Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1918
In Book II of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of creation, the distinction of creatures, and the human soul. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Caput I: Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia
Caput II: Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem
Caput III: Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum
Caput IV: Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus
Caput V: Ordo dicendorum
Caput VI: Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis principium essendi
Caput VII: Quod in Deo sit potentia activa
Caput VIII: Quod Dei potentia sit eius substantia
Caput IX: Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio
Caput X: Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur
Caput XI: Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas
Caput XII: Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo
Caput XIII: Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur
Caput XIV: Quod Deus sit omnibus causa essendi
Caput XV: Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in esse
Caput XVI: Quod creatio non est motus neque mutatio
Caput XVII: Quomodo solvantur ea quae contra creationem obiiciuntur
Caput XVIII: Quod in creatione non sit successio
Caput XIX: Quod nullum corpus potest creare
Caput XX: Quod solius Dei est creare
Caput XXI: Quod Deus omnia possit
Caput XXII: Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae
Caput XXIII: Quod Deus agit secundum suam sapientiam
Caput XXIV: Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse
Caput XXV: Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus
Caput XXVI: Quod divina voluntas ad determinatos effectus non artatur
Caput XXVII: Qualiter in rerum productione debitum inveniatur
Caput XXVIII: Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest necessitas absoluta
Caput XXIX: Quod non est necessarium creaturas semper fuisse
Caput XXX: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei acceptae
Caput XXXI: Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex parte creaturarum
Caput XXXII: Rationes ad probandum aeternitatem mundi ex parte factionis
Caput XXXIII: Solutio rationum supra positarum et primo earum quae sumebantur ex parte Dei
Caput XXXIV: Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex parte rerum factarum
Caput XXXV: Solutio rationum quae sumebantur ex parte factionis rerum
Caput XXXVI: Rationes quibus quidam conantur ostendere mundum non esse aeternum
Caput XXXVII: Quod distinctio rerum non est a casu
Caput XXXVIII: Quod materia non est prima causa distinctionis rerum
Caput XXXIX: Quod distinctio rerum non est propter contrarietatem agentium
Caput XL: Quod causa prima distinctionis rerum non est secundorum agentium ordo
Caput XLI: Quod rerum distinctio non est per aliquem de secundis agentibus inducentem in materiam diversas formas
Caput XLII: Quod distinctio rerum non processit ex meritorum vel demeritorum diversitate
Caput XLIII: Quae sit prima causa distinctionis rerum secundum veritatem
Caput XLIV: Quod oportuit ad perfectionem universi aliquas creaturas intellectuales esse
Caput XLV: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt volentes
Caput XLVI: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo
Caput XLVII: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit corpus
Caput XLVIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales
Caput XLIX: Quod substantia intellectualis non sit forma materialis
Caput L: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis differt esse et quod est
Caput LI: Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est actus et potentia
Caput LII: Quod non est idem componi ex substantia et esse, et materia et forma
Caput LIII: Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt incorruptibiles
Caput LIV: Per quem modum substantia intellectualis possit corpori uniri
Caput LV: Positio Platonis de unione animae intellectualis ad corpus
Caput LVI: Quod nutritiva, sensitiva et intellectiva non sunt in homine tres animae
Caput LVII: Quod intellectus possibilis hominis non est substantia separata
Caput LVIII: Quod homo non sortitur speciem per intellectum passivum, sed per intellectum possibilem
Caput LIX: Quod praedicta positio est contra sententiam Aristotelis
Caput LX: Contra opinionem Alexandri de intellectu possibili
Caput LXI: Quod anima non sit complexio, ut posuit Galenus
Caput LXII: Quod anima non sit corpus
Caput LXIII: Contra ponentes intellectum et sensum esse idem
Caput LXIV: Contra ponentes intellectum possibilem esse imaginationem
Caput LXV: Qualiter substantia intellectualis possit esse forma corporis
Caput LXVI: Solutio rationum quibus supra probatur quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori ut forma
Caput LXVII: Quod secundum dicta Aristotelis oportet ponere intellectum uniri corpori ut formam
Caput LXVIII: Quod anima immediate unitur corpori
Caput LXIX: Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte
Caput LXX: Quod intellectus possibilis non est unus in omnibus hominibus
Caput LXXI: De opinione Avicennae, qui posuit formas intelligibiles non conservari in intellectu possibili
Caput LXXII: Solutio rationum quibus videtur probari unitas intellectus possibilis
Caput LXXIII: Quod intellectus agens non sit substantia separata, sed aliquid animae
Caput LXXIV: Quod non est impossibile intellectum possibilem et agentem in una substantia animae convenire
Caput LXXV: Quod non fuit sententia Aristotelis de intellectu agente quod sit substantia separata, sed magis quod sit aliquid animae
Caput LXXVI: Quod anima humana, corrupto corpore, non corrumpitur
Caput LXXVII: Rationes probantes animam corrumpi corrupto corpore (et solutio ipsarum)
Caput LXXVIII: Quod animae brutorum animalium non sunt immortales
Caput LXXIX: Quod anima humana incipiat cum corpore
Caput LXXX: Solutio rationum praemissarum
Caput LXXXI: Quod anima non sit de substantia Dei
Caput LXXXII: Quod anima humana non traducatur cum semine
Caput LXXXIII: Quod anima humana producatur in esse a Deo per creationem
Caput LXXXIV: Rationes ad probandum quod anima humana causetur ex semine
As to the third point, Saint Thomas sets forth certain arguments against a determinate truth 1.
The first of these is as follows. The sensitive soul of man comes into being through the power of the seed, since it is of the same genus as the souls of the other animals. Therefore so too is the intellective soul. — The consequence is proved. Because in man the sensitive and the intellective are the same according to substance.
Second. The fetus is an animal before it is a man. Therefore it has a sensitive soul before it has an intellective one. But that soul is produced from seed. Therefore so is the intellective one, since the same soul becomes intellective, because an intellective soul that were another could not supervene upon it.
Third. The soul is united to the body with respect to esse. Therefore it is made by the same agent by which the body is made, since those things that are made one with respect to esse must terminate in a single action and a single agent. Therefore, etc.
Fourth. Man generates a being like himself in species by the power that is in the seed. Therefore he causes the soul, from which is man's species.
Fifth. According to Apollinaris, it would follow that God cooperates in adulteries: because, by creating the soul, He would give completion to an adulterous generation.
Sixth. Body and soul come into being simultaneously: otherwise the same thing would be prior and posterior to itself. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For the body begins to come into being at the emission of the seed.
Seventh. It would follow that God's action, and man's action, would be imperfect: because neither would produce the whole thing.
Eighth. The soul is a part of man. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in all things generated from seed, all the parts of the thing generated are comprehended in the seed by virtue. This is illustrated in wheat, where the blade, stalk, internodes, fruit, and awns are comprehended in the first seed, and afterwards the seed is extended and dilated 2 in order, by natural succession, toward the perfection of the thing, assuming nothing extrinsic: understand this as an efficient cause, although it may assume something extrinsic as matter.
Ninth. In the generation of man there is one and the same process of body and soul, and one and the same terminus: for according to the process of the formation and quantitative growth of the body, the operations of the soul are manifested more and more. Therefore etc.
Tenth. The body of man is formed by the action of the soul. First, because it is configured to itself. — Second, because the soul is the efficient cause of the body, as is said in II On the Soul, text 36. Therefore etc.
Eleventh. The seed lives, as appears from many considerations. Therefore there is in it a soul. Therefore, etc.
Twelfth. It follows that the body is first formed and the soul is afterward infused. Therefore the soul comes to be for the sake of the body: because what comes to be for the sake of something else is posterior to it, as is evident in garments, which are made for the sake of man.