Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas had determined the question of the cognition of separate substance with respect to the act, he now determines it with respect to the object itself ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he treats of the objects known; second, of their simultaneity in the intellect and in cognition, in the last chapter. In regard to the first he does two things: first, he treats of the immaterial object; second, of the material object, in the following chapter.

On the first point he does three things: first, he shows that every separate substance understands both itself and the other separate substances; second, he treats of the manner in which it understands itself ²; third, of the manner in which it understands the others ³.

I. As to the first, he shows that every separate substance understands both itself and the other separate substances. And he argues thus. Separate substances are per se actually intelligible. Therefore separate substances understand, as their proper objects, separate substances. Therefore each knows both itself and the others. — The antecedent is proved: because immunity from matter makes something per se intelligible. — The first consequence is also proved: because it was shown above that separate substances understand those things that are per se intelligible, namely as connatural and proportionate objects.

II. As to the second ⁴, the manner is shown in which a separate substance understands itself. And this conclusion is laid down: A separate substance understands itself through itself, and not through a species of another thing. This is explained by comparison with the possible intellect. For the possible intellect does not understand itself through itself, but through an intelligible species, by which it comes to be actually in intelligible esse: because it stands as potency with respect to intelligible esse, and it comes to be actual through an intelligible species, just as matter comes to be actual in sensible esse through a natural form; but nothing is known according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act. Similarly, a cognitive power comes to be actually knowing through some species: on account of which it is said in III de Anima, text 15, that it is knowable just as other things are, namely through species received from phantasms. Separate substances, however, are by their very nature as actually existing in intelligible esse.

III. Concerning what is said here, doubt is raised in several ways. First, concerning the possible intellect, it is argued that it knows itself through its essence, not through species abstracted from phantasms. For Saint Thomas, in the First Part, question 89, article 2, holds that the separated soul knows itself through its own essence. But the nature of the separated soul and of the soul joined to the body is one and the same. Therefore the soul joined to the body can also know itself through its essence.

Second, a doubt is raised concerning the conclusion itself ⁵. Because Saint Thomas, in the Third book of this work, chapter 51, posits a difference between the divine essence and the essence of a separate substance: for the divine essence can be the intelligible species of an intellect, but not the essence of a separate substance. But it could not understand itself through itself unless its essence were the species of its own intellect. Therefore etc.

IV. To make the first doubt evident, it must be considered that the whole reason why the possible intellect, and consequently also the intellective soul, which understands through it, does not know itself through its essence but through species received from phantasms is here assigned to be that it is a potency in the genus of intelligibles. Therefore, if this must be removed from the soul—namely, that it knows itself from phantasms and not through its essence—it is necessary that there be removed from it that complete potentiality by which it is called pure potency in the genus of intelligibles; for when the total and sufficient cause remains, the effect must remain.

2. It must be known, therefore, first of all that the intellective soul, according to its substance, is a certain mean between the separate substances and material things: for it communicates with material things insofar as it is a form giving esse to matter, and part of a material composite; but with the separate substances insofar as it is an immaterial substance subsisting through itself, not dependent on matter. And therefore there can belong to it a twofold mode of being, namely by union with matter, and with separation from matter: by one of which it has kinship with material things, by the other with immaterial subsisting things. Hence, when joined, inasmuch as it is such, it belongs to the order of material things; when separated, however, it belongs to the order of immaterial things. Therefore concerning it insofar as it is joined, we must speak as we do of material forms; but insofar as it is separated, as we do of immaterial things.

3. It must be known, secondly, that material things, according to the esse they have in particular matter, are not actually intelligible objectively, but only in potency: for nothing is actually intelligible unless it is separate from matter. Therefore the soul itself, too, as joined to matter, will not be actually intelligible in the manner of an object, since it is not able first and of itself to terminate the act of understanding and to perfect the intellect itself, but only in potency.

The intellect, however, is said to be in potency in a different way than other material things. For material things are potentially intelligible in such a way that they belong to the genus of intelligibles only in remote potency: for the order of intelligibles is the order of immaterial things, namely those which are neither composed of matter and form nor dependent on matter in their esse. Likewise, material things are made actually intelligible simply by the intellect itself, which receives its cognition from sensible things, and they are in potency to actualizing the intellect through themselves—not indeed through the reception of some form, but through separation and purification from matter and material conditions. But the intellective soul, when conjoined, is potentially intelligible in such a way that it nevertheless belongs to the order of intelligibles according to its substance, since it is neither composed of matter and form nor dependent on matter in its esse, but subsists. Similarly, it is not reduced to act in the genus of intelligibles through purification from matter in its esse, as happens when it is separated; rather, through the reception of an intelligible form, just as matter becomes actual in the genus of being through the reception of a substantial form. It is also in pure potency as intellective, because it cannot understand in act unless it is brought into act through an intelligible species received from things, since from the beginning of its creation it has no intelligible species congenital to it; yet the intelligible species is that by which the intellect becomes actually able to understand proximately. This indeed befits it because it holds the lowest grade in the genus of intelligibles, just as prime matter does in the genus of being.

But separate substances, and their intellects, are by their own nature actually intelligible: because they subsist without matter, which is an impediment to knowability. And therefore they have intelligible species congenital to them, by which their intellects are actualized. They also have it that, of themselves, with no other principal agent or object intervening, they can inform an intellect, either by their own essence, or by their own species in a proportionate intellect, if it is not informed by their species by nature: for material things are not made actually intelligible by the action of the agent intellect on any other account than that they are made immaterial.

Therefore the soul also, insofar as it is separate from the body, as subsisting without matter, will be intelligible in act, since it is able of itself to actualize and terminate the intellect's action of understanding; for even material natures themselves, insofar as they are separated from individual matter by the agent intellect, are intelligible in act.

From these things it follows that, just as the conjoined soul cannot know itself through its essence, because it is not actually intelligible objectively in itself, but, holding the lowest grade in the order of immaterial things, is pure potency in the genus of intelligible objects: so too, because it is actually knowable objectively when separated, it can, existing as separate, know its own essence through itself.

4. But if it is asked why, since both separate esse and joined esse belong to the soul, and according to the one it is intelligible in act while according to the other it is intelligible in potency, St. Thomas says absolutely that it is in the genus of intelligibles as a potency — the answer is that the reason for this is that to be united to a body, as we showed above ⁶, is natural to it, whereas to have separate esse is beyond its nature. Therefore, just as we say absolutely that it is the act of the body and that its nature is to be united to the body, so too we attribute to it absolutely that which accompanies it as united to the body, namely being a potency in the genus of intelligibles, and we say this belongs to it by nature; but being intelligible in act, which accompanies it insofar as it is separate, we do not attribute to it simply, but with this qualification, insofar as it is separate, and we say this belongs to it beyond its nature, just as does its being separate. Thus, therefore, insofar as it subsists in act in the genus of beings — not however as composed of act and potency, nor as dependent on matter in its esse — it has that it is contained in act in the genus of intelligibles; but insofar as it has esse united to matter, it has that it is in that genus of intelligibles as a potency, but not as an act nor as possessing an act.

5. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas, as was evident. For although the nature of the separate soul and of the conjoined soul is the same, taking nature for the essence and substance of the thing, yet the mode of being is different. And therefore it has a different mode of intelligibility.

V. For the clarification of the second doubt ⁷, it must be considered, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas Verit., q. VIII, a. 6, ad 2 and 6, that, since the essence of a separate substance and its intellect are in a twofold genus, namely in the genus of being and in the genus of the intelligible, a twofold order between them can be considered: namely, the order in the genus of beings, and the order in the genus of intelligibles. If they are considered as they are in the genus of beings, then the intellect is in the essence as an accident in its subject, and as a power in the substance of which it is the power. If, however, they are considered as they are in the genus of intelligibles, then the order is the reverse: for the essence is related to the intellect as act to potency, and as the intelligible species to the understanding power; not indeed as a species inhering in it, but as a species subsisting in itself, yet making one with the intellect in the esse of intelligibility for the act of understanding.

It must be noted, however, that although the essence does not inhere in the intellect as a form giving esse to it, in the way in which the intelligible species of our intellect gives esse to the intellect, there is nevertheless a greater union between them than if it were an intelligible species. For the intelligible species does not give to the intellective power the power of understanding, which belongs to it insofar as it is a power; rather, it actualizes and perfects a preexisting power. But the essence of a separate substance gives to its intellect every power that it has and sustains it, so that the intellect itself naturally accompanies the essence. Therefore it is not surprising if it can be the form of that intellect in intelligible esse, that is, the formal principle from which intellection is elicited, even though it does not give esse to it by way of inherence. For an intelligible species is required only so that the intellect and the intelligible may be united: and since this cannot happen in other objects through the presence of their own substance in the intellect, it must come about through an inhering likeness. But between the essence of an angel and its intellect there is a far greater union than between the intellect and an inhering intelligible species. Therefore the essence itself, acting of itself, will be able to take the place of the intelligible species for its own cognition, perfecting its own intellect in intelligible esse without accidental inherence, so that from the essence itself and the intellect there comes to be one thing in intelligible esse, but not in the esse of nature, which the essence would formally give to the intellect.

2. From these things it is clear that the arguments of Scotus are vain, in Book II of the Sentences, distinction III, question VIII ⁸, by which he strives to prove that the presence of the angel's essence to the intellect cannot be for that intellect the reason of understanding, because nothing can act by means of that which is separate from itself.

For it is said first that its substance is not separate from the intellect itself. Then, because it is united to it in intelligible esse. — Then, because the essence is the foundation and root of the intelligible power; and to it the intellect naturally follows, as having from it all its esse in the genus of material, final, and efficient cause, as Saint Thomas says of the soul and its powers ⁹.

It is said second that, since the intellectual substance and its intellect are not related as two agents, but as one, of which the first is that which acts and the other that by which it acts proximately—for the first and principal intelliger is the intellectual substance itself, while the intellect is the power by which it understands—the union of the object with the intelliger required for intellection, if it occurs with the substance of the intelligent being through identity, is greater and more efficacious for intellection than if it occurred through the information of the intellect by an intelligible species; for what is really identical with the intelliger is more one with it than what informs its intellect accidentally. And therefore, if the intelligent substance understands itself through itself, it does not understand through anything separate from itself, but through that which is more one with it than if it were united to it through information—although it is not united to its intellect in the manner of an inherent form, but only in the manner of an intelligible form, namely insofar as it is the principle by which it understands. — How that by which something acts must be its form was shown above, chapter LIX.

3. To what is objected on the opposite side ¹⁰, it is answered that Saint Thomas speaks in the third book of the essence of a separate substance in relation to extrinsic intellects, but not in relation to its own intellect, with which it has the greatest union. For a separate substance cannot be the form of an extrinsic intellect in intelligible being, because it has no other union with an extrinsic intellect; and it is not of itself act alone in intelligible being, as is the divine essence. But with respect to its own intellect, because of their natural union with each other, that condition—namely, not being act alone in intelligible being—does not prevent it from being able to be its form in intelligible being; for it has that for which a species is posited in the intellect, namely union with the one understanding.

VI. As to the third principal question ¹¹, it is shown how one separate substance stands in relation to understanding another. Concerning this he does three things: first, he raises a doubt; second, he recounts a certain opinion and rejects it ¹²; third, he determines the truth ¹³.

First, then, this doubt moves us. Separate substances differ from one another according to species, and one is like another according to the common nature of the genus. But all cognition comes about insofar as there is in the knower a likeness of the thing known. Therefore one does not know another except with respect to the common account of the genus.

VII. Second, he reports a certain false answer ¹⁴. For some said that, because one separate substance is the efficient cause of another by way of equivocal causation, in which the likeness of the effect exists in a more eminent mode, while conversely in the effect there is a likeness of the cause itself in an inferior mode: the lower separate substance knows the higher according to the mode of the knowing substance, but not according to the mode of the substance known, rather in an inferior mode; while the higher knows the lower in a more eminent mode.

This view, however, seems to be favored by the fact that in the Book of Causes it is said that the intellect knows what is beneath itself and what is above itself through the mode of its own substance, because one is the cause of the other.

2. But this opinion, says St. Thomas, cannot stand. First, because separate substances cannot be produced except by creation. But it belongs to God alone to create. — Second, because the principal parts of the universe, such as separate substances are, were all created immediately by God, as was shown above.

He adds that this mode can be preserved among the separate substances and God: namely, that each knows God by natural cognition, according to the manner of its own substance, insofar as it is assimilated to Him as to its cause; while God knows them as their proper cause, having in Himself the likeness of all things. But in this way one substance cannot know another, since one is not the cause of another.

VIII. For the clarification of this point, it must be known that, although a separate substance knows both God and itself by natural cognition through its own substance, this nevertheless occurs in different ways. For through its essence it knows itself most perfectly and quidditatively: because that substance is by nature apt to produce of itself the most perfect cognition, and is the ratio cognoscendi for its intellect, to which it is united by way of intelligible species, according to the whole of its power. But through that same essence it does not know God quidditatively: because the essence of a separate substance represents God only as a deficient and inadequate effect represents its cause; but a deficient and inadequate effect does not represent its cause quidditatively. Yet nevertheless, because it is the most perfect effect of God among creatures, even through its own essence it knows Him in a more perfect manner than we know Him from sensible things: for the more perfect an effect is, the more similar it is to its cause and the more it leads into knowledge of it.

It must be noted, however, that God is known by us from sensible things in a different way than by a separate substance through its essence. For sensible things, which are certain likenesses of God, are not in our intellect according to their essences, so that they could be of themselves reasons for the intellect to understand God. Nor do the intelligible species of those things themselves, although they are in some way a likeness of God, constitute the intellect itself in intelligible esse with respect to God himself: for they are apt to represent to the intellect immediately only that from which they were proximately caused, namely the nature latent in the phantasm. Hence it comes about that we know God through sensible things not by way of simple intuition, but by a certain discourse and inquiry, arriving at knowledge of God through argumentations drawn from our knowledge of them. — Separate substances, however, because they are actually intelligible in themselves and are united to their own intellects through themselves after the manner of intelligible species, are therefore for their intellect a reason for knowing God, whose immediate likenesses they are, as the noblest effects produced by him immediately. And therefore through their essences they know God not only in the way one thing known is known in another thing known, but also as represented immediately through intelligible species, though imperfectly. Likewise they know him not by discourse or argumentative inquiry when they see their own essences, or when they gaze upon him from their essences as from intelligible species, as Scotus argues, II Sent., d. III, q. IX ¹⁵: but by a simple intuition they know whatever about God we investigate by discourse, and many things more. For neither is cognition from something as from a species discursive, as is clear in our cognition whereby we know what a thing is; nor is the cognition whereby something is seen in another discursive, when both are seen in a single act, just as a thing is seen in a mirror in a single act together with the mirror itself.

IX. But then a doubt arises, in conformity with the doubt raised at the beginning of this part ¹⁶ by Saint Thomas, concerning the mutual knowledge of separate substances. For an effect leads to knowledge of its cause only in respect of that in which it is assimilated to the cause. If, therefore, a separate substance knows God through its own essence, it will know Him through its essence only in respect of that in which it is assimilated to Him, but not in respect of that by which it is distinguished from Him and from others. It follows, therefore, that God would be known by it only under some common aspect shared with the separate substances, and not distinctly. This does not seem to be what should be said, nor does it accord with the mind of Saint Thomas: for thus it would know God through its substance no more than other separate substances.

2. For the clarification of this, it must be noted that there is a twofold likeness: one according to a mere agreement in nature, as man and horse agree in the nature of animal; another according to representation, as the intelligible species of a thing understood assimilates it, and an effect, insofar as it is an effect, represents the causality of its cause. These two likenesses differ, however, because the first likeness, as such, is naturally apt to yield immediate cognition of the thing of which it is the likeness only with respect to those features that belong to it and to that thing by way of common nature: thus, if man and horse agree only in the nature of animal, from my cognition of man insofar as he is like the horse I shall be able to know of the horse nothing but its animal nature, in which both it and the horse agree. But a likeness according to representation is naturally apt to yield cognition even of that by which what is represented is distinguished from it, provided that this be a condition belonging suitably to the thing represented insofar as it is the cause of the likeness: thus the intelligible species, which is an accident of the intellect, represents the substantial quiddity with respect to all that belongs to its essence, because that quiddity itself was absolutely the reason for the phantasm's causing that species.

In both ways the separate substance is a likeness of God. For insofar as it is an intellectual substance, it has with Him a likeness of nature, according to analogy: for God too is an intellectual substance. But insofar as it is a form actually intelligible, produced by God Himself as by an intelligible object, it has it so as to be His likeness according to representation in intelligible esse. Therefore through the very fact that it is precisely an intellectual substance, nothing about God is known through it except intellectuality, in which it has with Him a likeness of nature. But through it insofar as it is an intelligible form and the ratio of understanding, God is known not only with respect to those things in which He agrees with it according to nature, but also with respect to those things by which He is distinguished from it, which nevertheless agree with it as He is its cause. For example, because God produces them through creation, and creation requires infinite power, founded in the infinity of essence, therefore through its own essence the separate substance knows God as infinite in power and perfection; and so of the other things that are required for His causality in the cause.

It is not so, however, with one separate substance in respect of another. For one is not caused by the other, so that according to its natural esse it could be a likeness of the other according to the representation of an intelligible likeness, although it is a likeness in the esse of nature absolutely. Therefore, through one the other could not be known except with respect to those things that are common to both. Hence, if one is to know the other distinctly, there must be in it a representative likeness of that other, either caused by it or caused by God, who is also the cause of the separate substance according to the natural esse that it has in itself.

3. To the doubt, therefore, it is said first that a separate substance knows God distinctly through itself, speaking of cognition below quidditative cognition: so that every cognition by which a thing is known with respect to something by which it is distinguished from others is called distinct cognition.

It is said second, that the antecedent is false concerning an effect which is not only a likeness of its cause according to nature, but also according to representation in intelligible esse, in which way a separate substance is a likeness of God.

X. In the third place ¹⁷ Saint Thomas declares the true mode of knowing one separate substance as distinct from another; and at the same time he declares every way in which a separate substance is known by another. First, he sets forth his proposal; second, he removes a certain doubt ¹⁸.

He sets out five ¹⁹ conclusions. The first of these ²⁰ is: No separate substance, according to its essence, is a sufficient principle of knowledge of all other things; but for each of them, above its own substance, there must be added certain intelligible likenesses, through which it may be able to know other things in their proper nature.

It is proved. And first, as to the first part, thus. If by its essence it were a sufficient principle of knowledge of all things, it would follow that it would be the likeness of all being and of all its differences. This is impossible. Therefore, etc. — The inference is proved. The intellect cannot know its object totally unless it have in itself the likeness of all being and of all its differences: since its proper object is intelligible being, which comprehends all the possible species and differences of being; and all cognition takes place by way of likeness. Therefore, etc. — But the falsity of the consequent is proved. Because such a likeness cannot exist except in an infinite nature, which is not determined to any species or genus of being, but is the universal principle and active power of all being: such as is the divine nature alone. Every other nature, however, is determined to some genus and species of being.

As to the second part, it is proved as follows. From the fact that some substance is intellectual, it is comprehensive of all being. But it does not comprehend in act all being through its nature. Therefore, considered in its substance, it is as it were a potency with respect to the intellectual similitudes by which all being is known, and those will be its acts insofar as it is intelligible. Therefore etc.

From the first part of the conclusion, Saint Thomas infers that God alone knows all things through His essence; but each of the separate substances, through its own nature, knows with perfect knowledge only its own species; whereas the possible intellect understands itself through an intelligible species ²¹

XI. But this argument could be pressed in two ways. First, because, although all possible species of being and all its differences require the infinity of the intellectual form if a single form is to represent them to that intellect—since possible beings are infinite—nevertheless not all species and differences of being posited in nature and knowable by a separate substance require such infinity in the intelligible species by which they are known; for those are not infinite but finite. Hence neither are infinite species posited in a separate substance as superadded to its substance, but finite ones. Therefore, notwithstanding the limitation and finitude of its substance, it will be able to know through itself all things naturally knowable by it, nor will it need intelligible species superadded to it.

2. Second ²². From whatever the proper and perfect likeness of all intellectual things naturally proceeds, that thing is of necessity the proper and perfect likeness of all intellectual things. But from the essence of a separate substance such a likeness proceeds naturally. Therefore the essence of a substance is the likeness of all things. The opposite of this is taken in this argument.

The major is proved. Because a likeness of something cannot be produced naturally by anything unless that thing itself is like it. — The minor, however, is proved. Because from the essence of a separate substance there proceed intelligible species of all things naturally intelligible through it: for as it is said in Prima, q. lv ²³, and elsewhere, the species by which angels understand are connatural to them.

XII. To the first it is answered that this argument does not proceed from the infinity of knowable things, but from the determination of a separate substance. For the possibles naturally knowable by a separate substance are not all the species of being and all its differences absolutely producible by divine power, but all the species of being that are required for the perfection of this universe, which divine wisdom ordained to exist. And these are not infinite, but determinate. And it is of these that Saint Thomas speaks. Nevertheless, although these are finite, they cannot all be contained, as in their likeness, in some essence that is determinate to a genus and species. For if some nature equaled all the genera and all the species and differences of being, it would no longer be limited to one species; otherwise the same thing would be posited as equal to all beings in perfection, and yet not equal to them but contained within the genera and species of being, as a particular being possessing a determinate perfection of being—which is clearly impossible. Since, therefore, the divine nature alone is infinite and unlimited to any determinate genus of being, it follows, as Saint Thomas argued, that it alone is the likeness of all intelligible things.

XIII. To establish the evidence against the second doubt ²⁴, it must be considered that, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. 6, a. 5, ad 2, something is said to be natural in two ways: in one way, that which is from nature as from an active principle, just as to heat is natural to fire; in another way, according to a passive principle, namely because it is an innate inclination of a thing to receive that from an extrinsic principle, just as motion is natural to the heavens. Capreolus therefore, in II Sent., d. 3, q. 2, ad 8, against the third conclusion ²⁵, holds that the intelligible species are connatural to the angel in the first way, as its properties. And thus, according to him, it must be conceded that they flow actively in some way from the angel's essence, namely by natural concomitance, just as the powers of the soul do from the soul. And then, in answer to the argument, one may say that it concludes something true in some way. For the essence of the angel is the remote and radical likeness of all things naturally intelligible by it, just as it is remotely and radically the principle of understanding. But it does not conclude against the mind of St. Thomas. For he does not intend to deny this: but only that the essence of the angel should be the proximate and immediate likeness of intellectual things naturally intelligible by it. But Capreolus's position could be confirmed from the words of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1, where he says that from the light of the angelic intellect its species are determined, by which a proper knowledge of things comes about. For this determination does not seem capable of being understood otherwise than that the species arise naturally from the very light of the intellect itself. Hence they extend only as far as the light itself extends.

2. But this, with all due deference to a better judgment, does not seem to me well said. First, because that which is determined by one difference by which it is distinguished from all other substances cannot be a perfect likeness of other substances, namely with respect to those things by which they are distinguished from it: neither, I say, a proximate nor a remote likeness. For it is repugnant that two substances be distinguished by their proper differences, and that one be representative of the other with respect to its proper difference, as St. Thomas wishes in this argument. Second, because, although in some sense it might be admitted that the essence of an angel is a remote and radical likeness of inferiors, it can in no way be conceded that it is a likeness of superiors. For superiors are not contained in inferiors virtually and eminently, so that they could be produced by it in intellectual esse: which would have to be said if an inferior angel were the radical likeness of a superior angel, from which the intellectual species of the latter would proceed by natural concomitance.

3. Wherefore it seems to me that we must say that the intelligible species of the angels are not their properties, naturally consequent upon their essence itself, but are said to be connatural to them in two ways: namely, both because they have a natural inclination to receive them all at once from God immediately, on account of their perfection in the genus of intelligibles; and because they have them all from their creation, just as men are said by nature to be children of wrath ²⁶, because they have this from their birth. This, moreover, seems to be according to the intention of St. Thomas. For wherever he speaks of this matter, he holds that these species come from God alone into the angelic minds: especially Prima Pars, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1; and q. 56, a. 2, ad 4; and II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1. But he never says that they proceed from the essence of the angel, although he says they are connatural to the angel: which is to be understood passively, just as the motion of the heavens is said to be connatural to the heavens, as we have explained. Hence, if at any time in our exposition it is found that the species of the angelic intellect are its natural properties ²⁷, this must be understood in this sense.

4. But to what is brought forward on Capreolus's opinion, the answer is given that by the name light Saint Thomas does not understand the intellect itself, or its cognitive power: for he adds that that light is the likeness of the whole thing; yet it is clear, in his doctrine, that the intellect of an angel is not posited as in itself a likeness of things with respect to matter and form, and other features proper to a thing. But by the name light he understands the intelligible species themselves: for it belongs to these that they be likenesses of things with respect to matter and form, inasmuch as they are exemplated from the divine ideas, which are productive of things not only with respect to form but also with respect to matter. They are said to be determined from the light of the intellect because from themselves, being a kind of light of the intellect, they are determined to the proper cognition of things, so that the angelic intellect does not need to receive anything from things by which it might be determined to the cognition of things.

XIV. Note, regarding the corollary ²⁸, that Saint Thomas does not deduce it from this single conclusion now proved, but from it together with the preceding ones. For it was shown above ²⁹ that the possible intellect does not understand itself except through species abstracted from phantasms. Likewise it was shown that a separate substance understands itself through its own essence. If to these is joined the conclusion now proved, together with the reason for the conclusion, where it is said that the divine essence alone is the likeness of all things, it follows most fittingly that God alone knows all things through His essence; but that an angel knows only itself through its nature, with perfect knowledge; while the possible intellect knows itself not through its essence, but through an intelligible species. It must be noted, however, that Saint Thomas does not say absolutely that a separate substance knows only its own species through its substance, but added with perfect knowledge: so as to convey that through its substance it cannot indeed know other things perfectly and quidditatively; yet that it may know other things imperfectly through it, with respect to certain common rationes, nothing forbids.

XV. The second ³⁰ conclusion is: It is impossible that these likenesses not be many. It is proved: because just as the nature of separate substances is not infinite but determinate, so neither is the likeness existing in it. But it was said that the perfect likeness of universal being cannot be anything but infinite.

2. To this argument it could be said that, although the likeness or species existing in the intellect of a separate substance is finite and determinate in its esse, just like the very substance from which it flows forth, yet in respect of representation it is infinite. For, as appears from what was said above ³¹, likenesses need not be equal to their manner of being, that is, to the esse they have in the intellect, in respect of representation. But if the intention of St. Thomas be considered deeply, it is clear that this reply amounts to nothing. For the declaration of which, it must be noted, from his own doctrine in Book IV, d. XLIX, q. II, a. 1, that in every cognition by which something is known through its proper species, the likeness of the thing known must be received in the knower according to the same ratio of species. This appears in vision: in order that whiteness may be known, it is necessary that whiteness be received in the seer according to the same ratio of species, although it has a different mode of being. Similarly, for the intellection of any quiddity, there must arise in the intellect a likeness of the same ratio in species as such a quiddity, although it may happen that its mode of being is different. For the form existing in the intellect is a principle of cognition not according to the mode of being it has in either place, but according to the ratio in which it communicates with the exterior thing. From these things it follows that the intelligible species of a known thing cannot exceed, in representing, its ratio and quiddity, even though its representation need not be limited according to the limitation of its esse. And therefore, if according to its ratio it belongs to a nature limited and determined to some genus or to some species of being, it cannot be a likeness representative of the whole of being and of all its genera, and thus be infinite in respect of representation.

3. But if it were said that the likeness existing in the intellect, although, insofar as it is an accident and a form of the intellect, it is determined to some genus of being, yet, insofar as it is the very quiddity of the object in cognizable esse, can be indeterminate—insofar namely as it is a likeness of common being, under which all genera and all species are contained—this is nothing. First, because being does not signify any entity common to all beings, since it is not univocal. Second, because even if there were a likeness of that common entity only with respect to its community and universality, it would not lead to distinct cognition of all beings, but to common and confused cognition.

4. If, finally, it is said that such a likeness could be a likeness of all beings distinctly, yet unequal to each being: — it is clear that this can belong to the divine essence alone, which is outside every genus, but not to any creature, since every creature is determined to some species and quiddity of being, whether it be a substance, or an intelligible species of substance, or even of an accident. For just as it cannot belong to a substance to be the form containing all beings, unequal to each, unless that substance is infinite, so this cannot belong to an intelligible species, since every intelligible species is some created quiddity, and it could not be a quiddity representative of all beings unless there were outside the intellect some created quiddity containing all beings and determined by its own character to no genus and no species. For we have already said that the species and the thing represented through it must be of the same character. — And thus it is evident that the foundation of the argument adduced is most sound.

XVI. The third ³² conclusion is: The intelligible likenesses existing in the higher substance are less multiplied and more universal.

It is proved first by reason. For the higher any separate substance is, the more its nature is like God, and therefore the less contracted, as approaching more nearly to perfect universal being and good, and on this account having a more universal participation of good and of being.

It is proved secondly by the authority of Dionysius, chapter 12 of the Celestial Hierarchy; and by the authority of the book On Causes.

From this it is concluded, first ³³, that there is a difference in intelligible nature. For the summit of this universality is in God, who knows all things through His essence; the lowest is in the human intellect, which for each intelligible object requires its own intelligible species, proportioned to it; the middle, however, is in the separate substances, which understand through more universal species.

2. Concerning the conclusion itself, it must be noted that an angel, or higher intelligence, can be understood to know through fewer species in two ways. In one way, according to superiority in specific grade: namely, that every angel who is superior to another by a specific difference knows through fewer and more universal species than the inferior one. In another way, according to the superiority of order with respect to order: namely, that angels belonging to a higher and more noble order of angels know through fewer and more universal species than angels of the lower order; yet all those of the same order know through species equal in number, although within the same order angels nobler specifically know more limpidly and clearly.

Although the conclusion can be understood in either sense, it nevertheless seems more probable that it should be taken in the second sense. For it does not seem probable that angels who are in the same order, being closest to one another in species, should have this diversity, that the higher one understands through fewer species. For we see that many irrational animals distinct in species are not so distinguished that one has more sensitive powers than another; rather, having the same powers in number, one has them more perfectly than another. It is more probable, therefore, that all angels of the same order understand through an equal number of species, but that the angels of a higher order understand through fewer species than the angels of a lower order. And this seems to be the mind of Dionysius, who distinguished the angels into hierarchies and these into orders, and according to this distinction determines their dignities ³⁴.

3. But because someone might believe that among the separate substances there is a less perfect knowledge than in our intellect, since they understand through more universal species—for among us we have a less perfect knowledge of a species through the likeness of the genus than through the likeness of the species—Saint Thomas excludes this tacit objection in second place ³⁵, saying that the account is not the same for our intellect and for the separate substances. For since our intellect holds the lowest grade among intellectual natures, a proper likeness must correspond to it for each proper object of knowledge; hence through the likeness of animal it does not know rational, and consequently neither man, except in a qualified sense. But the intelligible likeness that is in a separate substance is of more universal power, sufficient to represent many things; and therefore it does not produce an imperfection but a more perfect knowledge; for by one likeness it knows both animal and the differences of animal, or even in a more universal or a more contracted manner, according to the order of those substances themselves.

It is also declared by the likeness of the form of the agent in the universal cause, which, the more universal it is, extends itself to more things; and from these two extremes, namely God, who knows all things by one, and man, who needs diverse likenesses for knowing diverse things. Indeed this appears even in human beings themselves: for the higher a person's intellect is, the more things he can know from fewer ³⁶.

From these, St. Thomas wishes it to be held that the cognition had through more universal species is not more imperfect than that had through particular species: since the more universal species itself represents not only the universal nature, but also all of its differences. Indeed, it is more perfect: as being more efficacious, and extending itself distinctly to more things.

It must be noted, however, that when he says that through the likeness of an animal both the animal and its differences are known by a separate substance—or, in a more universal and also more contracted mode, that which sense is—the differences of an animal can be known by some substance through a species adequate to animal; and by some higher substance through a species more universal and less contracted than the species adequate to animal, namely a species representing not only animals but also certain other things; but by a lower substance through a species less universal and more contracted, knowing, that is, some species of animal through one species, others through another. This diversity arises from the fact that one separate substance is higher and another lower.

XVII. For the explanation of the reason brought forward for the conclusion ³⁷, it must be noted that, although there is a difference between a substance and the intelligible species received in it with respect to representation, there must nevertheless be a certain proportion between them, since species of this kind naturally befit the essence of a separate substance. For they differ with respect to representation. Because, since one species of substance is a quiddity distinct by its own proper account from every other substantial species, and has its own substantial difference distinct from the difference of another substance, one cannot distinctly and quidditatively represent another, even though one is like the other according to some common generic account. But the species that is in the intellect is the very quiddity that is outside the intellect, of which it is said to be the species, although it has another mode of being: for the species of a stone in the intellect is the very quiddity of the stone in intelligible esse. Therefore the species, by its own nature, has the power to represent the extrinsic quiddity distinctly and properly, and to lead the intellect into its cognition; on account of which it is said that the intelligible object is united to the intellect through its species and intelligible likeness. — Yet, notwithstanding this difference between a separate substance and its species in representing, there must nevertheless be a certain proportion between them, similar to that which is found between a subject and its proper accidents. For we see that the more perfect a subject is, the more perfect are the accidents that flow from it, and the more perfect and universal is its active power. Similarly, the more immaterial and less limited a substance is, the more immaterial are its natural accidents, and less limited in their own way, and less contracted. For the accidents that follow upon man by reason of the sensitive power are less contracted by material contraction, and more perfect, than the accidents that follow upon him by reason of the body: as to move oneself by apprehension and to sense is nobler than to be heavy and to move downward by gravity. Similarly, to understand, and to be receptive of learning, which befits him insofar as he is rational, is nobler than to sense.

Since, therefore, the intelligible species that are in a separate substance are as it were certain natural properties of that substance itself ³⁸, since they are accidents to which it is naturally in potency; it follows most fittingly, as Saint Thomas deduces, that the more any separate substance is like the divine nature and less contracted, having a more universal participation of good and being, the nobler species it also has and the less contracted in its representation, indeed more universal and representing more things: just as the substance itself has an esse less contracted and more remote from matter, and approaches more nearly to that which is supremely one, and which by one comprehends all things.

2. Hence Scotus's objection is excluded, in Book II, d. III, q. x ³⁹, where he tries to refute this argument, adduced both here and in the First Part, q. LV, a. 3, and also elsewhere. For he says that the intellect need not be more assimilated to God in understanding through fewer species, but rather in knowing more clearly and luminously.

But it is clear from what has been said that even in the understanding of that which is through the more universal species, an assimilation must take place, on account of the proportion that must exist between a substance and its natural properties. For as is stated in the cited question of the Veritate, article 10 ⁴⁰, the more unified a power is, the more efficacious it is in acting; and therefore, the higher it is, the more it is found to operate from fewer things, which nevertheless extend to more. This appears both in cognitive and in operative powers. For we see that one who has a loftier intellect proceeds from few principles to various conclusions, whereas one of duller intellect cannot arrive at them except through particular and adapted principles. Similarly, the architect is directed by a single form of his art in all things in which inferior craftsmen are directed by diverse principles.

XVIII. Concerning what is said in this place about the species of our intellect ⁴¹, it must be noted that our intellect should not be understood to require a proper and adequate species for the cognition of any quiddity whatsoever, as though through the species of one quiddity it could not in some way understand another quiddity: since it is said here that through the species of animal both rational and man are known secundum quid; and in Prima, q. XII, a. 10, ad 1, it is said that through the species of man animal and rational are known; and universally it is true that through the species of the whole the parts are known. Rather, this must be understood of distinct and proper cognition, by which a given quiddity is known as distinguished from every other quiddity essentially and according to its proper differences. For it is of this cognition that there is question here: because the mode whereby a separate substance knows things distinctly is being investigated. And concerning this cognition the difference is posited between separate substance and human intellect: namely, that the species of the human intellect by which things and quiddities are known distinctly and properly are diverse according to the diversity of the things known; whereas one species of a separate substance suffices to represent several quiddities, and according to the order of those substances in nobility and simplicity, they are more universal or more contracted in their representing.

2. But then a difficulty arises. For it was said in ⁴² that the intelligible species is of the same rational character as the quiddity represented through it, and is one with that quiddity, though they differ in mode of being. But one quiddity cannot be several quiddities: for the quiddity of a stone is not the quiddity of a plant. Therefore one intelligible species cannot be the species of several quiddities.

3. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered that we must speak one way of the species caused by the object, and another way of that species which is connatural to the intellect of a separate substance and communicated to it by God. For the species caused by the object is naturally fitted to represent distinctly only that quiddity from which it is caused by way of object, because from the very object by which it is caused it receives its determination and limitation. But the species which is not caused by the object, but by God, may fittingly represent several quiddities contained in one common thing which is the first and adequate object of the species; because, just as the divine essence is the proper ratio and proper species of all intelligibles, though inadequate to them, so God can create in some intellect an intelligible species which, being one, is the proper species of several quiddities, adequate to none of them, but exceeding each one, having something common to them as its adequate object. Nor is this unfitting. For just as it is not unfitting that a nobler nature, according to its natural being, contain an inferior one eminently, inasmuch as it has whatever perfection is in the inferior and something more, yet unitedly and according to one real being, as the intellective soul contains the sensitive and vegetative; so it is not unfitting that one intelligible species of a superior separate substance contain eminently the species of an inferior substance and something more in intelligible and representative being; namely, that whatever perfection is in the inferior species be contained in the superior, and that the superior represent whatever the inferior species represents and something besides.

To the doubt, therefore, it is said that it is not unfitting for one quiddity to be many quiddities in inadequate intelligible being, or eminently. For the same species which is intelligibly the quiddity of a stone can be the quiddity of a plant eminently, although one of these cannot be the other in natural being: just as the divine essence is the ratio of all things eminently and inadequately, although those things themselves are not of one ratio outside the intellect; and just as the nature of a genus contains diverse species potentialiter, which nevertheless are not of one specific ratio—although this is a different kind of containment than that of a species.

XIX. From these things it is clear how we are to understand what is said in the Prima, q. LV, a. 3, ad 3, namely, that the universal species which exists in the mind of an angelic intellect, on account of its excellence, can be the proper ratio of many things. For this must not be understood of its excellence in being, although the species of a superior angel has a nobler esse than that of an inferior angel. For Saint Thomas, in De Veritate, q. VIII, a. 10, ad ult. ⁴³, when drawing the distinction between the species of an angelic intellect and the species of our intellect, says that the former are more excellent than the things themselves: therefore one can be the proper ratio of many. But the species of our intellect are not more excellent than the things themselves with respect to representation, although they are more excellent with respect to their mode of being: therefore one cannot be the proper ratio of many. From these words it appears that excellence in being is not the intelligible cause why one species can be the proper ratio of many.

But the saying of St. Thomas can be understood in two ways. First, that the excellence of one intelligible species over another in quidditative esse is the reason for this. For since, as was said ⁴⁴, the intelligible species is the very quiddity understood, if one species were several quiddities united and simply in intelligible esse, it could be the reason of several; but if it is not several quiddities in this way, it will not be able to be the proper reason of several. Therefore, because the species of the angelic intellect are such with respect to the species of our intellect that one of them is unitedly several quiddities, namely as proceeding immediately from the divine essence, which contains all quiddities unitedly, and as closer to it; whereas these latter are such that one of them is only a single quiddity, namely as caused by a single exterior quiddity: therefore one of those can be taken as the proper reason of several, but not one of these.

Second, it can be understood that the reason for this is the excellence of the angelic species in representing. For since one species of the angelic intellect represents not only one quiddity perfectly and distinctly, but several, therefore it is not only the proper ratio of one thing, but can be taken as proper to many: just as, because the divine essence is a perfect likeness of all things, it can be taken as the proper idea of many. — This may be gathered from the passage cited in Qu. Verit.

This is not opposed by the fact that Saint Thomas, in the same place, speaks of the angelic species proportionally to the divine essence: for it is evident that that essence, on account of its excellence in being (in essendo), is the proper ratio of many. — For it is said first, that it is not on account of its excellence in being, but on account of the infinity of its nature, and on account of its excellence in representing, that it is the proper ratio of many. — It is said second, that this proportion is taken according to excellence in representing, not however in being.

Nor is it an objection that no reason for the thesis would be assigned except verbally. For the same thing would be proved by the same thing: namely, that therefore the angelic species, being one, is distinctly representative of many things because it represents them excellently, that is, not only one thing but several. — It is said, indeed, that according to this exposition the reason for the thesis is most excellently assigned.

For Saint Thomas does not there intend to assign the reason why one species of an angel represents many things, but why, being one, it can be the proper reason of many, namely in such a way that it is taken as the reason of each of them, leading to a proper and distinct cognition of each. For the reason of this is fittingly assigned: because it is a likeness of many with respect to those things that are proper to each of them; just as the reason is fittingly assigned why the species of a stone leads to a distinct cognition of the nature of stone, because it is its perfect likeness; and the reason is sufficiently assigned why the divine essence can be taken as the proper idea of all creatures, because it is the perfect likeness of all creatures. For since it is in itself the likeness of all, if it be considered under the relation to the nature of man alone as represented by it, insofar as it is such, it is the idea of man and not of another quiddity, and thus it is called his proper idea—although absolutely, and considered in itself, it is the likeness of all.

XX. But from what has been said another difficulty arises. For just as one higher intelligible species contains the perfection of the lower intelligible species, and on this account represents whatever the other represents and something more besides, so a higher separate substance contains the lower perfectionally, since they are distinct specifically and by grade, according to greater or lesser nearness to God. Therefore, just as through the higher species that thing is represented which the lower species also represents, so through the higher substance both it and the lower will be represented to the intellect. And thus the higher substance will be able, of itself and without an intelligible species, to know the lower. The opposite of this was shown above ⁴⁵.

It is answered, as can be gathered from the words of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 55, a. 1, ad 3, and in II Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3, that although the higher substance, considered as substance alone, contains the lower one in some way perfectionally, it does not contain it perfectly and according to its proper ratio, but according to a common ratio participated from that higher substance in a more perfect way, since according to its proper ratio it is specifically distinct from it; just as whiteness in some way contains other colors, inasmuch as it is more perfect than they are, yet it does not contain them perfectly and according to their proper ratio. And therefore the higher substance cannot be the ratio of knowing the lower one except according to some common ratio. But one intelligible species can contain another species perfectly, and according to its proper ratio, in intelligible esse, inasmuch as it is a species and a likeness, in such a way that it is not distinguished from it according to its proper ratio, as if excluding it entirely from its own ratio, as man excludes horse from his own ratio, but rather as containing perfectly whatever is in it and something further: just as a higher and universal active power contains a lower and particular power and something more; and just as the divine essence, though one, contains all things perfectly and according to their proper rationes. And therefore the higher species represents whatever the lower species represents and something more: for instance, if the lower species is posited to represent only the nature of man, the higher species will represent the nature of man and, beyond this, the nature of horse and the natures of other animals. And for this reason the intelligible species that is higher can lead to a proper and distinct knowledge of that which is represented by the lower species.

We can consider an example of this in the power of the sun. For the power of the sun, insofar as it is an accident of the sun, is limited to the very species of the sun and to a certain genus of accident, and it is not a power of fire: for the power that is in the sun is one accident, and the power that is in fire is another. Yet that power, insofar as it is an active power, is not determined to certain objects distinct from the objects upon which the power of fire can act, such that it could not act upon the objects of the power of fire but only upon others: rather, it can act upon all those upon which the power of fire can act, and also upon others upon which that power cannot act. Hence it is true to say that the power of the sun is a power of fire insofar as it is a power, and indeed something more than the power of fire. So too must we say concerning the higher intelligible species. For insofar as it is an accident of the intellect, it is distinguished from the lower species; but insofar as it is a species and intellectual likeness, it is the lower species itself eminently.

XXI. Finally, attention must be given to what is said, that a man, the higher his intellect, the more he can know from fewer things ⁴⁶, namely that this is not to be understood as if a man of higher intelligence understands through fewer and more universal species; for this conflicts with what was said above, ⁴⁷, that in the human intellect there must correspond to each knowable object its own proper and adequate likeness. Rather, it must be referred to complex principles. For the more penetrating someone's mind is, the more conclusions he can draw from one principle. By this Saint Thomas wished to show that, just as one man, because his mind is of nobler quality, can by reasoning from one principle come to know many propositions, so proportionally one separate substance, precisely because it is nobler and consequently of greater power of understanding, can understand more things through one species than an inferior substance, which, being of weaker intellectual power, needs more species.

XXII. The fourth ⁴⁸ conclusion is: The intellect of a separate substance is wholly perfected through intelligible forms, as regards natural cognition.

It is added, with respect to natural knowledge, because, as is said in the First Part, q. 58, a. 1: With respect to those things that are divinely revealed to separate substances, nothing prevents their intellect from being in potency ⁴⁹.

It is proved first. Because it cannot be stripped bare of all such likenesses: for this is the disposition of the possible intellect before it understands. Nor does it have some in act and some in potency, as prime matter stands with respect to its forms, and as our intellect stands when we are knowing: otherwise it would pass from potency into act, which does not befit separate substances, which are moved neither per se nor per accidens.

It is confirmed first, by comparison with the heavenly bodies, to which it is proportionally assimilated. For the matter of a heavenly body is so perfected by its form that it does not remain in potency to any further forms.

It is confirmed secondly by the authority of the Book of Causes, where it is said that an intelligence is full of forms.

XXIII. But doubt is raised about these proofs. First, concerning the argument. For although separate substances, according to Aristotle's mind, are immovable in themselves and per accidens with respect to bodily change, it cannot nevertheless be concluded from this that they cannot pass from potency to act in an intelligible manner, and thus be altered spiritually.

2. Second, concerning the confirmation drawn from the likeness to the heavenly bodies, a doubt is raised. First, from Scotus, in the Second book, distinction iii, last question ⁵⁰; and distinction ix, in reply to the arguments of the second question ⁵¹. For, as he says, the same reasoning does not hold of separate substances and of heavenly bodies. Because if natural qualities and forms (from which the likeness must be taken, as Durandus says ⁵²: otherwise the likeness would not be taken to the point at issue) were not concreated with the heavenly body, since nothing is given it from which it could acquire those qualities, it would always be imperfect, because no natural cause could produce them in it. But it is not so in the case at hand: for a separate substance has that from which, with other natural causes cooperating, it can acquire knowledge of all things ⁵³.

Second, from Durandus ⁵⁴ a doubt is raised. For it seems false what is said of the heavenly bodies, when they are compared to accidental perfections. For the moon and the stars receive light from the sun: and thus their matter remains in potency with respect to a form which it does not have from its principle.

XXIV. To the first of these it is answered that, since the posterior things have a dependence upon the prior ones and are in some way grounded in them, every motion that belongs to a being in potency must be grounded upon that motion which is first among motions of this kind, so that nothing subsists under that motion except by subsisting under the motion which is first in that genus. Now such a motion is the motion of bodies. Therefore every other motion of a being in potency must depend upon corporeal motion, such that nothing is moved from potency to act by such a motion unless it is also moved by corporeal motion, either per se or per accidens. For we see in our intellect, which is moved from potency to act with respect to an intelligible species, that it is moved per accidens to the motion of the body, because it is a power residing in a body in some way, namely by reason of the soul in which it is rooted. Since, therefore, it is established that a separate substance is not moved by corporeal motion, neither per se nor per accidens, since it is neither a body nor a power in a body, it is evident that it stands outside the genus of that motion which is the act of a being in potency, even though it is moved by a motion which is the act of a being in act. And therefore the argument of Saint Thomas is most excellent, and it has its foundation in the teaching of Aristotle.

2. To the second argument, which is Scotus's, it is said that the comparison is fitting. For just as primary bodies had from the beginning all their natural perfection in natural esse, both substantial and accidental, so it is fitting that the first intellectual substances had from the beginning all their natural perfection in intelligible esse. Nor can a dissimilarity between them be suitably assigned. For in the natures of things we consider what belongs to them naturally and by the condition of their nature: not what may or may not belong to them merely on account of something extrinsic. And therefore that God from the beginning conferred on the heavenly bodies all their natural perfections is not to be referred to a defect of natural causes, which could not have produced them; rather it is to be referred to their very nature, which, being incorruptible, requires that it possess its potency wholly completed by act, wherein it differs from corruptible bodies. For unless this had beenfitting to their natures intrinsically, God would not have given it to them from the beginning when he created the natures of things. And the same must be said of the first intellectual substances with respect to their intelligible esse. — Moreover, it has been shown above ⁵⁵ that a separate substance cannot receive knowledge from sensible things. — Therefore that dissimilarity posited by Scotus seems to be an evasion rather than to have anything of reason in it.

3. To the second ⁵⁶ it can be answered in two ways. First, that Saint Thomas is speaking of those perfections of the heavenly body that belong to it by way of a permanent first act. Now the light that some of them receive from the sun is received in them by way of a passing passion; hence the moon is varied in its light according to its different aspect toward the sun.

Second, it can be said that Saint Thomas is speaking of perfections which are naturally fitted to belong to a thing intrinsically, but not of those which a thing can share only through the activity of a superior being, as is clear from the Prima Pars, q. 58, a. 1. Now the light that heavenly bodies receive from the sun is not such a perfection. Hence Saint Thomas says in the same place: as regards those things that are divinely revealed to the separate substances, there is nothing to prevent their intellect from being in potency; for thus even the heavenly bodies are at times in potency so as to be illuminated by the sun. — This reply seems better, since it is drawn from the words of Saint Thomas himself.

XXV. Finally, Saint Thomas removes a certain doubt concerning the predeterminations ⁵⁷. For someone might say that, although a separate substance understands other things through species, nevertheless one thing is understood through another by means of the essence of the substance understood. For they are intelligible in act through themselves. — And because it is said in Book XII of the Metaphysics ⁵⁸, text 51, that in separate substances intellect, understanding, and what is understood do not differ.

Saint Thomas responds that to posit this involves many difficulties. For it is difficult to see how the conditions of an intelligible form can befit one another: namely, how one substance be one with another while it understands it. — And how one should be the form of the other, since each has its esse separate from the other. — Likewise, how a lower substance could be the perfection of a higher, and how the higher could understand the lower. — Likewise, how one substance could be within the intellect of another, since it does not flow into the mind, for this befits God alone.

From these considerations, therefore, it seems impossible that a separate substance be understood by another through its own essence, and not through a likeness of it in that other.

St. Thomas then adds that this is true according to the opinion of Aristotle, namely, that this mode is impossible. For according to him, understanding comes about through the fact that the thing understood in act becomes one with the intellect in act.

To the first, however, on the opposite side, he responds that the argument does not follow. For although a separate substance is always actually intelligible, it is nevertheless not understood except by the intellect with which it is one. — To the second, he says that the proposition of Aristotle adduced is no obstacle: for it holds true when a separate substance understands itself through its essence; then indeed the intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding are one and the same.

Note that this proposition, When a separate substance understands itself, the understanding, the understood, and the act of understanding are one and the same, is held by Averroes to be true of every substance abstracted from matter: as is clear in book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary 51, and also commentary 39. But Saint Thomas interprets it there ⁵⁹ as concerning only the first substance. Here, however, he takes it as universally granted by Aristotle, on account of the Commentator's opinion: and because nothing in his own undertaking depended on whether Aristotle had judged this to hold of every separate substance or only of the first.

But according to Plato's opinion, which the saying of Dionysius in chapter 4 of Div. Nom. seems to favor, it will not be unfitting for one separate substance to understand another through its essence, insofar as it touches it spiritually. For Plato held that understanding comes about through the contact of the intellect with the intelligible thing.

2. Concerning these arguments by which St. Thomas proves that one separate substance does not know another through the essence of that which is known, it must be noted that they are not put forward here as insoluble, but as raising a difficulty in the way of Aristotle. Hence he did not say simply that this is impossible, but that it has not a few difficulties; and he concludes that it seems impossible, but not that it is impossible. Likewise in the Quaestiones de Veritate, q. 8, a. 7, having set out the same arguments, after he had replied to the other arguments, he does not reply to these, but says ⁶⁰: But those arguments which prove that an angel does not know another angel through the essence of the angel seen or seeing, we concede, although they can in some way be answered. In these words he gives to understand that these arguments, although they have some probability, are nevertheless soluble.

For they could be answered in the same way as if the questions were raised about the divine essence, namely to prove that it could not be seen by the blessed through itself. For it would be said that one substance can be one to another by way of an intelligible form in intelligible esse, though not in the esse of nature. — And that it is not unfitting for a lower perfection to be that of a higher being in such a determinate intelligible esse. — Nor is it unfitting that it flow into the mind by way of an intelligible form, although it would be unfitting for it to flow into the mind by way of an agent cause, which is the way the divine essence flows into the mind.

But although these arguments may be answered in this way, they nevertheless seem to have some appearance of truth in Aristotle, because he himself, in Metaphysics XII, text 51 Metaph. (Cap. III, 5; s. Th. l. 5)^[], proves that God does not understand anything outside himself, namely as if he had in himself something else by which he understands, since that would perfect his intellect and would be nobler than it. And thus it would not be universally true in his view that a separate substance understands another through that very substance understood, united to itself in intelligible esse. — On these matters see St. Thomas on De Veritate Veritate, where above.

3. Concerning Plato's argument, note, with Saint Thomas in the place cited above ⁶¹, that there is none. For the knower and the known are not related as agent and patient, but as two things from which one principle of cognition is made. And therefore for cognition the contact between the knower and the knowable does not suffice, unless the knowable be in some way united to the knower as a form.

XXVI. But concerning this conclusion, and certain others ⁶², a doubt arises. For as the human intellect is related to material things, so the intellect of one separate substance is related to the other separate substances. But the human intellect, if it had some nature among the number of sensible natures, could not understand the other sensible natures ⁶³.

Therefore, if the intellect of a separate substance has some nature among the number of separate substances, it cannot understand other separate natures. But each of them has one such determinate nature. Therefore one cannot understand another. The opposite of this has been said.

It can be answered that this likeness holds insofar as, just as the quiddity of a material thing is the proportionate object of the human intellect, so the quiddity of an immaterial substance is the proportionate and connatural object of a separate substance. But it does not hold in all respects. Hence in Prima, q. 56, a. 2, ad 1, St. Thomas denies the consequence: for although one material nature existing connaturally to an intellect would impede knowledge of others, one spiritual nature does not impede knowledge of other spiritual natures, on account of their affinity with one another, since they are distinguished only by a certain order and according to diverse degrees of the same perfection.

XXVII. But this response, although true, nevertheless suffers a great difficulty. For it seems to wish that in proximate and kindred natures the cognition of one does not impede that of the others. But this does not seem to accord with the mind of the Philosopher. First, because the proposition stating that the recipient must be stripped of the nature of what is received, as Averroes says, III De Anima, comment. 4 ⁶⁴, is understood of the nature of the proximate genus of the things received. And thus, from the fact that the intrinsic nature of one thing has affinity and kinship with the extrinsic nature of another, it does not follow that the one does not impede the cognition of the other.

Second, because to Aristotle's argument it could similarly be said that, although the human intellect had some nature of sensible things—say, the nature of air—it would not thereby be prevented from knowing other things: for those natures could be close at hand, and distinguished by a certain order according to what is more and less perfect.

Third. That proximity and affinity do not remove the reason why a being present within excludes what is foreign ⁶⁵. Therefore, and so on. The antecedent is proved. For the cause of this is that what is determined of itself to a certain nature in act cannot be determined to other natures. For Averroes holds, at Physics I, commentary 66, that if prime matter had by its own nature any form, it would not receive all forms; and likewise, if it had any privation, it would not receive all privations. But this cause remains even in affined and proximate natures, since it is common to all actually specific natures that the ultimate difference of one cannot be determined by the ultimate difference of another. Therefore, and so on.

XXVIII. For the clarification of these matters, two things must be explained. The first is what cause there is in our intellect such that a sensible nature existing as connatural to it would forbid and exclude an extraneous or alien sensible nature.

Second, how that response of St. Thomas concerning the affinity of those natures ⁶⁶ is to be understood ⁶⁷.

2. As to the first point: since such a nature, existing in other natures, can be understood in two ways to bar and exclude them from the intellect—namely, with respect to their reception in the intellect through an intelligible species, as the Commentator seems to interpret it in III De Anima, comment. 4; and with respect to their actual cognition, as St. Thomas interprets it, going beyond the Commentator's exposition—first, we must consider the cause of the proposed thesis according to the first sense; second, according to the second ⁶⁸.

3. As to the first sense, which the Commentator follows, it must be known that he himself assigns the cause of this proposition, which is common even to those who do not know it, namely, that the recipient must be stripped of the nature of what is received. This proposition he himself expounds, saying that it is understood that the substance receiving should not be the substance of what is received according to species. The reason for this is that otherwise the thing would then receive itself, and the mover would be the moved. By the name of species, however, he seems to understand not only the most special species, as if it sufficed universally that the recipient not be of the same most special species as the thing received; for he, in declaring his exposition, gives the example of sight and hearing with respect to color and sound. For it is evident that sight is stripped not only of the blackness it receives, but of the whole genus of color; and that if it had whiteness connatural to itself, it could not receive blackness, however much it were specifically distinct from black. But he seems to understand by the name of species that nature of which the recipient is first and per se receptive, and to which it is related in potency, and by which, insofar as it is such, it is specified, whether this be a generic nature or a specific nature. For thus, because sight is first and per se receptive of color, and hearing of sound, therefore sight excludes color entirely from its own nature, and hearing sound. This sense is insinuated by that argument, that otherwise the same thing would receive itself. — It is also insinuated by what Averroes says below in the same commentary, namely, that it is understood that the recipient must be stripped of the nature of the species received, but not of the nature of the genus, especially a remote one, etc.; for he intends that although the recipient must be stripped of that nature which it first and per se regards, and by which, insofar as it is such, it is specified, nevertheless it need not be stripped of the genus of that nature. For although sight must be stripped of color so that it have no color at all, it ought not to be stripped of quality, which is the genus of color, that is, so that it have no quality at all. — The words of the Commentator himself also show the same sense, in comment 5 ⁶⁹, where, expounding that proposition, he says that it must be understood thus: that it is not necessary for the recipient not to be something in act altogether, but that it not be in act with respect to anything of what it receives.

But this proposition, so understood, Saint Thomas says (Truth, q. 22, a. 1, ad 8) is not universally true of the cognitive powers; rather it fails in those possessing an object that contains all things: for the object of the intellect is quiddity, and yet the intellect itself is not stripped of every quiddity, but is itself a certain quiddity. He also says that it does not hold true in the sense of touch, because its objects are necessarily those of the animal.

Since, therefore, the recipient must be stripped of the nature to which it is related first and per se, and with respect to which it is in potency; and since our intellect is in potency with respect to material quiddity, and is receptive of it first and per se, because it can know every material quiddity: it follows that it must be stripped of every sensible quiddity. And for this reason, if it had one sensible nature connatural to itself, that nature would prevent other sensible natures from being received in it. For, if what is receptive of a certain nature must be stripped of such a nature, it follows most fittingly that, if it is not stripped of such a nature, it is not receptive of that nature: just as, because what is colored is not in potency to color but has color in act, it is therefore susceptible of no other color, if it has one as connatural to itself.

It must be noted, however, that this sense of the proposition stated is not to the purpose of the doubt raised. For since the intellect of a separate substance is not in potency toward its object as able to receive its species, but has within itself innate species of all things naturally intelligible by it, it would be pointless to ask whether, if it has one of the natures intelligible by itself as connatural to it, as its proper quiddity, it is impeded by that nature from receiving the others.

4. As to the second sense, namely that what appears within would prevent knowledge of the external thing: it must be considered that this sense seems to be principally intended by the Philosopher. For perhaps it is not repugnant that something have the species of one nature or one genus and yet be receptive of other species of that nature according to intentional esse. For we see that, if a green glass is placed before the eyes, other things appear colored through the glass. Now this cannot be unless the likeness of those visible things be received in the glass as in a medium, since cognition cannot occur unless the visible thing be united to the seer through its species, and yet the green color is in the glass according to its natural esse. The sense of the proposition, then, is that what appears within would prevent—not indeed all knowledge of the external thing—but distinct and perfect knowledge of it. For although through a green glass other visible things are seen, they are nevertheless not seen distinctly and perfectly according to their proper colors, but are seen as green: for the species of them received in such a medium take on from that color existing in it this disposition, so as to represent their objects as green, even though they themselves have some other determinate color.

Yet the interpretation of Averroes can also be saved, by saying that what exists within impedes other things from being received in the cognitive potency, not absolutely, but as through a species representing the knowables truly and distinctly according to their proper natures.

The reason for this proposition, so understood, is assigned by St. Thomas in no other way, III de Anima ⁷⁰, than this: that that inwardly appearing thing, because it would be connatural to the intellect, would always appear in act, as it were always actually cognized, and thus the intellect would be impeded from understanding other things. This reason, however, is founded upon experience. For we see in material things that if something is actually cognized by a sense, then at that time another sensible thing cannot be distinctly and completely cognized by such a power; for this is evident by running through each of the senses.

Here, however, is the sense of the doubt at issue. For it is asked whether, just as our intellect, if it had one of the natures of sensible things, would be impeded from a perfect and distinct cognition of other natures, so too a separate substance, having a determinate nature within the genus of immaterial quiddities, would be prevented by its own nature from a distinct cognition of other immaterial natures.

XXIX. As to the second principal point, namely how that response of St. Thomas is to be understood ⁷¹, it must be considered that, since in that response he refers back to what was said earlier, he determines in q. 50 of the First Part, a. 4, ad 1, that angels are not distinguished specifically in such a way that one has some substantial perfection superadded to the perfection of another angel; but rather because, while all agree in the perfection which is noblest in them, namely intellectuality, they are distinguished within that perfection according to diverse degrees, which therefore constitute a specific distinction because they are taken from forms of different degrees. St. Thomas therefore wills in that response under dispute that, because angels are akin and close to one another, being as they are distinct only by a certain order of degrees of intellectuality, which is their ultimate and noblest perfection, the nature of one angel does not prevent him from knowing other separate substances, however much he always actually understands his own nature. This, however, is not found in material things: for they are not distinguished merely by degrees of the same perfection; but either by diverse perfections, one of which is worthier and more perfect than the other, as animate beings are distinguished from inanimate; or, if they are distinguished formally by degrees alone of the same perfection, as perhaps is the case with the forms of the elements, beyond this distinction they also have a material distinction, which introduces a great difference between them. Hence one of them, existing naturally in the cognitive power, impedes knowledge of other natures.

Saint Thomas therefore wishes to deny that consequence, because the account is not the same for sensible natures and for spiritual natures. For in material natures alone, on account of their materiality and distance, it holds true that what appears within bars the knowledge of what is outside; but not in spiritual natures, in which there is distinction only according to degrees of the same perfection.

XXX. To the first argument, on the contrary ⁷², it is said first that it is not the mind of the Commentator that what receives must be stripped of the proximate genus of what is received, but of the nature which the receiver, insofar as it receives, first regards; whether that nature be generic or specific in itself.

It is said second, that it has truth in cognitive powers which are in potency with respect to their objects: but not in those which are in act, such as the intellect of a separate substance. Therefore that proposition is not to the point, as was shown above ⁷³

2. To the second it is said that the account is not the same for material natures and for spiritual natures. For the former are not distinguished by formal distinction alone, according to diverse degrees of the same perfection, as spiritual natures are; but by a greater, or more manifold, distinction, as was said ⁷⁴.

3. To the third it is said that that is not the cause of that impediment, but rather the one we assigned ⁷⁵, namely the perpetual appearing and actual cognition of that which exists inwardly. Which cause indeed, as was said, produces an impediment to cognition in material things, but not in spiritual things.

XXXI. But further doubt is raised concerning certain other conclusions of what has been said ⁷⁶. Against the first ⁷⁷ an argument is drawn from Durandus, as cited by Capreolus, II Sent., d. III, q. II ⁷⁸: A species representing some thing, and the thing of which it is the species, are of the same specific rational character, though they differ in mode of being (essendi). But no species existing in the intellect of a separate substance can be of the same specific rational character as the substances of things which the separate substance understands, since it is an accident. Therefore it does not understand substances through any species superadded to it.

2. Against the third ⁷⁹ it is argued by Scotus and by Aureol. For Scotus argues, Book II, d. III, q. x ⁸⁰, that a separate substance does not know distinctly several quiddities through one species. First, because one ratio of knowing has one adequate object, in which are perfectly included all things knowable through that ratio: as is clear from the divine essence, to which the essence itself first corresponds by way of object. The reason for this is both because the ratio of understanding is measured from the object, and because there cannot be a ratio of knowing several things in such a way that it be the proper ratio of them; therefore it must contain virtually the ratios for knowing several things. But no such object can be given that contains virtually several quiddities. Therefore etc.

Second. To one species and one intelligible concept there corresponds a single act of knowing adequate to it. But it is impossible for several distinct quiddities to be known by a single act, according to St. Thomas, who holds that the created intellect cannot know many things distinctly at once. Therefore, etc.

3. Aureolus ⁸¹ also touches upon Scotus's arguments. But he adds one of his own, to prove that it is false that a separate substance, the higher it is, understands through fewer and more universal species. He argues as follows. Let there be posited a separate substance that understands all things through ten species. A higher substance understands through nine, and a still higher one through eight, and so on successively. Therefore, such a substance could be created that would understand all things through a single species. Therefore, if another higher than it were created, it would understand all things through its essence, not through a species. This is false. Therefore, etc.

XXXII. In answer to the objection against the first conclusion, two points must be noted. The first is that, just as the image of a thing can be considered in two ways, namely materially, insofar as it is such a thing, for instance wood or stone, and formally, insofar as it is an image of this thing; so too the intelligible likeness that is in the intellect can be considered both materially, insofar as it is such an entity, which is a form of the intellect, and formally, insofar as it is the intelligible likeness of this thing. If it be considered materially, then the intelligible likeness and that which is represented through it need not be of the same rational character: since the likeness itself is an accident of the intellect, while the thing represented is sometimes a substance. And in this sense Saint Thomas must be understood, De Veritate, q. VIII, a. 11, ad 3, where he says that the form of a stone in the soul is of a nature far different from the form of the stone in matter. But if it be considered formally, then, according to what was determined previously ⁸², it must be said to be of the same rational character as the thing represented. And thus what is said in IV Sent., at the place cited above ⁸³, and in De Veritate, q. x, art. 4, ad 4, is to be understood.

The second point is that something can correspond to the intelligible species, on the side of the thing, first and adequately, and something else secondarily and deficiently: just as to the species of animal which is in the mind of a separate substance there corresponds first and adequately the nature of animal; but inadequately and deficiently the nature of man or the nature of horse, because it represents not only the nature of man but also the natures of other animals. Therefore, when it is said, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that the intelligible species is of the same account (ratio) as the thing represented by it, if this is understood to mean that it is adequately of the same account as such a thing, this holds true of the thing that is represented first and adequately, but not of that which is represented secondarily and deficiently; for in order to represent the latter it suffices that the species contain its account eminently. As is clear in the divine essence, which represents itself adequately and first, and is of the same account as itself as represented; but it represents things other than itself secondarily and inadequately, and is not of the same account with them, though it contains their accounts eminently. Similarly, the species of animal which is in the mind of a separate substance is of the same account as the nature of animal, which it represents first; indeed, as we said above ⁸⁴ — and this is also the mind of Albert ⁸⁵, Tract. II super Porphyr., cap. VI; and III de Anima; and likewise de Intellectu et Intelligibili — it is the very nature of animal in intelligible esse; but it is not of the same account as the nature of man; rather, it contains that nature eminently in intelligible esse, and therefore represents it distinctly as well. — But if the species is understood to be of the same account as the thing represented eminently and inadequately, namely because it contains that thing unitedly and eminently together with other things and natures which it represents, then it is no inconvenience for the species to be of the same account even with each of those things contained under its adequate object.

From these things the answer to the objection is clear. For it proceeds from the species taken materially, not formally.

2. But a doubt arises concerning this reply. For as is had in I Physics, ⁸⁶, what truly is, has nothing that befalls it accidentally. Therefore it seems that a form which is an accident of the intellect could in no way be of the same account as the extrinsic substantial quiddity.

But it is answered that a substance, according to its natural esse, cannot be the accident of anything. Yet there is nothing unfitting in the fact that a substantial quiddity, according to the intelligible esse it has in the intellect, may have an accidental esse: for this belongs to the quiddity only insofar as it is received intentionally in the intellect.

XXXIII. To make evident what Scotus objects against the third conclusion ⁸⁷, it must be considered that we can understand one species to represent several quiddities in two ways. First, in such a way that it represents them not primarily and adequately, but secondarily, insofar as they agree in something common which is represented primarily and adequately; yet so that they are represented not only as to their common ratio, but also as to their proper conditions. And then there is no doubt that some one adequate object corresponds to a species representative of several quiddities, as represented first and per se, namely that which is common to all those quiddities. Nevertheless, the unity of such an object need not be real outside the soul, so that it would be something one realiter as an object in the manner of a singular, just as an intelligible species is really one; but it suffices that it have the unity of formal ratio, just as the universal is one according to reason in its singulars. The reason, moreover, why an intelligible species of a separate substance can distinctly represent several quiddities contained under one common thing which is one only according to reason, is that this species is representative of that common thing first not merely in abstraction, as the species of our intellect represent the universal, but in concretion with those things by which it is determined in nature. For just as animal is not found separated from its differences and species, but outside the intellect is divided into species and subsists under the conditions of species, so too an intelligible species of this kind, which is caused by the Creator of all the species and conditions of animal, represents the nature of animal not in abstraction, but divided into species; and on account of this it perfectly and distinctly represents the various species of animal; yet first and adequately the common thing itself, one according to reason; secondarily, however, and with a certain eminence, each of its species and the conditions of species.

Second, we can understand that it represents all those quiddities first and immediately, but not insofar as they agree in some common thing represented: just as if we were to say that the divine essence is first and immediately representative of all creatures, not insofar as they agree under one aspect, but absolutely, as each one is distinguished from another. And thus it also clearly appears that it is not necessary to posit for each intelligible species one adequate object.

Although the first sense seems to approach more truly the mind of St. Thomas—both because we see that not only to a single species in us, but also to a single habit constituted from many species, there corresponds one formal ratio of the object; and because all things that are understood through one species are known in one act of cognition, indeed, as is said in the Prima, q. 58, a. 2, just as unity of term is required for unity of motion, so unity of object is required for unity of operation—yet since either sense can be maintained, an answer will be given to Scotus's arguments according to each.

2. Following therefore the first sense, it is said first that the major is true of the unity of formal reason: but the minor in that sense is false. For it is not unfitting that a creature, one by this formal rational unity—say, one genus—should contain several quiddities perfectly on the side of the thing contained; that is, should contain them with respect to everything pertaining to those quiddities, although, insofar as it is universal, it contains them only potentially.

It is said secondly that, if it is understood of one object by real unity, it is more false. — To the first proof of this, it is said first that the intelligible species which is not caused by the object, such as are the species of a separate intellect, do not have their measure from the object. It is said secondly that, even granting that they are measured by the object, such unity as the real unity of species need not be in the object according to real esse, as is also evident in the species of our intellect: for the species of animal in one intellect is one according to real esse, and yet animal is not one according to real esse outside the intellect. — To the second it is said that one species can be the proper ratio of many things contained under the adequate object, but not under the inadequate. That is to say: it can be the proper representative of diverse things such that it represents all that is proper to each of them; yet it cannot be the adequate representative of any of them, namely such that it would represent that thing alone and not another; for this is repugnant to its being said to be the ratio of many. Hence one intelligible species can be called the proper ratio of many, though inadequate; and it can be said to contain eminently the ratios of many, on account of the perfection of the species itself.

3. But if one follows the sense that Capreolus, in the place cited, seems to follow, Scotus's major premise is false. — In proof of the first of these, the assumption is denied, as before, concerning a species and ratio not caused by the object. For if the species is caused immediately by the object, then because from one object only one is caused, for this reason to one species there corresponds one adequate object distinctly and perfectly represented. But where it is caused by that which is the cause of all things, it is not unfitting that several objects correspond to one species, and that no single object be adequate to it.

To the second it is said, as before, that it is not unfitting for the same thing to be the proper account of many, while being inadequate to each of them.

Nevertheless, as I have already said, the first mode of responding seems to be the more secure. — How, however, one and the same thing can be the proper reason of many was shown in the First Part, where knowledge of God was under discussion ⁸⁸.

4. To Scotus's second objection it is said that Saint Thomas does not deny that many things can be understood at once and by a single act, when they are understood through one species, as will be shown below ⁸⁹

XXXIV. To the argument of Aureol ⁹⁰ it is said first that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, it does not suffice to say that one angel could be created who would know himself through his essence and all other things through a single species; and that, if a superior angel were created above him, he would not understand without species, but through a more universal species, insofar as through it he would know more reasons and conceptions of things. First, because just as St. Thomas holds it to be an inconvenience that a separate substance should know all things through its essence, so too he holds it to be an inconvenience that it should understand all things through a single species, as appears at this place. — Second, because he says not only that higher substances understand through more universal species, but also through fewer. Indeed, he posits them as more universal only because, while they represent all those things which are represented by the species of lower substances, they are nevertheless fewer than they: from which it follows that they must also be more universal.

It is said second, that Saint Thomas speaks of the cognition of the separate substances according to the order now established among them, through Dionysius, chapter 12 of the Celestial Hierarchy, who is believed to have been taught these things by the Apostle Paul and to have made them manifest to us. And therefore, since Dionysius himself held that the higher beings possess a more universal knowledge, Saint Thomas explains this mode by positing that the supreme separate substance understands through certain species; then, descending, the lower a substance is, the more the intelligible species are multiplied in it. But what God is able to do he leaves to the divine providence and foreknowledge itself.

It is said, however, thirdly that, given the case of the creation of higher intelligences, a superior would always understand through fewer species. For new representative species of new natures to be created would always be created in inferiors: and thus, with the species of inferiors multiplied, there would always be more species in inferiors than in superiors. For example, if the supreme substance understood through two species, and some substance superior to it were created, that superior would also understand through two species: for in the substance which was supreme and understood through two species there would be posited a species of the newly created substance, and thus it would no longer understand through two but through three species, and so on for the others. Hence it follows that a superior newly created would always understand through fewer species: not indeed by diminution of the binary in the newly created substance, but by the addition of a species in the inferior substance. This can be gathered from St. Thomas, Prima, q. 56, a. 2, ad 4, where he says that if God had instituted making more angels or more natures of things, he would have impressed more intelligible species upon angelic minds. It must be noted, however, that in such a case not only would there be fewer species in the newly created substance, but also more universal ones: for it would understand through those species an inferior substance, which understands itself through its own substance, not through a species. It is also likely that through its species, even by natural cognition, as St. Thomas seems to wish, II Sent., d. 3, q. 2 ⁹¹, a. 2, ad 2, it would understand more rationes of things than inferior substances.