Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Second, Saint Thomas treats of the particular material object of the cognition of separate substance ¹.

I. And he puts forward this conclusion: By means of the likenesses of material things, separate substances know material things not only according to the account of genus or species, as our intellect does, but also according to the individuals themselves.

It is proved first. The likenesses of things in the intellect of a separate substance are more universal than in our intellect, and more efficacious for knowing something through them. Therefore, through the likenesses of material things they know not only material things according to the account of genus or species, as our intellect does, but also according to individuals.

The antecedent and the consequence are explained by the difference between the species of our intellect and the species of the intellect of a separate substance. * For those species, existing immaterially, are so contracted in power that one leads only to knowledge of one thing: namely, such that through the species of a genus the difference cannot be known, nor can an individual be known in its singularity through the likeness of a species. But through the likeness of the intellect of a separate substance, which is one and exists immaterially, not only what is of the nature of genus and species but also of the individual can be known through the intellect* ².

St. Thomas adds, moreover, that on this account it is not necessary for a likeness of this kind to be material; nor that there be infinite likenesses, according to the number of individuals.

2. Concerning what Saint Thomas says about the likeness of our intellect, * namely that, since it is immaterial and leads only to the cognition of one thing, it cannot lead to a cognition of the principles individuating*, it must be noted that he is speaking of perfect and distinct cognition. Of this indeed it is true that one species of our intellect does not lead to a cognition of several things formally distinct, such as genus and difference, or species and the material principles that individuate. Hence, speaking of this cognition: since the species has its esse in the intellect as altogether immaterial, it will be first and per se a likeness of what is immaterial, namely of the species or genus, which are abstracted from individual matter; and since, on account of its own contraction, it cannot represent several things formally distinct, it follows that it represents only the common nature, and not the individuating principles, which are formally distinct from the universal nature.

3. Concerning what is said, that the form by which a separate substance understands need not be material; nor that there be in it infinite species, even though it knows material individuals, which are infinite, it must be noted that Saint Thomas by this wishes to establish a dissimilarity between the species by which a separate substance knows singulars and the species by which we know them. For since we do not know singulars per se and directly except through sense, the species by which we know them must be sensible and subject to material conditions, and thus in some way material. But the species by which a separate substance knows singulars is not sensible but intelligible: and consequently it is immaterial, just as is the intellect which it perfects. — Likewise, the sensible species by which we know one singular is adequate to that singular: and therefore there must be multiplied in us species of known singulars according to their multitude. But the species of a separate substance by which it knows a singular is not adequate to that singular, but excels it: because one and the same species is primarily representative of the species, secondarily of the singulars. And so there is no need for the species of singulars to be multiplied according to the multitude of the singulars, so that they be infinite species as the singulars are infinite: since all things are understood by one and the same species.

From these things it is evident that Scotus's reasoning is vain, by which, in Book II, distinction III, last question ³, he argues that a separate substance cannot know singulars through innate species, because then it would have infinite species in act. For it is clear from these things that this in no way follows.

II. Second, ⁴. The human soul is lower in the order of nature than a separate substance, and it knows universals through intellect and singulars through sense. Therefore a separate substance, which is higher, will know both in a higher manner through one principle, namely through intellect. — The consequence is proved: because whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but more eminently.

III. Concerning this argument a doubt arises. For by means of it one could prove that our intellect knows singulars, just as is said of the separate substance. For just as the separate substance is superior to and higher than the human soul, so our intellect is a higher power than the senses. Therefore, if, because that substance is superior to the human soul, it knows universals and particulars through one power, whereas the soul knows them through diverse powers, then by the same reasoning, because the intellect is higher than the senses, it could know by itself all the things that are known through the several senses.

Nor does it avail if it be said that this proposition, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher power can do, is understood in this place of the nature of a higher thing complete in species, constituting another grade in the order of things; whereas our intellect is not a nature complete in itself in species, but is confined to that grade of things in which man also stands — this reply, I say, does not stand, for it is not the mind of St. Thomas. Because, in explaining that proposition, he makes it plain in the common sense, which apprehends the diverse genera of sensible things perceived by the five exterior senses. But it is manifest that the common sense is not more a nature complete in species than the intellect. Therefore, and so on.

IV. For the clarification of this point, it must first be considered that, since a power looks to two things, namely its operation and its object, the claim that the higher power can do whatever the lower can can be understood in two ways: either because it can act upon every object upon which the lower power can act; or because it can perform every operation and every mode of operation that are naturally suited to belong to the lower power. — Further, since an operation is a kind of mean between the power from which it proceeds and the object at which it terminates, and takes some mode from each of these, this may be understood either of the mode of operation proper to it as it stands on the side of the power, or of that which belongs to it as it stands on the side of the object.

It must be considered, second, that one power can be said to be superior to another in two ways: in one way, because it belongs to a higher order of things, as the power of a separate substance is superior to bodily power; in another way, because within the same order of things it holds a higher degree, as the interior sensitive power is superior to the exterior sensitive power.

It is said, therefore, first that, with respect to the objects, it is universally true that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do—whether it be of a higher order or merely of a higher degree—provided they are directly subordinated according to the same rationale. This is evident in the case of those of a higher degree alone, from the fact that we see this in the common sense with respect to the particular senses; but in the case of those of a higher order, it is evident from the comparison of the angelic intellect to sense, as is shown here: for into all things in which a particular sense can act, the common sense can act; and into all things in which sense can act, the angelic intellect can act.

It is said secondly, that every operation which an inferior virtue has, a superior virtue also has, unless it is accompanied by some imperfection that does not befit the superior, as was shown above ⁵

It is said thirdly that, with respect to the mode of operation as it stands on the side of the power, it is universally true also that however an inferior power can operate, a superior power can operate in the same way, or in a more excellent mode. This is evident: because such a mode of operating follows the mode of being of the one operating.

It is said fourth that, with respect to the mode of operation considered on the side of the object, a virtue of the higher order can operate in a more noble way, a way that includes eminently the less noble mode. But a virtue of a higher degree only can operate in the same manner, yet it is not necessary that it operate in a more noble way. — The first is evident in an angel, who knows material singulars not only with respect to their extrinsic accidents, in the way sense knows them, but also with respect to their intrinsic essence. — The second is likewise evident in the common sense, which knows of singulars only their accidents, just as does the exterior sense, but not their quiddity.

Therefore, when it is said here that whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can do, but more eminently, two things are meant to be understood: that it can act upon all the objects upon which the inferior power can act; and that it can do so in a nobler manner of operation.

V. With these points premised, it is said in reply to the first doubt that the reason here adduced proves very well that a separate substance can know singulars, and in a more excellent manner than our soul does through sense, both on the part of the knower and on the part of the thing known. For it knows them unitedly and immaterially, whereas our soul knows them through the senses dividedly and materially. And it knows them not only with respect to their extrinsic accidents, as sense does, but also with respect to their essence, which is intrinsic: inasmuch as the species by which it understands represent the thing with respect to its essence and with respect to its principles of individuation, just as the divine essence, from which they flow forth, is their cause with respect to both.

It is said secondly, that indeed by this argument it can also be proved that our intellect, considered absolutely—that is, with respect to its own nature—through abstraction from this or that mode of being, can know material singulars directly with respect to their singularity. For Saint Thomas shows in the Prima, q. 89, a. 4, and in De Veritate, q. 19, a. 2, that our soul, when separated, knows singulars.

It is said thirdly, that nevertheless by this argument it cannot be proved that our intellect, when joined to the body, knows singulars both directly and with respect to their singularity. For the argument does not hold: Our intellect, considered absolutely according to its nature, can know singulars, as being superior to sense; Therefore, when joined to the body, it can do this.

It is said fourth, that by this very thing it can be well proved that it can know them in some way: namely, as regards their singularity, indirectly; but as regards their quiddity, directly. Which is to know them in a more excellent manner than the senses do, which know only their extrinsic accidents. Hence St. Thomas in the Prima, q. 86, a. 1, when he had proved with this argument that our intellect knows singulars — namely, that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do — replying to the fourth objection on its false part, answers that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but in a more eminent manner, and that the intellect knows more eminently what the senses know. In like manner, answering this argument in the Verit., q. 10, a. 5, ad 5, he says that whatever a lower power can do, a higher power can do, yet not always in the same way, but sometimes in another and loftier way; and that the intellect knows singulars in a loftier way than the senses do, since it penetrates to the very nature of the species which is in individuals, whereas the latter knows individuals only as regards their material dispositions and exterior accidents.

From these things it is evident that by that proposition, Whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can do, it can also be concluded concerning our intellect that in some way it can know material singulars. But something was said about this proposition also in the first book, chapter LXIV ⁶.

Third ⁷. The species of the intellect of a separate substance regard the whole thing, namely the principles of the species and the individuating principles. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because it receives them not by the way of resolution and abstraction from material conditions, as our intellect does; but as it were by the way of composition, through its assimilation to the first intelligible species of the divine intellect, which is not abstracted from things, but is their maker both with respect to form and with respect to matter, which is the principle of individuation.

It must be noted that for intelligible species to arrive at the intellect of a separate substance by way of composition is for them to represent to that intellect the quiddity together with a composition toward individuating accidents: just as the intelligible form of the divine intellect is productive of the quiddity with such a composition. The intelligible species of our intellect, however, arrive by way of resolution: because, although they are caused by a thing composed and united to individual accidents, they nevertheless represent the bare quiddity itself, and not it concreted to individuating accidents. — Yet Saint Thomas adds, as it were: so as to show that there is there a certain likeness of composition, but not true composition. For, just as in the divine essence material quiddity and accidents are contained in unity, yet do not there make a true composition, but are contained in one simple productive power of both; so in the intelligible species of a separate substance they are contained in unity, inasmuch as it, being one, represents both the quiddity and the accidents; yet they do not make a true composition in it.

VII. To this argument Scotus replies, in Book II, distinction III, last question ⁸, with two points. First, that even if it is granted that things flow from God both as to matter and as to form, it does not follow: Therefore they flow into the intellect of the separate substance as regards the cognition of singularity; especially since, according to Saint Thomas, matter pertains to what a thing is.

Second, he says that to argue—since the divine essence is the ratio of knowing both singular and universal—that therefore also the species infused into the mind of a separate substance is that ratio of knowing is to commit the fallacy of accident, proceeding affirmatively from what is more perfect to what is less perfect.

2. To the first of these it is said first that that consequence holds most excellently. For since, according to Augustine ⁹, things proceed to a twofold esse, namely, according to material esse in themselves, and according to intentional esse in the mind of a separate substance; just as in natural esse they have matter and form from God, so it follows that they also have these in the intentional and representative esse in the mind of a separate substance; otherwise not the whole thing produced by God in the esse of nature would be produced in intentional esse in the separate substance. And because cognition occurs through the representation of an intelligible form, therefore it follows that the separate substance knows both the matter and the form of things, which is to know singulars in their singularity.

Nor is it an obstacle that, according to Saint Thomas, matter pertains to the quod quid est, from which it seems that even a separate substance, although it knows matter, need not know the singular in its singularity. For it is said that, although Saint Thomas holds common matter to be of the essence of quiddity, he does not hold this of individual matter, of which we speak when we say that God is the cause of a thing not only with respect to its form but also with respect to its matter, and that a separate substance knows a thing with respect to its matter and with respect to its form. For thus to cause a thing with respect to its matter and form is to cause it with respect to its very singularity; and to know it with respect to its matter is to know it with respect to its very singularity.

3. To the second it is said that no fallacy is committed when one argues affirmatively from the more perfect to the less perfect, in those cases where the less perfect has been derived from the more perfect as from its exemplar. For what belongs to the exemplar insofar as it is the ratio of something exemplated must also belong to the exemplated thing, insofar as it is such: for the figure of Hercules which is exemplated by his image, insofar as it is his image, must be assimilated to Hercules, just as his image is assimilated to him. Since therefore the species existing in the mind of a separate substance, as is said in II Sent., d. III, q. ult., a. 3 ¹⁰, are exemplated from the proper ideas of things insofar as they are their own proper rationes; and those ideas represent things with respect to their singularity: it is necessary that the species themselves also represent things with respect to their singularity.

VIII. Fourth. Among the philosophers, the heavenly bodies are moved by separate substances. Therefore separate substances know the mobile thing which they move, and the positions that are renewed through motion, which are certain singulars. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved: because they act and move through intellect.

IX. The aforesaid conclusion ¹¹ As to the part of this claim which holds that separate substances know singulars, Scotus also holds it, in Book II, distinction III and distinction IX. But as to the other part, namely that one and the same species is representative both of the quiddity and of all its singulars in the angelic mind, he objects.

And he argues thus first ¹². Because it would follow that such a species would be infinite. For where numerical plurality implies greater perfection, numerical infinity implies infinite perfection. Now it is so with representative forms that the power to represent more things implies greater perfection. Therefore the power to represent infinitely many things distinctly implies infinite perfection in the representing form.

Second ¹³. A representing ratio that is uniform in itself and in the intellect does not represent something in a non-uniform way. Therefore this one ratio that is posited will either represent at once opposites pertaining to the existences of things naturally: and then it will always represent opposites, and so it will understand opposites, and consequently nothing. Or it will represent one of them determinately: and thus it will never represent the other. If, therefore, it ever has a certain and determinate cognition of one of the opposites with respect to existence, it will never by the same ratio have a determinate and certain knowledge of the other opposite.

He also adduces certain other arguments, by which he proves that the universal, as known, is not the means of knowing the singular distinctly. — But since we do not say this, but only that the same species which is representative of the nature is also representative of singulars, and that by one species a separate substance knows both the universal and singulars, therefore we need not respond to those otherwise.

2. Aureolus also, as reported by Capreolus in the place cited above ¹⁴, argues against the said conclusion ¹⁵. First thus: and the argument seems to be taken from Averroes, III de Anima, comment. 22 and 23. The universal and the singular are different intentions and different objects. Therefore they require different powers. Therefore a separate substance cannot apprehend the universal and the particular through one power, which is the intellect.

Second, ¹⁶. The singular species represents the singular in a quantitative and material manner, namely as this here and now. But such things are repugnant to the intellect. Therefore, and so on.

X. To the first argument of Scotus it is replied, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in Verit., q. xx, a. 4, ad 1, that it is not unfitting for some species to be infinite secundum quid yet finite simpliciter. For just as infinitely many individuals of one species are finite secundum speciem, insofar as they belong to one determinate species, so a representative species of infinitely many individuals is finite simpliciter, because it is determined to one species; but it is infinite secundum quid, insofar as it is representative of infinitely many individuals contained under one species.

2. To the second, some respond ¹⁷ that this presupposes something false, namely, that the species in the mind of a separate substance represents the duration of a contingent conjunction as a thing represented. But this is false.

For in Saint Thomas, such a species indeed represents the universal nature and the particular, and their conjunction with existence in the nature of things, and with any other esse, whether accidental or natural: but it does not represent the duration of such conjunctions as a represented thing; rather, the duration itself is like a condition without which that conjunction is not represented. This can be inferred from the fact that we firmly believe separate substances do not know future contingents. But if there were implanted within it a likeness of my sitting tomorrow, it would evidently foreknow that sitting is to be conjoined to me tomorrow.

But this response does not seem to me to accord with the mind of St. Thomas; rather, it falsely assumes, namely, that the duration of a contingent conjunction is not a thing represented by the species of the separate substance, but only a condition of the thing represented without which it is not represented. This does not seem so, for two reasons. First, because in his view the species existing in the separate substance represent singulars and all the accidents that are in singulars, as is clear in Verit., q. viii, a. 11, ad 9. But in singulars there is not only contingent conjunction but also the very "when," which pertains to duration, just as the very "where" is in them: according to the opinion that holds that "where" is distinct from place and "when" from time. Therefore etc. — Second. In St. Thomas's view, separate substances know of singulars whatever we know through composition and discourse by simple intuition ¹⁸. But we know composition and the duration of a contingent conjunction by composing, when we know how to measure the sitting of Socrates by present time. Therefore a separate substance knows the same much more. Therefore the duration of such a conjunction is a thing represented to it by species.

Those who think this way, however, seem to be deceived, because they wish to measure our knowledge of a separate substance against our sensitive cognition, so that just as our sight does not see the duration of the visible object, but duration is present as a condition without which the visible would not move the sense nor terminate vision, so it might be with the intellect regarding a separate substance. But this is most false. For those species represent singulars and all their conditions far more perfectly than do species received in the senses. — Nor does it follow that if such a duration of composition were represented by species, separate substances would know future things. For composition is not known, nor its duration, except when it is in act: not when it is future.

3. To Scotus's argument, therefore, a different reply is given. It is said, first, that the antecedent can be understood in two ways: the phrase to represent in a non-uniform way can be taken either on the side of the representing thing or on the side of the thing represented. For if it is taken on the side of the representing thing, then the antecedent is most true. For if the ratio is uniform in itself and in the intellect, it is clear that it does not represent in a non-uniform way on account of its own manifoldness. But then the conclusion does not follow. — If, however, it is taken on the side of the thing represented, then the antecedent itself is false. For a single ratio, remaining the same in itself and in no way altered with respect to anything absolute, can represent something in a non-uniform way because of the non-uniformity and change of the thing represented, from which change the thing has it that now it is assimilated to the intelligible species which is in the separate substance in one way, and now in another. For as was said above, chapter XCVI ¹⁹, a singular does not have actual assimilation to species of this kind except when it is in act. Likewise, it is not assimilated to it according to some condition except when it actually stands under that condition.

It is said secondly that, if we speak of potential or fundamental representation, then those species, pertaining to the existence of things under this or that accidental condition, naturally represent them in such a way that there is simultaneity of the power, but not a power of simultaneity. For they are by nature apt, as far as they are concerned, to represent the thing under the existence of one such accidental condition and under the existence of its opposite successively, according as the singular itself is at one time under one of the opposites and at another time under the other. — But if we speak of actual representation, then, given the existence of the singular thing, it determinately represents one of the opposites, namely that which is in act, speaking of the conditions or accidents of the individual. And when it is argued, therefore it will not represent the other, the consequence is denied: for just as it naturally represents this condition of the individual while it is in act, so it naturally represents the opposite condition of the existing singular while it is in act. — But speaking of the existence of the singular absolutely, it is said that it naturally represents that very esse while it exists, and never represents its opposite: because, as was said, it does not actually represent a singular that does not actually exist.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that when we say the species does not represent a non-existing singular, we are speaking of a future singular, namely one that never was; for such a one never had an actual assimilation to the species, and therefore, as long as it is future, it is not represented. But concerning a singular that is already past, it is true that the species represents it, even after it has passed, under non-actual existence: because it did have an actual assimilation to the species. Hence first the species represents the actual existence of the existing singular, and then its non-existence, after it has ceased to be—on account of the variation of the singular alone, however, not on account of any variation in the species, except according to diverse relations.

XI. To the first argument of Aureol ²⁰, the antecedent is denied: speaking of the formal diversity of objects insofar as they are objects, as they are referred to a separate substance. For by comparison to the powers of the soul which they move, the universal and the particular are formally distinct objects, on account of the different mode of immutation, namely universal and particular; and therefore they require different powers. But in relation to the separate substance, whose mover they are not, they are only materially distinct objects. Therefore they can be apprehended by one single intellective power.

To the second, it is said that "to represent in a quantitative mode" can be understood in two ways. In one way, on the side of the representing thing. And thus the major is denied, if it is taken universally: for it is true only of the singular individual material species adequate to its object; such is not the species of a separate intellect. — In another way, on the side of the thing represented. And thus the minor is false. For some intelligible species, existing wholly immaterially on the part of itself, can represent a material thing having a quantitative mode. — For the rest, see Capreolus.