Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Having shown that the human soul is immortal, the arguments made to the contrary must be answered ¹. First, Saint Thomas sets out those arguments; second, he answers them in the following chapter ².

I. As to the first, it is argued first ³: Souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies. Therefore, once the bodies are destroyed, they cannot remain in their multitude. Therefore either only one remains, or they altogether cease to be. The first is false. Therefore, and so on.

Second ⁴. If many souls remain after their bodies are corrupted, they must be diverse in species. Therefore also before they are separated. Therefore the individuals of men are distinguished by species. This is inconvenient. Therefore, and so on. The assumption is proved: because among them there will be a formal distinction, since they are forms only. But the first consequence is proved: because by the corruption of the body they are not changed into another species. But the second: because composites receive their species according to their form.

Third ⁵. It would follow, according to those who posit the eternity of the world, that an actual infinite exists: because infinitely many men have existed before us. This is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Fourth ⁶ It follows that man would be a being per accidens: for the body would come to be and pass away while the incorruptible soul remained, and thus the soul would also be united to the body only accidentally.

Fifth ⁷. Every operation of the soul is completed together with the body. For to give life is through bodily qualities and through a bodily instrument. Sensation, too, is completed through bodily organs. But understanding is not without phantasms, as is said in Book III of De Anima; and in Book I of De Anima it is said that the soul is corrupted when something within is corrupted; and in Book III of De Anima it is said that we do not remember after death. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because it is impossible for there to be any substance that has no operation whatsoever.

⁸ Twice. To the foregoing arguments Saint Thomas responds.

To the first, he denies the consequence. For although souls must be multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, because form and matter must be fitted to one another and proportioned, just as a proper act comes about in its proper matter; yet whatever must be mutually fitted and proportioned receive multitude or unity together, each from its own cause. Nevertheless the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls, just as neither is the body the cause of the soul itself, since the human soul is a form whose esse does not depend on matter. For if the esse of one of those things that must be fitted together depends on the other, its unity or multiplication also depends on that other. But if the esse of one does not depend on the other, neither does its unity or multiplication depend on it, but it has dependence from another extrinsic cause. And therefore it is not necessary that, when the bodies are destroyed, the plurality of souls should cease.

Note, concerning this response of St. Thomas, which is most beautiful, that whatever things must be fitted together and proportioned to one another receive at the same time multitude and unity, each from its own cause, as St. Thomas says in this place. And therefore one must speak of the cause of the multitude or unity of the soul just as of the cause of its esse. Now the intellectual soul has no formal cause of its esse really distinct from itself, just as other forms do not: for a form does not exist simply through another form, but through itself formally, in that mode in which esse befits it. Nor does it have a material cause: because it does not depend on matter with respect to esse simply, as is said here, and as was shown above. It remains, therefore, that it has only an efficient cause and a final cause of its esse. From this it follows that only the efficient cause of the soul, namely God, and the end which He intends, are the cause of the multiplication of souls. I speak of the cause per se: for, speaking of the occasional cause, without which the multiplication does not begin, even the multiplication of bodies is a cause of the multiplication of souls with respect to its principle; just as the body is in this way a cause of the soul in its beginning. And therefore from a deficiency in the multitude of bodies the multitude of souls need not fail, as St. Thomas answers most excellently: but only from a deficiency of the agent, namely God, if He could fail, or if He were to cease from His influx; since He is a cause not only in becoming, but also in being made and in being conserved.

II. To the second ⁹ Saint Thomas responds by denying the first consequence. In proof of this he says first that not every diversity of forms produces a diversity according to species, as is clear in the case of the forms of different fires; but only that diversity which is according to formal principles, or according to a different account of the form.

He says second, that the multitude of separate souls indeed follows upon the diversity of forms according to substance, since the substance of this soul is one thing and that of another another; yet it does not proceed from a diversity of their essential principles, nor is it according to a diverse account of soul; rather it is according to a diverse commensuration of souls to bodies, for this soul is commensurated to this body, and that one to that. Such commensurations remain in the soul even when the bodies perish: just as their very substances remain, as not depending on bodies in respect of esse.

2. In this response two things must be noted. The first is that the diversity of formal principles must not be understood to make a specific diversity of forms as if a form had some essential principles out of which it were really composed, for then every form would have to be intrinsically and really composed; but by the formal and essential principles of a form Saint Thomas understands its proper genus and proper difference, from which forms are composed according to their concept, in the way in which forms are in species. Hence, to say that they are distinguished specifically according to formal principles, or according to the diverse concept of the form, is the same as if it were said: They are distinguished either according to some part of their definitions, or according to the whole definition.

The second point is that commensuration can signify two things: namely, the foundation of the relation, and the relation itself; just as likeness can. The foundation of commensuration in the soul is the very substance of the soul, which, according to its essence and its esse, is proportioned to this body as its proper form to its proper matter—a proportion that does not hold with respect to any other body. Upon this produced essence, fitted to this matter, is founded the relation of commensuration by which this soul is said to be formally commensurated to this body: just as upon whiteness is founded the relation of likeness by which this thing is said to be formally like that one; whether that relation be identical with its foundation or not—for this has no bearing on the matter at hand. Therefore, when it is said that the diversity of souls is according to their diverse commensuration to bodies, commensuration is not taken formally as importing a relation: for thus souls would not differ in substance, as is said here; but only in a superadded accident, if the relation is posited as distinct from its foundation; or according to a reason making no diversity in reality, if the relation is taken formally. Rather, commensuration is taken fundamentally. For since this soul, according to its substance and its esse, is so much the proper form of this body and not of another, and is substantially so fitted to this body and not to another, it follows that it is distinguished substantially from another soul proportioned to another body. And since the relation of commensuration necessarily follows upon this substantial foundation, it may also be said that separated souls are distinguished by their relations secondarily indeed, but not first. From these things it is clear how badly they understood Saint Thomas who attribute to him the view that he wished souls separated from bodies to have their distinction from the relation alone to bodies. For Saint Thomas never even dreamed this—much less did he understand it.

3. But against this answer a doubt arises. For according to it it will be true to say that souls are distinguished by themselves: if they are distinguished by commensurations, and a commensuration is nothing other than the very substance of the soul commensurated to this body. Yet this does not seem to be true in the doctrine of Saint Thomas.

It is answered that they are indeed distinguished from one another by themselves identically: that is, not by some entity superadded to them. Formally, however, they are not distinguished by themselves, but by a commensuration to bodies, which is formally distinct from the soul itself. Just as man is distinguished from horse by himself identically in species, because not by some entity really distinct from him: but formally he is distinguished from it by his specific difference, namely rationality. For in these cases the individual grade stands to the individual substance of the soul as the specific difference stands to the species.

III. To the third ¹⁰ he responds: first, according to the opinion of others; then according to his own opinion. He says therefore, first, that among those positing the eternity of the world, some, occasioned by this argument, conceded that souls perish together with their bodies. — Others said that something one remains of all souls: namely the agent intellect, as Alexander holds, as is said in the first argument; or along with it also the possible intellect, as Averroes. — Others said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a determinate time, as Plato. — Yet others, namely Avicenna and Algazel, said that it is not absurd for an actual infinite to exist among things ordered per accidens, such as souls are. — As for Aristotle himself, what he thought on these matters is not expressly found: although he expressly posits the eternity of the world. Nevertheless, from the principles laid down by him it does not conflict that an actual infinite exists in immaterial substances: since in III Physics and I On the Heavens he proves that an actual infinite does not exist only in material bodies.

Second, Saint Thomas, setting forth his own opinion and that of the Catholic faith, says it is false that the world is eternal. And thus the foundation of the argument collapses.

IV. But concerning arguments of this kind a twofold doubt arises. The first concerns the opinion of Aristotle. For it seems that he proved that the infinite does not exist, not only in material things but also in immaterial things, which is contrary to what is said here. For the argument taken from him proves universally that an actually infinite multitude cannot exist, namely because number is a multitude measured by one. This is true not only in material things but also in immaterial things. Hence St. Thomas himself uses this same argument in the Prima Pars, q. 7, a. 4, to prove universally that it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.

The second doubt ¹¹ is this: although according to faith the world began, Saint Thomas nevertheless holds that the world could have been produced from eternity ¹². And therefore the doubt is how, given this supposition, one ought to answer in accordance with his opinion.

V. To the first doubt it is said that Aristotle indeed proves only concerning the infinite in material things that it cannot exist in act, but not in immaterial things; nor do I see how the esse of the immortal soul could be preserved in his view, unless by conceding that, according to him, an infinite in act in immaterial things is not repugnant. For all these propositions cannot stand together: Infinitely many men have preceded; The soul is immortal, multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies; and, An infinite in act cannot exist. Therefore, if we grant the first two as his own view, the third must be denied; or it must be said that from the first two there follows something against his own opinion which he did not see—a thing I would not dare attribute to so great a Philosopher, and on a matter so well known. What he would determinately answer to the argument made, St. Thomas says, in the Treatise against the Averroists ¹³, cannot be known by us, because we do not possess that part of the Metaphysics which he wrote on separate substances; for, as he says in II Physics ¹⁴ the work of First Philosophy is to consider forms that are separate but are in matter, insofar as they are separable. But when it is said that his argument in III Physics proves universally that an actually infinite multitude cannot exist, this is denied. For he supposes as a foundation that every multitude existing in act is a number, and that a number is a multitude measured by one. Now number, which belongs to the genus of quantity, to which it belongs to be measured by one, because the notion of measure accompanies the notion of quantity, is found only in material things, since it is caused only by the division of the continuous. Therefore that argument concludes only concerning material things. On account of which St. Thomas says there, lecture 8, that the argument is probable, as proceeding from what is commonly said (if, I say, it is made about multitude absolutely): because one who would say that some multitude is infinite would not say that it is a number.

2. Nor is it true that the argument which St. Thomas uses in the First Part is the same as Aristotle's argument. For St. Thomas does not assume, as Aristotle does, that every multitude is a number; but rather that the species of multitude are proportioned to the species of numbers, and that every number is a multitude made one ¹⁵—a proposition most distant from that proposition which Aristotle supposes in his argument, namely that every number is a multitude measured by one; for it is not the same thing for a number to be measured by one and for it to be made one. Here it must be known that, since every species of multitude is something per se one with the unity of order, but from several things there cannot be made something per se one unless one has the role of matter and the other that of form, as is said in VIII Metaph. ¹⁶: it is necessary that among the unities constituting a multitude there be some one which is the form giving species to the number, while the others have the role of matter. But this cannot be unless there be given some ultimate unity rendering that multitude of a certain determination: because form has the character of a terminus. On account of which the Commentator says, III Phys. ¹⁷, that where one proceeds toward form, one does not proceed to infinity. Therefore for a number to be made by a unity is for it to have some ultimate unity of its own in the manner of a form, by whose subtraction the very species of the number is changed: just as when a unity is subtracted from three, no longer does a three remain, but a two. But for a number to be measured by a unity is for it precisely to be rendered and certified through the replication of the unity.

Hence Aristotle's argument is: Every multitude (namely, a material one) in act exists in some species of number; but an infinite multitude does not exist in any species of number; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: because every species of number is a multitude measured by one; but an infinite multitude is not measured by one; therefore, etc. — Now St. Thomas's argument in the First Part is: Every multitude existing in act must be in some species of multitude; but every species of multitude is finite; therefore, etc. The minor is proved: because the species of multitude are proportioned to the species of numbers; but every species of number is finite, since it is a multitude made by one; therefore, etc.

Behold, the argument of Aristotle proceeds from number, whereas the argument of St. Thomas proceeds from the proportion of the multitude of species to the species of numbers. Likewise, Aristotle's argument proceeds from the measurement of numbers, whereas St. Thomas's argument proceeds from their formal constitution itself. And thus it is clear that it is not one and the same argument in both cases.

VI. On the second doubt ¹⁸ he answers that, given the supposition that the world is eternal, and likewise the generation of men—since those three things are impossible, namely, that the world and the generation of men be eternal, that the soul be immortal, and that an actual infinite cannot exist even in abstractions from matter—it must be said that God would have found some mode in things by which all the rest would be preserved and there would not be an actual infinite; for instance, by making souls pass from bodies into bodies; or by making souls cease through the withdrawal of his influx, even though by their nature they would remain immortal and incorruptible just as the intelligences are; or by imposing upon things any other order unknown to us. For, just as we say that the world could have been produced from eternity—not on account of any real power existing in the world itself for this, but on account of God's power alone, which is able to effect it—so too it is not unfitting to say that some other order in created things than the one now present can exist through divine power, even though we are unable to know that order distinctly. Nor need anyone be anxious about what that order might be.

2. It could be said secondly that, according to Saint Thomas, although the world as regards some things could be eternal, it is not so as regards the generation of men. Hence, on this difficulty he explains himself in this place by saying that the world is not eternal. And in the First Part, q. XLVI, a. 2, ad 8, solving this argument insofar as it seems to remove the eternity of the world, he says that this argument is particular, that is, it concludes only about some particular thing that it is not eternal: but this does not conflict with the matter at hand, in which we ask universally whether any creature existed from eternity: for someone could say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, but not man. — To say, however, that man would have stood through infinite time before generating, as Scotus says, in II Sent., d. 1, q. 3¹⁹, about the ass, would indeed save man from having existed from eternity, but it would not save the eternal generation of men.

3. Beware, however, here lest you admit that response which says that, given all those things, it does not follow that an infinite in act is given; because, although no first soul produced is given, there is nevertheless given a last, to which the addition of other souls can be made; but it is repugnant to the infinite that a first or a last be given. For this response does not remove the force of the argument. For although one may arrive at the last soul produced, one will not, however, be able to arrive at the first. And thus it will follow that this multitude will indeed be finite toward us, since it has a terminus; but ascending it will be infinite, because, beginning from this last, in ascending one will never be able to arrive at the first and at a terminus. Now this infinity of souls ascending toward the producer suffices for the multitude to be infinite in act. For we call a multitude finite in act that which is simply terminated, such that it is measured and certified by one in some species, whether made²⁰, so that we can say that these are so many and no more. But this cannot belong to a multitude infinite on one side, whether, I say, a parte ante or a parte post. For, given the eternity of time a parte ante, and consequently given infinite days a parte ante, we cannot say that so many days have preceded and no more: although the days are finite a parte post, and a last day is given. Similarly, given the duration of time eternal a parte post, and consequently given infinite days a parte post, we cannot say that the future days are so many and no more: although they are finite a parte ante and a first day is given, beginning from today's day. That response, therefore, would not escape without its being necessary that an infinite multitude in act be given: because that which you call last is not last in the manner of a form limiting the multitude to a determinate species.

VII. But concerning the foregoing a doubt arises. For it seems that in the preceding responses it is held as firm and settled that an infinite multitude cannot exist in act, even in immaterial things. This, however, involves a difficulty in the way of St. Thomas. For in the Quaestiones de Veritate, q. 2, a. 10, he says that, if existing in act is repugnant to the infinite by reason of its very nature, God cannot do this; but if it is not repugnant, God can do it. Yet in Quodlibet XII, art. 3²¹ he seems to hold that existing in act is not repugnant to the infinite: for there he says that for something infinite to exist in act is not repugnant to the power of God absolutely, because it involves no contradiction. Therefore God can make infinites in act.

It is answered, from what is said in Quodlibet IX, a. 1, that the actual infinite can be understood to involve a contradiction in two ways. In one way, so that the reason of made is absolutely the cause of this implication: namely, because being infinite is repugnant to a made thing insofar as it is made, since it is against the reason of a creature to equal the Creator, and it would equal Him if it were posited as actually infinite. In another way, so that the reason of the infinite is the cause of this implication: namely, because being in act is repugnant to what is infinite. — If we take the second way, then to be actually infinite does involve a contradiction, and it cannot be brought about by divine power: as St. Thomas seems to intend in the First Part, in the place cited above²²; and in Quodlibet IX; and I Sent., d. XLIII, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5. For when any multitude is posited in act, it is thereby posited as belonging to some species of multitude; and consequently it is posited as finite, since no species of multitude is infinite: as was declared above²³. And thus it would follow that the infinite is not infinite. — But if we take the first way, then it does not involve a contradiction. For if a creature were posited as infinite in number or quantity, it would not follow that it equals the Creator: for it would be infinite only secundum quid. That this is St. Thomas's mind in Quodlibet IX is clear, because he says that God cannot make a being actually infinite just as He cannot make a horse rational. Yet in the same place he says that being rational is not repugnant to a made thing insofar as it is made, but is repugnant to a horse insofar as it is a horse.

To the argument, therefore, it is said that St. Thomas in the Questions on Truth holds that if something implies a contradiction in any way whatever—whether, I say, from the reason of the fact or from the reason of the infinite—it cannot be done by God. But if it implies a contradiction in no way at all, it can be done. Now, to the minor premise it is said that where he is cited, he does not intend that it implies no contradiction whatsoever: but rather that it does not imply a contradiction in the first way mentioned, namely, from the reason of the fact absolutely. It does, however, imply one by reason of this fact, that it would be posited as infinite.

VIII. To the fourth²⁴ he responds by denying the consequence. In proof of this, he says that in that description of an accident the term "subject" is understood to mean the composite of matter and form, not a principle of the composite subject. For form comes to prime matter, and it departs while the latter remains incorruptible; and yet form was not joined to it accidentally but essentially, because they share one esse. Similarly, the soul is united to the body in one esse. And therefore, although it remains after the body, the body is nevertheless not united to it accidentally.

It is also added that, although prime matter remains in act after the form, and likewise the soul after the body, this nevertheless occurs differently: for matter remains in act according to another form, whereas the soul remains in the same act.

Note that, since to be one in being (esse) simply is the mark of one essence, if certain things have a single esse simply speaking, they must constitute one essence. On this account Saint Thomas argues that form is united essentially to matter, because it is united to it according to one esse. But an accidental form is not united to its subject according to one esse: for the esse by which the subject subsists is one thing, and the esse of the accident is another. Therefore it is not united to its subject essentially, as one with it constituting an essence, but only accidentally.

IX. But in this response a doubt arises. For if by the name of subject there is understood, in the description of accident, the composite of matter and form, so that the description is understood in this way: An accident is that which can be present and absent without the corruption of the subject composed of matter and form, it follows that no accident is in the soul: for the soul is not composed of matter and form, but is the principle of the composite of matter and form. And thus intellections, which come to the soul and depart from it, and likewise affections, will not be accidents, but substances. For if that is the description of accident, they must convert with one another: namely, that every accident comes to and departs from the composite of matter and form; and conversely, everything of this kind is an accident.

2. It is answered that accident, insofar as it is one of the five predicables, of which the description given above is offered, is not taken as divided against substance, that is, as a container holding beneath itself nine genera of things—for thus taken, accident would not be distinguished against property—but is taken, as is said in On Spiritual Creatures, last article, according as it signifies an accidental habitude of predicate to subject. Hence accident so taken is the same as accidental predicate, namely one which is neither of the essence of the thing nor caused from the principles of the species.

Yet it must be noted that if accident is taken as what is common absolutely to every accidental predicate—whether, I say, it be natural and material, or spiritual and intelligible—in that description the name of subject is taken for whatever is the subject of a proposition: because every such accidental predicate can both be affirmed and denied of the subject with respect to which it is said to be an accidental predicate, without the reason of the subject being removed; and every predicate which stands thus to a subject that it can be affirmed and denied of the subject—which is to be able to be present in and absent from it without detriment to its reason—is an accident, that is, an accidental predicate. - But if accident is taken for material and natural accident only, as distinguished against spiritual and intelligible accident, then in that description the name of subject is understood of the composite of matter and form. For then every accident is such that it can be present and absent, whether according to real esse or according to affirmation and negation, without the corruption of its subject, the composite of matter and form: for such an accident can come to be and depart, either according to real esse or according to the apprehension of the intellect, without ceasing to be actually a subject, either in nature or in apprehension. For if it be a separable accident, then it can be separated without the subject ceasing to be actual in nature, as sleep from an animal. But if it be an inseparable accident according to real esse, it can be understood not to be in the subject without the subject being understood not to be actual: for I can understand a crow not to be black, and yet apprehend it to be actual, by apprehending it to be white. And likewise everything that can be present and absent apart from the corruption of the composite is an accident. - But if something can be present and absent successively from prime matter or from form, which are principles of the composite, that thing is not an accident.

It is said, therefore, that St. Thomas takes this description of accident as applying only to the material and natural accident, in which way Porphyry seems to have spoken of accident: for he makes no mention of spiritual and intelligible accidents, but only of material ones. Hence it is granted that the intellections and affections of the intellective soul are not accidents according as the accident is described by this assigned description, although absolutely they are accidents and spiritual and intelligible accidental predicates.

3. It can also be answered in another way: namely, that Saint Thomas does not take that statement here as a description of the fifth predicament, which is called accidental predication, but rather as it appears in the argument, where it is attributed to every accidental form. For that description of an accident does not hold as it is distinguished against substance, and as it is said of every accidental form. Indeed, as Saint Thomas says, it is false that everything which comes to something and departs from it without its corruption comes to it accidentally, that is, as an accidental form. For that proposition is not universally true unless by the name of the subject one understands only the composite of matter and form. From this, however, it does not follow that only what comes to and departs from the composite is an accident, as it is taken in the objection. It stands at once both that whatever comes to the composite of matter and form and departs from it without its corruption is an accident, and yet that there may be some other accident which comes to the form alone.

X. To the fifth he responds by denying the antecedent. And he says first that understanding and willing remain in the separated soul, though they are not exercised through organs. But the operations that are exercised through bodily organs do not remain in act, yet they do remain well in their root, which is the essence of the soul.

He says secondly ²⁵ that understanding with a phantasm befits the soul insofar as it is united to the body: for just as the body is a kind of covering for it, and a subject receiving it, although it does not depend on the body as regards its esse, so understanding, even though it does not depend on the body as exercised through a bodily organ, nevertheless has its object in the body, namely the phantasm. — Likewise, remembering does not befit it except through the cogitative and memorative power, by which phantasms are prepared.

He says in the third place ²⁶ that to separate souls, because they have esse alone without a body, it does not belong to understand by reference to certain objects existing in the organs of the body, which are phantasms; rather, they understand through themselves, in the manner of separate substances, from which they will be able to receive a more abundant influx for understanding more perfectly. A sign of this appears in living beings ²⁷, in whom, the more the soul is withdrawn from occupation with its own body and also from the bodily senses, the more it receives the impression of higher things: as is evident in those who sleep, who sometimes perceive something of future contingents that exceeds the mode of human reasoning, by reason of the impression of higher things; and likewise in those who faint and those who undergo ecstasy. Hence, when the soul shall be wholly separated from the body, it will be perfectly assimilated to the separate substances with respect to its mode of understanding.

He says fourth, that remembering properly so called, since it is an act exercised through a bodily organ, as is proved in the book On Memory and Recollection, does not remain in the separate soul. If, however, it is taken equivocally, insofar as it names the understanding of those things which one previously knew, thus it remains in the soul: since, as was shown above, intelligible species are received indelibly in the intellect.

He says in the fifth place that loving, rejoicing, and the like, insofar as they are passions of the soul and acts of the sensitive appetite, do not remain in the separated soul. But they do remain well, since the will is a power not using an organ, as naming a simple act of the will, which is without passion. In this way it is said in Ethics VII that God rejoices by one simple operation; and in Ethics X that in the contemplation of wisdom there is an admirable delight; and in Ethics VIII that the love of friendship is distinguished from being loved, which is a passion.

Thus, therefore, it is clear that many operations remain in the separated soul, although not in the same manner in which they exist in the soul united to the body.

XI. Concerning the second statement of this reply, it must be noted that when it is said that the soul has its object in the body, namely the phantasm, because the body is its instrument and subject, that if the soul is in the body, and the body is its instrument and subject, then the body must serve some purpose for the soul's operation; otherwise, since the esse of the soul does not depend on it, it would have been united to the body in vain. Hence, since the body does not serve the soul in understanding by way of an organ and instrument, it must serve it on the side of the object. For since the soul needs to receive intelligible species from sensible things, and sensible things, insofar as they are outside the soul, are not intelligible except in potency and cannot act upon the intellect: if they are to be made actually intelligible, they must be placed in a certain being that is in some way abstracted, in which they can, together with the agent intellect, move the possible intellect. This happens when, through phantasy and its bodily organ, phantasms of those things are formed, and thus the object is united to the soul existing in the body and made close to it. — In the sensitive soul, however, although it is not required that its object be made actual, because a thing outside the soul is in itself actually sensible and needs no abstraction in order to move the sense; still, in this respect it depends on the body, that its operation does not take place without a bodily instrument.

It must also be noted that when it is said that phantasms are prepared by the cogitative and memorative powers, this is not to be understood as though these powers formed phantasms within themselves, since it belongs only to the fantasy and imagination to possess phantasms in themselves; but rather because, at their motion, phantasms are formed in the imagination, ordered and so disposed as to be apt and suitable for intellection.

XII. Concerning what is said in the third dictum of the response ²⁸ about the knowledge of future things by the living, two points must be noted. The first is that which is had from Saint Thomas, II-II, q. 172, a. 1 ²⁹, and De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3: since in cognition there are two elements, namely reception and judgment concerning the things received, if we speak with respect to reception and apprehension, abstraction from the senses—as happens in those who are asleep or in ecstasy—aids the reception of impressions from separate substances or from higher bodies, and their perception. For the soul of one who is awake and using his senses is occupied with sensible things; but when the exterior senses are bound, the interior powers are quieted from the tumults of exterior sensibles, and thus they can better perceive interior impressions made in the intellect or imagination. In this knowledge of future things, then, sleepers are said to perceive certain things that exceed the mode of human ratiocination, either because they perceive some things to the knowledge of which the soul could not arrive by any argumentation; or because, as is said in the Questions on Truth at the place cited above, the soul is so elevated that it understands conclusions conformably to the separate substances, namely by simple intuition, without deducing one thing from another, seeing most certainly. — But if we speak with respect to judgment, reason is more vigorous in waking than in sleeping. For the perfection of judgment comes from this, that the things about which judgment is passed are examined in reference to some principle of cognition. Now the first principle of our cognition is sense. And therefore it is necessary to resolve all things about which we judge, in a certain manner, back to sense. Hence also in III De Caelo ³⁰ it is said that the complement of art and nature is the sensible and visible thing. — Saint Thomas therefore speaks here of cognition with respect to the reception of impressions from a higher cause, not with respect to the perfection and completion of judgment.

The words of St. Thomas in this place must be attended to. For he does not say absolutely that those asleep perceive things to come from the impressions of higher beings; rather he limits it, adding, when they do not use the senses of the body, nor is there any disturbance of humors or vapors impeding; because clearly future things are not perceived in dreams unless the imagination is apt to act purely and in an orderly manner in act, which does not occur when there is a disordered motion of the humors and the spirits. And therefore the objection of Scotus in Book IV, d. xlv, q. 2 ³¹, by which he infers that, if what St. Thomas says about those asleep is true, then the deeper the sleep, the more such things would be seen, is null. For it is clear that this does not follow from the position of St. Thomas rightly understood. For in deep sleep there is a disturbance of the humors, or a multitude of vapors, impeding the operation of the imagination, and consequently the reception of subtle impressions.

2. Second, attention must be given, when it is said that this happens in those who swoon and undergo ecstasy: this must be understood not of those who suffer fainting and abstraction from the senses on account of bodily illness, for that arises from a disturbance of the humors or of vapors, which hinder cognition more than they aid it; but it is understood of that which occurs when someone is alienated from the senses because of the vehemence of an affection or of an intention toward something, and especially when it proceeds from some higher cause elevating the soul.

3. It must also be noted, concerning the same third statement, that the wholly separated soul is said to be assimilated to the separate substances with respect to their mode of understanding, not because it understands so perfectly through infused species as the separate substances do—for this is false, as will appear below ³²—but because, since there are several modes of knowing, namely through species received from things, and through species infused by the divine light, of which the second is absolutely and simply nobler and more perfect, the separated soul is assimilated to the separate substances in this respect: that it will know all things through species infused by God and without discourse, just as they do; but it does not know anything from an impression of those substances themselves, as happens in those who are asleep or in ecstasy, who approach imperfectly after the manner of their cognition.

XIII. But concerning the proposed solution and argument ³³ two doubts arise. The first is that Saint Thomas seems to interpret Aristotle’s proposition in De Anima III, text 20, where he says, “But we do not remember again,” as referring to recollection after death ³⁴: so that the sense is that after death we do not recollect those things which we knew in life. This exposition, however, according to some ³⁵, does not seem to accord with Aristotle’s meaning. First, because if he had understood it of the separated soul, he would have spoken in the singular, “But it does not recollect,” namely, the soul; but he would not have spoken in the plural of us human beings, “But we do not recollect.” — Next, because that causal particle, namely “because,” when there is added, “because this indeed is impassible,” is of no use for that exposition. — Next, because if the discourse was about recollection after death and about the cogitative power, it ought to have been said, “and without this the soul does not recollect”: not, however, “it understands nothing”; for this is false and beside the point. — Next, because the words of Aristotle in De Anima I ³⁶, text 66, which are brought forward by Saint Thomas in De Anima III ³⁷ to suggest that what he disputed there, he here affirmed, are beside the point. For here Aristotle speaks of us, when he says, “But we do not recollect”: there, however, he speaks of the soul itself as distinguished from us; hence he says ³⁸ that “these are not its passions, but of that which possesses it; wherefore also, when this is corrupted, it neither remembers nor loves.” — Therefore those words should rather be explained of us even while living: namely, that our understanding is not a recollecting, as Plato held: etc.

2. The second doubt ³⁹ is this: that the response does not seem to satisfy the argument in accordance with Aristotle's mind, since he posits no other mode of understanding in the soul than with a phantasm. For it will be argued thus. It is impossible for there to be any substance that has no operation; but every operation of the soul is terminated together with the body; therefore etc. The minor is proved concerning intellection. Because understanding, which seems most relevant here, is not without a phantasm, according to Aristotle; for Aristotle is not found to have posited any other mode of understanding for our soul that would be without a phantasm. But in a separate soul there would be no phantasms. Therefore etc.

The argument is confirmed ⁴⁰ Because, as he himself says in I De Anima ⁴¹, if there is any operation proper to the soul, it is separable from the body; but if none of its operations is proper to it, it is not separable. Yet no operation is proper to it: for understanding, of which it seems most capable, does not occur, according to him, without a phantasm, which is in the body informed by the soul. For, as we have said, he posited no other mode of understanding for our soul than with a phantasm. Therefore it will not be separable.

XIV. To the first doubt it is answered that this exposition accords with the mind of Aristotle. And it is that not only of Saint Thomas, but also of John the Grammarian, Themistius, Averroes, and other ancients. For, as Saint Thomas explains, because he had said that the intellective part is immortal and everlasting, someone might suppose that in the separated soul after the death of man there would remain knowledge of things in the manner in which it now has it. And therefore, removing this, he says that we do not remember after death, nor understand, in the manner in which we now do.

Hence, in reply to the first objection it is answered that he said "we do not remember," speaking of ourselves, because man, as is said in the tenth book of the Ethics ⁴², is that which is most principal in him, namely intellect. Hence what is said of the separate intellectual soul is fittingly said of man, as though man after death were that very separate soul. And this alludes to the common way of speaking: for we too say that Peter the Apostle and the Saints see the divine essence, and we invoke the Saints saying, "Saint Peter, pray for us," and so with the others; although their souls alone exist and see the divine essence, not the composite. Therefore in the same way the Philosopher, alluding to the common way of speaking, since the soul does not remember after death, says that we do not remember after death.

To the second it is said that that causal note serves the purpose excellently. For a cause is given why we do not remember after death: namely, because the intellective part, which remains after death, is impassible, that is, it is not the subject of the passions of the soul, such as love, hatred, and recollection, but the composite is. Therefore, once the composite has been corrupted, they do not remain in the soul, as is said in I de Anima, text 66.

To the third it is said that it should not have been said of the cogitative that without it the soul remembers nothing, but rather that without it the soul understands nothing. For just as by the impassibility of the intellect he had shown that we do not remember, so by the corruptibility of the cogitative part he wishes to show universally that after death we do not have that mode of understanding which we have while living; for the soul conjoined understands nothing without the cogitative, or without the sensitive part, which he calls the passive intellect—according to the exposition not only of St. Thomas but also of Averroes, Themistius, and John the Grammarian. Since therefore this sensitive part is corruptible, and consequently does not remain after death, it follows that the separated soul does not understand in the way in which it understands when conjoined. From these things it is clear that what is said here is neither false nor beside the point, according to this exposition.

To the fourth it is said, as to the first, that Aristotle uses "we" and the separate soul indifferently: because, according to the common way of speaking, what belongs to the separate soul is said to belong to us after death. And therefore Aristotle, in order to show this indifference of speech, repeating the very thing he said in the first book—that the soul does not remember when the composite is corrupted—says instead that we do not remember after death.

XV. To the second doubt ⁴³ it is answered that that response, even according to the mind of Aristotle, satisfies the argument. Hence, when it is said that Aristotle did not posit any other way of understanding the soul itself in an absolute sense than with a phantasm, it is clear from what has been said ⁴⁴ that this is false. For according to the exposition of St. Thomas, Aristotle held that the mode of understanding of the separate soul is other than that of the soul conjoined, that is, without a phantasm and without the assistance of the sensitive powers: although he did not expound that mode of understanding in the books that have come down to us ⁴⁵. — But according to the exposition of Philoponus, on I and III De Anima ⁴⁶, according to Aristotle the first intelligibles and first acts of understanding are neither with phantasy nor are they phantasy. — Similarly Albert, on III De Anima ⁴⁷, held that Aristotle intended that the conjoined soul can understand something separate from matter without a phantasm, although things sensible, or abstracted from sensible things, cannot be understood without a phantasm.

2. In confirmation, it is said first that Aristotle's proposition in I De Anima is understood of the proper operation of the soul which excludes a bodily organ, not however of one which excludes a bodily object. And the sense is that if some operation belongs to the soul alone in such a way that no bodily instrument concurs with it, the soul is separable from the body; but if none occurs without a bodily instrument, it is not separable. That it must be understood thus is evident, because the soul's being separable from the body and its being subsistent in itself accompany each other: for if it is subsistent, it does not depend on the body with respect to esse; and if it does not depend on the body with respect to esse, it can be separated from it. But for something to be subsistent, it is not required that it have no need of the body as an object: because, as St. Thomas argues in the First Part, q. 75, a. 2, ad 3, if needing the body as an object removed something's being subsistent, an animal would not be something subsistent, since it needs external sensibles in order to sense. Therefore, for the soul to be separable from the body, it is not required that it have an operation without a bodily object. And likewise, for it not to be separable, it does not suffice that without a bodily object it has no operation. But for separability it suffices that it have an operation without a bodily instrument; for inseparability, however, it is required that it have no operation in which a bodily instrument does not share.

It is said in reply to the second, against the minor, that it is false according to the sense of the major. And to its proof it is said that it does not prove the soul to need a body as an instrument, but only as an object. This is not to the point. — Even absolutely, moreover, this too is false, according to St. Thomas, though it is true of the soul as joined to the body; but according to Philoponus and Albert, it is not even universally true of the soul as joined ⁴⁸.

XVI. Besides these arguments, there are two passages in Aristotle from which Scotus argues, in Book IV, d. xliii, q. ii ⁴⁹, that Aristotle wished the soul to be corruptible. The first is Metaphysics VII, text 60 ⁵⁰. For there he posits that all parts which can remain separate from the whole are elements, that is, material parts. Therefore, according to him, the form cannot remain separate from the whole.

The second is I of the Heavens, text 102 ⁵¹, where, against Plato, he holds that nothing which has begun to be is incorruptible. But the intellectual soul has begun to be. Therefore, and so on.

XVII. To the first of these it is said first, following the exposition of Saint Thomas, that what is adduced is not said by Aristotle. For although Aristotle there wishes to argue that besides the parts composing some one thing per se, there must be something else, namely the composite, which results from them and is distinguished from them—because, when the composite is corrupted, the elements from which the composition was made remain, just as, when this syllable ba is corrupted, the letters remain, namely b and a, and, when flesh is corrupted, fire and earth remain, or the hot and the cold—nevertheless he does not say that all the parts which can remain separate from the whole are elements, that is, material parts.

It is said secondly that, according to the exposition of the Commentator, who held that form alone belongs to the quiddity of a material thing, and consequently that when the composite is corrupted the form is corrupted as well, it will perhaps be necessary to say that all the parts capable of remaining separate from the whole are material parts; because, according to him, the soul of man—the only soul we say is incorruptible—is mortal. For in his view the intellect is not in the soul formally, but is a substance separate per se: and thus it follows that the soul of man belongs to the genus of sensitive soul alone, and is consequently corruptible. But since it is not true that the intellect is a separate substance, nor is it true either, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas, that form alone belongs to the quiddity of a material thing, therefore we do not hold Averroes's exposition in this respect, if he intends the sense which the objector brings forward.

XVIII. To the second objection ⁵² it is answered ⁵³, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas at the end of Book I of the De Caelo ⁵⁴, that Aristotle speaks of that which has begun to be through transmutation and generation. Now, we say that the intellective soul does not begin to be through transmutation and generation, but through creation, or through a simple emanation: even according to Aristotle himself, who held that the intellect arrives from without ⁵⁵. Therefore that authority is not to the point.

XIX. But it seems that this response is not in accord with Aristotle's mind. For, wishing to show how ingenerate and incorruptible are convertible with eternal, and declaring in what sense he takes "ingenerate" and "incorruptible," he says, text 125 ⁵⁶: "ingenerate" is said of what now is, of which it would be false to say it was not before; but "incorruptible" of what now is, of which it would be false to say it will not be afterward. Then in what follows he shows that the ingenerate and the incorruptible, taken in this way, are convertible. Therefore, according to Aristotle, what is incorruptible must not only not begin through transmutation, but must also in no way have non-being before its esse.

2. To make this evident, it must first be noted, according to Simplicius and St. Thomas on I Caeli ⁵⁷, that Aristotle there, against the words of Plato by which he seemed to wish the world to be generated in time and yet incorruptible, intends to argue and to show that it cannot be that something should be generated and yet be incorruptible—that is, as it were, beginning to be through generation and yet unable to cease to be through corruption. This is clear from the final argument adduced ⁵⁸, which is a natural one, where he proves this, as is also clear through Averroes, in his last commentary; namely, because all generable and corruptible things are alterable, and they are corrupted by those very contraries out of which they are made.

It should be noted, second, that since everything that is generated and corrupted has this by virtue of some power of its own, in every signification of these terms—namely "generated" and "ungenerated," "corruptible" and "incorruptible"—such a power must be understood: as is also clear from Aristotle's procedure, text 130 ⁵⁹ through the end of the First Book, where he proceeds from a power to be or not to be against Plato. Hence, according to Aristotle, that is generated which now is and previously it was true to say did not exist, yet having a power to be through some subject in which it was in potency. But ungenerated: that which now is and previously it was not true to say actually did not exist, yet having a power to be. Similarly, corruptible is said of that which now is and later it will be true to say "it does not exist," the subject remaining by which it was able not to exist. But incorruptible: that which is and later it will not be true to say "it does not exist," the subject remaining through which it was in potency to non-being.

3. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that the signification of those terms, understood as we have expounded it, does not destroy the answer given. For it is clear that "unbegotten," which is convertible with "incorruptible," is said of that which is not first in the potency of matter before it has esse in act. Such a thing is that which does not receive esse through generation, although it may receive esse in another way. And thus the soul is incorruptible and unbegotten in this manner, namely, that it is not produced through generation, although it began to be through creation. For before it is created, it does not have non-being in such a way that it is in the potency of any matter so as to be, since it is not drawn out of the potency of matter; rather, it has non-being and is in the potency of the creator, to be brought into esse through creation.

XX. But it still seems that this response does not satisfy. For from the interpretation given, it can indeed be granted with respect to the meanings of those names that ungenerated is the same as not produced through generation, and incorruptible indeed that it cannot cease to be through corruption; yet it is not granted that they are convertible with everlasting, as Aristotle wished. For the intellectual soul is in this way ungenerated and incorruptible, and yet it is not everlasting. And thus Aristotle will not prove that the world is eternal, as he intended to prove.

2. This can be answered in two ways. First, in accordance with what was said above, chapter XV ⁶⁰: because Plato, as his words suggested, seemed to wish that nothing could begin to be except through generation, it followed most fittingly for him that ungenerated and incorruptible, in the manner explained, were convertible with everlasting. And therefore, once it had been proved that the world did not begin through generation, it was proved that it was everlasting.

Second, it could be answered that, since God, according to Aristotle, acts necessarily ⁶¹, what is produced by him is not produced through transmutation (in which the maker must precede the thing made in duration) but through simple emanation; therefore it is necessarily produced from eternity. And so, if the world was not made through transmutation, it follows that it is eternal: and universally that everything ungenerated, in the manner explained, is eternal. — But because this answer would not save the soul's being produced anew by God, notwithstanding that it is ungenerated and incorruptible, therefore it must be rejected, and the first must be followed.

XXI. Another response to the principal difficulty can also be given ⁶², one which perhaps is not foreign to Aristotle's mind: namely, that for him ungenerated, incorruptible, and everlasting are convertible only in things complete in species, which are produced by God according to their whole substance. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul is not something complete in species. Therefore the authority of the Philosopher does not stand in the way of what has been proposed.

The reason for this answer is that in those things which are produced by God immediately according to their whole substance and not in any matter, which are produced of necessity by nature according to Aristotle, no cause of beginning can be assigned, according to Aristotle, either on the part of the thing produced or on the part of the producer. For, since no matter is presupposed from which these things are said to be produced, the newness of production cannot come from a new disposition of matter. Nor can it come from any newness in the agent, since it is altogether immutable. Therefore they must have been produced from eternity. — But in those things which are not complete in species, but are produced in matter for the completion of the species, such as the rational soul, a cause of the newness of esse can be assigned on the part of the matter. For this soul is now produced and not earlier because now the matter, through a secondary agent, is disposed to this form, whereas before it was not so disposed. Hence it can itself be incorruptible on its own part, and yet be generated, that is, have esse after non-being.