Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas had determined the nature of the intellectual substance, and its union with and separation from matter, he now determines concerning its cognition ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines the cognition of such a substance on the part of the one knowing; second, on the part of the object known, in chapter XCVIII.

¶ On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of cognition itself with respect to the first act; second, with respect to the second act, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he demonstrates the proposition; second, he draws certain corollaries from it ².

I. As to the first, the following conclusion is proposed ³: Separate substances do not acquire intellective cognition from sensible things, that is, from things which are outside the soul in matter, as the human intellect does.

It is proved first ⁴. Separate substances do not have bodies naturally united to them. Therefore they do not receive intellectual cognition from sensible things. — The consequence is proved. Because every cognitive substance that receives its cognition from sensible things has sensitive cognition, by which sensible things are naturally apt to be apprehended according to their own nature; and consequently it has a body naturally united to it.

For the declaration of this argument, it must be noted, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas at Prima, q. LV, a. 2, ad 2, that the esse of a form in the imagination, which is an esse without matter but not without material conditions, is a mean between the esse of a form in matter, which is both with matter and with material conditions, and the esse of a form in the intellect, which is abstracted both from matter and from material conditions. And because one does not pass from one extreme to the other except through a mean, as is clear from Physics V ⁵, therefore a separate substance could not transfer a thing from an esse wholly material to an esse wholly immaterial unless it first reduced it to imaginable esse. Since it cannot do this, because it has no body, it cannot receive knowledge from sensible things. And this is the foundation of the argument set forth here.

II. But against this foundation Scotus argues, II Sent., d. III, q. ult. ⁶; and IV, d. XLV, q. II, ad 2 ⁷. First, because *what is a medium for a lesser power need not be a medium for a greater power. But the intellect in a separate substance is more perfect than in us. Therefore it does not follow that, if the imaginable is a medium in us, it is likewise so in an angel.

Second. If being imaginable is per se a medium, it is either on the side of the thing in itself, or on the side of the power. If on the side of the object, then not even God could understand except by means of a phantasm or an imagination. If on the side of the power, then it is not necessary that it be a medium for the angel, even though it is a medium for us. — Or one could also say that it is not a medium for us, but an extreme: so that being imaginable and being sensible are two extremes (namely, on the one side), or as it were one extreme, relative to being intelligible.

III. For the understanding of this reasoning of St. Thomas, it must first be considered that there are two kinds of medium: namely, a medium in being (in essendo), and a medium in causing. A medium in being is that which, by its esse absolutely considered, mediates between two things in such a way that it is of itself closer to each of them than they are to one another: as the middle place between two places, and the tepid between the hot and the cold. A medium in causing is that which mediates between cause and effect, as the closer and more immediate cause of the effect: as man begetting is a medium in causing between the sun, which causes generation, and the man begotten by it.

2. It must be considered, second, that in each mode there can be a twofold mean between certain things: namely, a mean per se in the first way, and a mean secondarily. A mean per se in the first way is that which has the character of being a mean between those things by its own proper account: as what I call less white and what I call less black is a mean per se in the first way between intensely white and intensely black. But a mean secondarily is that which is not a mean by its own proper account, but by the account of that to which it belongs first and per se to be a mean: as red is a mean secondarily between white and black, and every intermediate color taken in itself. — Proportionally, too, the mean in causing is distinguished into a mean per se in the first way and a mean secondarily.

The passage through a medium, in the first and per se sense, when the transition is made from one extreme to the other, is so necessary that one cannot arrive from one extreme to the other, the order of nature being preserved, unless the passage is made through such a medium. For no natural agent can transmute a body from supremely white to supremely black unless it first transmutes it to less white; although God, who is above the order of nature, can do this without a medium. Likewise the sun cannot generate a man except through a man as medium: but God can indeed do this. — The passage through a medium in the secondary sense, however, is not so necessary, but the transition from one extreme to the other can be made without the passage being made through it: just as one can pass from white to black without passing through red.

3. It must be considered, thirdly, that material esse, intelligible esse, and imaginable esse (understanding by "imaginable" every esse in sense) can be attributed to sensible nature in two ways: in one way, as receptive, when it passes from one esse to another; in the other way, as the active principle of cognition, namely, so that it be a condition of that cognition insofar as it acts with respect to the knowledge of itself.

If esse is considered as imaginable, insofar as it is attributed to sensible form as to a subject, it is thus the medium per se and first in being between material esse and intelligible esse: for by its own proper account it participates in sensible esse in this, that it is esse conjoined with individual conditions; but it participates in intelligible esse in this, that it is esse without matter, which esse cannot belong to a nature having esse in singulars as such; and consequently it approaches each of these more than they approach each other. From this it follows that a sensible nature cannot, the natural order being preserved, be reduced from wholly material esse to wholly immaterial esse, which is intelligible esse, unless it is first reduced to imaginable esse: although God, who is above the order of nature, can lead it from one esse to the other without imaginable esse. And therefore, since the power of the separate substances is determined to the order of nature, it cannot operate beyond the natural order by reducing a sensible nature from wholly material esse to wholly immaterial esse, which is intelligible esse, without the medium of esse, which is imaginable esse; but if it were to reduce it from wholly material esse to wholly immaterial esse in itself, it would first have to lead it to some esse in sense or in imagination.

If also the imaginabile esse is considered as attributed to sensible nature as a motivating principle toward intellection, then it is likewise an essential and per se medium between the material esse of sensible nature and its intelligible esse, which is produced by it. For a wholly material nature cannot be the immediate agent in causing an intelligible species in the intellect unless it is first elevated to some immaterial esse: because nothing acts by its own power upon something of a higher order. — If it is said that the material thing outside the intellect concurs in causing the intelligible species in the intellect, not indeed principally, but as the instrument of the agent intellect: therefore it can cause it by the power of the latter, although it cannot do so by its own proper power: — this does not hold. Because, as Saint Thomas says in the Prima, q. xlv, a. 5, an instrument does not share in the action of a superior cause except insofar as it operates by something proper to itself toward the effect of the principal agent. Hence, if the material cannot in any way act upon the wholly immaterial of itself, it must, if it is to be a fitting instrument for acting upon it, be elevated to some degree by which it can in some way act upon it. And this indeed occurs when it is reduced to the imaginabile esse, which is in man in some way of the order of intelligibles, inasmuch as from its generation it is illumined by the light of the agent intellect ⁸.

4. The argument of St. Thomas, therefore, as it is set forth here and explained in the First Part ⁹, proceeds from the natural order of the diverse esse of sensible nature, insofar as these are attributed to it not only as receptive but also as a motive principle toward the intellection of itself. Hence it is shown here that intellective cognition of separate substances cannot be derived from sensibles, from the very order of sensitive cognition to intellective cognition: namely, because sensibles, inasmuch as they are sensible—that is, insofar as they are outside the soul in matter—are naturally apt to be apprehended by sense; and therefore sensitive cognition must precede intellective cognition, which is received from sensibles. And thus sensible nature must first move sense, and consequently receive some immaterial esse, before it moves the intellect; for they are apprehended by sense for no other reason than that they cause their likeness in the sense.

Scotus, however, was deceived in this matter: he supposed that when he said Saint Thomas held that an angelic intellect cannot reduce material forms to intelligible esse unless it first reduces them to the esse of imagined forms, Saint Thomas was speaking of the esse of sensible nature only as attributed to it as to a merely receptive subject—as though the intellect, or whatever other agent, were related as agent, and nature were related as purely passive, namely as that to which diverse esse are attributed, and in no way actively concur to cause those diverse esse of its own. But this is not the mind of Saint Thomas. For neither in him nor in Aristotle does the intellect alone, or any other power receiving cognition from the senses, cause the intelligible or sensible species; rather, the object must also concur in its causation. Hence he holds that no intellectual nature can give a wholly immaterial esse to a sensible thing unless it first gives it imaginable esse; nor can it use the thing itself, having material esse, to cause intelligible esse, unless the thing itself has first caused imaginable esse in that intellectual nature.

But even if the nature were related to all those acts of esse in a merely passive way, still the created intellect could not lead that nature from the material esse it has outside the intellect to intelligible esse, unless it were first reduced by the intellective nature itself to imaginable esse, as we have shown.

IV. To the first argument of Scotus, then ¹⁰, insofar as it could be brought against this explanation, it is said that the essential medium, which, as we have said, can be imagined as mediating between material esse and immaterial esse, is a medium for the greater power just as for the lesser among the naturally enumerated powers—of which kind is the intellective power of a separate substance; since it is an essential medium and per se first:

Although a supernatural virtue ought not to be a mean, as we have shown. Therefore the argument of St. Thomas proceeds concerning the intellect itself just as it does concerning the human intellect.

2. To the second it is said first that "being imaginable as a per se medium on the side of the object in itself" can be understood in three ways: namely, either as the object is considered under the aspect of the term of cognition; or as it is considered under the aspect of the term of the action preceding cognition, by which, namely, the intelligible species is produced; or as the object is considered under the aspect of the motive for its own cognition.

In the first way, the sense is that a sensible nature cannot terminate the intellection of any knower according to intelligible esse unless it first terminates its imaginative cognition according to imaginable esse. — And then it is said that it is not a per se medium on the side of the object precisely and absolutely: because, if it were so, neither God, as was argued, nor a separate substance could be borne toward the intelligible esse of a sensible nature without first imagining it.

In the second mode, the sense is that a sensible object cannot receive intelligible esse in anyone's intellect unless it first receives imaginable esse in that knower himself; or, which is the same thing, an intelligible species of a sensible thing cannot be caused in the intellect unless a phantasm is first caused in the phantasy or imagination of the one understanding. — And then it is said that imaginable esse is not a per se medium on the side of the object considered in itself and absolutely, since God co-created intelligible species of sensible things in angelic minds, in which he placed no phantasms; but it is indeed a medium on the side of the object insofar as it receives such esse through the action of one abstracting the nature from matter and receiving cognition from sensible things. For a material nature, given the order of nature, cannot by the power of one receiving cognition from sensible things be purified through abstraction from singulars entirely from matter and from material conditions, unless it is first purified from matter without purification from material conditions, which occurs according to imaginable esse.

In the third way, sense is such that an object having esse in matter cannot move the intellect to knowledge of itself by causing in it an intelligible species of itself, unless a phantasm, caused by that object in the imagination, concurs. — And then the imaginable esse is the medium per se on the side of the object taken absolutely.

In these two latter ways it must be said that imaginable esse is in some way a per se medium, as was evident, on the side of the object: but not in the first way, with which the argument was concerned.

3. It is said second, that it is also a per se medium on the side of the created power that leads the nature from material esse to intelligible esse: since, as was evident in the response to the first argument, no created knower can lead the nature by abstraction from material and singular esse to intelligible esse unless it first leads it to imaginable esse.

4. It is said thirdly, that imaginable esse and sensible esse in matter cannot have the character of one extreme, or of two extremes on the same side: since imaginable esse is posterior to extrinsic material esse, is in some way an effect of it, and shares something of the condition of material esse and something of the condition of intelligible esse, as was shown above ¹¹; and thus it is closer to either extreme than one extreme is to the other. For although both are sensible esse in some way according to a certain common character, nevertheless imaginable esse is not that sensible esse which belongs by nature to a thing existing in matter outside the soul, but is of a higher grade: because the latter is wholly material, whereas this is in some way immaterial.

V. Second, ¹². The intellective power of a separate substance is higher than the intellective power of the human soul. Therefore it has a higher object than the sensible thing existing outside the intellect, and than the phantasm. Therefore it has as its object that which is intelligible in act. Therefore it does not receive its knowledge from sensible things. — The first inference is proved: because a higher power must have a higher object. Now the object of the human intellect is the phantasm, which is higher in the order of objects than the sensible thing existing outside the soul. — The second inference is also evident: because nothing is higher than the phantasm in the genus of knowable objects except what is intelligible in act.

2. Concerning this proposition, that the phantasm is higher in the order of objects than the sensible thing existing outside the soul, it must be noted that Saint Thomas does not say the phantasm is absolutely higher than sensible things, for this would be false, since the phantasm is a bodily accident, whereas the sensible nature is a corporeal substance; rather he added, in the order of objects, namely of things knowable. For the more a knowable object recedes from matter, the higher an object it is, in this way: since each thing is knowable through some degree of abstraction from matter. Now the phantasm recedes from matter more than does the sensible nature existing outside the soul. For the phantasm is without matter as a phantasm, that is, insofar as it is a likeness of a thing existing outside the soul: because it does not have esse in the natural matter of that form, although it is joined to material conditions, which are determination to this here and now, and the like. But the sensible thing outside the soul has esse in matter, and is united to material conditions, as we have said many times.

3. Concerning the foundation and force of the argument, it must be considered that, if the intellect is to be moved by some object and to receive cognition from it, that object must be connatural to the intellect and proportionate to it: because an object otherwise has no power of itself to move the intellect, though perhaps it can do so together with a proportionate object. For we see that, although our intellect knows separate substances in some way, it does not nevertheless receive cognition and intelligible species from them, since they are not objects proportionate to our intellect; rather, from sensible quiddities, which are objects proportionate to it, it receives cognition and intelligible species. If, therefore, the intellect of a separate substance received cognition from sensibles, those sensibles would have to be objects proportionate to it. But this is false: for since the intellect in them is of a higher grade than ours, and phantasms are objects proportionate to our intellect, there must be something higher as an object proportionate to the intellects of separate substances. Therefore one must not say that they receive cognition from sensibles, but rather that they know intelligibles in first act. And herein consists the force of the argument.

4. From these things the defect of Scotus's reasoning is evident, in the place cited ¹³, by which he wishes to prove that the intelligible in act is not the object of a separate intellect, because the adequate object of that intellect is not one immaterial nature, but something common according to predication which is common both to material and to immaterial things.

For it is said that Saint Thomas is not speaking of the adequate object, but of the connatural and proportionate object, by which a separate intellect would be naturally moved, if it were to be moved by an object. For just as the quiddity of a material thing is the connatural and moving object of our intellect, so the quiddity of a thing abstracted from matter yet having esse distinct from itself is the connatural object of the separate intellect, by which it would be moved, as is clear in the First Part, q. XII, a. 4. And because such a quiddity in itself is actually intelligible according to its natural esse, therefore Saint Thomas rightly says that the intelligible in act is the object of such an intellect, namely its connatural and proportionate object.

VI. Third. Those things that are intelligible in themselves in act are higher in the order of intelligibles than those things which are not intelligible except because we make them intelligible, such as all sensible things are. Therefore, since these latter are what our intellect understands, namely as proportionate objects from which it receives knowledge, the intellect of a separate substance, which is superior to our intellect, will understand things per se intelligible in act, namely as objects proportionate to itself. — The consequence is evident, because the order of intelligibles follows the order of intellects.

VII. Fourth. A separate substance is an intellect, that is, an intellectual substance, existing per se, not in any body. Therefore its intellectual operation will be of intelligibles that are not grounded in any body. Therefore it does not receive knowledge from sensible things. — The first consequence is proved.

Because the mode of a thing's proper operation corresponds proportionally to the mode of its substance and nature. — The second is also proven. Because all intelligibles received from the senses are in some way grounded in certain bodies, namely in phantasms, which are in bodily organs.

2. For the clarification of this argument, it must first be considered that Saint Thomas holds that the intelligible species caused in the intellect through the senses are received from sensible things. Such species, namely, as are the quiddities of material things, are not in themselves actually intelligible with respect to their material esse, but are made actually intelligible by the intellect abstracting them from matter. Now such intelligibles are said to be grounded in the phantasm because they lie hidden within it and exist there potentially, as in a cause from which they have their species: for the agent intellect causes the species with respect to their immaterial esse; but with respect to their specific determination—inasmuch, that is, as this is the species of a stone or of a horse—they are caused by the phantasm itself in the manner of an instrumental efficient cause. For this is the species of a stone and that the species of a horse precisely because this one is caused by the phantasm of a stone and that one by the phantasm of a horse. But the species which are in the intellect of a separate substance, even those of material things, have no foundation in the body as in a productive cause.

It must be considered, second, concerning the proof of the first inference, that Saint Thomas added the word proportionally because the mode of nature and of operation need not be absolutely the same, since operation is of a different rational character from the substance and nature of the one operating. For it is not necessary that if a nature is a form giving esse to matter, the operation should likewise be a form giving esse to matter, as is clear in the case of the intellectual operation of our soul. But the mode of operation must correspond to the mode of nature proportionally. For since operation, as such, is ordered to an object both as terminating it and as its principle through its own likeness, from which it receives its species, the mode befitting the proper operation of anything is the mode of its object insofar as it is its object. And therefore for the mode of a proper operation to correspond proportionally to the mode of the operating nature is for the operation to be terminated at a thing having a similar mode of being to the mode of the operating nature, as at its proper and proportionate object. From this it follows most fittingly, as Saint Thomas argues, that since a separate substance is an intellect not in any body, its proper operation will also be terminated at an intelligible not existing in any body, as at its proper and connatural object, but at an object separated from body.

VIII. Fifth. Separate substances are in act in intelligible esse. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. For just as being in potency with respect to all sensible forms belongs to prime matter, which is the lowest thing in the order of sensible things, while those things that are above matter must have their form in act, by which they are constituted in sensible esse; so too being in potency with respect to all intelligibles belongs to the lowest thing in the order of intelligibles, which is the human intellect; whereas separate substances, which are above the human possible intellect, must be in act in intelligible esse. — The consequence is also proved. For an intellect that receives its cognition from sensible things is not in act in intelligible esse, but in potency.

It must be noted that, since a power is in itself equally disposed toward all its connatural and proportionate objects to be known, it must by nature be disposed in the same way toward the species of those objects, as regards having or not having them from nature: for there is no greater reason that the species of one object should be innate to it than of another. Therefore, if by nature it has what makes it lack one, it must lack all: hence we see that the human intellect has from nature the species of no material quiddity, but is in potency with respect to all. If, however, one species were innate to it by nature, all the others would have to be innate as well. On this account St. Thomas argues rightly that, because the intellect of a separate substance is higher than the human intellect, it must be absolutely in act within the genus of intelligibles—that is, it must have in itself intelligible species by nature, by which the intellect is brought into act in intelligible esse—and consequently it is in potency with respect to none; namely, because if it has one, it must have all, and it is in no way in potency to any natural intelligible.

IX. Sixth. The perfection of a separate substance consists in understanding. Therefore its understanding does not depend on sensible things, in such a way that it receives cognition from them. — The consequence is proved. Because the perfection of a superior nature does not depend on an inferior nature.

2. Concerning the proof of the consequence, a doubt arises. For in the same way it would be proved that the human intellect does not receive cognition from sensible things: because human intellectual nature is also nobler than non-intellectual sensible nature.

It is answered that that assumption is understood of the perfection of a nature not in any way whatever, but as belonging to a higher order of things. For thus, as has been shown above, the nature of a lower order cannot contribute, even instrumentally, to the perfection of the nature of a higher order. And therefore, since a sensible thing is of a lower order than a separate substance, it cannot operate toward its proper perfection. — But the case is not the same with the intellectual soul. For it is not of an altogether higher order than sensible things, but belongs to the order of sensibles, existing as it does in matter, though it holds the supreme degree within that order. And further, it is moved by sensible things only insofar as they have been made actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect, by reason of the phantasm, according to the modes explained in what precedes ¹⁴. But in this way they are of the same order as the intellect, though they are of a lower degree within that order.

X. As to the second principal point, Saint Thomas draws three corollaries from what has been said ¹⁵.

The first is: In separate substances there is no agent and possible intellect, unless perhaps equivocally. This is proved in two ways. First, namely, because they are not found in the soul except on account of the fact that it receives cognition from sensible things. But separate substances do not receive cognition from sensible things. — Second, because, speaking of these, Aristotle, in Book III of On the Soul, says that they must be posited in the soul.

It must be noted that, strictly speaking, the possible intellect is called that which in itself is indifferent to intelligible forms and to their privation, namely, which is related to them in itself as a potentiality of contradiction. But improperly speaking, an intellect may be called possible which is informed by intelligible species and is related to them as potency to act. — In the first way, Saint Thomas denies a possible intellect in separate substances; but not in the second way.

Likewise, properly speaking, the agent intellect is called the intellect that makes in act those things which are in themselves intelligible in potency, by imprinting their species upon the possible intellect. Improperly, however, it may be called the agent intellect that intellectual light by which the intellect understands intelligibles. — And Saint Thomas also denies this, taken properly, to the angels; but he does not deny it to them when taken improperly.

For this reason, when he had said that these differences of the intellect are not found in separate substances, he added, unless perhaps equivocally. From this it is clear that the arguments of Scotus in Book II Sent., d. III, q. ult. ¹⁶ are not against the mind of St. Thomas. For he himself proves that in separate substances there is a possible intellect improperly so called. This St. Thomas does not deny.

XI. The corollary is: Local distance cannot impede the cognition of a separate substance. — It is evident: because local distance is related to the intellect only per accidens, insofar as the intellect receives from sense; since things intelligible in act, insofar as they move the intellect, are not in a place. But a separate substance does not receive intellectual cognition from sensible things.

It must be noted that we can understand this corollary in two ways. First, by supposing some local distance between a separate substance and its knowable object. And then, since a separate substance is not in place except definitively, insofar as it operates in some place, one separate substance will not be able to stand at a local distance from another except by reason of the distance of the places in which they operate. And then the sense of the corollary is that, however the aforesaid distance may be between a separate substance and its proper object, it nevertheless does nothing to impede cognition. The reason for this is that distance between knower and known does nothing to or against cognition except insofar as the knowable has to move the sense, because sensible things move the sense according to a determinate distance, since they determine a place for themselves. But things actually intelligible, because they do not determine a place for themselves—indeed they are not in place except by reason of an operation extrinsic toward something else—do not require any determinate distance according to which they move the intellect, but can move it from any distance whatever.

Second, we can understand the corollary by denying all local distance between the separate intelligent substance and the intelligible substance: so that the sense is that local distance cannot impede the cognition of the separate substance with respect to its connatural object, because there is no local distance between them; since neither is such an intelligent substance in a place, nor is the substance that is its connatural object, namely another separate substance.

Although either sense can possess truth, the first nevertheless seems more in accord with the mind of St. Thomas. Hence he does not deny simply that things actually intelligible are not in place; rather, he says that they are not in place insofar as they move the intellect. As if to say: they can indeed be in place, and consequently be locally distant from one another; yet being in place is not a condition of them as having the power to move the intellect, as happens with sensible things, which move the sense precisely as determined to place and to time.

It must also be understood that, when it is said that intelligibles in act move the intellect, this can be understood either by formal motion or by effective motion. If by formal motion, then it is simply true that intelligibles in act move the intellect of a separate substance, and every intellect by which they are understood through a species. For they are forms of the intellect moving the intellect formally to intellection. — If, however, by effective motion, then the proposition of St. Thomas is to be understood under a condition: namely, that even if intelligibles in act were to move the intellect of a separate substance by causing their species in it, they would nevertheless not be in place insofar as they would move the intellect; and thus no local distance could prevent a separate substance from being moved by an intelligible in act.

XII. The third corollary is: Time is not mixed into their intellectual operation. — This is evident, because things intelligible in act, just as they are without place, are also without time; for only those things are measured by time which are in some way in place, since time follows local motion. But the operation of our intellect has time mixed into it because we receive knowledge from phantasms, which regard a determinate time. Hence it comes about that in composition and division our intellect always joins on a time—present, past, or future; but not when understanding what a thing is. For the intellect understands what a thing is by abstracting the intelligible from sensible conditions; but it composes and divides by applying previously abstracted intelligibles to things.

XIII. Concerning the principal conclusion ¹⁷ a doubt is raised from Scotus, in book II of the Sentences, at the place cited ¹⁸ For he argues as follows. First. A separate substance can know the singular as this. And it cannot know it by means of a universal concept, because this nature, as this, is not contained determinately under universality. Therefore it is known through its own species. But it is not probable that all the species of possible singulars were co-created in it for it to know, since these are infinite. Therefore it can receive some species from a singular.

Second. * From knowledge of quiddities and universals, a contingent composition cannot be known. But the existence or non-existence of things is contingent. Therefore, in order that it know such things, it does not suffice for it to have knowledge of universals. Therefore it receives this knowledge from things.* — It is confirmed: * because the rationes of the terms whose species it has connately either represent determinately that I will sit tomorrow, or indeterminately. If determinately, then it is impossible for it, through those very terms, to have the knowledge that this is contingent. If indeterminately, then through these terms it will never have that I determinately sit. Therefore it must receive the knowledge of this from elsewhere.*

Third. * It has intuitive knowledge of the singular. Therefore it receives knowledge from the singular.* The consequence is proved ¹⁹ * Because for intuitive knowledge the thing itself necessarily concurs as present.* It is confirmed. * Because it is impossible for intuitive knowledge to be by some representation representing in the same way whether the thing remains or does not remain.*

XIV. Concerning the first corollary also ²⁰ a doubt is raised, following Scotus, where above ²¹, about the agent intellect. For an active power that is of perfection in an inferior nature ought not to be denied to a superior nature. But the agent intellect is an active power that is of perfection in the intellectual soul. Therefore etc.

It is confirmed from the same foundation ²². Because it belongs to the perfection of our intellect that it have something by which it can actively acquire the species of all quiddities. Therefore it must not be denied of a more perfect intellect.

2. Concerning the second corollary ²³ a doubt is also raised from Scotus, IV Sent., d. XLV, q. II ²⁴. For Augustine, in the book de Cura pro Mortuis agenda ²⁵, and Gregory, in the Homily ²⁶, say that separated souls do not know the things that happen here. — Likewise Aristotle, VIII Physics ²⁷, holds that the substance moving the orb is present to that part whence the motion begins, namely where it is swiftest. In the Seventh Physics also ²⁸ he wills that agent and patient be together. Therefore local distance impedes cognition.

3. Concerning the last corollary ²⁹, where it is said that our intellect does not join time to its understanding of what a thing is, but that in composing and dividing it always joins time, present, past, or future, a doubt is raised. For, as he himself says in this corollary, time attaches to the operation of our intellect because we receive cognition from phantasms, which regard determinate time. But the cognition of what a thing is is received from phantasms just as composition and division are. Therefore, by the same reason that time is mixed into one operation, it is mixed into the other.

XV. For the clarification of what is objected against the principal conclusion ³⁰, two things must be understood ³¹. The first is drawn from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, Prima, q. LVII, a. 3 ³², and De Veritate Verit., q. VIII, a. 9 ³³ and 12 ³⁴: namely, that the intelligible species is required on the part of the knower so that it may represent the thing known to the knower by way of likeness. But an actual likeness cannot represent a singular thing in act unless that thing exists; just as the likeness of this white thing in the eye, if it were preserved when this white thing departed, would not represent it except while it existed in act. For the species of a singular, insofar as it is the species of a singular thing, represents that thing under actual existence, because the conditions of a singular material thing are its determination to this here and now. Therefore, when the thing itself does not exist, such a species is not actually a representative likeness of it. And since a relation can arise from a change in only one of the extremes, it can happen that something which was not actually the likeness of a certain thing begins to be its likeness through that thing's change alone, while the likeness itself remains unmoved. Hence it follows that, since the species present in the intellect of a separate substance are representative not only of the universal quiddity but of all the individuals of that quiddity, as will be shown below ³⁵; if certain singulars do not yet exist, the species of their quiddity is not their actual but their potential likeness; but once they have esse in nature, it is their likeness in act. And therefore, since the species represents nothing to the intellect by way of an intelligible object unless it is actually its likeness, it follows that the species which previously did not represent to the intellect singulars not yet existing, afterwards represents them to itself once they have been brought into act. This happens, however, not because of any real change in the species, but because of a change in the object, which previously did not possess in act the universal nature of which the species is representative, and afterwards possesses it. For Socrates, not existing, does not have human nature; existing, he has it. And therefore now he is assimilated to the intelligible species through the nature he possesses in act, whereas before he was not assimilated to it, because he did not have the nature through which he would be assimilated to it. Hence Saint Thomas says, Prima, q. LVII, a. 3, ad 3, that things that will exist in the future do not yet have the nature by which they would be assimilated to the angelic species. And in De Malo, q. XVI, a. 7 ³⁶, he says that singulars, before they exist in act, do not participate in the nature of the species. And in Prima, q. LVII, a. 3, ad 3 ³⁷, he says that future things do not yet have the nature by which they would be assimilated to the angelic species.

2. But a doubt arises concerning this statement. For St. Thomas, in I Metaphysics, lecture 1, holds that the proposition "Socrates is a man" is per se: because, if Socrates were defined, "man" would be placed in his definition. Now it is established from I Posterior Analytics ³⁸ that everything per se is necessary, and consequently eternal. Therefore this predicate "man" always belongs to Socrates. Therefore it is false that Socrates, not existing, does not yet have the quiddity of man.

It is answered that "man belongs to Socrates" can be understood in two ways: in one way, according to a logical consideration; in another way, according to real esse outside the intellect. In the first way, man belongs to Socrates per se, and this proposition, "Socrates is a man," is per se and of eternal truth, because the predicate is of the essence of the subject. And it is in this way that Saint Thomas understands that proposition to be per se in I Metaphysics. — In the second way, man does not belong to Socrates per se and always, but only when he is in act. And thus is understood what Saint Thomas says elsewhere, that singulars, before they exist in act, do not participate in the nature of the species ³⁹.

Here it must be noted that the intelligible species of an angel is related differently to the quiddity, and differently to the individual of the quiddity. For it represents the quiddity first and per se in itself; and because the quiddity, considered in itself, has only quidditative esse and abstracts from every esse of existence, therefore, in order that it be assimilated to the intelligible species, it is not required that it have any esse of existence in reality. But the singular is not represented first, but only insofar as it participates in the quiddity. And because the accidents that individuate the quiddity and constitute the individual, being extraneous to the quiddity, do not accompany the quiddity in its quidditative esse, but only in its real esse, therefore, in order that the singular participate in the quiddity in such a way that it can actually be assimilated to the intelligible species, it is required that it be in actual existence, participating in that quiddity in real esse.

3. It must be known, secondly ⁴⁰, that Saint Thomas does not posit that distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge under those words, nor even in the sense in which many posit it, namely, that intuitive knowledge is that which is had of a thing without a cognizable species, while abstractive knowledge is that which comes about through a species; for in Saint Thomas there is no knowledge which occurs without a species, or without something playing the role of a species. But if we call intuitive knowledge that which is of an existing thing as it exists, or of the particular as it is particular, and abstractive knowledge that which is of the quiddity of a thing absolutely, then we shall find it in the doctrine of Saint Thomas, but under other words. For Saint Thomas distinguishes knowledge, in Prima, q. LXXXVII, a. 1, and Verit., q. X, a. 8, into cognition with respect to whether it is (an est), and cognition with respect to what it is (quid est). But in the First Part, q. XIV ⁴¹, and de Verit., q. II ⁴², he distinguishes it into knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple apprehension. Which distinctions are equivalent to that distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, in the manner just explained.

XVI. These suppositions being granted, to the first argument of Scotus ⁴³ it is said first that the singular can be known through the reason and species of the universal in two ways. In one way, so that it is understood through the representative species of the universal precisely and adequately. And thus it is conceded that it is not known through the reason of the universal: because its singularity is not included in the reason of the universal. — In another way, so that it is known absolutely through the universal species as representative. And thus it is denied that it is not known through the species of the universal. For it does not conflict with one and the same species being of a universal nature and representative of its singularity, even though the individuating principles are not contained determinately under the quiddity, as existing, namely, as part of its reason.

It is said secondly, in response to the consequent, for greater understanding, that that a singular is known by its proper species can be understood in two ways. In one way, such that the species is adequate to it, so that through it nothing else is known but the thing itself. And then it is false that it is known by its proper species. — In another way, such that it is known through a species which represents it distinctly and determinately. And thus it is represented by a proper species. But then there need not be as many species as individuals: rather one species, which is representative of the quiddity, excellently represents all the natural conditions of any individual of that quiddity.

2. To the second it is said that, although through knowledge of quiddities and universals as such a contingent composition cannot be known, yet through the species of the quiddity which represents not only the quiddity but also all its natural conditions—such are the species of separate intellects—such a contingent composition can be known. Hence such cognition need not be caused in the intellect of a separate substance by the things themselves.

In confirmation it is said that the species of terms represent determinately that I am sitting, if I sit: because the species of human nature existing in a separate intellect represents the very quiddity itself, and all its singulars in existence, and all the conditions of those singulars actually inhering in them. And by such a species there is also obtained the knowledge that this, namely my sitting, is contingent: because by the same species the separate substance knows which things are substantial in reality, and which are accidental; and as singulars vary, so by the same species it knows their variation.

3. To the third, the consequence is denied. — To the proof it is said that, although the thing necessarily concurs to intuitive knowledge as present, it does not nevertheless concur necessarily under the aspect of a motive of the intellect, but rather as terminating the act of cognition.

For confirmation, it is said that the way in which the species represents the thing in the same manner, whether the thing exists or does not exist, can be understood in two ways: in one way, as the uniformity of representation holding on the side of the representing form; in the other way, as holding on the side of the thing represented. If it is understood in the first way, the assumption is false: for by a form in no way varied in itself, and representing the thing whether it exists or does not exist, intuitive cognition of the thing can be had as long as it exists. — But if it is understood in the second way, the minor premise, understood implicitly, is denied. For the species concreated with the angel does not represent the thing in the same manner while it exists and while it does not exist: just as neither does the thing represented hold itself in the same manner while it exists and while it does not exist, speaking of a singular thing. But it is indeed true that it always represents the very quiddity in itself absolutely, with respect to those things that belong essentially to the quiddity, in the same manner, whether the thing exists or does not exist: because those things are not varied; and the quiddity considered absolutely abstracts from existence and from other particular conditions.

XVII. Against the arguments against the first corollary ⁴⁴ It is said at the same time that the proposition, Whatever perfection is in an inferior nature, is much more in a superior nature, holds true only of things of the same genus, not of things of different genera, and only of a perfection that no imperfection accompanies. For something can be a perfection in an inferior nature that would nevertheless be an imperfection in a superior nature, on account of some imperfection accompanying that perfection: just as to generate one's like is a perfection in a corruptible nature, but not in an incorruptible nature; because this perfection is accompanied by this imperfection, namely that the nature cannot be perpetuated in one individual, and in one individual it does not have every perfection that is naturally suited to belong to it absolutely; but this imperfection, which is presupposed by this perfection, is repugnant to an incorruptible nature, and especially to an immaterial nature; therefore in that nature this perfection of the corruptible nature is not found. Similarly, then, in the case at hand, having the active power of making things intelligible in potency actually intelligible through a certain abstraction presupposes having a possible intellect, not perfected by intelligible forms. And because this imperfection is repugnant to the nature of a separate substance, since the opposite perfection belongs to it naturally—for their intellect is naturally perfected with all the species of created things—therefore neither is such a perfection as the agent intellect naturally suited to belong to them.

But if it be urged that then the higher nature would be less perfect than the lower nature, because it lacks some perfection found in the lower nature: — the consequence is denied. For although the higher nature does not possess that perfection of the lower nature formally, it nevertheless possesses something more excellent than it, in which the perfection of the lower nature is contained in a unified way, and by a certain excellence; just as heat and the form of fire are contained eminently in the sun.

XVIII. To the objections against the second corollary, it is answered: and first, to the authorities of Augustine and Gregory, it is said that, although they hold that separated souls do not know what is done here, they nevertheless do not say this is because of local distance, but because of another cause, which St. Thomas touches upon in the First Part, q. 89, a. 8: namely, that the souls of the dead, by divine ordination, and according to the mode of being (essendi) they possess, are cut off from the company of the living and joined to the company of the separate substances.

But against the authority of Aristotle it is said that we do not hold that intelligible objects move the intellect of a separate substance effectively. And therefore they need not have local proximity to those substances, as the Philosopher wishes the mover to be together with the thing moved.

Granted also that the objects which are intelligible would effectively move such an intellect in act, it would still not be necessary that they be with it locally; rather, there would be required a proximity of a certain order, namely, that the intellect be movable and actualizable by such an object, and that the object be a sufficient mover of it. For both such an intellect, as actualizable by an object, and that object itself, as the mover of that intellect, do not require that they be in place; just as the motive power of a body must be near it according to place—indeed, must be in the same place—insofar as the body moved is in place.

XIX. To the objection raised against the third corollary, it is said that it does not proceed against the mind of St. Thomas, if what is said in the corollary is properly understood. For it is one thing for time to be adjacent to the operation of our intellect; and another for the intellect to join time to its own operation. For time to be adjacent to an operation is for it in some way to measure that operation: for time to be adjacent to something is for it to be present to that thing as a measure to the thing measured. But for the intellect to join time to its operation is for it to co-intend time along with the thing understood, as the measure of the thing understood, and for the conception it forms, together with the thing signified, to co-signify some distinction of time.

It is said, therefore, that time accompanies every operation, namely both the first, by which the quiddity is known, and the second, which is composition and division: not indeed on account of itself, since it is immaterial and outside motion; but on account of the phantasm existing in time and motion, insofar as it is a form existing in a bodily organ. For our intellection is measured by an instant of time with respect to its production; and by time per accidens with respect to its continuation, on account of the phantasm, sense, and imagination, from which it depends, which are in time and motion, as we have said, and this is the mind of St. Thomas, Verit., q. viii, a. 14, ad 12; I Sent., d. xxxviii, a. 3 ⁴⁵; IV Sent., d. xlix, q. iii, a. 1 ⁴⁶; I IIae, q. cxiii, a. 7, ad 5. And thus what St. Thomas says in this place is universally true, namely that time accompanies our intellectual operation from the fact that we receive knowledge from phantasms, which regard determinate time.

But although this is common to every operation of the soul, composition and division nevertheless differ from the simple apprehension of what a thing is. For when the intellect apprehends the quiddity, abstracting intelligibles from the conditions of sensible things—among which is determinate time—it does not, along with that quiddity itself, apprehend time, as though it apprehended a quiddity as belonging to some determinate time. But when it composes or divides, not only does the operation itself in some way fall under time, but it also apprehends, on the part of the thing, the union or composition of the predicate with the subject under a determinate time, and it con-signifies that time through the proposition, saying that this is, was, or will be. St. Thomas assigns the reason for this: because it composes or divides by applying previously abstracted intelligibles to things—that is, to things existing outside the soul—and consequently possessing the conditions of sensible things, which are determination to a certain place and a certain time.

That this is the sense of the words of St. Thomas when he says that our intellect always joins time in composition and division—namely, that along with the thing understood it co-understands time—is evident from his final words, in which, as if explaining what he had said, he states that the intellect composes or divides by applying previously abstracted intelligibles to things, and in this apprehension time must necessarily be co-understood.

It is therefore evident that the argument proceeds as if, for Saint Thomas, it were the same thing for time to be adjacent to the operation of the intellect and for the intellect to join time to its own operation. But we have shown this to be false. Therefore the argument does not proceed against our intended point.