Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

In the second place, Saint Thomas treats of the multitude of intellectual substances¹. Concerning this he does two things principally: first, he treats of the very multitude of such substances considered in itself; second, of the distinction among those substances that are posited as many, in the following chapter.

As to the first, he does two things: first, he recounts Aristotle's opinion; second, he shows that there are far more than Aristotle posited². As to the first, he does two things: first, he sets forth Aristotle's opinion; second, he resolves his argument³.

I. As to the first, he says that Aristotle held the separate substances to be of the same number as the motions observed in the heavens, or that can be observed, neither more nor fewer.

He argued for this, however, on the supposition made here⁴, that there are no motions in the heavens that cannot be detected by us: especially since there are not several celestial bodies of the same species. And he proves this because every motion that is in the heavens exists on account of the motion of some star, which is sensible; for the orbs carry the stars, and the motion of the carrier is on account of the motion of the thing carried.

Then he argues as follows. There are not some separate substances from which no motions proceed in the heavens. Therefore there are not more of them than the motions observed and observable in the heavens. — The consequence is evident from the supposition. — The antecedent, however, is proved. Because, if there were more substances than those which he enumerates, then some motions would also be ordered to them. The sequel is proved: because otherwise the motions would be imperfect, since the celestial motions are ordered to separate substances as to their ends.

II. For an understanding of Aristotle's opinion, it must be noted that he himself posited two orders of intellectual substances: one, namely, of those which are movers of the heavenly bodies in the manner of an efficient cause, which are called by some souls of the heavens; the other, however, of those which are the proximate ends of such motions, on account of which, that is, the motive substances move. He held that the first are united to the heavenly bodies, whether by way of form or by way of mover only, according to the various opinions concerning the animation of the heavenly bodies; but that the others are entirely separate from body. Now the necessity of positing these substances as entirely separate from body was, as St. Thomas shows, Spiritual Creatures, a. 5, according to Aristotle's mind, that since, as was said in the preceding chapter⁵, an incorporeal mover united to a body is moved per accidens with the motion of the body, whether it be united to it by way of form, or by way of mover only but applied to one determinate part of the mobile; and since uniform and regular motion must come from a mover which is moved neither per se nor per accidens: in order to preserve the uniformity and regularity of celestial motion, it was necessary to posit certain substances entirely separate, moved neither per se nor per accidens, which cause the motion of the heavens by way of end, so that from the immobility of the end there may proceed the uniformity and regularity of the motion. That this distinction of intellectual substances exists according to Aristotle's mind, St. Thomas gives us to understand when he says that the celestial motions are ordered to separate substances as to ends. But he states this more expressly in Spiritual Creatures, aa. 5 and 6; and in De Potentia, q. VI, a. 6; and in the little work entitled De Angels⁶. This distinction, moreover, is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text 48⁷, presupposing those things which he had said in the preceding passages. Averroes also touches upon it, XII Metaphysics, comment. 41: although in the book On the Substance of the Orb he seems to wish that the same thing moves the heavenly bodies both as agent and as end.

Aristotle therefore posited, in Book XII of the Metaphysics, as many wholly separate substances, moving as ends, as there are motions that are observed in the heavens or that can be observed. And because the apparent motions in the heavens are either fifty-five or forty-seven, according to the various opinions of the astronomers of his time, he concluded that there are exactly that many separate substances, neither more nor fewer.

2. Concerning that conditional, if there were not some motions ordered to separate substances posited beyond those fifty-five or forty-seven, the motions would be imperfect, it should be noted that this is proved from the fact that the celestial motions are ordered to separate substances as to their ends: that is, that every separate substance is the end of some motion, as is said in book XII of the Metaphysics, text 48. For from this it follows that the motions of the heavenly bodies ought not to be fewer than the separate substances: for an end of this kind ought not to be without something ordered to it as to its end. Therefore, if there were more separate substances than motions, it would follow that there would not be so many motions in the heavens as there ought to be. And thus it follows that the celestial motions would be imperfect, inasmuch as they would lack other motions which ought to exist: just as one would say that the universe of creatures is imperfect if it lacked any mode of being which by its nature ought to befit it, as was shown above.⁸

3. Concerning the supposit as Aristotle's reason⁹, it must be noted that the following was added, especially since there are not several heavenly bodies of the same species, in order to exclude the objection which Aristotle brings forward in Metaphysics XII, text 49Metaphys.¹⁰. For someone could say that all the motions of the heavenly bodies cannot be detected by us because there are many worlds, and consequently several heavenly bodies of the same species; and therefore, although the motions of the heavenly bodies of this world can be detected by us, the motions of another world are nevertheless unknown to us. But this objection is removed if it is held that there are not several heavenly bodies of the same species.

Concerning that proposition, There are not several heavenly bodies of the same species, it must be known that Averroes, in II On the Heavens, comment 59, seems to hold the opposite. But Saint Thomas shows, in II On the Heavens, lecture 16, that his opinion is false, and that one must hold that there are not several heavenly bodies of the same species. First, because if they were of the same species, they would have the same operations, the same effects, and the same motions, as appears in other natural things in which there are many individuals of one species. — Second, because it is repugnant to the perfection of heavenly bodies: for with Aristotle, the universe is perfect because it is one; whence it has it that it consists of all the matter of its species. We also see among lower things many individuals of one species on account of some impotence, because either one individual cannot endure forever, or it does not receive the perfect operation of the species, as is most evident in human beings. — Third, because multiplication according to species, which is formal, pertains more to the perfection of each nature than multiplication according to number, which is material. — Nor does the Commentator's argument avail, says Saint Thomas there, namely that heavenly bodies would be material. For this follows much more if they are several of one species: since the multiplication of individuals within one species comes about through the division of matter (this is had from Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, text 49). But neither is it necessary to remove matter entirely from heavenly bodies.

It must be noted, however, that the opposite of what Averroes says in Book II of the De Caelo, in the commentary cited, seems to be held in the last chapter of the De Substantia Orbis. But this apparent contradiction the Commentator himself resolves in Book II of the De Caelo, commentary 49, where he says: *Yet we must understand, when we said that they are alike in species, that the likeness is according to priority and posteriority, not according to univocation. And therefore the nature of any one individual among them is other than the nature of another in some way.

Concerning the proof of that supposition ¹¹, it must be noted that by those words, which is sensible, Saint Thomas wishes to convey, according to the mind of Aristotle, that the variation of the star to whose motion the motions of the orbs are ordered can be detected by sense; and therefore all the motions of the orbs, since from them arises this variation in the motion of the star, are either detected or can be detected. Which was the point intended.

III. Having posited Aristotle's opinion concerning the multitude of separate substances, Saint Thomas responds in the second place to his argument ¹², saying that it has no necessity. First, because if the celestial motions are ordered to separate substances as to their ends, the number of those substances cannot be concluded necessarily from the number of the motions: for in things that are for the sake of an end, necessity is taken from the end, II Physics, text 23, but not conversely. For it can be said that there are other substances of a higher nature than those which are the proximate ends of the celestial motions: just as artificial instruments exist for the sake of men who work through them, yet nothing prevents there being other men who do not work immediately through those instruments, but command those who do. — Second, because Aristotle himself says that he introduces that argument as probable, not as necessary.

2. Note that, although from among those things that are ordered to an end—especially in incorruptible things—the number of ends can be argued a posteriori, where one end corresponds to one thing ordered to that end, and to one end there corresponds one thing only that is so ordered; nevertheless the number of those things belonging to the same genus as that to which the end belongs cannot be argued of necessity. For although from the multitude of genera of instruments pertaining to the various arts one can argue the number of genera of artisans, since there are as many genera of artisans as there are genera of artificial instruments pertaining to the various arts; nevertheless the necessity of that number cannot be argued in human nature absolutely, namely, that necessarily there are just as many men, and no more, as there are genera of instruments ordered to those very men who use those instruments: for, as Saint Thomas says, there can be many other men who do not work through those instruments. Similarly, even if from the number of motions ordered to separate substances it can be concluded that there are just as many separate substances which are the ends of those very motions and use those very motions immediately as instruments; nevertheless it cannot be argued that there are not more separate substances than those which are the ends of the motions: for there can be others besides.

What St. Thomas says, therefore—that the number of separate substances cannot be concluded necessarily from the number of motions—is understood of the number of separate substances taken precisely, such that it is neither greater nor lesser. It is not, however, understood of the number of those substances that are ends, corresponding absolutely to the number of motions. For although the necessity of the end is not to be drawn from those things that are for the sake of the end, since the necessity of the prior is not taken from the posterior, but rather the necessity of the things that are for the sake of the end is taken from the end; nevertheless, the number of proximate ends must correspond to the number of things ordered to an end, where one thing ordered to an end requires one end per se, and one end has only one thing ordered to it, as we have already said; and from the number of such things ordered to an end, the number of proximate ends can be concluded a posteriori.

Hence that proposition, Every separate substance is the proximate end of some celestial motion, is not necessary: as Saint Thomas says in Book XII of the Metaphysics, ¹³

IV. As to the second principal point ¹⁴, it is proved that separate substances are far more numerous than the celestial motions are.

And it is argued first as follows. In separate substances there must be a degree according to their elevation above corporeal nature, since their esse, by reason of its genus, transcends every corporeal nature. But there are certain intellectual substances of this kind that are united to bodies as forms. And because the esse of intellectual substances, by reason of their genus, has no dependence on body, a higher degree of them is found: namely those that are not united to bodies as forms but only as their proper movers. Therefore likewise, since intellectual substance does not depend on moving, because moving follows upon their principal operation, there will be some higher degree of them: namely those that are not the proper movers of any bodies.

2. Concerning the argument by which it is proved that intelligible substances do not depend on moving, namely that moving follows upon their principal operation, which is understanding: it must be considered that, since each thing exists for the sake of its operation as for an end, as is said in Book II of the Heavens ¹⁵ and since each thing depends on its end, because it has esse only in order to an end: each thing must depend on its operation as on an end. It must be noted, however, that not every operation of a thing is its fitting end, but only that which is proper and principal to it, accompanying its nature first and per se. But that operation which follows upon the first operation of a nature insofar as it is found in some determinate subject is not the end of that nature itself; and therefore the nature need not depend upon it, as though it could not exist unless ordered to that operation. Therefore, since the proper and principal operation of intellectual nature is to understand, not to move—rather, moving follows upon the understanding of those substances which are the proper movers of certain bodies, insofar as they move through intellect—it follows that intellectual nature does not depend on moving, as though it could not have esse unless ordered to the motion of some body. Yet it does depend well upon understanding, since there can be none which is not ordered to understanding. For this reason Saint Thomas rightly infers that the nature of an intellectual substance does not depend on moving, because moving is consequent upon understanding, which is its principal operation.

V. Second ¹⁶. The degrees of intellectual substances must be taken according to the degree of the intellectual operation that is proper to them. But above the intelligible conceptions of the proper movers of the spheres, there are to be found certain more universal conceptions. Therefore there are certain intellectual substances above those which are the proper and proximate movers of determinate spheres.

The minor is proved. For, since an agent acting through intellect must be proportioned to the patient and to the effect through the form of the intellect—so that such a form be intelligible, capable of being induced by the action of the agent into matter, just as an agent acting by nature is proportioned to the patient by reason of its own form—it is necessary, following the opinion of Aristotle (namely, in this: that an intellectual substance is so determined to some motion as its proper mover that it cannot move anything else), that the proper movers of the orbs, who move through intellect, have such intelligences as are explicable through the motion of the orbs and producible in material things. But above conceptions of this kind there are to be taken certain more universal ones, since the intellect apprehends the forms of things more universally than their esse exists in things, as is evident in speculative intellect and in art governing. Therefore, etc.

VI. But a doubt arises concerning this argument. From a more universal apprehension it does not seem possible to argue for a higher grade of intellectual nature really separate and distinct from the grade of the intellectual nature apprehending in a particular way. For, as is said here, the form of the speculative intellect is more universal than the form of the practical intellect, and yet the practical and speculative intellect are one and the same in us. Hence to the argument it may be replied that the proper mover, which forms conceptions of particular producible things through motion, also forms more universal conceptions: just as the craftsman forms both particular conceptions and universal ones. And thus there need not be, above the proper movers of the spheres, higher intellectual natures.

VII. For the resolution of this doubt, two things must be noted that are touched upon in the foundation of this argument. For when it is said that the degrees of intellectual substances must be taken according to the degree of intellectual operation that is proper to them, two things are touched upon: namely, the degree of intellectual operation; and the propriety of that degree with respect to the intellectual nature. Therefore two things must be explained. First, how these degrees are to be understood. Second, how some degree is proper to a given nature. And then the dissolution of the doubt will be evident.

As to the first, it must be known that, since intellection occurs insofar as the thing known is present in the knower, the degrees of intellectual operation must be taken according to the degrees of the intelligible species by which the thing known is in the knower. Now intelligible species are diversified in the intellect and have different degrees according as one is more universal than another in distinctly representing many things; for the more things a species represents distinctly, the more perfect it is, just as a nature is the more perfect the more perfections it contains unitedly. Thus the species of the angelic intellect are of a higher degree than the species of our intellect, because one species of our intellect represents only one universal nature distinctly, but not the singulars of those natures; whereas the species of the angelic intellect represent not only universal natures but also the particulars themselves distinctly, and one such species is representative of many natures. And the more universal the species are, the more universal also are the conceptions elicited from those species, proportioned to the intelligences understanding through those species. It follows, therefore, that the degrees of intellection are taken both according to the universality of the intelligible species and according to the universality of the conceptions, in distinctly representing many things.

2. As to the second point, it must be noted that it is not unfitting that what belongs to a higher grade and what belongs to a lower grade should in some way belong to one and the same thing; but that both should belong to the same thing as something proper to it is impossible, because what is of a higher grade determines to itself a higher nature, and what is of a lower grade determines to itself a lower nature. Thus intellectual and sensitive cognition, which are of different grades, do indeed belong to one nature, namely man; but sensitive cognition is not proper to man, since it belongs also to brute animals, and belongs to man only insofar as he has a kinship with brutes in sensitive nature. In like manner, although different grades of intellectual operation can belong to one nature, yet neither of them can be proper to that nature: rather, that one is proper to it which belongs to it alone by reason of its own nature. Since, therefore, the proper operation of an intellectual nature, to which it is ordered, is understanding, the grades of an intellectual nature must be taken according to the grades of intellectual operation—not of any operation whatever, but of that which is proper to each: so that, namely, as the proper intellectual operation of one intellectual nature holds a certain grade in comparison with the proper intellection of another intellectual nature, so does the nature hold a grade when compared with the other nature.

3. Hence, since intellection according to more universal conceptions is of a higher degree than intellection through particular conceptions, it is necessary that the nature whose proper function is to understand through more universal conceptions be higher than the nature whose proper function is to understand through particular conceptions, even though the latter also understands something through more universal conceptions insofar as it participates in the nature of the superior. And likewise, if there is a nature which has a lower degree of intellection as its proper function, it is fitting that there also be some nature to which a higher degree of understanding is proper, provided a higher degree of intellection can exist.

If, therefore, the proper movers of the spheres have as their proper mode of understanding through conceptions (which Saint Thomas here calls intelligences) that are particular, inasmuch as they are explicable and producible in material things through the motion of the spheres; since there is a higher grade of intellection, namely that which is through more universal conceptions, it is necessary that there be certain intellectual natures above the proper movers of the spheres, whose proper mode is to understand, in the manner described, through more universal conceptions. And herein consists the argument of Saint Thomas.

4. To the argument on the other side, it is said that the conception of the human speculative intellect is universal only with respect to the object represented, because it represents only a universal nature, but does not represent particulars distinctly, since it is elicited by an intelligible species abstracted from material things by the agent intellect. But the universal conception which we say constitutes a higher degree of intellectual operation is universal because it is a conception proper to many things, though not an adequate one, but exceeding them. Now, to know the universal and to know the particular belong to the same nature and power, though not always in the same way; but it does not follow that what can know through particular conceptions can also know through universal conceptions in the manner explained, especially as though through something proper to itself. Therefore the speculative intellect does not differ really from the practical intellect in us; yet well indeed is that nature distinguished whose proper mode is to understand through conceptions extending themselves distinctly to many things, from that nature whose proper mode is to understand through conceptions extending themselves to fewer things. — As for what St. Thomas adduced to make manifest his thesis concerning the mode of conceiving of the speculative intellect, this was not done so as to show that the human speculative intellect has that mode of understanding which constitutes a degree above the intellection of its own proper objects; but only so that it might be shown that the intellect, speaking absolutely, can apprehend things more universally than they are in reality; although this belongs to the human intellect and to the angelic intellect in different ways.

VIII. Thirdly ¹⁷. Intellectual substances are more excellent than all bodies, as the immobile and immaterial than the mobile and material. Therefore they exceed in number every multitude of material things. — The consequence is proved: because the order of the universe seems to require that what is more excellent exceed in quantity or number what is less excellent, just as the celestial bodies exceed the elementary bodies. The reason for this is that lesser things exist for the sake of higher ones, and consequently it is necessary that higher things, existing as it were for their own sake, be multiplied as much as possible.

2. It must be noted, with regard to the conclusion, that the multitude of intellectual substances exceeding the multitude of material things is understood with respect to the species of material things, not with respect to individuals: as Saint Thomas seems to hold in Potentia, q. 6, a. 6, and in the following argument. For the number of material species is exceeded, as it were incomparably, by the multitude of separate substances, as is said in the Prima, q. 50, a. 3, just as corruptible bodies are exceeded, as it were incomparably, by the heavenly bodies in magnitude. And in this it is signified that the multitude of separate substances is the greatest. For since the multitude of material species is great, a multitude exceeding that multitude, as it were incomparably, cannot fail to be the greatest.

3. Concerning the proof of the consequence, it must be noted that things which are for the sake of an end receive limitation and determination from that end, because as many and as great things are sought as suffice for the end itself; but the end itself is sought without limit, as Saint Thomas says on Romans 12 ¹⁸, and on I Corinthians 11, lecture 3. For if health is sought as an end, so much or such health is not sought determinately, but as much as can be had. On this account Saint Thomas says that since the nobler things are for their own sake, they must be multiplied as far as possible. Yet since what is an end with respect to certain things can be ordered to some further end, therefore what as an end has no limitation, insofar as it is ordered to another end, receives a certain limitation; just as health which is ordered to the performance of some work is sought in such quantity as suffices for that work, and, that order to the end being preserved, is sought in as great a quantity as can be had. So too, since the noblest things among beings, although they are the end of the less noble, are nevertheless ordered to the total perfection of the universe as to an end; therefore, when it is said that they themselves must be multiplied as far as possible, this must not be understood of multiplication possible absolutely, as is clear from what was said above ¹⁹; but as far as possible according to the exigency of the total perfection of this universe. Hence Saint Thomas assumed that the order of the universe seems to require that the nobler things exceed the less noble: thereby making clear that he speaks of the multiplication of things not absolutely, but according to the exigency of the universe.

4. Concerning the excess of the nobler things over the less noble, it must first be understood that Saint Thomas makes a comparison among those things that pertain of themselves to the perfection of the universe, as is said in De Veritate, q. 5, a. 3. These are the things that possess perpetuity, such as intellectual substances, celestial bodies, and the species of corruptible things; but not the individuals of such species. Therefore the proposition of Saint Thomas must be understood with respect to these. For the nobler any one of those things that possess perpetuity is, the more it exceeds the less noble in quantity or number.

It must be understood, second, that the nobility of these things can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to specific grades alone: namely, that thing is said to be more noble which is constituted by a more noble specific difference. In another way, according to the grades of the order of things in the universe, which is considered according to the diverse modes of being: namely, that thing is said to be more perfect among things which belongs to a higher and more perfect order in the universe. Therefore, when it is said that the more noble things among things must exceed in number or quantity the less noble, this must be understood not of the more noble according to specific grade alone, but of the more noble according to order and mode of being, namely, of those things which pertain to a higher and worthier order and to a higher mode of being. Hence the objection that could be raised concerning gold, silver, precious stones, balsam, and the like is removed; for these are indeed more noble than many other bodies, and yet they exceed others neither in magnitude nor in multitude. For it is evident that concerning these the proposition of Saint Thomas is not understood: because they are not of a higher order in the universe than other corruptible things, since they themselves belong to the order of corruptible things, although they are more noble according to specific grade.

IX. Fourth. Forms that exist outside matter have esse more completely and more universally than forms that are in matter, which are received into matter according to its capacity. Therefore they are not fewer in number than the species of material things are. — The consequence is proved. Because even the species of material things are not multiplied by matter, but by form.

St. Thomas, moreover, adds to this argument, in order to exclude a false interpretation of his words, that we do not say for this reason (namely, when we hold that separate substances have an esse more complete and universal than the forms which are in matter, and that they exceed those forms) that separate substances are the species of these sensible things, as the Platonists held, deceived by the fact that knowledge of them could come to us only from sensible things; since universal matter belongs to the definition of the species of these sensible things. But we say that they are other species, nobler than those, inasmuch as the pure is nobler than the mixed.

2. Concerning this proposition, that Forms which are outside matter have a more complete and more universal esse than forms which are in matter, it must be noted that Saint Thomas does not speak here of the universality of predication and potential containment, in the way that animal is more universal than man: but of the universality of perfectional containment. For, as is clear from what precedes ²⁰ and is also touched upon here, forms which are received in matter do not possess every perfection of being that is naturally suited to their species, because they receive some limitation in the esse of their species from the subject in which they are received: but forms subsisting through themselves, entirely separate from matter, are not limited to any grade of being of their species, but possess every perfection of being naturally suited to that species; hence they are also said to be infinite, that is, unlimited, in their species. In this sense, therefore, they are said to have a more complete and more universal esse, because they possess every complement and every perfection of the being of their species: material natures, however, do not possess every complement of their esse, but have an esse limited within the species. And this is to have a more universal esse according to perfectional containment.

3. Concerning the proof of the consequence, it must be noted that someone might say that the multitude of material species is greater than the multitude of immaterial substances, because those are multiplied through matter, which is divisible to infinity when it is subjected to quantity; but matter is not present in abstract substances. Therefore, excluding this, Saint Thomas says that the multiplication of such species is not through matter, but through form. Hence there is not a greater cause of multiplication in material species than in abstract substances. Therefore, since they have more perfect being, it follows, according to the preceding argument, that either they are more numerous than those, or at least not fewer. Hence this argument is a confirmation of the preceding argument.

It must be noted, however, that although Saint Thomas says that the species of things are multiplied through form and not through matter, he does not by this wish to exclude matter from the ratio and quiddity of material species, since here he says that matter is of the ratio of sensible species. Rather, he means that the multiplication itself is from form as from that from which the essential difference is taken, according to which one species differs from another. For although matter enters into the quiddities of material things, on account of the condition of the form, which requires such or such a matter, still the essential difference is not taken from matter itself, but rather the ratio of the genus. Hence it is not the reason of specific multiplication, but accompanies it.

4. Concerning that proposition placed last, Separate substances are nobler species than sensible things—inasmuch as the pure is nobler than the mixed—it must be noted that "pure" and "mixed" are not taken as equivalent to "simple" and "composite of many altered elements," in the way mixture is defined in I de Generatione ²¹, namely as the union of alterable things that have been altered; but rather as equivalent to "separated from everything baser than itself" and "joined to what is baser," so that "mixed" is equivalent to "impure." For thus it is evident that the pure is nobler than the mixed, that is, than the impure.

X. Fifth. Separate substances are in intelligible esse according to their nature. Therefore a greater multiplicity is possible in them than in material things, considering the property and nature of each genus. Therefore it is so in act. — The first consequence is proved. Because something is more capable of multiplication according to its intelligible esse than according to its material esse, as is clear in the case of a line: to any finite line an addition can be made mathematically, but not naturally. The same holds for the rarity of bodies, the speed of motions, and the diversity of figures, which can be increased to infinity according to intellect, but not according to nature. — The second consequence is also proved. Because in eternal things esse and being able do not differ.

2. Concerning the assumption used in the proof of the first consequence, a doubt arises. For the material species in the intellect is only one, whereas in matter it is multiplied. Therefore it is not true that something is more capable of being multiplied according to intelligible esse than according to material esse.

It is answered that the proposition is universally true, the name of intelligible esse being taken to comprehend also imaginable esse. For each thing, in the manner in which it is multiplicabile, is more capable of multiplication according to the intellect than according to nature. For the multiplication of a species is according to individuals; the multiplication of a genus is according to species; and the multiplication of an intensible form, as such, is according to greater intensity. Now we can understand and imagine more individuals existing in some species than could exist simultaneously in nature, considering only the power of nature; and more species than could exist in a genus according to nature; and a form more intense than could exist in nature.

To the argument on the opposite side it is said that, although the species in the intellect is only one according to its specific character and according to specific esse, nevertheless, according to its numerically singular esse as apprehended, it can be multiplied simultaneously by the intellect or imagination more than it is multiplied according to its material esse outside the intellect.

3. Concerning those things which Saint Thomas enumerates as augmentable to infinity according to the understanding, it must be noted, according to his own doctrine in VI Physics ²², that, since something can be repugnant to a thing by reason of species and not by reason of genus, and the understanding can consider the genus by abstraction from the species, it is not unfitting that something can agree with the genus insofar as it is considered by the understanding