward the action itself; but sometimes toward something made through the action. Therefore every agent in acting intends an end: either the action, when the action does not terminate in something made; or the thing wrought through it, if something is effected through it.

The antecedent is proved. Both because not just any action proceeds from just any power, as is clear in heat and cold; and because actions differ in species according to the diversity of active principles. — The consequence also is proved. Because in things that manifestly act for an end, we say that that is the end into which the impetus—that is, the actual inclination and motion—of the agent tends: because while the agent attains that, it is said to attain the end, and while it falls short of it, it is said to fall short of the intended end, whether it knows the end or does not know it; as is clear in the physician healing, and the man running.

Note, when it is said that an action sometimes terminates in something made, as house-building in a house and healing in health, but sometimes not, as understanding and sensing: that this is understood of something made to whose perfection the operation is ordered; not, however, of something made which is effected on account of the perfection of the operation. For understanding does not have something made through it to whose perfection it is ordered; but it well has something made which is ordered to the completion and perfection of intellection itself. Therefore it is said absolutely that intellection does not have something made through it; but house-building is said to have something made through it, because it terminates in something produced through it, not as in that which is produced on account of the perfection of the operation, but as in that to the perfecting of which the operation is ordered. Whence it is well said that in those things which have some such thing made, the thing made itself is the end; but in those which do not have some such thing made, the operation itself is the end: because, namely, in the former the operation is intended on account of the thing made to whose perfection it is ordered; but in the latter the thing wrought is intended on account of the operation itself, for the sake of whose completion and perfection it is intended.

II. Secondly. In the action of any agent whatever it is to come to ³ something beyond which the agent does not seek anything. Therefore etc.

The consequence is proved. Because in all things that act for an end, we say that that is the ultimate end beyond which the agent does not seek anything, as health with respect to the physician. — The antecedent also is proved. Because otherwise actions would proceed to infinity. Which is impossible: because the agent would not begin to act, since nothing is moved to that to which it is impossible to arrive; but it is not possible to traverse infinite things.

III. Thirdly: and it is a confirmation of the preceding. It is impossible that actions proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary that there be something having been obtained by which the striving of the agent rests. Therefore etc.

The antecedent is proved. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, either something made follows from them, or not. Not the first. Because it is impossible for an agent to begin to make something made for which infinite actions are prerequired: for such a thing is impossible to be, and consequently it is impossible to be made, and thus to make it is impossible. — Nor also the second. Because if the order of this sort of actions is taken according to the order of active powers, as is the order among sensing, imagining, understanding, and willing, inasmuch as one is on account of the other, it is clear that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in active powers, just as neither in the forms of things, from II Metaph., text 10, since form is the principle of acting. If also the order of them is taken according to the order of objects, as is the order in the consideration of a body, a soul, a separate substance, and God, beginning from a body, so that namely the consideration of one is that one may arrive at the consideration of the other: thus there is not a process to infinity; because neither in objects is there a process to infinity, just as neither in beings, since there is one first being, as was proved above.

2. Concerning this reason a doubt occurs. For someone could say that, although there is not a process to infinity in per se ordered objects, just as neither in beings, nevertheless nothing prevents there being a process to infinity in accidentally ordered ones. And thus operations can proceed to infinity: just as, positing the eternity of the world, things would be generated to infinity, and generations would succeed one another to infinity. And thus one agent can produce one action on account of another, and that on account of another, to infinity.

It is answered that it is one thing to speak of actions through which something made is produced; and another of actions from which no thing made follows, of which kind are understanding and sensing. For where something made follows, as in generations, there is indeed a process to infinity with respect to diverse generated things, because singulars can be generated to infinity; but with respect to one object to be produced there cannot be a process to infinity in actions, because its production would never be completed. — Where, however, no thing made follows from actions, there cannot be a process to infinity from a process of formal objects to infinity: because formal objects are not infinite. But there could well be a process to infinity absolutely around material objects, which succeed one another to infinity, if the agent were to endure to infinity. But there cannot be an ordered process to infinity, so that one operation is intended on account of another, and that on account of another, to infinity. And in this way is understood what St. Thomas says here concerning the process to infinity of actions from which no thing made follows. For considerations of diverse singulars of one nature do not have such an order: because the cognition of one of them cannot be the reason for the cognition of another proceeding to infinity, because not all individuals are so ordered that one, as far as it is from itself, is better known to us than another as to the intellect. And similarly it is in all other operations of this sort.

IV. Fourthly. It would follow that active principles proceed to infinity. This is false, as was shown: namely in the preceding reason. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in those things which act for an end, all intermediate things between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to prior things, and active principles with respect to subsequent things.

2. Concerning this reason a twofold doubt occurs. The first is, because it does not seem to be distinguished from the preceding reason. For it was proved also through that one that there is not a process to infinity in actions because there is not a proceeding to infinity in active powers.

The second is, because St. Thomas seems to presuppose what he has to prove, namely that there is some ultimate end of the agent. For this is what must be proved.

3. To the first it is said that this reason is not the same as the preceding, although it has a dependence upon it. Because in the preceding reason it was proved that it is not on account of the infinity of active powers that actions proceed to infinity, because in them there is not a proceeding to infinity: here, however, it is argued that if in actions there is a proceeding to infinity, it is necessary that the powers themselves proceed to infinity, which was shown to be false.

To the second it is said that he does not presuppose what he has to prove. For he intends to prove this universal: Every agent acts for an end. But he does not presuppose this; rather, it is presupposed that in some things which manifestly act for an end, an ultimate end is found: for the healer, as such, has health for an ultimate end. Then, from that which is found in those things which manifestly act for an end, he wishes to deduce the proposition universally. For in them it is manifest that intermediates are ends with respect to prior things, and active principles with respect to posterior things: just as medicine made by a craftsman is the cause of health. And from this it is had that if there is a proceeding to infinity in actions, so that the striving of the agent is not toward something determinate, prior things made will be productive of posterior things to infinity, supposing that the agent acts one on account of another and that on account of another to infinity, and thus there will be infinite active and productive principles.

V. Fifthly. An agent through intellect as well as an agent through nature acts for an end. Therefore every agent does.

The antecedent is proved. As to agents through intellect indeed, because they act pre-conceiving in the intellect that which they attain through action, and from such a preconception they act. For this is to act through intellect. — As to natural agents, however, because just as in the pre-conceiving intellect there pre-exists the whole likeness of the effect to which one arrives through the actions of the intelligent being, so in a natural agent there pre-exists the likeness of the natural effect, from which the action is determined to this effect, as is clear in the production of fire and of an olive.

For the evidence of this reason, as to what it touches upon concerning natural agents, it must be considered that an agent through intellect tends into something determinate according to the direction of the conception itself, because it acts through a conception, which is the likeness of something determinate: for the conception of the agent does not direct except into that of which it is the likeness, because every agent produces a form similar to the form through which it acts, just as a house-builder through the conception of a house is ordered to producing nothing other than a house. And because where the cause is the same, the same effect ought to follow, for that reason, since also in a natural agent there is the likeness of the natural effect, to which the action of the agent is determined through such a likeness, it follows that a natural agent also acts for the sake of something ultimate, and thus acts for an end. For the ultimate that a natural agent intends through its action is the likeness of the form through which it acts; just as the ultimate that an agent through intellect intends is that to which it is assimilated through its preconception: for the impetus of the agent follows the inclination of the form through which it operates. And this is the foundation of this reason.

VI. Sixthly. In an agent through art, and in an agent through nature, sin is found: as when a grammarian does not speak correctly, and when monstrous births are produced. Therefore etc.

The consequence is proved. Because sin is not found except in those things which are for an end: for it is not imputed to anyone as a sin if he falls short of that for which he is not; as it is not imputed to a builder or a grammarian if he falls short of healing, but it is well imputed to a physician.

For the evidence of the foundation of this reason, it is to be understood, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. xxi, a. 1; and De Malo, q. ii, a. 1, that sin, whether in natural things or in artificial things, according to Aristotle, II Physics ⁴, consists in an act which is done for an end, not indeed that the sin of the agent is absolutely not to attain the end, since it happens sometimes that an agent does not attain the end not on account of a defect of nature or art, but from elsewhere, as that nature does not digest iron in the stomach is because it is indigestible, and that a physician does not induce health sometimes happens because either the sick person has an incurable disease, or does something contrary to health: but it happens that an agent sins when it produces an operation not having the due order to the end. For it is imputed to a physician if he falls short of healing when this happens on account of a defect of his operation, because namely he does not operate according to the rule of art: whence if he even introduced health not operating according to the rules of art, he would nonetheless sin, on account of the inordination of the operation. On account of which, when St. Thomas says that a physician sins if he falls short of healing, it is to be understood if the defect of healing arises from this, that he turns aside from the rules of medicine. The foundation, therefore, of this reason is this alone, namely that sin is found only in those things which are for an end; not, however, this, that it consists in the non-attainment of the end absolutely. For whether someone attains the end by operating or not, it is enough for the proposition that wherever sin is found, there order to an end is found.

VII. Seventhly. If an agent did not tend to some determinate effect, it would be impossible for it to act. Because all effects would be indifferent to it: but that which is indifferently disposed toward many things does not operate one of them more than another, unless it is determined to one by something.

To this reason it could be said that an agent acts by many actions, and that it is determined to act something by one action; but because it orders that to another, and that to another to infinity, therefore it does not tend to something ultimate which is its end.

But this response is not according to the mind of the argument. Both because it suffices for the argument that each single action have some determinate effect intended by the agent. For such an effect will be the end of the agent in that action; and thus the agent, inasmuch as it is an agent, in each single action acts for an end, since it acts toward something determinate, and not into what is uncertain; which was intended. — And because it was shown above ⁵ that the actions of an agent cannot proceed to infinity according to the order of one to another.

How, moreover, from a cause contingent to either side an effect does not follow unless it is determined through something, was declared in the first book ⁶.

VIII. As to the second ⁷, St. Thomas removes a certain doubt. For someone could opine that there is some agent not operating for an end, because playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without intention, as the stroking of a beard, do not seem to be for any end.

St. Thomas answers, and says three things. First, that contemplative actions are not for some end; but they themselves are the end. — Secondly, that playful actions are the end when someone plays solely on account of the pleasure which is in the play: but they are for an end when we play so that afterwards we may act more vigorously ⁸. — Thirdly, that actions done without attention are not from intellect, but either from some sudden imagination; or from a natural principle, as an inordination of humors exciting an itch is the cause of that stroking of the beard. And these actions tend to some ends, although outside the order of intellect.

2. Concerning the first statement, it should be noted that from it it is had that, in order for something to act for an end, it is not necessary that its operation be ordered to another as to an end, but it suffices that it itself is the ultimate which is intended by that action. For whether the agent intends something other besides the operation, or the operation itself alone, it is always said to act for an end, that is, on account of something ultimately intended.

3. Concerning the second statement it is doubted, because a contradiction seems to be implied. For the pleasure which is in the operation is other than the playful operation: because it belongs to the appetite, but the operation to another power. If therefore someone plays on account of the pleasure which is in the play, the operation itself is ordered to pleasure as to an end, and consequently the operation itself is not the end. And thus it implies a contradiction to say that the playful operation is the end when someone plays solely on account of the pleasure which is in the play.

The doubt is increased. Because in IIª IIae, q. clxxx, a. 1; and 7, ad 1, it is said that contemplation terminates in the affect. And this also proceeds against the first statement.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. xlix, q. iii, a. 4, quª 3, that the pleasure following upon some operation and the operation itself are not to be considered as two goods, but as one: because from them one perfect operation is made, as from the perfectible and its perfection. And therefore St. Thomas speaks here of the operation and pleasure as of one thing intended by the agent: not, however, as if they are two intended things of which one is intended on account of the other, against which sense the objection proceeds. — Whether, however, if they are considered as two intended things, pleasure is the end, or rather the operation upon which it follows, will be shown below, chapter XXVI.

To the confirmation it is said, for now, that St. Thomas speaks there of operation as it is distinguished from pleasure: according to which mode it can be said that pleasure is in some way the end, although it is not simply the end, as will be shown below. Here, however, he speaks of both as of one intended thing, so that pleasure and operation intended together are not ordered in contemplation or in such a playful operation to another end, but it itself then, conjoined with its pleasure, is the end and ultimate intended thing.

4. Concerning the third statement, it must be observed that St. Thomas means through it that actions of this sort which happen on the spur of the moment are not indeed ordered by the intellect to some end, but are well ordered by nature or imagination to something, as the stroking of a beard to the expulsion of an itch.

From these things is excluded the error of the ancient Naturalists, who remove the final cause from things, and posit that all things are made from the necessity of matter.

Having shown that every agent acts for an end, St. Thomas now shows that every agent acts for the sake of the good ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he infers a corollary, in the following chapter.

As to the first, he proves that Every agent acts for the sake of the good.

I. And first thus. Every agent tends toward something determinate. Therefore toward something suitable to itself: for it would not tend toward it except on account of some suitability. Therefore it tends toward the good: because that which is suitable to something is good for it.

Note that every agent acts toward something determinate from an inclination or direction following the form through which it acts. But a form directs only to something similar and conformed to itself. Therefore that determinate thing on account of which the agent operates is similar, conformed, and suitable to the agent insofar as it acts by such a form. And upon this is grounded the first consequence of this reasoning.

II. Second. The end is that in which the appetite of the agent or mover, and of that which is moved, rests. Therefore every motion and action is for the sake of the good. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to the ratio of the good to terminate appetite, as is evident from its definition.

But it seems that this reasoning does not hold: because it argues from pure affirmatives in the second figure, arguing thus: The end is that in which appetite rests. The good is that in which appetite rests. Therefore the good and the end are the same. If therefore every agent acts for an end, it follows that it also acts for the sake of the good.

It is answered, according to the mind of the Commentator, II Phys., comm. 23; and IV Phys., comm. 33 and 42; likewise II De Caelo, comm. 23, that it is not unsuitable to use an argument in the second figure from two affirmative propositions when the major proposition is universally converted. And this is manifest per se: because then the syllogism is virtually in the first figure; for once the major is universally converted, the syllogism appears to be in the first figure. Therefore doctors, and indeed Aristotle himself, sometimes do not care to construct arguments explicitly in due form when from the evidence of the propositions the very form according to which it has to be constructed is apparent. In the present case, therefore, St. Thomas did not care about the due form, because the major proposition is universally convertible: for just as every end of an agent as such is that in which the appetite of the agent is quieted, so everything in which the appetite of the agent is quieted is an end. If to this the minor is subsumed, namely, The good is that in which appetite is quieted, it follows most appropriately in the first figure: Therefore the good is the end.

III. Third. Every action and motion is ordered in some way to being (esse). Therefore to the good. — The consequence is evident. Because this very thing that is being is good: namely fundamentally. A sign of which is that all things desire being.

Fourth. Every action and motion is for the sake of some perfection: either, namely, for the sake of the action itself, which is the second perfection of the agent; or for the sake of the perfection induced in the moved thing; toward which the mobile also tends, if it is a natural motion. Therefore it is for the sake of the good. — The consequence is evident. Because to be good is the same as to be perfect.

It must be noted, when it is said that toward the perfection introduced by the agent into the moved thing the mobile also tends if the motion is natural: that in natural motion both the agent and the mobile tend toward the perfection caused by the agent, insofar as each of them is inclined to it; but this happens in different ways. Because the agent is inclined to introduce it into the moved thing by the actuality of the form through which it acts: but the mobile, as such, is inclined to receive it from its natural potentiality. This does not happen in violent motion, where there is no natural potency in the mobile for that motion.

IV. Fifth. Every agent tends toward some act: because it acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore it tends toward the good: because every act has the ratio of good, since evil is not found except in a potency falling short of act.

Sixth. An agent through intellect does not determine an end for itself except under the aspect (ratio) of the good: because the intelligible does not move except under the aspect of the good, which is the object of the will. Therefore also an agent through nature: because, although an agent through intellect determines an end for itself, an agent through nature does not, since it does not know the ratio of the end, but is moved to an end determined for it by some intellect.

Here two things are to be noted. The first is, that the intelligible is not therefore said not to move except under the aspect of the good as if it moved the intellect itself under the aspect of the good: for this would be false, since the ratio of the good is not the formal ratio of the object of the intellect, but rather the ratio of the true. But this is said in relation to the appetite of the one determining an end for himself through intellect. For an agent through intellect does not determine for itself an end on account of which it acts except because it proposes to itself that on account of which it wills to operate, and from whose volition it is moved to operate. And thus it is necessary that the intelligible which it determines for itself as an end move its appetite before it proceeds to operation. But the intelligible does not move appetite except under the aspect of the good.

The second is, that not determining an end for itself is common both to agents without knowledge and to brute animals acting from knowledge. Therefore St. Thomas includes both of these under the name of agent through nature. For although brute animals have some knowledge of that thing which is the end, from which they are moved to operate, nevertheless they do not know that thing under the ratio of end, since they do not know what an end is, as has been shown in the preceding ².

V. Seventh. All things flee evil, both agents through nature and agents through intellect: which is evident because they resist corruption, which is an evil, as much as they can. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to the same ratio to flee evil and to desire good: just as not to be moved downward and to be moved upward.

Concerning this proposition, It belongs to the same ratio to flee evil and to desire good, it must be noted that they are not therefore said to be of the same ratio as if to flee and to desire or seek were one and the same act: but because they accompany each other. For no one flees evil except on account of the appetite for some good which is taken away by such evil: just as no one flees death except because he desires life; and a light body does not recede from a place below naturally except because it naturally desires to be moved upward.

VI. Eighth. In the works of nature we see either always or for the most part what is better: as is apparent in plants and the parts of animals. And this is not from chance. Therefore a natural agent intends what is better. And much more manifestly an agent through intellect. Therefore etc. — The minor is evident. Because things that occur always or frequently are not casual or fortuitous, but rather those that happen in fewer instances.

Note here, from II Phys.³, that not only when an agent produces what happens for the most part does it act for an end, but also when it produces what happens in the lesser part. For chance or fortune does not exist except in actions that are done for the sake of some end. For although nature does not intend the effect which happens in the lesser part, at least primarily and per se, nevertheless it does not produce it except when it acts toward that which happens for the greater part, and when it cannot arrive at this because of some impediment, it produces that which happens rarely.

Note also that an agent through intellect does not always or for the greater part produce what is absolutely better, but what is better in comparison to the extrinsic end that it intends: just as a builder does not make the greatest and best house that could be, but one that is suitable for the inhabitants for whose habitation he makes it.

Ninth. That which is moved tends to the good: because it tends from potency to act. Therefore also the agent and mover. — The consequence is evident. Because, since everything that is moved is led to the term of motion by the agent and mover, the mover and that which is moved must tend to the same thing, insofar as it is moved.

VII. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of those who say that the good is that which all things desire; and of Dionysius, chapter IV of De Div. Nom., saying that all things desire the good and the best.

It must be noted concerning this chapter and the preceding one, that by proving that every agent acts for the sake of the good and for the sake of an end, St. Thomas does not intend that the agent acts for the sake of another good or for another end distinct from itself, but speaks absolutely: whether, I say, the agent acts for itself or for another, as for an end.

From the premises St. Thomas deduces as a corollary that evil is beside intention in things, and befalls beside the intention of agents¹. And on account of this corollary, he makes a determination concerning the nature of evil.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the nature of evil; second, he infers a corollary, in chapter XV.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows that evil is beside intention, which follows immediately from what precedes; second, he treats of the nature of evil, in chapter VII; third, of its causality, in chapter X.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he raises doubts, in the following chapter; third, he answers them, in chapter VI.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. Evil is distinct from good, which every agent intends. Therefore it happens beside intention: because that which results from an action distinct from what was intended by the agent happens beside intention.

Secondly. An agent intends an end corresponding to its power. Therefore that which results corresponding to a defect of power is beside intention. Therefore so is evil. — The antecedent is proved. Because an agent, according as it acts, so intends the end. But it acts according to what it has of active power, not however according as it suffers a defect of power. — But the second consequence is proved. Because a defect in the effect and action follows upon some defect in the principles of action: as is clear in monstrous births and in limping.

Note, when it is said that a defect in operation and effect follows upon some defect in the principles of action, that a defect of the principle can be understood in two ways. In one way, for the removal of some perfection that ought to be in it for right generation, from whatever altering cause it may arise. In another way, for an impediment of the principle arising from without: just as that fire does not perfectly burn some wood can arise from the interposition of some body preventing the action of the fire from completely reaching the wood; for then there is some defect of the agent, inasmuch as it cannot use its whole power on account of some impeding thing. But it is true that this defect is reduced in some way to an intrinsic defect of the cause: namely, inasmuch as it has a power that can be impeded on account of its imperfection. — In the present discussion, therefore, a defect of the principle is taken generally, whether it be intrinsic or extrinsic. And it is understood of principles not only of action, but also material ones: for when a defect happens in the effect, this arises either from a defect of the agent or from a defect of the matter.

II. Thirdly ². A movable thing by its motion tends to form, but it arrives at privation accidentally and beside intention. Therefore by its motion it intends to arrive at good, but it arrives at evil beside intention. Therefore, since every agent and mover tends to good, evil arises beside the agent's intention.

The antecedent is explained in generation and corruption, where it is agreed that matter does not intend privation, although it is in potency to it: since it is impossible for it to be under privation alone. It is also explained in other motions. — But the first consequence is proved. Because good is according as matter is perfected by form, and potency by its proper act; but evil is according as it is deprived of its due act. — The second is also proved. Because the motion of the movable thing and the moving action of the mover tend to the same thing: since, namely, the act of the mover and of the movable thing is the same, as is said in Physics III ³.

Note, concerning that proposition, Good is according as matter is perfected by form, and potency by its proper act, that St. Thomas cautiously added the word proper. Because the good of a potency is not to be under just any act, but only under its proper act and that which is due to it: just as it is not the good of water to be under heat, but under cold, which is the perfection due to it. For although every form and act is in itself a certain perfection, it is not nevertheless the good or perfection of each thing, taking perfection for that which is due to nature, and according to which a nature is said to be complete in its being.

III. Concerning the things that are said in this reasoning, many doubts arise. The first is that the appetite and intention of matter is nothing other than its receptive potency: as is the mind of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. XVIII, q. 1, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. XXII, a. 1, ad 3. If therefore matter is in potency to privation, and arrives at it through motion together with the form, it follows that the appetite and intention of matter is toward privation. Therefore it includes a contradiction to say what is said here, namely that matter is in potency to privation, and nevertheless, while it is moved, does not intend privation.

2. The second is ⁴ that someone could say that matter, although—because it cannot exist under privation alone—it does not seek privation separately and apart from form, nevertheless seeks and intends it together with form: just as it is simultaneously in potency to both, and simultaneously tends to both.

3. The third is concerning that proposition, Matter cannot be under privation alone ⁵. For it can be argued against it by the arguments of Scotus, who maintains, in II Sent., d. XII, q. II ⁶, that matter can exist without any form.

First. An absolute that is distinct from and prior to another absolute can exist without contradiction without it. Matter is an absolute distinct from and prior to any form whatsoever. Therefore etc.

Secondly. God gives being to matter by means of form, which is not of the essence of matter. Therefore God without form can give being to matter. — The consequence is proved. Because whatever absolute thing God makes in creatures by means of a second cause that is not of the essence of the thing caused, He can make without it.

Thirdly. God immediately creates matter. Therefore He can immediately preserve it, without any other posterior absolute entity.

Fourthly. There is no absolute necessity of connection of matter to form. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because then matter would of necessity determine to itself some form: for what determines to itself some genus determines to itself some species in that genus; and what determines to itself some species of necessity determines to itself being in some one individual of that species.

It is confirmed. Because matter is related contingently to any form whatsoever. Therefore it is also related contingently to the whole genus of form.

It follows therefore from these things that it is not absolutely impossible for matter to be under privation alone.

IV. To the first doubt it is said that the potency of matter to privation does not properly and per se have the character of a receptive potency in comparison to privation itself, since privation formally taken posits no being in matter: but it is called receptive of privation accidentally, inasmuch as it is receptive of a form which it can lose, and inasmuch as it is receptive of another form to which the privation of the form it has is necessarily conjoined. And therefore, when it is said that matter is in potency to the privation of the form possessed, it must be understood accidentally and secondarily, namely by reason of the form to which it is conjoined. But the appetite and inclination of matter is called the potentiality and aptitude of matter toward that which it regards per se, not however the aptitude and potentiality toward that which it regards secondarily and accidentally: because the appetite of a thing regards its perfection, not however the negation of perfection.

V. To the second doubt ⁷ it is said that, if privation were equally regarded by potency along with form, both would have to be simultaneously intended and desired by matter, since it tends to them simultaneously. But because matter does not per se regard privation, but only accidentally, inasmuch as it is conjoined to form, therefore it is not desired per se by matter together with form, but only accidentally, inasmuch as the form to which it is conjoined is desired. But St. Thomas is speaking here of appetite and intention per se, not however of accidental appetite.

VI. For the clarity of the third doubt ⁸, it must be considered that for matter to be able to exist without any form, and consequently only under privation, can be understood in two ways. First, speaking of the absolutely possible, according as that is called possible which does not imply a contradiction. And thus for matter to be able to exist without any form is for it not to imply a contradiction that it be in act and have no form. And because whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done by God, if in that way it were possible for matter to exist without form, God would be able to make it to be without form. — Secondly, speaking of the possible by comparison to natural active power. And thus for matter to be able to exist without any form is to be able by some natural power to be brought about so as to have being without any form.

Scotus therefore held that through divine power matter can have being without form: and that for it to be without form does not imply a contradiction. — But St. Thomas, in the Prima Pars, q. LXVI, a. 1; De Potentia, q. IV, a. 1; Quodlibets, quodl. 3, a. 1, holds, with Averroes, II Physics, comm. 12, and Avicenna, in the second book of his Metaphysics, ch. III, that it implies a contradiction for matter to exist actually without any form, and consequently it is not something doable by God. For then something would be in act without an act; and something would be a being that was not determined to any mode of being. — But because this question has been disputed by other Thomists ⁹, and especially by Capreolus, in II Sent., d. XII ¹⁰, let it suffice for now to respond to the arguments of Scotus.

2. To the first, the major premise is denied when two absolutes have a necessary connection between themselves. For it is not universally true, as is clear in quantity and quality: for quantity cannot exist in nature unless it has some shape; and yet quantity is an absolute something prior to quality. But matter, as to the actuality of existence, has a natural and necessary connection with form. Whence it is indeed true that everything that can exist without another, but not the other without it, is prior to it; but not conversely that everything prior can exist without what is posterior.

It is said secondly that that major proposition, if it has truth, holds only in a prior and posterior both of which express some act: but not in a prior that expresses no act, but pure potency, of which sort primary matter is.

It is said thirdly that, if it has truth, it is understood of separation from any posterior whatsoever divisively, but not conjunctively. For animal, although it can exist without each of its species taken divisively and per se, cannot nevertheless exist without every species of animal conjunctively, so that there would be an animal in the nature of things existing in no species of animal. In the same way, although matter can exist without any form taken particularly, it cannot nevertheless exist without every form conjunctively, so that it would exist in the nature of things subject to no form.

3. To the second, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that the assumption is true of a second agent cause, but not of a formal cause. For whatever God makes by means of an efficient second cause, He can work by Himself alone without the second cause. But not whatever He makes by means of a formal cause can He work without such a cause: for He cannot make a wall white without whiteness, for to be white is to have whiteness. Now, God gives being to matter by means of form as by a formal cause, not however as by an efficient cause. Therefore the reasoning does not follow.

4. And through this the response to the third is clear. For although God immediately creates matter by the removal of a mediate efficient cause, He does not however do so by the removal of a mediate formal cause.

5. To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof of which, the consequence is denied. But to the proof of the consequence it can be answered in two ways. First, that the assumption has truth when two conditions are observed: the first is that such a thing determining a genus to itself be something complete in act; second, that the genus which it determines to itself be essential to it. For thus it is true that everything that determines a genus to itself determines to itself some species of that genus: because, as is said in the Categories ¹¹, what is in some genus is in some species of that genus. But it is not true where either of those conditions is lacking; and it is much less true where both are lacking. In the present case, however, both conditions are lacking: because matter is not a complete being in act, since it is pure potency; nor is form of the essence of matter taken absolutely. Therefore that assumption does not have truth in the present case. — But the reason why matter, which is an incomplete being, being one, does not determine to itself some most special species of the genus of substance nor some individual, is that by reason of its potentiality it is susceptible of diverse forms; and because form is that from which each thing has species, therefore, just as it is in potency to diverse forms, so it is in potency and indifferent to diverse species and to diverse individuals.

It can be answered secondly to the same assumption, speaking of a genus extrinsic to the essence of that potency which determines that genus to itself, that for what determines to itself some extrinsic genus to determine to itself a species of that genus can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it determines to itself in being some determinate species of that genus; in another way, that it determines to itself one or the other of them disjunctively. In the first way, the assumption is false; in the second way, it is true. For the visual power, which determines to itself color as the object of operation, does not determine to itself white determinately and designatively, so that it could not see except white, nor similarly black, or any other color: yet it cannot see unless it sees some particular color, namely either this or that. Similarly this body, say wood, determines to itself place: yet it does not determine to itself this place designatively, so that it could not exist without this place; but it is true that it cannot exist, according to nature, unless it is in this or in that place, enumerating all places. In like manner, it is not necessary that matter, which determines to itself form in being, should determine to itself this form designatively, say the form of man, so that, just as it cannot exist without form, so it could not exist without the form of man: but it is indeed necessary that it determine to itself some particular form disjunctively; for it cannot be in act unless it is under some particular form, namely either this one or that one, enumerating all forms.

Through this the response to the confirmation is clear. For the consequence is false. For that which is related contingently to whatever is contained under a genus taken designatively and determinately—as it is true that matter is related contingently to every form—does not have to be related contingently to the whole genus. Whence according to Scotus himself, II Sent., d. XV ¹², this consequence must be denied: This body can exist without this place and without that place (and so of the others designatively); therefore it can exist without any place. But it is indeed true that that which is related contingently to everything contained under a genus taken vaguely and indeterminately and disjunctively is related contingently to the whole genus. But we do not say that in this sense matter is related contingently to every form. On the contrary, it is related necessarily to it: because it cannot exist without this or that form.

VII. Fourthly ¹³. In agents acting through intellect and any estimation whatsoever, evil is beside intention. Therefore also in agents acting through nature. Therefore in all agents.

The antecedent is proved. In agents of this kind intention follows apprehension: since it tends toward that which is apprehended as an end. Therefore, if it arrives at something that does not have the apprehended form, it will be beside intention: as happens in one who, believing he is eating honey, eats gall. But an agent of this kind tends toward something according as it grasps it under the aspect of good. Therefore, if that at which it arrives is not good, but evil, it will be beside intention. — The first consequence is also proved. Because to tend to good is common to an agent through intellect and to an agent acting through nature.

2. Two things must be noted here. The first is that for something to be apprehended as an end can be understood in two ways: in one way, so that the notion of the end is known to belong to it; in another way, so that it is apprehended as per se desirable, apprehending it, namely, as suitable absolutely, and not as useful for something else. In the first way, it belongs only to those having intellect, whose property it is to know what an end is. But in the second way it belongs even to brutes. On this account St. Thomas said, not only of agents acting through intellect, but also of agents acting through any estimation whatsoever—as namely are brutes, which are moved to their operations by natural estimation—that intention follows apprehension, because it tends toward that which is apprehended as an end. For intention also belongs in some way to brutes, as was explained above in the second Book ¹⁴.

The second is that, although to tend toward the good belongs in different ways to an agent through nature and to an agent through intellect, this is nevertheless common to both, that intention follows the form through which the agent operates. And therefore, just as in an agent through intellect intention follows the apprehension through which it acts, and everything that results that is not conformed to its apprehension is beside its intention; so the intention of an agent through nature follows the form through which the natural agent acts, and everything that happens that is not conformed to the inclination of the agent's form is beside its intention. And therefore, since evil is just as discordant from the inclination of the natural form, which inclines to good, as from the apprehension of the agent through intellect; just as it is beside the intention of the agent through intellect, so it is beside the intention of the natural agent. On this account St. Thomas, in order to show that evil is beside the intention of a natural agent if it is beside the intention of an agent through intellect, very well uses this reason, that to tend to good is common to both agents. Lastly, the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, ch. IV of On the Divine Names.

Because against the determined truth there are certain arguments that present difficulty, St. Thomas, in order that the complete and whole truth may be possessed, first adduces them, and second resolves them, in the following chapter¹.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. Evil in natural things is always: since corruption is always joined to generation. In voluntary things also sin happens in the greater number of cases: since it is difficult to act according to virtue, II Ethics. Therefore evil does not occur outside of intention. — The consequence is proved. Because what is outside of intention is fortuitous and casual, and an accident occurring in the fewer cases.

Second². In the third book of the Ethics it is said that malice is voluntary. Therefore evil is not outside of will, or intention.

Third³. Corruption is a natural change. Therefore its end, which is a privation having the character of evil, is intended by nature. — The consequence is proved. Because every natural motion has an intended end.

¹

² I bis. Having set forth the objections against the determination made above, St. Thomas proceeds to their solution, in his own order ³.

Now for the solution of the first argument, he premised four points.

The first is that the character of evil in any substance is in a privation taken strictly and properly, namely one that is of what it is naturally apt to have and ought to have, but not in the privation of what it is not naturally apt to have, or ought not to have: just as for a man it is an evil if he does not have hands, but not if he does not have wings, or does not have blond hair.

The second is that the privation of a form, compared to matter, is not its evil, but it is indeed the evil of the nature whose form it is: just as the privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire, but not for matter. Because, although matter is naturally apt to have all forms, yet none is due to it, since without any one of them it can be perfect in act: yet each of them is due to some one of the things that are composed of matter.

The third is that, since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to be except according as they are in a subject, if a privation is an evil in comparison to the subject in which it is, it will be an evil simpliciter. But if not, it will be an evil not simpliciter, but of something.

The fourth is that the evil of an action is the privation of the due order or commensuration in the action, when and according as it ought to be in it. And such a privation is an evil simpliciter: because to every action there is due some order and some commensuration.

II. For the evidence of the first and second points, it should be noted that that is said to be due to something which is required for its integrity and perfection, such that without it the thing is not said to be perfect in nature according to its species. Now this can be something belonging both to the essence of the substance and also to some accidental completion and perfection: for it is due to man that he have a rational soul; and that he have hands, if he is to be called a perfect man in nature. And therefore the privation of this is called the evil of man: for a man lacking hands is imperfect, and thus some evil is said to be in him.

2. For the evidence of the third point, it must be considered that, since form has the character of good inasmuch as it gives being, as is said in the First Part, q. 5 ⁴, the privation opposed to it has the character of evil inasmuch as it takes away some being. Therefore, to see how a subject's being under a privation is an evil simpliciter or not simpliciter, one must look to the way in which form and privation are related to being itself. On this account St. Thomas, in order to show how something is said to be an evil simpliciter, takes the mode of being of a privation and of the habit opposed to it.

For because the form to which privation is opposed as such, and privation, have being only in a subject—speaking with a sound sense concerning privation, for it is said to have being in a subject because it denies form and being of the subject, but not because it properly has being of itself: for privation, even commonly taken, is the lack of form in some subject—therefore according as it is related in diverse ways to the subject, in diverse ways a subject's being under such a privation is an evil. For when it deprives the subject in which it is of a form due to that subject, then it is an evil of the subject; and therefore it is evil absolutely for a subject to be under such a privation, just as absolutely speaking, without any other addition, it is evil for a man not to have a hand, because to lack a hand is an evil in comparison to man. But when it does not deprive the subject of a form due to it, then it is not an evil simpliciter for the subject to be under such a privation, since that privation is not an evil as it is compared to that subject: for that is said to be the evil of something simpliciter which, compared to it, is an evil, but not that which is an evil compared to another; just as also that is said to be the good of something simpliciter which is good in comparison to it, but not that which is good in comparison to something else only. Yet it can be the evil of something: just as, because to lack the substantial form of air is not an evil of matter, since it does not remove a form due to matter, in accordance with the aforesaid, for matter to lack the form of air is not an evil absolutely, but is an evil of air, because from the fact that matter does not have the form of air, the nature of air is removed.

III. These things having been presupposed, St. Thomas answers the objection that was made ⁵. For as to natural things, it is said first that not everything that is outside of intention is casual and in the fewer cases. For natural corruption and some privation, which are outside the intention of the generator, always follow generation: although privation is sometimes not an evil simpliciter, but of something, as has been said.

It is said secondly that it is not universally true that evil is as in the greater number of cases. For a privation that deprives of something due to the generated thing is an evil simpliciter and casual, as when monstrous births occur: for this does not follow of necessity upon what is intended, but is repugnant to it.

It is said thirdly that the evil of an action follows upon a defect of the active power, and is outside the intention of the agent having the defective power. But it is not casual when the agent either always or frequently suffers such a defect: because it follows of necessity upon an agent so failing. But it is casual when such a defect rarely accompanies the agent.

2. As to voluntary things, it is said first that sometimes evil is not casual, but sometimes it is casual. For when the particular good that is intended in the action has joined to it the privation of the good according to reason either always or frequently, as the inordination of adultery is joined to the pleasure intended from the use of another's woman, evil does not follow casually. But when sin follows as in the fewer cases, the evil is casual: as when someone, shooting at a bird, kills a man.

It is said secondly that goods of this sort, to which privations of the good of reason follow, are intended as in the greater number of cases because more people live according to sense, for the reason that sensible particulars, in which operation consists, are more manifest to us and move us more effectively: and upon more sensible goods there follows the privation of the good according to reason.

IV. For the evidence of the things said here, so that it may be known when evil happens in the greater number or in the fewer cases, it must first be seen how this is in natural things; second, how it is in voluntary things ⁶.

As to the first, it should be known from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. 63, a. 9, ad 1; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 5; II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, and d. 34, a. 3, ad 2, that in natural things evil can be considered either with respect to the whole of nature, or with respect to some determinate species in nature. Whichever way evil is considered, it is in the fewer cases. With respect indeed to the whole of nature, it is clear: because it is only in corruptible things, which, if they are considered in the character of continuous quantity, are much smaller than the celestial bodies; for all corruptible bodies taken together are of much smaller quantity than the celestial bodies are. With respect also to a determinate species it is clear: because an action always turns out according to nature unless it is impeded; but an impediment happens rarely. Hence we see that monsters turn out for the lesser part in nature.

It must be noted, however, that although a defect of nature and of its operations in a whole species happens for the lesser part, yet in some single singular a defect of action can happen for the greater part, on account of a defect of the power or of the instrument: as is apparent in one who limps, and in one who generates monstrous offspring for the greater part. And in this sense is understood what St. Thomas says in this place, that evil follows always or frequently in natural things when the agent, namely the singular one, either always or frequently suffers a defect of power.

V. As to the second ⁷, it is said first that in the angels evil was as in the fewer cases. Because for the greater part there followed an operation according to the suitability of nature, which in them is only one and intellectual: just as natural action also for the greater part follows according to nature.

2. It is said secondly that in human beings, considering the whole nature of the species as to things that can be made, evil is in the fewer cases: because art operates in the manner of nature⁸, and thus fails in the fewer cases, just as nature does too.

But as to moral actions and things to be done, evil is in the greater number of cases. Because, since sensible particulars are multiplied more, and are known to more people, and move more than pleasurable things according to reason, more people follow pleasurable things according to sense, which for the greater part have joined to them the privation of the good of reason. On account of which in them is the evil of man inasmuch as he is man: since he is man through reason, and consequently it is due to man, inasmuch as he is man, to operate according to reason. And in this sense is understood what Aristotle says in II Topics⁹, that evil turns out as in the greater number of cases; and what St. Thomas says in this place, that the reason why more people intend goods to which privations of the good of reason are joined is that more people live according to sense.

3. It is said thirdly that, considering one individual and singular, if there is in him a will perfected through the habits of the virtues, evil turns out in the fewer cases: because habit inclines in the manner of nature, which fails in the fewer cases. But if the will is deformed through habits of vices, evil turns out as in the greater number of cases: because through habits of this sort a man is conformed to brute animals, which for the greater part follow the impulse of nature, as Boethius says in IV De Consolatione, prose 3. And thus, since operations proceeding from a habit of vice are the evil of man inasmuch as he is man, because they are contrary to reason, it follows that such a one for the greater part works evil. Also if the will is perfected by no habit, since, as such, it is related indifferently to either; and evils happen in more ways than goods; it is bent toward evil in more cases than toward that which is perfectly and totally good; especially on the supposition that nature is vitiated through sin.

4. It is said fourthly, according to the mind of St. Thomas in De Potentia, the place cited, that although the evil both of nature and of morals, comparing the effects to a common cause, sometimes turns out for the greater part, whether nature is considered in universal, or in some singular agent; yet if the effects are compared to their proper causes, evil is never found except in the fewer cases. For although a monstrous birth, compared to the generative power, is absolutely a certain evil of nature, inasmuch as it does not follow the order of nature; yet compared to a generative power failing in such a way, it is not an evil, since it is according to the inclination of its own proper principle; but a non-monstrous birth will be an evil of that power so failing, because it turns out outside its inclination. And since that turns out rarely, it follows that the proper effect of that cause fails for the lesser part, and thus for the lesser part evil turns out, compared to its proper cause. Similarly an operation concerning what is pleasurable according to sense, compared to man absolutely, is evil: yet compared to the sensible appetite and the sensitive nature, which is its proper cause, it is found good, since it is according to the inclination of such a nature; just as also in brute animals following sensible appetite it is good. Therefore in operations of this sort concerning sensible things, as they are referred to the sensitive nature and the sensible appetite, evil is in the fewer cases, because for the greater part they agree with the sensible appetite: although, as they are referred to reason and the rational appetite, or to man absolutely, evil is in them for the greater part; in which sense we spoke above¹⁰.

From these things is clear the understanding of what St. Thomas says in this place, namely that evil always or frequently happens in operations proceeding from a failing agent, when such defects always or frequently follow the power of the agent. For this is understood by comparing the action itself to the power of the agent absolutely, say motion to the motive power: because then, if a defect accompanies it for the greater part, the evil of the action will follow for the greater part. But if the comparison of the action were made to the power as it is under such a defect, in which way it is the proper cause of the defective action, then such an action will not be evil as lacking due order: since for it, as proceeding from a cause so failing, it is not due to have the perfection that it lacks; just as neither is it an evil for a man to lack the perfection of wings, since it is not due to the integrity of man to have wings.

5. It must be noted, however, that in this whole digression we are speaking of evil simpliciter, in the sense that St. Thomas explained here: and not of the evil of something else only¹¹. Because if we were speaking of evil of this sort, evil follows every action, both natural and voluntary, for the greater part. For a morally good operation that is according to reason is accompanied by the privation of the pleasurable good according to sense, which privation is the evil of the sensitive appetite: and the generation of the introduced form is accompanied by the privation of the cast-off form, which is the evil of the corrupted nature. On account of this St. Thomas said that evil, namely so taken, turns out either always or for the greater part in actions, and does not turn out in the fewer cases and by chance.

VI. To the second objection¹² the answer is made by denying the consequence: because evil is both voluntary and outside of intention. For intention is only of the ultimate end, which one wills for its own sake: but will is also of that which one wills for the sake of another, even if simpliciter one would not will it. This is shown by the example of one throwing merchandise into the sea for the sake of safety, where the throwing of the merchandise is willed per accidens. And similarly malice is said to be willed not per se, but per accidens: as someone wills an inordinate action on account of a sensible good.

2. It must be noted, concerning that response, that St. Thomas makes a distinction between the intention of something and the volition of it. Because the will and appetite intend that toward which they are inclined for its own sake: for intention is properly an act of the appetite concerning the end; but the end, as such, is willed for its own sake. But volition is not only of that which we will for its own sake, but also of that which we will for the sake of another: just as we will both health and medicine. Therefore to say that evil or malice is not intended, but is outside of intention, and yet is willed per accidens, is to say that it is not willed for its own sake, but is nevertheless willed for the sake of another.

3. It should be noted secondly that what is willed per accidens can be taken in two ways. In one way, that it totally escapes the knowledge of the one willing, and yet is joined to what is willed per se: as one willing to drink something sweet, not knowing that it is poison, is said to will poison per accidens. And such is said to be willed entirely per accidens. — In another way, because it indeed falls under the knowledge of the one willing, but yet he does not will it except inasmuch as he wills some good to which it is joined; nay, if he could separate the one from the other, he would will the one without the other: as he who wills to throw merchandise into the sea for the sake of his own safety does not will the throwing of the merchandise except because he wills his safety, which he cannot attain without the loss of the merchandise; and if he could attain safety without the loss of the merchandise, he would not will their loss.

Therefore evil is never willed for its own sake. But sometimes it is willed entirely per accidens: as, when someone wills to shoot an arrow toward a place through which men are not accustomed to pass, if it happens that by shooting the arrow he kills a man, he is said to have willed the killing of the man entirely per accidens and in no way per se, neither, I say, primarily, nor secondarily for the sake of another. — But sometimes it is not willed per accidens entirely, as if, namely, the deformity and deordination of the willed act were not known: but it is willed per accidens as per accidens is distinguished against primarily and per se, as it is the same as through another; as, when someone wills to attain the pleasure that is in adultery, knowing that the privation of the order of justice is joined to it, he wills that deordination on account of the pleasure, inasmuch as he wills the pleasure to which that evil is necessarily joined, and he prefers to incur that evil rather than lack such pleasure. And in this sense the Philosopher says that malice and sin are sometimes voluntary. For not only is that voluntary which we will for its own sake, but also that which we will for the sake of another, although taken in itself it would not be voluntary, as is said in I-II, q. 6, a. 6¹³. And on account of this, as is said in Questions on Evil, q. 1, a. 3, ad 15, man in things of this sort is not excused from sin, although the evil is not intended for its own sake: because in order that the evil be imputed to him, it is sufficient that it be willed for the sake of another, although it is not willed for its own sake.

Now what I said, that the killing of a man from the shooting of an arrow is willed entirely per accidens by one not considering that it ought to happen, is not contrary to what St. Thomas says in De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, ad 15, namely that, while some accident is joined to the effect as in the fewer cases and rarely, it is not necessary that the agent intending the effect per se intend in any way the effect per accidens. For St. Thomas takes an effect to be intended per accidens there when it is intended from knowledge: but not as that is said to be intended per accidens which is joined to what is intended per se even if it is not known to be joined to what is intended per se.

VII. To the third objection¹⁴ he answers that privation is not intended per se and separately from form, but per accidens, inasmuch as it is joined to form, which is the end of generation, just as corruption is also always joined to generation. This is declared by the example of the corruption of water and the generation of air.

2. Concerning this response two things are to be noted. The first is that intention is sometimes taken properly: and thus it is only of that which is the end and is intended per se. But sometimes it is taken for the inclination of the appetite toward anything whatsoever. When therefore it is said here that nature intends both, namely both the end of generation and the end of corruption, at the same time, intention is taken commonly, but not properly. For although it is one and the same act by which something is inclined to the end and to that which is toward the end, as such, yet that is called intention with respect to the end, but not with respect to what is ordered to the end. Hence there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas when in the preceding response he said that evil is not intended, but only willed, while here he says that privation, which is a certain evil, is intended at the same time with form: for there he took intention properly, but here commonly. — Or we can say that evil cannot be intended by a proper act terminated at it; but it can well be intended by an act that is terminated at the good to which the evil is joined.

3. Note secondly that both particular generating and corrupting nature and universal nature intend first and per se generation and the form of the generated; but per accidens they intend corruption, and the privation of the preceding form in the matter, because there cannot be generation except through the casting off of the preceding form. For air acting on water, and likewise the celestial power, intend the generation of air, as is said here, absolutely and simpliciter, but they do not intend the corruption of water except because it is necessarily joined to the generation of air: for if nature could generate air without the corruption of another nature, it would do that. On account of this St. Thomas says that nature does not intend the end of corruption separately from the end of generation, but intends both at once. — But what St. Thomas sometimes says, that corruption is of the intention of universal nature, but is against particular nature¹⁵, is to be understood of the particular nature that is corrupted: because neither per se nor per accidens does a nature, as far as it is from the ratio of its form, intend its own corruption. It is not, however, understood of the nature corrupting another nature while generating what is like itself: for such a nature, as has been said, together with generation intends corruption per accidens, just as universal nature also does.

VIII. From these answers St. Thomas deduces that it is manifest that evil simpliciter is entirely outside intention in the works of nature; but evil not simpliciter, but for a certain thing, is intended by nature secundum accidens.

For the understanding of those things which have been said, note, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. xxxvi, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, that the intention of nature is twofold: one primary, the other secondary. The primary intention is the inclination of nature absolutely toward what is like itself and conformed to it according to all its perfection. But the secondary is toward what is like itself as far as can be done, on the supposition that the primary intention is frustrated: just as also in artificial things the primary intention of the artisan is to make from the given matter a work conformed in every part to the art; but the secondary is, on the supposition that he cannot attain the first intended end, to make from that matter something like the art as far as he can. Corruption therefore and every defect are against the primary intention of nature: because nature by primary intention intends being and perfection. Yet some defect is of the secondary intention of nature. For when nature cannot bring the effect to a greater perfection, it leads it to a lesser: as when it cannot make a male, it makes a female, which is a misbegotten male, as is said in XVI De Animalibus¹⁶. What St. Thomas says therefore, that evil simpliciter is entirely outside intention in the works of nature, as monstrous births, is to be understood as being outside the primary intention of nature: not, however, as being outside the secondary intention.

After St. Thomas has shown that evil is in things outside the intention, he now wishes to show that no essence is evil in itself ¹, taking evil formally, namely, for the very privation of a perfection due to be present. Concerning this he does two things: first, he shows what was proposed; second, he raises certain doubts and resolves them, in the two following chapters. I. It is argued therefore first as follows. Evil is a privation. Therefore it is not any essence in things. — The antecedent is clear from the use of the name. — But the consequence is proved. Because privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance, that is, in a subject. Secondly. Each thing is good according to the fact that it has an essence. Therefore, since good and evil are opposed, nothing is evil according to the fact that it has an essence. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because each thing has being according to its essence. But insofar as it has being, it has some good: since all things desire being. Note regarding that proposition, Each thing has being according to its essence, that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the very essence of the thing is its being. And in this way the proposition is false, nor does St. Thomas understand it thus: for in God alone is it true that his essence is his being, as was shown in the preceding sections ². — In another way, that the being of the thing proceeds from the very essence of the thing. And in this way the proposition is true, and is intended here. For a created simple essence is the formal cause of its being, and receptive of it. But a composite essence from matter and form is the proper receptive subject of being, so that, once the essence is constituted, the being of the supposit immediately results: and thus a thing is said to have being according to essence. The essence of a composite thing is also the formal cause of being by reason of its form, which gives being formally. II. Thirdly. Evil is neither an agent nor a thing made: since everything that acts, acts insofar as it is in act and perfect; and the terminus of any generation is form and good. Therefore evil is not any thing. — The consequence is clear: because every thing is either an agent or made. Fourthly. Every agent by acting intends good. Therefore no being insofar as it is of this kind, is evil. — The antecedent is proved. Because nothing tends to its contrary, but to what is similar and suitable. Note that, although this argument directly concludes that no made being is evil, nevertheless from this it is left universally that evil is no being. For if it is not any made being, much less will it be a being capable of making other things. III. Fifthly. What is evil in itself cannot be natural to anything. Therefore no essence is evil in itself. — The antecedent is proved. Because evil is the privation of that which is natural, as is clear from the definition of evil: for the substance of anything is the very nature of the thing; but an accident is caused by the principles of some substance.

2. Concerning this proposition, Everything that belongs to the genus of accident must be caused by the principles of some substance, and be natural to it, it is doubted. First, because thus every accident will be proper, and none will be common. For every accident is proper to that nature to which it is natural, and by whose principles it is caused.

Secondly, because grace and charity are accidents of the soul. And yet they are caused by the principles of no subject, and are natural to no subject.

3. For the clarification of this, it must be considered that, since every accident has to be defined through substance, on account of the natural dependence of an accident on a subject, as is stated in Quodlibet IX, a. 5 ³, ad 1; and, as is stated in the Treatise on Being and Essence ⁴, differences in accidents are taken from the diversity of the principles by which they are caused: it is necessary to say that every accident is caused by the principles of some substance, although frequently those principles are unknown to us. It is not necessary, however, that all be caused by the proper principles of some specific nature: but it suffices that they be caused either by the principles of the genus, or of the species, or even of the individual, as is gathered from the same Treatise on Being and Essence ⁵: for some accidents are proper to the genus, some to the species, and some indeed to the individual. But nevertheless it must be noted, from the same Treatise ⁶, and from II Sent., d. xxvi, a. 2, ad 2, that some accidents are caused by the principles of the subject with respect to complete act, as heat by fire; but some are caused with respect to aptitude only, as transparency is caused by the principles of air, yet is completed by something illuminating extrinsically; for the transparent in act includes light, which belongs to air from within only with respect to aptitude and habititude for the complement of act. — That therefore which is said here, that every accident is caused by the principles of some substance and is natural to it, is understood either with respect to complete act, or with respect to aptitude.

4. To the first in the opposite, therefore, it is answered that certainly every accident is proper with respect to some subject, either generic or specific or singular, with respect to this, that it is caused by the principles of the subject, in the manner explained; and is compared to it as proper act is compared to proper potency; and also with respect to this, that it is sustained through the subject. For although there are certain accidents, as is said in I Sent., d. xvii, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, which are repugnant to the principles of the subject and are introduced by violence, as is the case with heat introduced into water; nevertheless they must, either with respect to complete act or with respect to aptitude and habititude, determine for themselves some subject, according to genus or species or individual, without which they cannot be with respect to either of them. For although heat can be in something according to act through violence, nevertheless it is not in it according to aptitude and habititude.

Speaking in this sense, no accident is common. But that accident is divided into proper and common, this division is taken by comparison to the most specific species. For something belongs to one most specific species, as risibility to man: but something belongs to several species, as whiteness to snow, milk, the swan, and others.

5. To the second it is said, from II Sent., in the place previously cited, that although grace and charity are not caused by the principles of the subject with respect to complete act, yet the receptivity of these always follows the subject, and is caused by the principles of the subject, and thus can be called natural, as is clear in that which is to be susceptible of instruction.

It could also be said that St. Thomas is speaking about accidents which can be caused by a natural agent. But grace and charity are not such accidents.

IV. Sixthly. Every essence is either a form, or having a form: since each thing is placed in a genus or species through form. Therefore it is good. For form, insofar as it is of this kind, has the ratio of goodness: both because it is the principle of action, and the end intended by the agent; and because it is the act by which each thing is perfect. Therefore etc.

Seventhly. Act, insofar as it is of this kind, is good: since each thing, according as it is in act, is perfect. Potency also is something good: since it tends to act; and is proportionate to act, but not contrary; and is in the same genus with it; but privation does not belong to it except per accidens, namely insofar as it is joined to form. Therefore every being, insofar as it is being, is good. — The consequence is clear. Because being is divided through act and potency.

Eighthly. Evil cannot be an effect of God. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because all being, in whatever way it is, is from God, as was shown in the Second of this work. — The antecedent is also proved. Because evil cannot be an effect of good, namely per se. But God is the very essence of goodness.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Gen. I; and Eccles. III; and I Tim. IV; and of Dionysius, IV ch. of Div.

The error of the Manicheans, who posit that some things are evil according to their natures, is also excluded.

Against the posited conclusion certain objections are made, which St. Thomas first recounts; secondly, he resolves them, in the following chapter¹.

I. As to the first, some argue first thus. Evil is the specific difference of a moral habit and act: since vice is an evil habit according to its species. Therefore it gives species to certain things. Therefore it is some essence.

Secondly. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because each of the contraries is a certain nature.

Thirdly. Good and evil are said to be the genera of contraries by Aristotle. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because every genus has some essence and nature.

Fourthly. Evil acts: for it corrupts good. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear: because everything that acts is some thing.

Fifthly. Among evils one is found to be worse than another. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because things in which greater and less are found must be certain things having an order.

Sixthly. Evil is in the world. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: because thing and being are convertible.

¹

² I bis. To the aforesaid objections, St. Thomas answers.

To the first³ indeed, it is said first, that evil and good are specific differences in moral matters, and primary ones. Because moral matters, since they depend on the will, receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will; just as natural actions receive it from the form, which is the principle of action. But good and evil are spoken of according to an order to an end or the privation of order, as from a primary measure.

It is said secondly⁴ that, since in moral matters some things are called good or evil from the end of reason as from a primary measure, that which in them takes its species from an end contrary to the end of reason is called evil according to its species.

It is said thirdly⁵ that such an end of evil, although it removes the end of reason, is nevertheless some good. This is declared by the example of what is pleasurable according to sense, and similar things. Hence evil, according as it is a specific difference, does not signify something that is evil according to its essence; but something that in itself is good, yet is evil inasmuch as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man. From this St. Thomas intends to deny that evil taken formally, about which the conclusion is understood, is a specific difference; although it is true of evil taken accidentally and concretively.

II. Concerning this proposition, Good and evil are spoken of according to an order to an end or the privation of order, it must be considered that this can be understood either of good and evil in common, or of good and evil according as they are found in actions and habits. If it is understood in the first way, it can have a twofold sense. One is that good and evil are only in those things that are naturally suited to be for an end: good indeed, if it is orderable to the end and suitable to the end; but evil if it is not orderable to the end, but is disproportionate to it. This sense is not true. Because good and evil are not only found in things that are for the end, but also in the end. Indeed, good is principally said of the end: because what is ordered to the end has the character of good only because it is ordered to the good, or lacks the due order to it. — Another sense can be that good and evil are spoken of either according to the concomitance of the end, or according to the negation of such concomitance. For the character of the end accompanies the character of the good, if good is taken absolutely and simpliciter; but such a character does not accompany the character of evil, rather the privation of the end accompanies it; for just as evil taken absolutely is the privation of good, so the privation of the end accompanies it. And this sense is true.

If, however, it is understood in the second way, the sense is that a good act, and a good habit, is spoken of according as it is ordered to an end, namely the due one; but an evil one, according as it lacks order to the due end.

Although, however, what is said here can be understood in both ways, it seems nevertheless that it should be understood in the first way in the true sense, namely concerning good and evil in common. Both because St. Thomas speaks absolutely of the end, and makes no mention of the due end; and because it is more suitably adapted to the premises. For because he had said that moral matters obtain their species from the end, he concludes, because the end and the good accompany each other, and similarly evil and the negation of the end, that therefore good and evil are the primary differences in moral matters, namely the extrinsic ones, from which the intrinsic differences are taken.

III. Concerning the second statement of the response⁶, it should be noted that the end of reason is called the end conforming to the right judgment of reason, which namely is appetible according to the right judgment of reason. But the end contrary to the end of reason is an appetible object that is contrary to what is appetible according to right reason: just as what is pleasurable according to sense, not regulated by reason, is contrary to what is pleasurable according to reason. And because man is man through reason, therefore moral goods, which belong to man inasmuch as he is man, receive goodness and malice from an order to the good of reason or to what is contrary to that good.

IV. Concerning the third statement⁷ two things are to be observed. The first is that good or evil from an order to another, as such, does not have goodness or malice except according to the goodness or malice of that to which it is ordered. And therefore, if that other is in some respect good and in some respect evil, what is ordered to it will in some respect be good, and in some respect will be evil. For according as such an order terminates in a good thing, it will be good, but according as it terminates in a thing having something of malice, it will be evil: for, inasmuch as it is of this kind, it has no goodness or malice except from the goodness or malice of that to which it is ordered. Therefore, since the evil that is a specific difference in the genus of moral matters is something that in itself is good and in some respect is evil, inasmuch, namely, as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man, it is apparent that an evil habit is in some respect good, namely inasmuch as it regards a good; and in some respect evil, inasmuch namely as it regards the privation of the order of reason conjoined to that good.

The second is that something is called evil in two ways, as St. Thomas sets forth in II Sent., d. xxxiv, a. 2, from the mind of Avicenna in his Metaphysics⁸: namely, per se, and per accidens. Evil per se is the privation of good itself abstractly taken. Evil per accidens is both the very subject of such privation, and that which causes it in another. Therefore the evil that is posited as a constitutive difference in moral matters is not evil per se and abstractly, but is evil per accidens and concretively. Which is to say: It is not the privation of good itself formally and abstractly taken, but is the subject and nature to which the privation of good is conjoined. For the positive order to an evil end has conjoined to it the privation of order to the due end, as was said⁹; just as the undue end also has conjoined to it the privation of the due end. Hence it is called evil per accidens and concretively, as is also the end at which it terminates.

2. But a doubt occurs. For if a moral habit and act is specified by the end, it is specified by it either according as it has goodness, or according as it has privation and malice. If inasmuch as it has something of goodness, it follows that the habit and act is not evil: for what expresses an order to something inasmuch as it is good, does not have it from that to be evil. If inasmuch as it has privation and malice, it follows that it is specified by evil per se and abstractly considered. And thus also evil formally and per se taken will be a specific difference in moral matters. Which St. Thomas denies here and in many other places¹⁰.

It is answered that the division is insufficient, if the goodness and malice of the end are taken according to the complete prescinding of one from the other. For an evil habit and act is specified neither by reason of goodness precisely taken by the exclusion of malice, nor by reason of malice precisely taken, but by reason of the one as it is conjoined to the other. For it is specified by the good itself as it is a good underlying such privation and malice; and similarly it can be said to be specified by malice, not absolutely, but inasmuch as it is in such a nature. Therefore St. Thomas says in the First Part, q. xlviii, a. 1, ad 2, that evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is not a constitutive difference, but by reason of the conjoined good; and in II Sent., d. xl, a. 1, ad 2, that evil is a difference according as it is founded upon some end undue to the will, which nevertheless is not entirely devoid of goodness. Here, however, he says that evil, according as it is a specific difference in the genus of morals, does not signify something that according to its essence is evil, but what is good in itself, yet evil to man. From which it is clear that both can be said: namely, both that the undue end specifies by reason of malice according as it is founded in the good, inasmuch namely as the good does not specify except as it underlies malice; and that it specifies by reason of goodness, inasmuch namely as malice does not specify except as it is founded in goodness; so that the one without the other would not specify. But by reason of which of the two it more principally has it to specify, it seems from what is said in the First Part, and in II Sent., d. xxxiv and xl, and similarly in Qu. de Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, that it has this by reason of goodness, although by reason of malice it gives malice to the habit. For St. Thomas intends in the places cited before that evil does not constitute a species by reason of privation, but by reason of that which underlies privation¹¹; and here it is said that the evil that is a specific difference signifies something that is in itself good. This also is harmonious with reason: because, since a species expresses a certain nature and essence, it does not have it to be specified except through that which signifies a nature.

V. To the second objection¹² it is answered that they are contraries according as they are taken in the genus of moral matters. But evil, inasmuch as it is evil, is the privation of good.

Note that evil, if it is taken formally and abstractively, which St. Thomas calls evil inasmuch as it is evil, cannot have the character of a contrary to good, because it is a mere privation, and formally expresses no nature or essence: but it is privatively opposed to it. If, however, it is taken also subjectively, namely for the subject of privation, thus it expresses some essence and nature subject to privation: and thus it can have the character of a contrary. Because therefore evil in moral matters is taken concretively, namely for an act or habit lacking due order and due perfection, St. Thomas therefore says that in moral matters good and evil are contraries.

2. But then a doubt occurs that is touched upon in Qq. de Malo, q. 1, a. 1. For according to that which underlies evil itself, evil agrees with good. Therefore it is not contrary to good by reason of the substrate, but inasmuch as it is evil.

It is answered, and said first, according to him in the same place¹³, and it is from the mind of Simplicius on the Categories¹⁴, that evil is not a privation that consists in having been deprived, as death and blindness; but it is a privation that consists in being deprived, like sickness and ophthalmia, one of which is the way into death and the other the way into blindness. Therefore evil can be spoken of contrarily: because it does not deprive of the whole good, but leaves something of the good, inasmuch as it is founded in the good. For privations of this kind can be called contrary, inasmuch as something of that which is deprived is still retained.

It is said secondly that, although that in which it agrees with the good does not suffice for the character of its contrariety to the good, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety: just as, although that in which black agrees with white does not suffice for their contrariety, nevertheless without this there could not be contrariety¹⁵. Therefore it is conceded that moral evil is not contrary to good solely from the character of the substrate: but it is very true that it is contrary from the substrate itself together with the privation. So that, if all underlying good is removed, it will not have the character of a contrary, but only the character of a privatively opposed, indeed of a contradictorily opposed thing.

VI. To the third objection¹⁶ it is said first, conformably to the preceding points, that good and evil, as they are in moral matters, are genera of contraries: because in moral matters either both contraries are evil, as prodigality and illiberality; or one is good and the other is evil, as liberality and illiberality.

It is said secondly that such a moral evil is a genus and difference, not according as it is the privation of the good of reason, from which it is called evil; but from the nature of the act or habit ordered to some end that is repugnant to the end of reason. This is declared by the example of a blind man; and of this difference which is irrational.

Note that the response aims at this, that the argument is not against the determination that was made. Because when it was said that evil is no essence, this is understood of evil formally and abstractly taken; but the proposition of Aristotle is understood of moral evil, which is evil concretively, for it is a habit or act to which some evil is conjoined. But when it is said that evil is a genus and difference, namely a genus of evils, and the difference of moral evil from moral good, not according as it is a privation, but from the nature of the action and habit: understand this, as in the preceding response, that the privation itself is not the genus and difference, but the act and habit, yet according as they underlie such a privation.

It is said thirdly that it could be said that Aristotle did not say that according to his own opinion, just as in many of his logical books he uses examples according to the opinion of others; but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who said that good and evil are the primary genera and primary principles, under each of which he posited ten primary contraries.

It is said fourthly that the statement of Pythagoras has some truth. Because of all contraries one is perfect, the other diminished, having as it were a certain privation mixed in. But all diminution and privation pertains to the character of evil; and all perfection and completion to the character of good. And according to this, good and evil seem to be the genera of all contraries, inasmuch as one seems to be comprehended under the character of good, while the other seems to approach the character of evil.

2. It must be noted here first, that this response¹⁷, namely that Aristotle exemplified in the Categories concerning good and evil as contraries and genera of contraries, was from Iamblichus, as Simplicius recounts on the Categories¹⁸. For because Pythagoras made two coordinations of things, namely one of goods and the other of evils, and said that good and evil are the primary genera and primary principles of those contrary coordinations, Aristotle therefore, following the opinion of Pythagoras, said that good and evil are contraries as genera of contraries.

It must be noted secondly, from St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. xxxiv, in the place cited before¹⁹, that according to that manner by which it is said that good and evil simply and universally taken can in some way be called genera of contraries (which seems to have been the interpretation of Theophrastus²⁰), genus is not taken according to its proper signification, namely for that which is univocally predicated of many differing in species in the quid est; but improperly, as everything that by its commonness encompasses and contains many things can be called a genus. And thus the Porphyrians took the name of genus in that proposition, as Simplicius reports²¹. Hence also Ammonius²² says that these are called genera because they are found in all genera, just as Plato also posited as the genera of beings being, the same, the diverse, motion, and rest; not, however, as if they were genera distinctly set apart from the other ten genera.

It must be noted thirdly, when St. Thomas says that all diminution and privation pertains to the character of evil, that evil is not taken there simpliciter, as in ch. VI he declared that that is called evil simpliciter which is the evil of the subject in which it is, when namely it deprives the subject of that which it is naturally suited and ought to have: for it is not an evil to blackness that it lacks the perfection of whiteness, just as neither is it an evil of man that he does not have wings. But evil is taken universally for the lack in something of a perfection which something of its genus is naturally suited and ought to have.

VII. To the fourth objection²³ it is said first, from the view of Dionysius, ch. iv of De Divinis Nominibus, that evil does not act except per accidens, by reason of the good to which it is conjoined.

It is said secondly that evil is said to corrupt good, not only by acting in virtue of the good, but also formally according to itself: just as blindness is said to corrupt sight because it is the corruption of sight.

Note that the response is this: that if we speak of the corrupter by way of an efficient cause, evil does not corrupt per se, but per accidens. If, however, we speak of the corrupter formally, evil corrupts per se. But it is not necessary that the one corrupting effectively per accidens be so because namely it is conjoined to a power corrupting per se; nor that that which corrupts formally be some nature.

VIII. To the fifth objection it is answered that something is called a greater or lesser evil than another through departure from the good: because in this way privations are intensified and remitted, as is clear in the dissimilar and the unequal. For they are not intensified as if having some essence, like forms; but through the increase of the depriving cause, which makes the subject be further distant from the form. This is shown by the example of darkness, which arises in the air from the interposition of an obstacle.

From these things it is clear that that proposition is false: In whatever things greater and less are found, they must be certain things having an order. For it fails in those things in which greater and less are spoken of through departure from the opposite. — Concerning greater and less, enough has been said in the preceding, so far as pertains to the matter at hand²⁴.

IX. To the sixth objection it is answered that, since being is said in two ways, as is clear in V Metaph., namely according as it signifies the essence of a thing, and according as it signifies the truth of composition; evil and privation are not called being in the first way, but in the second way, inasmuch as by a privation something is said to be deprived, and by evil some thing is said to be evil.

2. For the declaration of this response, it should be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the places cited before²⁵, and from the Commentator, V Metaph., comment 14, that being taken in the first way, and being spoken of in the second way, differ in two ways. First, because being which signifies the essence of a thing, when predicated of something, is a substantial predicate; but being which signifies the composition of the intellect is an accidental predicate.

Secondly, because the first is answered to the question what is it; but the second is answered to the question whether it is. Where it should be noted that whether it is, although it seems at first sight to ask about being in the nature of things, does not however ask about the real being of that about which it is asked whether it is; but it is asked absolutely whether it can truly be affirmed of it that it is in the nature of things, and whether it can ground a true composition of the intellect saying that it is, or affirming something of it, whether it be as something affirmed or as a negation. And therefore, when it is answered that it is, the "is" expresses the truth of the composition of the intellect; and the sense is that true is the composition of the intellect saying that it is in the nature of things, and that it is truly affirmed of something, for instance because it is true that something is deprived, as that a man is blind; so that compositions of this kind have the foundation of their truth in the privation itself. And although in expressions of this kind privations seem to be signified to have some being in reality, nevertheless a certain non-being of the opposite form is signified rather than some being of the privation. Hence Augustine, on that text, Darkness was over the face of the abyss, says that it was so said, Darkness was over the face of the abyss, as if it were said, There was no light over the abyss²⁶. And in book III of De Vita Beata, ch. III²⁷, he says that for some place to have darkness is nothing other than not to have light.

X. But concerning this there is a twofold doubt. First, because the composition of the intellect is not true unless something corresponds to it in reality. If therefore privation has no real being of actual existence outside the intellect, the composition of the intellect saying that privation is will not be true.

Secondly because, as is said in VI Metaph.²⁸, the true and the false are distinguished from the good and the evil, because the true and the false are in the intellect, but the good and the evil are in things. Therefore evil and privation posit some being in things.

2. To the first it is answered, and it is said first, that it is not necessary that something correspond to the composition of the intellect in reality that is real, or has real being outside the soul: for it is evident that to this true composition, Non-being is non-being, nothing real corresponds on the part of what is signified or understood. But it is indeed necessary that the thing understood or signified be proportioned and equated to the composition of the intellect. And this is what is signified when the intellect is said to understand just as it is in reality.

It is said secondly that, if the intellect understood a privation to have positive real being in nature, it would understand falsely: because what is understood would not be equated and proportioned to the one understanding. But it does not understand this when it says that a privation is: rather, only that the privation has being in whatever manner being belongs to it; whether, I say, in the manner of that which has some nature and essence, or in the manner of negations that determine a subject for themselves. Therefore, it is not necessary that some real being of the privation correspond to this composition in reality: but it suffices that it have being in its own manner, namely as a negation whose being consists in the subject itself being such from which it has that it is the foundation of a true proposition, and thus is equated to the composition made concerning itself.

It is said thirdly that there also corresponds to such a composition something real, namely the subject lacking a form, from which the composition has that it is true. For because there is in nature an eye lacking the visual power, therefore this composition is true, Blindness is, and this one, Blindness is in the eye.

3. To the second it is said that, since good and evil pertain to the appetite, which is terminated at the thing outside, good and evil are not primarily in the intellect objectively as known, but in things themselves as terminating the appetite: good indeed per se, but evil per accidens; likewise, good as positing some perfection in the thing, but evil as the removal and privation of a perfection. Hence in De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 20, St. Thomas says that evil is indeed in things, but as a privation, not, however, as something real. Therefore this consequence is not valid: Evil is not primarily in the intellect as the terminus of the intellect, or as known, but in things. Therefore it posits some real being in things.

If, however, the consequence is proved thus: Every being is either real or of reason. Evil is not a being of reason: because it does not belong to a thing, according to you, as it is objectively in the intellect, which is the condition of a being of reason. Therefore it is a real being: — it is answered that the privation of a real being is indeed a real being, not as positing a real being in the thing, but as the removal of a real being; for affirmation and negation pertain to the same genus. But this is not against the response: because it was not denied that privation is a real being after the manner of a negation, but that it formally posits something to be real in things.

Or it should be said that the division adduced is insufficient. For not everything is either a real being or a being of reason: but either a real being; or a being of reason; or a negation of a real being; or a negation of a being of reason.

After St. Thomas treated of evil with respect to its nature, he now treats of it with respect to causality ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of the cause of evil itself; second, he shows how it is the cause of other things, chap. XIV. — Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows that evil is not caused except by good; second, that every evil has a cause in some way, chap. XIII. — Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows absolutely that it is not caused except by good; second, particularly that good is its subjective cause, in the following chapter.

I. Regarding the first, he does two things: first, he shows that good is the cause of evil; second, how it is the cause ².

As to the first, he shows that Good is the cause of evil.

And he argues first thus. If evil is the cause of some evil, it does not act except by the power of the good, as was proved. Therefore good is the primary cause of evil.

It should be noted that from this argument it is clear that St. Thomas does not exclude all manner of causality from evil, but the principality of causality. Which is also made manifest from the third argument.

Second. Evil is not some being. Therefore it cannot be the cause of anything: because every cause is something. Therefore, if evil is caused by anything, that thing must be good.

Notice, when it is said that evil is the cause of nothing, that this is understood of evil taken formally and abstractly: but not of evil spoken of per accidens and concretely ³.

Third. Evil cannot be a cause per se of anything. Because, since every cause properly and per se tends toward its proper effect, evil would tend toward evil. But it was shown above that every agent intends the good. Therefore it will be a cause only per accidens. Therefore evil must be caused by good: because a cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se; but only the good can be a cause per se.

2. Regarding that proposition, A cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se, it should be noted that it is to be understood in the same proportional way as it is understood that an effect per accidens is reduced to an effect per se. In the effect, however, it is not understood as if every effect per accidens of something must be the effect per se of another cause, for this is not universally true: but because either it is itself the effect per se of another cause, or there must be some effect per se of that cause of which it is said to be the effect per accidens, to which it is conjoined. So, therefore, it is not understood that every cause per accidens is reduced to a cause per se as if, besides the cause per accidens of some effect, another cause must be given which is the cause per se of that effect; or that every cause per accidens of some effect must be the cause per se of another effect: but because either the cause per accidens of one thing must be the cause per se of another, as happens in a cause which is said to be the cause of something per accidens because that thing is conjoined to its per se effect and is outside the intention of the cause; or because the cause per accidens must be conjoined to something that is a cause per se of something, as happens where something is said to cause another thing per accidens on the part of the cause itself, namely because it is conjoined to the cause per se, just as we say that a musician builds per accidens when it happens that the same person is a musician and a builder. Evil, however, is said to be the cause per accidens of evil, not on the part of the effect, namely because it is conjoined to its effect per se, since evil, as such, has no effect per se: — hence its causality per accidens need not be reduced to causality per se in such a way that it is itself the cause per se of something else — but only because it must be conjoined to something that is the cause per se of some effect, which is good alone.

3. Fourth. Evil can be neither matter, nor form, nor agent, nor end: since it was shown above that both being in act and being in potency are good; and each thing acts according as it is in act and has form; and evil is outside intention. Therefore it cannot be the cause of anything. Therefore etc.

II. As to the second ⁴, St. Thomas shows that Good is not the cause of evil except per accidens. And first, he shows how this is in natural things; second, how it is in voluntary things ⁵.

That it is not the cause of evil except per accidens he proves, because one of two opposites is not the cause of the other except per accidens, as is said in VIII Phys., text 8 ⁶; but good and evil are opposites.

It should be noted that evil and good can be taken in two ways: in one way, according to the general notions of good and evil; in another way, according to particular notions, such as fire and the privation of fire. If they are taken in the first way, thus good is the cause per accidens of the evil opposed to it. And St. Thomas is speaking in this sense here. — But if they are taken in the second way, thus good is not the cause per accidens of the evil opposed to it, but of another evil: just as the goodness of fire is not the cause of the evil of fire, but the cause of the evil of water, and this also per accidens, as is said in the First Part, q. XLIX, a. 1, ad 2.

2. How, however, good is the cause of evil per accidens in natural things, he explains by setting forth a distinction. For in natural things this can be taken both on the part of the agent and on the part of the effect.

On the part of the agent, indeed, as when the agent suffers a defect of power, from which it follows that the action is defective and the effect deficient: as is clear in the weak power of a digesting organ. And because the agent acts both by power and by an instrument, the same judgment applies if the defect of action and effect arises from a defect of the instrument, as happens in limping. In this way, therefore, evil is caused per accidens on the part of the agent, insofar as the agent is of deficient power: because it is accidental to the agent, insofar as it is an agent, that it suffers a defect of power. And from this is verified what is said, evil does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: because evil does not follow from the agent except insofar as it is of deficient power, and according to this it is not efficient.

On the part of the effect, however, evil is caused per accidens both on the part of the matter of the effect and on the part of the form. On the part of the matter, when the matter is not disposed to receive the impression of the agent: as sometimes happens in monstrous births. This is not imputed to a defect of the agent, if it does not transmute undisposed matter to a perfect act: because every natural agent has a power determined according to the mode of its nature, namely for acting upon duly disposed matter. — On the part of the form of the effect, however, evil happens insofar as the privation of another form is necessarily conjoined to some form, and thus the corruption of one is conjoined to the generation of another. But this evil is not the evil of the effect intended by the agent, but of another.

III. Regarding the first mode per accidens, namely that which holds on the part of the agent, when it is said to be verified through that mode that evil has a deficient cause, but not an efficient one, it should be considered that for evil not to have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it proceeds from a cause in no way acting, but according as it ceases from action: in the way in which the sinking of a ship is said to arise from an absent sailor who does not act toward the conservation of the ship. And this sense is not intended here: because here the question is about evil conjoined to an action, or to a produced effect, according as it is referred to the cause of that effect to which it is conjoined; for it is evident that the cause of evil in this way is not a cause by not acting, but by causing the effect to which evil is conjoined.

In another way, that it proceeds indeed from an acting cause, but does not proceed from it according to that whereby it is efficient, that is, through the power by which it acts insofar as it is power and act, but insofar as it suffers a defect of power and thus is deficient in power. And this sense is intended. For this is to say nothing other than that the power by which the cause operates, as to that which it has of entity, is not the reason for the agent why evil follows in its action or in its effect: but the defect of power is the reason for it why that evil follows from it. So that power is indeed the form by which the agent produces the effect to which evil is conjoined: but the effect and operation do not have evil conjoined except because the power of acting underlies some evil and privation. And this is what St. Thomas meant when he said that evil does not follow from a cause except insofar as it is of deficient power, and according to this it is not efficient. For a defect is not the form through which an agent acts, but power: since, as he said above, if an agent were entirely lacking in power, it would not act at all.

It can also be understood in another way that evil does not have an efficient cause even per accidens. For it does not have one that reaches evil itself by its action. Because evil cannot terminate the action of any cause, namely so that through it it receives being: but it has a deficient cause, which, I say, because it has a defect of power, produces an effect to which evil is conjoined.

2. It should be noted, however, from the First Part, the place cited above ⁷, and De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, that the evil of another thing conjoined to the proper and per se effect of an agent is not reduced to some defect of the agent, but to the perfection of its power. For fire by its power intends to introduce the form of fire into matter; and because the corruption and privation of the form that preceded in the matter follows upon the introduction of its form, therefore it causes per accidens the privation and evil of the other form; and the more perfect the fire is in power, the more perfectly, in generating fire, does it corrupt its contrary. But the evil of the proper and per se effect is reduced to a defect of the power of the agent or of the matter, as was said ⁸. Nevertheless, although the cause of this evil is some defective good, a reduction must still be made to some prior cause that is not deficient, but perfect, as is clear in the generation of a monstrous birth: for an evil of this kind, when it arises on the part of the agent, is a defect of the power existing in the seed, and thus the seed, insofar as it is deficient, is per accidens the cause of monstrosity; but the cause of the defect of power in the seed is some altering agent inducing some quality contrary to the quality required for the good disposition of the seed. But the more perfect the power of this agent is, the more it induces this contrary quality and causes a greater defect in the seed. From which it is clear that the proximate agent of a deficient effect is a deficient agent; but the remote agent is a perfect and good agent.

3. But a doubt arises regarding the explanation that was made. For St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 8, says that evil simply, taken subjectively and denominatively, produces a corrupted effect not by acting, but by de-acting. Therefore the deficient good, which he calls the subject of evil simply, is the cause of the evil effect through cessation from action. The opposite of which was said ⁹.

It is answered that such a good being the cause of evil by de-acting can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it is the cause by in no way acting: and St. Thomas does not understand it in this way. In another way, by acting defectively, that is, by acting with an action lacking its due perfection: and he understands it in this way. For he explains himself in the same place, subjoining: that is, through a defect of active power. For it belongs to the action of the seed that it proceed from a complete power, and be productive of a complete effect. But this is deficient in the action from which a monstrous birth arises: because such an action does not have the perfection of being productive of a complete and perfect effect. And this belongs to it because it proceeds from a deficient power. And thus such an agent is said to be the cause of evil not by acting, but by de-acting, that is, not by acting perfectly, but imperfectly and deficiently. It is clear, however, that this does not contradict the determination that was made.

In the same way, adds St. Thomas ¹⁰, sin also happens in artificial things: namely, just as in natural things.

IV. In the second place he shows how good is the cause of evil per accidens also in moral matters ¹¹. And first, he shows whence the difficulty regarding this arises; second, he shows the truth ¹².

The difficulty is because moral vice does not seem to follow from a defect of power: for weakness of power either totally removes, or at least diminishes, moral vice, because it is necessary that moral vice be voluntary, not necessary. And therefore vice does not seem to be in moral matters in the same way as in natural matters.

It should be noted that moral vice and sin is not said to be anything unless it is voluntary. Therefore a defect entirely preceding the character of the voluntary cannot be the reason that something is a moral evil: because that which has a defect and is evil as proceeding from such a deficient cause is necessarily evil; just as that which proceeds from a defective natural power, insofar as it proceeds from it as it is deficient, is necessarily evil. And therefore, in order for there to be a moral evil, some voluntary defect must precede it, by reason of which the whole is said to be voluntary. On this account St. Thomas said that weakness of power either removes or diminishes moral vice, because such a vice is not voluntary, but necessary: and therefore it merits pardon, but not punishment. — How, however, weakness removes or diminishes the character of sin; similarly also ignorance, which is a defect of the apprehensive power; see in Qq. de Malo, q. III, a. 11; and Iª IIae, q. LXXIV, a. 5; and in other places.

V. In order to remove the aforesaid difficulty, however, St. Thomas does two things: first, he shows that the root and origin of moral sin is to be sought in the act of the will; second, he shows how that is on the part of the will ¹³.

As to the first, he says three things. The first is, that as to something evil is similarly in moral matters and in natural matters; and as to something dissimilarly. For as to this they are dissimilarly related, that in natural matters evil is considered in the action and in the produced effect: but in moral matters vice and evil is in the action alone, because the moral virtues are not productive, but active. — From this it follows that moral evil does not follow from the matter or form of the effect, but from the agent alone. And in this it is clearly assimilated to evil in natural matters: because in them some evil arises from a defect of the agent.

The second is, that there are four active principles in moral matters: namely, the executive power in the limbs; the will, which moves the executive power; the apprehensive power judging this to be good or evil, which are the objects of the will, by whose judgment the will is moved; and the apprehended thing, by which the apprehensive power is moved. And thus the first mover is the apprehended thing; the second, the apprehensive power; the third, the will; the fourth, the executive power.

The third is, that the act of the executive power presupposes moral good or evil: because exterior acts of this kind do not belong to morals except according as they proceed from the act of the will. And therefore a defect of this kind of power either totally excuses or diminishes moral vice. — The act also by which the apprehended thing moves the apprehensive power is immune from moral vice: because any object moves a potency according to the natural order. — The act also of the apprehensive power, considered in itself, lacks moral vice: since its defect, namely ignorance, either excuses or diminishes vice, just as weakness does. — It remains, therefore, that moral vice is found first and principally in the act of the will alone: and reasonably so, since an act is called moral because it is voluntary ¹⁴. And consequently the origin of the moral act is to be sought in it.

2. Regarding the first statement, it should be noted that the moral virtues are called active, not also productive, because they are not productive of some extrinsic effect, in the manner of arts, but are directive of operations that remain in the agent: for they produce a right intention and inclination toward the end, as is said in III Sent., d. XXXIII, q. 1, a. 1, quª 2, ad 2.

Regarding the third statement, it should be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. LVIII, a. 1; and III Sent., d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 4, quª 2, that mos, from which the moral virtues are named, signifies a natural or quasi-natural inclination to doing something. And because the inclination in us according to which it is in our power to act and not to act is the inclination of the will, therefore that act alone is properly called moral which is in some way voluntary: and as the act is related to being voluntary, so it is related to being moral. An act is voluntary in two ways, however: in one way, because it is freely elicited by the will, such as willing and choosing; in another way, because it is commanded by the will, but not elicited, such as walking and considering and the like. Therefore the acts that are elicited by the will are essentially called moral. But those that are commanded are moral as to use: for they are not moral according to their species as referred to their proper causes, since they are not acts elicited by the will; but they are moral insofar as they are commanded by the will, and thus participate in something of the voluntary. It follows therefore that, if acts of this kind are separated from the character of the voluntary, and compared only to the potencies from which they are elicited, they are not moral, and consequently in them there can be neither moral good nor moral evil. On account of this, therefore, St. Thomas said of the act of the executive power, and of the act of the apprehensive power considered in itself, that is, without respect had to the will, that in it there is no moral vice. For it is clear that they are not voluntary except according as they are commanded by the will. Therefore, if they are considered according to themselves, with no respect had to the will, moral evil cannot be in them.

VI. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas in Qq. de Malo, q. II, a. 3, holds that some exterior act is evil in itself, such as theft, murder, and the like. And in Iª IIae, q. XX, 1; and II Sent., d. XL, q. I, a. 3, he maintains that the exterior act has a proper goodness belonging to it from matter and circumstances. Therefore it is false that the act of the executive power presupposes moral good or evil, and that it is good only when the act of the will is good, but evil when the act of the will is evil.

It is answered, as can be gathered from the places cited above, and especially De Malo, the same question, art. 2, ad 6, that we can speak in two ways about the goodness or malice of an exterior act: namely, about natural goodness or malice, and about moral goodness or malice. If we speak of natural goodness or malice, then this belongs to an exterior human act in itself, and does not presuppose the act of the will. For since some act is called human insofar as it is according to reason, such an act receives its species from the object according as it is compared to reason: and it is called good if it is about due matter according to the rules of reason, such as feeding the hungry; but evil if it falls upon undue matter, such as stealing another's goods. — If, however, we speak of moral goodness or malice, thus, the will being set aside, the exterior act does not have goodness or malice, namely such that such an act is called fault or sin, or merit: since, as was said above ¹⁵, an act does not belong to mos except insofar as it is voluntary. — St. Thomas is speaking, therefore, in the places cited above, of the goodness or malice belonging to an act in the being of the nature of a human act: but not of moral goodness or malice, of which the discussion is here.

2. But against this reply seem to be the words of St. Thomas saying, De Malo, the same question, art. 3, that the character of evil and sin is found primordially in the exterior act according as it is in apprehension. But sin names an evil of mos. And thus it seems that even the evil of mos, the will being set aside, is in the exterior act.

It can be answered in two ways. First, that St. Thomas does not take the name sin as it signifies fault and demerit, but as every act lacking due perfection can be called a sin, even in natural things. And he seems to understand this when, explaining how such an evil act is primordially evil, he says that this is because it is not clothed with the due circumstances, and from this very fact that it is an evil act, that is, deprived of due mode, species, and order, it has the character of sin.

3. Second, it can be answered that the character of sin being found primordially in the exterior act according as it is in apprehension can be understood in two ways. In one way, that prior formally to the act of the will, it has the character of moral sin. And this sense is not true, nor intended there by St. Thomas, as the objection assumes. Which is evident because he subjoins in the same place that the character of fault and moral evil is completed according as the act of the will is added.

In another way, in that fundamentally and originally sin and guilt are in the apprehended exterior act before they are formally and completely in the act of the will. And this sense is true, and intended by St. Thomas. Because the natural evil of the exterior act, according as it is in apprehension, is compared to the will as an object, from which the will, freely accepting it, has it that it is formally and completely evil in its act. And thus the evil act itself is the foundation whence the act of the will tending into it has it that it is morally evil: for that act of the will is morally evil which is borne toward an evil object and one not regulated by reason. And it is similar to how we say that truth is fundamentally and originally in the thing, but that truth is formally in our intellect. For just as the being of a thing is called truth originally, not because truth is formally in the thing, but because the intellect is formally true from the fact that it is conformed in understanding to the being of the thing itself; so the exterior act, evil according to natural being, is called morally evil fundamentally and originally, because the act of the will, freely tending into it, has it that it is morally evil from the fact that it is borne toward that exterior act which is naturally evil. And just as a thing is not called formally true except by extrinsic denomination, namely because it is adequated to the intellect, which is formally true; so the exterior act, posited in act and in execution through the command of the will, is not called formally evil with moral malice except extrinsically, namely because it proceeds from an evil moral act of the will. And therefore in the same place St. Thomas adds that, if the act of sin is taken according as it is in the execution of the work, namely according as it is formally moral, primordially and primarily guilt is in the will.

It is clear therefore that the objection is not against the response that was given. For it proceeds as if St. Thomas intended, in the cited place, that the exterior act is formally evil in the moral genus prior to the act of the will. But we have shown that this was not his intention.

4. The objections from Scotus, in the second book, dist. xl, and from others, may be seen in Capreolus, in the Second Book, d. xlii. For many of them prove that the goodness of the exterior act in natural being is one thing, and its malice likewise another: which is conceded. But they do not prove that its moral goodness or malice is other than the goodness and malice of the act of the will.

VII. Having shown that the root of moral sin is to be taken in the act of the will, St. Thomas wishes further to show how this is ¹⁶. And first, he touches upon the difficulty that arises concerning this; second, he clarifies the thesis ¹⁷.

The difficulty is that, since a deficient act arises on account of a defect of an active principle, one must understand beforehand a defect in the will before a moral sin. Therefore, that defect will either be natural: and thus it will always adhere to the will, and the will in acting will always sin morally. Or it will be voluntary: and then it will be a moral sin; the cause of which will again have to be sought, and so on to infinity.

St. Thomas answers that a preexisting defect of this kind in the will is not natural, on account of the stated reason; nor casual or fortuitous, because then moral sin would not be in us, that is, in our power; but it is voluntary. But it is denied that it will then be a moral sin.

2. Toward the declaration of this, he says first, that the perfection of the virtue of any second active principle depends on a higher agent. And therefore, when an agent remains under the order of the first agent, it acts indefectibly: but when it is deflected from the order of the first agent, it fails in acting.

He says secondly that, since in the order of moral operations two principles precede the will, namely the apprehensive power and the apprehended object, which is the end; the proper motive of the will is reason and some determinate good, namely the good of reason; but not any apprehensive power whatever, or any good whatever. Therefore, when the will tends into an act moved by the apprehension of reason representing to it its proper good, the due action follows. But when it breaks forth into action at the apprehension of the sensitive apprehensive power, or of reason itself representing a good different from the proper good, moral sin follows in the action of the will.

It follows from these things that in the will a defect of order to reason and to the proper end precedes moral evil: as when, at the sudden apprehension of sense, the will is moved into what is delightful according to sense; or when reason, by reasoning, arrives at some good which is not good now or in this manner, and yet the will tends into it as into its proper good.

He says thirdly, that this defect of the will is voluntary: because it is in the power of the will to will and not to will; and similarly to consider or not consider the reason in act.

He says fourthly that this defect is not a moral evil: because, if reason does not consider, or considers any good whatever, there is not yet a sin, until the will tends into an undue end; which is already an act of the will.

He concludes lastly that, in moral matters just as in natural matters, evil is not caused by good except per accidens.

3. For the evidence of those things that are said here, it must be considered that a second cause does not act except according as it is moved by the first, and therefore the perfection of its virtue is according as it perfectly stands under the virtue of the first cause. But if it happens that the second cause fails in acting solely on account of a defect of the first cause, then the defect in the action of the second cause is not reduced to a defect of the second cause itself, but of the first: just as, when an imperfect and deficient movement occurs on account of a defect of the motive power, while the leg remains in its due disposition, the defect of walking is not reduced to a defect of the leg, but of the motive power alone. But if the second cause fails in acting because it is not perfectly subject to the first cause but is deflected from it, then the defect of the action is reduced to a defect of the second cause, not to a defect of the first: just as the limping of one possessing a perfect motive power is reduced to a defect of the leg not perfectly standing under the motive power. When therefore St. Thomas says that when an agent remains under the order of the first mover, it acts indefectibly, it is understood of a defect that must be reduced to a defect of the second cause itself, and ought to be imputed to it. Yet a defect could happen in the action of the second cause on account of a defect of the first cause: but then it would not be imputed to the second cause, the second cause itself remaining under the order of its prior cause, by which it has it to be moved as by its proper motive.

VIII. Concerning the defect which St. Thomas posits in the will as preceding the morally evil act, first it must be seen how it precedes in the will; second, how it is voluntary ¹⁸; third, how it is not a moral evil ¹⁹.

As to the first, it must be considered that a twofold defect of the will precedes a morally evil act. One is remote, from which the will has it that other defects can be in it and that it can fail in acting, namely being from nothing. But this defect does not suffice for moral evil to be in the will: because, since this defect is natural, and always accompanies the will, the will would always sin in acting. — The other is a proximate defect, namely not standing in act under its proper cause. And this defect is the proximate cause of an evil moral act, in the way in which a negation can be a cause, according to what was determined above ²⁰: for the will proceeding to operation with such a defect sins.

The first defect is never simply an evil of the will, since it is natural to it; and according to itself it precedes the morally evil act in duration. — But the second, when the will does not go forth into operation, does not have the nature of evil simply: because to stand under and to be moved by the apprehension and the proper good is not due to the will always, but only when it proceeds to operation; whence the fact that the will does not stand under apprehension or the proper good when it is not operating is not an evil of it simply. But when the will goes forth into operation not standing under the apprehension of reason or the good of reason, but following sensitive apprehension or enticed by a good that is not the good of reason, then such a defect is simply evil: because it is the privation of an order due to be in the will at that time. If therefore a defect of this kind is considered according as it is not simply evil, it thus precedes moral sin in duration: because it precedes the operating will. But if it is considered according as it is simply evil, it thus does not precede the evil act of the will in duration, but accompanies it. Yet according to reason, we understand the will to be moved by the apprehension of sense or by an undue good, and consequently to lack the due order to its proper motives, before it elicits the act: and thus such a defect precedes the evil act according to reason.

2. As to the second, it must be known that something can be called voluntary in two ways. In one way, because the will is borne into it as into a thing willed through its act: as healing is voluntary in the physician who wills to heal. In this way a defect of this kind is not called voluntary: since it is understood beforehand to every act of the will. — In another way that is called voluntary which is in the power of the will that it be or not be: as an act of the will freely elicited is called voluntary, not because the will wills it by another act, but because it is in the power of the will to produce it or not produce it. And in this way a defect of this kind is called voluntary. For it is in the power of the will to proceed to operation without such an order, or not to proceed: because it is not necessarily drawn by a good contrary to the good of reason, or moved by sensitive apprehension, but is free and disposed to either alternative. And therefore for a defect of this kind one need not seek any other cause than the freedom of the will, as is said in the Second Book, d. xxxiv²¹.

3. As to the third, it is said that a defect of this kind, according as it precedes the evil act in duration, is not a moral evil of the will: indeed, nor a natural one, as has been shown. — But according as it accompanies moral evil and is joined to it, it is thus a moral evil. Hence in De Malo, in the place cited before²², at 13, St. Thomas says that it receives the nature of guilt from this very fact, that the will applies itself to the work with such a defect: because then the good which is privated through a defect of this kind is due to the will and to its act. — But according as it is understood beforehand to the evil act and is considered per se, it thus also does not have the nature of an evil of guilt nor of punishment, just as neither when it precedes the evil act in duration.

When therefore St. Thomas says that a defect of this kind is not a moral evil, it must be understood as considered according to itself and absolutely: but not as it is conjoined with the evil act of the will.

IX. From those things which St. Thomas says here, it is clear that Scotus, in II Sent., d. xxxiv²³, when he argues that the defectibility of the will is not the ground of sinning for the will, does not attain to the mind of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas does not posit that the aptitude for failing is the proximate ground of sinning for the will: but the actual defect, namely when, not standing under the due order, it proceeds to operation.

Similarly when he argues²⁴ that an actual defect is not the cause of an evil of this kind, because then there would be a defect before the first defect of the will, it is evident that he does not follow the mind of St. Thomas. For he does not posit that that defect is morally evil according as it is understood beforehand to the evil act, as has been shown. Nor is it unsuitable, but rather necessary, that before the first morally evil defect there should be another defect not having the nature of moral evil.

Since it has been shown that the good is the accidental cause of evil, St. Thomas now shows in particular that it is its subjective cause ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the thesis; second, he infers a corollary, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that every evil is grounded in some good; second, he removes a doubt ².

1. It is argued therefore first as follows. Evil is not existing per se, since it does not have an essence. Therefore it is in some subject. Therefore it is in some good: because every subject, since it is a substance, is a good.

Someone, however, could deny the first consequence in this argument. For although evil does not have an essence, it is not necessary, however, that it be in a subject, since it is a negation and has no real esse.

But this response does not remove the argument. For one must speak in one way of simple negation, and in another way of privation, of which sort evil is when formally taken. For a simple negation, since it is said even of non-being, does not require any subject. But privation and evil is a negation concerning a determinate subject, and therefore it does not denominate anything except being. On this account, since evil is in things, as was shown above ³, and is not per se subsisting, it must be in another as in a subject; not indeed as a being or expressing some essence, but as a privation of perfection, in accordance with what was previously determined ⁴, insofar as it can truly be affirmed of something on account of the absence of the form from that subject.

2. Secondly. The subject of form is being in potency to the form. Which is a good: since potency and act are in the same genus. Therefore evil also is in the good as in a subject: since evil is a privation, while form and privation are in the same subject.

One could deny to this argument that being in potency is a good. Because, if it is called good from the fact that it is ordered to the good, by the same reason, since it is ordered to evil, namely to privation, of which it is receptive, it will be evil.

He answers: and it is said first that, as was said above ⁵, matter is ordered to the good per se, but to evil and privation per accidens: either, namely, insofar as it is receptive of a form in a losable manner, or because it is receptive of a form to which the privation of another form is joined. Therefore from its order to the good it is called a good; but from its order to evil it is not called evil.

It is said secondly, as was said above in chapter VI, that the privation of a form is not an evil of matter: because no determinate form is owed to matter, although it is receptive of all; but evil is called the privation of a form that is owed to be present.

3. Thirdly. Evil is so called because it harms. But it harms nothing except the good. Therefore it is in the good. — The consequence is evident. Because it would not harm the good formally unless it were in it. — But the minor is proved. Because to harm an evil is good, since the corruption of evil is good.

Concerning this proposition, Evil would not formally harm the good unless it were in the good, it should be noted that St. Thomas added the word formally because something harms in two ways, as is said in the Second Book, d. XXXV, a. 1, ad 3: namely formally, and this is the harm itself, or the very taking away or privation of the good; and effectively, and this is what causes the privation of the good. That which harms something actively, therefore, as such, is not in it as regards the proximate receptive subject of the harm; but that which formally harms certainly is.

4. Fourthly. Evil is caused by the good per accidens. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since every per accidens is reduced to what is per se and is grounded in it, it is necessary that along with evil, which is the per accidens effect of the good, there be some good which is the per se effect, in which the evil is grounded.

II. As to the second, St. Thomas removes a certain doubt ⁶. For at first glance it seems that evil is not in the good, since they are opposites. But he answers that, since good is said commonly, just as being is; just as it is not unfitting that non-being be in being, as privation in substance, so it is not unfitting that evil be in the good.

It is said nevertheless secondly that, just as non-being is not in the being opposed to it, but in another, as blindness is not in sight, but in an animal; so also evil is not in the good opposed to it, but in another; as moral evil is in the good of nature; and natural evil, which is the privation of form, is in matter, which is a good, as is also ⁷ being in potency.

III. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that good and evil can be considered in two ways. In one way, as to the common nature, so to speak, of each, according to precision from inferiors. And because in this way one totally removes the other, as directly opposed to it, one cannot be in the other. Hence if something were posited to exist as good per se, as the universal nature of the good, no evil could be in it: as is evident in God, who is goodness itself subsisting per se, in whom there is no evil. And if something were per se and universally evil, it would include no good. But because this cannot be, since evil expresses a negation of the good in a subject, on that account Aristotle says in Ethics IV ⁸ that it would destroy itself.

2. In another way, as to this particular good and evil. And then each of them can also be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the universal notions of good and evil preserved in them. And thus any evil is opposed to any good. And according to this Augustine says ⁹ that the rule of the dialecticians fails, which says that contraries cannot be together at the same time: because in this way evil is found in that to which the universal notion of good belongs. For since the good, universally taken, does not express some determinate perfection, but perfection in common, whatever perfection a thing has, it is called good. Similarly whatever perfection owed to it it lacks, it is called evil. And thus, on account of the amplitude of the notion of good and evil, it can happen that the same thing is good according to something, and evil according to something; and notions which, universally taken, are opposed, can be found together in the same subject with respect to diverse things; just as the same animal lacking sight is at once good and evil, good insofar as it is a being in act, evil insofar as it lacks perfection. On this account St. Thomas assigns as the reason why good and evil can be together, and one be grounded in the other, the very amplitude and unlimitedness of the good. — Nor does it follow that contradictories are true at the same time if the same thing is good and evil: because it is not according to the same thing, but according to diverse things that it is called good and evil.

In another way a particular good and evil can be considered according to their particular notions. And thus not every evil is opposed to every good directly, but to a determinate good: for injustice is opposed to justice, but not to temperance. And in this way evil is not in the opposed good, but in another good: for injustice is not in justice, but in the soul; nor is blindness in sight, but in the animal.

3. But a doubt arises. Because St. Thomas in the First Part, q. XLVIII, a. 3, ad 3, and in other places, seems to approve the opinion of Augustine who says that in good and evil the rule of the dialecticians fails; but in Questions on Evil, q. I, a. 2, ad 5, he says that the rule does not fail even in these according to truth, but according to a certain appearance, insofar as evil absolutely spoken and good seem to have opposition.

It can be said to this that both statements are true, but in diverse ways. For if in a particular good and evil only the universal notions of good and evil are considered, according to truth that rule fails: because then one of the opposites is in the other. For the common notion of the good, and the common notion of evil, are opposed notions: and therefore every evil, insofar as it is evil, is absolutely opposed to every good, insofar as it is absolutely good. If, however, the particular notions of good and evil are considered in them, thus the rule fails according to appearance only. For because in this particular good the universal notion of good is preserved, and in this particular evil the universal notion of evil, it seems that any evil, even according to its particular notion, is contrary to any good, as it is such a good, on account of the contrariety of good and evil in the universal; and thus, while this evil is in this good, it seems that one of the opposites is in the other. But it is not so: because not every evil is contrary to every good, if they are taken according to their particular notions; although according to the universal notions of good and evil they have opposition.

IV. Concerning that proposition, Natural evil, which is the privation of form, is in matter, which is a good, as is also being in potency ¹⁰, it should be considered that for matter to be a good as also being in potency can have a twofold sense. One is, that it is a good in potency, but not in act, just as it is not a being in act, but in potency. The other is that, just as it is a being in potency, so it is a good in act. And each sense is true as to something. For we can speak of the goodness of prime matter in two ways. In one way, of the goodness which it has from the form, while it is actually informed: and in this way it is not good except in potency while it lacks the form itself. In another way, of the goodness which it has from the very order to the form: and in this way it is something good in act in some way. For the order itself, and the aptitude itself to the good, is a certain good, by reason of the term which it regards. And everything ordered to the good, as such, has the notion of the good: hence useful things also fall under the division of the good. St. Thomas touched upon both senses in the First Part, q. V, a. 3, ad 3. But the first sense seems to be intended in this place, on account of the comparison to being in potency: hence in the First Part, in the question cited ¹¹, he expressly says that, just as it is being in potency, so also it is good in potency.

From the premises St. Thomas deduces as a corollary that, However much evil may be multiplied, it can never entirely destroy the good ¹. This he proves, because the subject of evil, which is good, must always remain.

I. But concerning this corollary he raises a doubt. For if from a finite thing something is taken away infinitely, it must at some time be consumed by being taken away. But by the intensification of evil to infinity the good, which is finite, is always diminished. Therefore the whole good will at some time be taken away by evil.

To this some respond by denying the major premise, when the subsequent taking away occurs according to the same proportion. For it is evident in the division of a continuum according to proportional parts, which proceeds to infinity, and yet the whole quantity is never consumed. Now, in this way, they say, the diminution of the good takes place.

But against this response St. Thomas argues thus. In the process of a division of this kind, what is subtracted later is always less: as is evident in the division of quantity. But in the diminution of the good through evil this can by no means happen. Both because, the more the good has been diminished by evil, the weaker it will be: and thus by a second evil it will be able to be diminished more; that is, from it not less, but more will be able to be taken away. And because the subsequent evil happens to be greater than or equal to the prior evil: and consequently it will take away either a greater or an equal good.

Note that St. Thomas, by these words, In the diminution of the good this can by no means happen, does not mean to posit the impossibility of the diminution of the good according to the same proportion, but only the non-necessity of such a division, as is evident in the First Part, q. xlviii, a. 4, ad 3. Hence the sense is that it can by no means be that in the diminution of the good the same proportion is always necessarily preserved: since it happens, either from the weakening of the good remaining after the subtraction, or from the equality or greater magnitude of the subsequent evil in the subsequent subtraction, that either more or an equal amount is subtracted.

II. St. Thomas therefore responds: and he says first, that evil indeed totally takes away the good to which it is opposed, but nevertheless the subject remains. And since this subject, inasmuch as it is a subject, has the character of good, according as it is in potency to the act of the good of which it is deprived by evil, the less it is in potency to that good, the less good it will be.

He says secondly, that it becomes less in potency to the form, not by the subtraction of any part of the subject itself or of its potency, but because by a contrary act it is impeded from being able to issue into the act of the form: just as a thing is so much the less potentially cold, the more heat is increased in it. And thus good is diminished by evil more by the addition of a contrary than by subtracting something from the good. For the more the good from which evil follows outside the intention of the agent is multiplied, the more the potency to the contrary good is diminished. And thus through evil the good is said to be diminished more: namely, inasmuch as through the good to which evil is joined, the potency of the subject to the good that is removed by evil—in which potentiality the goodness of the subject consists—is taken away more.

He says thirdly, that this diminution of the good in natural things cannot indeed proceed to infinity. Because neither the contrary form, nor the power of the contrary agent, can be increased to infinity: since natural forms and powers are determinate. — But in moral matters the diminution can proceed to infinity. Because the intellect also can proceed to infinity in understanding: a sign of which is that the mathematical species of numbers and figures are said to be infinite. Similarly, the will proceeds to infinity in willing: for one willing to commit a theft can also will to commit something else ² to infinity. And thus the good of natural aptitude can be diminished to infinity through moral evil: since the more the will tends toward undue ends, the more difficult it is for it to return to its proper and due end; as is evident in those in whom a habit of vices has already been induced through the custom of sinning. Never, however, is such an aptitude totally taken away, but it always accompanies nature.

From these things it is clear that the objection is null. Because it proceeds concerning a diminution that takes place by subtraction, but not concerning that which takes place by the addition of a contrary. And also because in natural things it is false that evil can be intensified to infinity through an addition of this kind, and the good be diminished to infinity.

2. Note that the further a potency is removed from act, and the less apt the subject is for receiving it, the more difficult it is to reduce it to act: as is evident in natural and artificial things. And therefore a sign of the removal of potency from act is the difficulty of reduction to act. On account of this, St. Thomas, wishing to show the diminution to infinity of the natural aptitude for the good through sin, adduces as a sign that the more the will tends toward undue ends, the more difficult it is for it to return to the due end. And since it can tend toward undue ends to infinity, just as the intellect can also understand diverse things to infinity, it follows that such difficulty can be increased to infinity; and consequently the potency can be removed from act to infinity, and the aptitude be diminished to infinity.

III. For the clarification of this response, it must be considered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, at the place cited; and II Sent., d. 34, a. 4; likewise in the Questions de Malo, q. ii, aa. 11 and 12; and Iª IIae, q. lxxxv, aa. 1 and 2, that the good is threefold: namely, that to which evil is opposed; the subject of evil; and the fitness of the subject itself for the good, which St. Thomas here calls the aptitude for the good. Evil therefore totally takes away the good to which it is opposed: just as blindness totally takes away sight. — But the entity of the subject it not only does not totally take away, but does not even diminish: just as blindness removes nothing from the substance of the eye. — But the fitness itself and aptitude of the subject for the good, which is potency to the reception of act, it indeed diminishes in the manner stated, namely by accompanying in the subject the form contrary to the good to which it is opposed and which it totally takes away, through which form the subject is impeded from receiving the opposite form: yet it does not totally take away the fitness itself, because, since it accompanies the substance and nature of the subject, while the nature of the subject remains, the fitness itself always remains. St. Thomas gives the example of the fitness of air for light, which, although it can be diminished to infinity by the interposition of an opaque body between it and the sun to infinity, is nevertheless never totally taken away while the air remains. If, however, there were something able to corrupt the subject, that, by corrupting the subject, would totally remove the fitness of the subject. Hence although, where the diminution of something occurs through the subtraction of parts, the finite must at last be totally consumed; yet where the diminution and remission occurs through the interposition of an impediment and obstacle, it is not necessary that the finite be at last consumed: for impediments can be applied to infinity, by which the potency and aptitude are further removed from act, and yet as to something the potency and aptitude always remain.

2. It must be considered secondly that, since the aforesaid fitness and aptitude for the good is understood as intermediate between the nature of the subject, in which it is founded as in a root, and the good toward which it tends; the diminution of fitness by the addition of an impediment is not understood as it holds on the part of the root, since by such an impediment the nature of the subject is not diminished; but it is understood as it tends toward the good; for by an addition of this kind it is impeded from reaching the good toward which it is ordered. Hence the more impediments are added, the more it is impeded and removed from act; which is for the aptitude and fitness or inclination toward the good to be diminished as it is considered on the part of the term itself.

Hence the objections of Durandus in the Second Book, d. xxxiv³, which proceed concerning the diminution of a fitness of this kind as it holds on the part of the subject, do not proceed against St. Thomas. For the diminution and intensification of fitness as it holds on the part of the term does not have to occur through something inhering in the subject: although perhaps this is required for its intensification and remission as it holds on the part of the subject.

Similarly, it is clear that the objections of Scotus in the thirty-fifth distinction of the Second Book⁴ do not proceed against this determination: because they proceed concerning the diminution that is by subtraction, but not concerning that which is by the addition of an impediment, and which is not per se, but through another.

IV. But a doubt occurs concerning what has been said. For we see that a blind man cannot naturally recover sight. Therefore there does not remain in him a natural fitness and aptitude for sight: because a natural aptitude can be reduced to act by a natural agent. Therefore evil totally takes away the aptitude of the subject for the good.

2. To this it is said first, that this is universally true: that, while the potency to some act remains, its fitness for the act, which is immediately founded in it, always remains, and when the potency is removed, it is removed: because it necessarily accompanies the potency itself. And because no privation, as such, takes away its subject or potency, since it determines that subject to itself as that in which it is in its own way; therefore no privation, and no evil, removes from its subject the fitness for the form immediately founded in it; although it may sometimes happen that by some agent the potency and the fitness are corrupted together.

3. It is said secondly, that although the blind man has totally lost the proximate aptitude for the act of seeing, which was founded in the visual power; nevertheless there remains in him an aptitude for the visual power, as is stated in de Malo, q. 2, a. 12, ad 3; and there remains also an aptitude for the act of seeing as in a root and remote foundation.

When it is proved because he cannot naturally recover sight: — it is said that this is not on account of a defect of aptitude; but because, as is stated in Iª II^ae, q. lxxxv, a. 2, ad 3, there is lacking a cause that can reduce that aptitude to act, by forming the organ that is required for seeing.

When, however, it is said that a natural aptitude can be reduced to act by a natural agent: — it is answered, as can be gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Third Book, d. I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, that certainly natural aptitude, considered absolutely according to its species, can be reduced to act by some natural agent: but it is not necessary that every singular aptitude be able to be reduced to act, because on account of some impediment it can happen that it cannot be reduced to act. And thus it is said that natural aptitude for sight, considered according to its species, can be reduced to act by a natural agent, for we see that through natural generation such an aptitude is fulfilled: but in him who is deprived of sight, it cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent on account of the impediment that supervened. For since it regards sight and blindness in a certain order, because namely it does not arrive at blindness except through sight; a return from it to sight cannot be made by a natural agent, because, when matter is related to diverse things according to an order, there cannot be a return from what is posterior to what is prior, as St. Thomas says in VIII Metaph.⁵, for the reason that there is a determinate mode of generation for every thing. Therefore, when blindness is posited in an animal, an impediment is posited against the fitness for sight being able to be reduced to act by a natural agent. — Nor does it stand in the way that sometimes a man is blind from birth: and thus it does not seem that matter always arrives at blindness through the visual power. For it is said that, although he does not then have the visual power beforehand, he nevertheless would have had it had it not been impeded. Hence just as one corrupting the eye is said to corrupt the sight existing in it, and the accompanying blindness is the corruption of the sight that preceded; so one causing an impediment or a contrary disposition to sight in the generation of an animal is said indirectly to corrupt the sight that would have been present had it not been impeded; and the accompanying blindness is the corruption of the sight that ought to have been present.