Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

Finally, with respect to this part, Saint Thomas shows that every intellectual substance is incorruptible ¹.

1. And he argues first as follows. Every corruption, both simply and in a qualified sense, comes about through the separation of form from matter; for, while the form remains, the thing must be, since it is through the form that the substance becomes the proper recipient of esse. But in intellectual substances there cannot be a separation of form from matter, since they are not composed of matter and form. Therefore, and so on.

2. But this argument does not seem to conclude. For someone could reply to the major premise that it is true of the corruption of composite things, but not of the corruption of spiritual substances. Hence Scotus, in IV Sent., d. xliii, q. ii², says that not every corruption is by the separation of one thing from another: for the esse of an angel is destructible through the succession of the opposite to that esse.

Nor does it seem a sufficient reason that, when the form remains, esse remains, because it is through the form that the substance becomes the proper recipient of esse. For if something becomes the proper recipient of some act through something else, it does not follow that, that principle remaining, the thing has that act. Thus it is through the principles of the body that it becomes the proper recipient of whiteness; yet it does not follow that, those principles remaining, the body is white—otherwise every body would be white.

3. To the first of these it is said that Saint Thomas takes that proposition as universally true, from the things that appear among us: for we see in those things which are corrupted substantially that corruption comes about through the separation of the substantial form from matter; but accidental corruption comes about through the separation of the accidental form from its subject. The foundation of this proposition, however, is that in every corruption, as is clear from the third argument set forth below, something must remain, otherwise there would be no change; and something must not remain, otherwise there would be no corruption. What remains is matter, because matter is the first subject both of generation and of corruption; what does not remain is something distinct from matter, which is the proper recipient of esse. But this cannot be except through the separation of form from matter: because as long as the form is united to matter, so long is matter the proper recipient of its esse, as is said here.

Hence the proposition can be proved as follows. In every corruption something must remain, and something must cease to be. But this cannot happen except through the separation of form from matter: because in that which is composed of matter and form, if the form were to remain united to the matter, the composite would remain, which is the proper subject of esse; but in a subsistent form, if it were to cease to be, nothing would remain, and consequently there would be no corruption. Therefore, etc.

Hence it is clear that Scotus's objection has no force. For the esse of an angel, as was shown, is not destructible by corruption, such that something of the angel himself would remain after his esse, which would be his non-being. For a subject that remains in corruption is not said to remain under the non-being of something unless because it takes on the esse of another species, to which the non-being of that thing is joined. For what in no way has esse is not said to remain in nature: we do not say, for instance, that a corrupted stone remains in nature after its corruption. But if the esse of an angel were to cease, the angel would not receive another esse to which its non-being would be joined, so that it could be said to persist after its esse; nor would any subject, which had been its matter, remain. Therefore its esse would not be destroyed by corruption, but by the annihilation of its substance. And thus it is clear that this proposition is most true: Every corruption occurs through the separation of form from matter.

4. To the second it is said that, just as form necessarily follows upon the ultimate disposition of matter, which is called necessity toward form, because matter so disposed can neither remain without form nor with another form; so esse is necessarily received in its proper receiver of esse. For it cannot be that the proper receiver of esse is constituted in nature and yet not have esse. Therefore it is necessary that, while the principle remains in the thing by which it becomes the proper receiver of esse, the thing itself be.

To the objection it may be said, first, that the account is not the same for the receiver of an accidental form and for the receiver of substantial act. For the receiver of an accidental form, even granted that it does not have that accidental form, nevertheless remains in act through its substantial form. But the proper receiver of substantial act cannot be in act without that substantial act itself.

It can be said second, and better, that if some body is posited as the proper recipient of whiteness in such a way that it is ultimately disposed to whiteness, then whiteness will necessarily be in that body as long as there remains in the subject that by which it becomes the proper subject of whiteness: just as, because by a corporeal form united to matter a body becomes the proper recipient of quantity, so long as such a form remains in the corporeal thing, it is always quantified. But not every body is thus the proper recipient of whiteness. Therefore there is no objection.

II. Second ³. Intellectual substances are subsistent forms. Therefore it is impossible that they cease to be. — The antecedent is clear from what was said above. — But the consequence is proved as follows. Esse follows upon form per se. Therefore substances which are themselves forms cannot be deprived of esse. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: because each thing has esse according to its form; but we say something is per se when it is so according to the thing itself. The consequence is also proved: because what belongs to a thing per se inheres of necessity both always and inseparably, as is clear in the case of roundness with respect to a circle.

III. Concerning this proposition, that esse follows per se from form, a doubt is raised ⁴. First, because above, in chapter LII, in the fifth argument, Saint Thomas said that for every created substance its esse is from another. Therefore it does not follow per se from form.

And often, concerning the mind of Avicenna ⁵, he says that esse is an accidental predicate.

IV. Because the solution of these doubts depends on the understanding of this proposition, "Esse per se consequitur formam" (Being per se follows upon form), it must be known that, since per se is taken both as opposed to what is per aliud and as opposed to what is per accidens, some say ⁶ that the proposition has truth in both senses. In the first sense, because esse belongs to form immediately through the intermediation of action. That is: the form does not first come to be and afterwards, by another action, become joined to esse; rather, the very becoming of the form terminates in that conjunction. For it is true that whatever belongs per se to something belongs to it inseparably: since things generated by the same generation are corrupted by the same corruption. In the second sense they show that esse belongs to form by distinguishing per se into per se simpliciter and per se physice. The first perseity is founded on the relation of terms taken absolutely; the second on the relation of terms posited in natural being. Likewise, in the first kind the predicates presuppose nothing unnecessary, since they regard subjects taken absolutely, and the proposition is so necessary that its opposite implies a contradiction; in the second, however, the predicates presuppose something not necessary, namely that the subject has been produced in the nature of things, and in such propositions there is no necessity except that of the course of nature, and therefore their opposite does not imply a contradiction. They say, then, that esse per se follows upon form, not with perseity simpliciter but with perseity physica: for it necessarily accompanies the form as produced, as far as lies in itself, and inseparably.

2. But although this interpretation is beautiful, and by men most learned in every respect, it does not seem to me fitting. First, for it does not seem to be according to the mind of the Philosopher to interpret per se as distinguished against per aliud. For that something should belong to something immediately through the exclusion of a mediating action does not seem to constitute this per se: for risibility and rationality belong in this way immediately to Socrates, since Socrates and his risibility and his rationality are produced by one and the same action; and yet these do not belong to Socrates in this way per se, but per aliud, namely through man. — Likewise, if this were sufficient for such perseity, then not only to the form, but also to the composite would esse belong per se in this way: whose opposite is said both here, and in the First Part, q. 50, a. 5. That however this follows is evident. For just as the same generation terminates at the form and at esse, so the becoming of the composite terminates at the composite and at the union of esse with it.

Second, this interpretation seems deficient with respect to the second mode of per se: if per se simpliciter is taken as Aristotle posits it in the second mode, in I Posterior Analytics ⁷. For it does not seem that anything belongs necessarily and inseparably to something posited in nature unless it belongs to it by one of the modes of per se simpliciter: namely, either because it itself belongs to the account of the subject, or because the subject belongs to its own account. For as Saint Thomas says in I Posterior Analytics, lecture 14, if some accident inheres in a subject of necessity and always, it must have its cause in the subject, such that once the cause is posited, the accident cannot fail to inhere; and from this he concludes that the subject must be placed in its definition, and consequently that it is a per se accident. Therefore, if esse belongs per se to a subsistent form posited in nature, it is necessary that it belong to it per se simpliciter, namely because the subsistent form itself must be placed in its definition.

Furthermore, if it were said that it belongs per se to a form because a produced form, once posited in nature, is necessarily accompanied by it, then by the same reasoning it would be said to belong per se to every nature; and thus it would follow that every nature is incorruptible. The inference is proved: for every thing posited in nature is necessarily accompanied by existing—indeed, this belongs to its very definition insofar as it is posited in nature. For it is repugnant that a thing be posited in nature outside its cause and not exist, since a thing is said to be posited in nature for no other reason than that it receives esse outside its cause. — Nor would it suffice to say that it does not belong first to any and every thing, as it does to the form. First, because the discussion here concerns what is per se as opposed to what is per accidens, not as identical with what is first. Second, because provided that esse belongs to things per se, it follows that all things are incorruptible, even if esse does not belong to them first; for thus the possibility of the opposite of risibility is removed from Socrates just as from man, to whom risibility belongs first.

V. Setting aside this interpretation, then, it seems to me that one must say that esse indeed follows form per se and as opposed per aliud, and as opposed per accidens, but that these must be understood in a different way than the aforementioned opinion understood them.

For the clarification of this, it must first be considered, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the place cited above ⁸, that something distinct from the essence of a thing belongs to it per se in the sense in which per se is distinguished from per accidens when there is some cause in the subject upon which it necessarily follows. For something is then said to belong to a subject per se because it belongs to it through the proper and intrinsic principles of that subject; and because the subject is then placed in the definition of that which is said to belong to it per se. Hence such a per se is per se simply speaking, as being founded upon the rationes of the terms taken absolutely. — From this it follows that such an attribute, once the subject is posited in nature and left to its natural condition, cannot be removed or separated from it; and that its opposite, the subject being left to its nature, would imply a contradiction if it belonged to it. And therefore nothing can belong per se and necessarily to anything posited in nature unless it belongs to it per se simply speaking.

It must be considered secondly, from the previously cited passage and from what was said above in chapter xv ⁹, that first, or as it is itself, includes per se and adds to this a certain adequation: namely, that the subject not be found outside the predicate, nor the predicate outside the subject; that is, that nothing have the character of such a subject—or, I say, formally or by participation—to which that predicate does not belong; and that the predicate belong to none to whom the subject does not belong, either formally or participatively. For thus we say that laughable belongs first to man, because there is no man who is not laughable, nor anything laughable that is not man: but it does not belong first to Socrates, although it belongs to him per se, because it belongs to someone who is not Socrates.

I say therefore that esse to belong per se to a form is understood first and inasmuch as it itself belongs to it: as is clear in this place from St. Thomas, who per se explains as meaning inasmuch as it itself. And because first includes per se as distinguished against per accidens, therefore it is said that esse belongs to it per se, simply, and first: per se indeed, because it follows from the very essence of the form; but first, because esse belongs to every form, and esse belongs to nothing unless either it is a form or participates in a form. This interpretation is clear from what St. Thomas says both in this place and in Prima q. 50, a. 5; and from the example brought forward concerning the roundness of a circle, for it is evident that roundness belongs to the circle per se, first, simply, and not merely per se physically.

VI. But against this interpretation many difficulties arise ¹⁰. The first is this. If esse belongs to a subsistent form simply and of itself, it follows that it is simply of itself, the angel is. But this is false. Therefore, and so on. — The falsity is proved as follows. If it were simply of itself, the angel is, its opposite would imply a contradiction. And thus God could not bring it about that the angel not be. This is against the doctrine of all theologians. Therefore, and so on.

The second argument is this. Whatever belongs to something per se and first is never separated from it, at least naturally: neither, I say, per se nor per accidens. But esse is separated from the form in the corruption of the composite: for, once the composite is corrupted, the form no longer exists (speaking of forms other than the intellective soul). Therefore, etc. — It is confirmed. Because in Christ, according to the teaching of St. Thomas ¹¹, the soul does not have its own esse, but has been drawn to the esse of the divine supposit. Therefore, etc.

The third is this. Esse belongs first and per se to the composite: because it is properly of the composite that it comes into being, as is Aristotle's teaching in book VII Metaph., text 27 ¹², and St. Thomas cites it in nearly countless places. Therefore it does not follow the form first and per se.

The fourth is this. That which belongs to something first and per se is caused by its substantial principles, if it is really distinct from the essence, as is clear from what has been said ¹³. But, as Saint Thomas says in the Prima, q. III, a. 4, esse cannot be caused by the essential principles of a thing. Therefore it cannot belong first and per se to any created thing first and per se.

VII. For the solution of these difficulties, it must be noted that it is one thing for some predicate not to belong to some subject, and another for the predicate itself to be separated from the subject, or conversely. For the first, the negation of the predicate from the subject suffices; and therefore even of a non-existent subject it can be said that it is not such, just as of a non-existent Socrates it can be said that he is not white. For the second, properly speaking, the negation of one of the other does not suffice, but what is required is that one be with the other non-inhering in it: for something is said to be separated as white from Socrates when Socrates exists and is not white.

It must be noted, second, that there is a difference between the first and the second mode of perseverance, because in the first mode of perseverance the predicate so necessarily accompanies the subject that in no way, nor by any power whatsoever, can the subject be found without the predicate; and therefore, whether the subject is posited in reality or in the apprehension of the intellect, the predicate always inheres in it, either in reality or in the apprehension of the intellect; so that this cannot be understood to be without that being, and the opposite simply implies a contradiction, since the same thing is formally imported by the subject and the predicate. In the second mode, however, when the predicate is a thing really distinct from the essence of the subject, although the predicate follows the subject by natural concomitance, it is not unfitting nevertheless that by divine power it be impeded from following what, considered in itself according to its nature, was naturally apt to follow it, as will be declared below in Book Four ¹⁴ And therefore by divine power one thing can be separated from another in real esse, namely, that one be in nature without the other; and consequently it can also be apprehended by the intellect that one thing exists and yet such a predicate does not inhere in it. Nevertheless such propositions are said to be necessary simply, and truths of eternal truth: because the predicate by natural concomitance always follows the subject, both being considered according to their own nature and left to themselves, and not impeded by divine power, which, by its infinite virtue, can prohibit what is born of itself to follow from one thing from attaining that.

VIII. Then, in response to the first difficulty ¹⁵ it is said, first, that the proposition an angel is is per se, just as is the proposition an angel is eternal or everlasting and incorruptible: although perhaps the latter is in the first mode of per se predication, while the former is in the second.

To the argument on the opposite side, however, it is said that its opposite implies a contradiction in the way that the opposites of propositions of the second mode imply a contradiction per se: namely, because it implies that, as subject, with its nature laid aside, the opposite of the predicate should belong to it per se. For when the predicate belongs per se to the subject in such a way that it arises from the principles of the subject, and there is in the subject no potency for the opposite of such a predicate, it is repugnant that the subject be deprived of its nature and that the opposite of such a predicate belong to it; but it does not imply a contradiction simply and absolutely. But when it is inferred, Therefore God could not make it that an angel not be, the consequence is denied. Because if God were to make it that an angel not be, he would not be making what implies a contradiction: for it does not imply a contradiction that an angel absolutely not be; although that it not be with its nature laid aside—because of some potency existing in it for non-being—does imply a contradiction.

It must be noted, however, that when I say that an angel, once abandoned by its nature, cannot not be, I do not mean by this the subtraction of the divine influx, as if, were the divine influx removed from the angel, the angel would nevertheless remain in esse. For this is against the mind of all the theologians, and especially of Gregory, who says ¹⁶ that all things would tend to nothing unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them; for, as is said in the First Part, q. CIV, a. 1, ad 1, esse follows of itself from the form of a creature, provided, however, the divine influx is presupposed. Rather, I mean the removal of the divine action that impedes the natural sequel of existence to the angel's essence, and that forbids its natural course.

2. To the second difficulty it is said that esse in the corruption of a composite is not separated from the form, although both the form and esse cease: for the form does not remain, so that it could be said that the form is and does not have esse. Just as, although Socrates, once corrupted, is not really risible in the esse of nature, risibility is nevertheless not said to be separated from Socrates, as if Socrates remained and did not have risibility. This response is had from a similar case in Questions on the Power of God, q. 5, a. 3, ad 10, where Saint Thomas says that, if God were to reduce incorruptible creatures to nothing, he would not on that account separate eternity from nature, as if nature would remain non-eternal: rather the whole of nature would fail, the influx of the cause ceasing.

But against that response it is argued. For it follows from it that esse belongs per se to the composite in the same way as to the form. For just as esse cannot be separated from the form in such a way that the form remains without esse, so it cannot be separated from the composite in such a way that the composite remains and does not have esse. And thus the composite will be incorruptible, like a subsisting form.

It is answered: and it is said first that esse indeed belongs to the composite per se, insofar as per se is divided against per accidens, since it follows upon its form; yet it does not belong to it per se in the first way, in the manner in which it belongs to the form.

It is said second, that it does not follow that every composite is incorruptible, just as every form subsisting through itself is incorruptible. For if a composite is such that it cannot lose the form by which it has esse, it will be incorruptible; but if it can lose the form, it will be corruptible. As is clear in the example brought forward concerning roundness: for roundness can in no way be removed from a circle such that the circle remains and yet not be round; but it can indeed be removed from a bronze circle, because the figure of the circle can be removed from the bronze. Esse therefore cannot be removed from that to which it belongs first and through itself; but it can well be removed from that to which it does not belong through itself but through another, namely through a form, if that thing can lose the form. And then that thing will be corruptible.

It is said thirdly that, although esse cannot be separated from the composite in such a way that the composite remains in nature whole and complete without esse, it can nevertheless be separated from it according to some part of its essence, namely according to matter, which remains.

For confirmation¹⁷ it is said that indeed by the divine power, absolutely speaking, it can come about that a form exists and does not have its own proper and natural esse. If, however, it is left to its natural course, it always and necessarily has its natural esse when it is produced in nature. And this necessity, as was said above¹⁸, suffices for the perfection of the second mode, when the predicate says something really distinct from the essence of the subject.

3. To the third it is said that esse can be compared to form in two ways: in one way, as a formal effect to its cause; in another way, as act to potency, namely as the act through which the form itself exists in nature. Therefore, when we say that esse belongs first and per se to the form, this can be understood in two ways: in one way, absolutely and indistinctly, without determining any mode of belonging or accompaniment; in another way, by determining the mode according to which it belongs to something, just as act belongs to potency—namely, making that very thing exist as that which is.

If it is taken in the first way, then esse belongs first and per se to the form. For, since it belongs to the form as its formal effect, but to the composite as act; and since by nature and in intellect it is prior for an effect to flow from its cause than for it to actualize some subject, even though both occur simultaneously in time: it is necessary to say that esse belongs by nature to the form before the composite. And this is what Saint Thomas intends here, that esse belongs to the form first and per se.

But if it is taken in the second way, then esse belongs to the composite prior to the form. For the composite itself is properly that which is, whereas the form is that by which the composite is and exists, as a part of the composite which exists first. And to this sense the Philosopher and Saint Thomas intend that esse belongs first and per se to the composite.

4. To the fourth it is said that St. Thomas does not state absolutely that esse cannot be caused from the substantial principles of a thing, but only adds this¹⁹. For he intends that esse is indeed caused from the essential principles of the thing, namely from the essence of its form; but that it is not caused from that alone—rather, beyond the causality of the form, the causality of an efficient cause is required. On account of which he said, in the passage cited above²⁰, that esse follows form per se, supposing nevertheless the influx of God. That this is his intention is evident from the proof brought forward there, namely that no thing suffices to be for itself the cause of being if it has caused esse: for he does not say that no thing is for itself the cause of its being, but that it does not suffice, since evidently, besides the principles of the thing which are the cause of esse, an extrinsic agent is also required.

5. To what was adduced above²¹ it is said, first, that the mind of St. Thomas is that esse belongs to a form through another as efficient cause. But this does not conflict with its belonging to it per se formally, as we intend.

It is said second, that esse is called an accidental predicate because it is really distinct from the essence of the thing: not, however, because it belongs to the form per accidens.

IX. Thirdly²². If it were corrupted, it would remain after its corruption. But this is impossible. Therefore, and so on. – The consequence is proved: because in every corruption, when the act is removed, the potency remains, since nothing is corrupted into being absolutely nothing. Now in intellectual substances, esse is as act, while the substance itself is as potency.

Fourth²³. In an intellectual substance there is no potency to non-being. Therefore etc. – The consequence is evident, because in everything that is corrupted there must be a potency to non-being. – The antecedent, however, is proved as follows. That which is the proper recipient of some act is in no way in potency to its opposite; this is clear in the case of fire with respect to heat. A complete substance is the proper recipient of esse. Therefore it is not in potency to non-being, unless perhaps by reason of matter in composite substances. Therefore intellectual substances, which are immaterial and complete, are not in potency to non-being.

X. Concerning this proposition, "That which is receptive of some act is not in potency to the opposite," a doubt arises.

For the eye is the proper receptive subject of sight. And yet it is also the receptive subject of blindness. Therefore, and so on. — Likewise, the same thing is the subject of a habit and of its privation. — Likewise, the same power is that of contraries.

Therefore, that which is receptive of some act is also receptive of its opposite.

2. It is answered that when St. Thomas speaks of the proper recipient of some act, he understands the proximate and proportionate recipient of that act, not a remote and non-proportionate one. And it is universally true that what is not in potency to opposites: for what is proportionate to heat is not proportionate to cold, so as to be in proximate potency to it. Hence even prime matter, insofar as it is proportionate to the form of fire through the accidents of fire, is not receptive of the form of water—although considered absolutely it is receptive of it, as the first and common subject of all forms.

To the first, therefore, it is said that if by the name "eye" we understand the substance of the eye together with those dispositions by which it is the proper subject of sight, then it is not in potency to blindness: for blindness does not befall it except because it is changed from its natural disposition. But if by the name "eye" we understand the substance absolutely, which underlies such dispositions, then the eye is not the proper recipient of sight, but only its remote one.

To the second it is said, according to the mind of St. Thomas in Truth, XXI, a. 2, ad 1, that the subject of a habit and of a privation is not called the same in such a way that everything which has some form is also receptive of a privation; for it is evident that there are in things certain accidents of which their privation cannot exist, as St. Thomas gives the example of the heat of fire; but because, if a privation is naturally apt to exist in something, that thing must be receptive of the opposite habit.

To the third it is said that the proximate potency of contraries need not be the same, but it suffices that the remote potency be the same: as is the mind of St. Thomas, II On the Heavens, lecture 10. – Likewise, when one of the contraries is present by nature, the potency receptive of contraries is not the same: as is said in Truth, at the place cited above.

A complete substance, therefore, because it is the proper subject receptive of esse, is not of itself in potency to non-being. But if any substance is in potency to non-being, this belongs to it through something else, namely by reason of matter, which is by nature apt to receive another form.

XI. Fifth²⁴. In intellectual substances, their very substance, complete in itself, is that which holds the place of first potency and first subject. Therefore the substance itself is incorruptible. Therefore, etc. — The first inference is proved: because in whatever things there is a composition of potency and act, that which holds the place of first potency and first subject is incorruptible, as is evident in the case of prime matter of corruptible things. — The second is also proved: because nothing is corruptible except because its substance is corrupted.

Sixth²⁵ They are not corruptible, neither per se nor per accidens; therefore, and so on. That they are not corruptible per se is proved: because they have no contrary, nor are they composed of contraries; the sign of this is that things which are contrary by nature cease to be contraries in the intellect; rather, one is understood through the other. But everything corrupted per se must either have a contrary or be composed of contraries, since things that mutually expel one another must be contraries. — That they are not corrupted per accidens is evident: because they are subsistent beings. But those things which are corrupted per accidens are accidents and non-subsistent forms.

XII. Concerning the sign by which it is proved that intellectual substances have no contrary and are not composed of contraries, namely that things which are contrary according to their nature cease to be contrary in the intellect, it must be considered that St. Thomas is speaking of contrary forms, such as white and black: for it is evident that the species of these, in respect of which they are said to be in the intellect, are together in the intellect at once, and consequently do not possess contrariety; and there is also one science of these contraries themselves. But he is not speaking of the operations of the intellect themselves. For the opinions of the intellect about contradictories are contraries, and they cannot be together in the intellect. From this it follows that they are contraries not only objectively, as some wish — for thus also the species of white and black are objectively contraries, which nevertheless St. Thomas says are not contraries in the intellect — but also on the side of the subject: since they expel one another mutually from the intellect in which they are received subjectively, which St. Thomas says suffices for the ratio of contrariety, II On the Heavens, lecture 10.

2. But then a doubt arises: how can contrary forms losing their contrariety in the intellect be a sign that the intellectual nature neither has anything contrary to it nor is composed of contraries? For, although some contraries lose their contrariety in the intellect, there are nevertheless in it contrary opinions.

3. For the clarification of this point, it must be considered that being receptive of contraries according to the notion of contrariety is not a sufficient sign of having a contrary, or of a subject's being composed of contraries, except perhaps in an independently subsisting nature: for the matter of things generated and corrupted is receptive of contrary forms, and yet it neither has a contrary nor is composed of contraries, and is therefore incorruptible, although it is the principle of corruption in other things. But that something is not a subject of contraries is indeed a sufficient sign that it has no contrary, or is not composed of contraries: for everything that has a contrary, or is composed of contraries, is necessarily receptive of contraries, since one contrary is by nature apt to act upon another. Therefore, wishing to show that St. Thomas held that intellectual substance neither has a contrary nor is composed of contraries, he adduced as a fitting sign that it is not receptive of contraries as contraries are, since those things which are contrary by their own nature do not have contrariety in the intellect.

But it must be noted that Saint Thomas, as was said before ²⁶, is speaking of the contrariety of the things themselves existing outside the intellect. For from this contrariety is taken the sign of corruption and incorruption of things: for what does not receive contrary things by way of contrariety has no contrary, nor is it composed of contraries, and it is incorruptible, since it is unalterable; but what receives contrary things by way of contraries is either corruptible, as composed, or is the principle of corruption in the composite, as matter is for things generated and corruptible. — He is not speaking, however, of the contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as is said in II Perihermeneias ²⁷; for from this contrariety no judgment of corruption or incorruption of a thing is taken. Hence, as is said in Iª IIae, q. lxiv, a. 3, ad 3, although contrary things, that is, those which are contrary outside the intellect, do not have contrariety in the soul, yet in the intellect there is a contrariety of affirmation and negation. For although esse and non-esse are contradictories as they are considered in things, nevertheless as they are referred to the act of the soul, according as the soul opines something to be, and opines that same thing not to be—for example, when it opines that good is good, and that good is not good—they are contraries. On this account Saint Thomas fittingly adduced as a sign that an intellectual substance is not composed of contraries, because those things which are contrary according to their nature, that is, according to the esse they have outside the intellect, lose their contrariety when received into the intellect, although contrary opinions are received in the intellect: namely, because from these the judgment of corruptibility and incorruptibility is taken; but not from the contrariety of affirmation and negation, according to which no transmutation is naturally apt to occur in the intellectual substance of nature itself.

XIII. Seventh ²⁸. An intellectual substance is not a body. Therefore it is not moved. Therefore it is not corrupted per se. — Nor is it corrupted per accidens, because it is not a form or a power dependent upon a body. Therefore etc.

The first consequence is proved. Because everything that is moved is a body. — The second is also proved. Because corruption is the mutation which is the terminus of motion, and therefore it must be that whatever is corrupted is moved.

Eighth. It does not undergo a passion that leads to corruption. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. For something is corrupted by the very fact that it undergoes something. — But the antecedent is proved. For whatever is received in an intelligent substance is received in it intelligibly. But what is so received in it perfects it and does not corrupt it, since the intelligible is the perfection of the one understanding. Therefore, etc.

In the ninth ²⁹. It is not corrupted by its own corruption, which arises from the excellence of its object: for one who understands more intelligible things also understands the less intelligible ones all the more. Nor on account of the corruption of the subject: since it does not depend upon the subject. Therefore, and so on. — The consequence is evident. For just as the sensible is the object of sense, so the intelligible is the object of the intellect. Now sense is not corrupted except either because of the excellence of its object or because of the corruption of the subject.

XIV. Concerning what is said here about sense, a doubt arises. For it seems that St. Thomas holds that sense is corrupted per se by the excellence of its object, but per accidens by the corruption of the organ: as if sense were corrupted in two ways, namely sometimes per se without corruption of the organ, and sometimes because of the corruption of the organ. But this does not seem to be true. For an excessively intense sensible seems to corrupt sense for no other reason than that it dissolves the proportion of the organ. And thus sense is not corrupted, even by an excessively intense sensible, except on account of the corruption of the organ.

2. To this a twofold reply can be given. First, that Saint Thomas does not understand by "subject" the organ of sense, but the animal itself. And thus the corruption of sense on account of the excellence of the sensible is not distinguished from its corruption on account of the corruption of the organ, but from its corruption on account of the corruption of the animal. For that corruption which occurs on account of the excellence of the sensible is called the proper corruption of sense, because it befits sense insofar as it is sense, as proceeding from its proper object; but the other is not proper to it, and befits it only insofar as it is an accident of the animal.

Second, it can be answered that by the subject of sense St. Thomas understands its organ: and he wishes that, with respect to its corruption, it can be corrupted in two ways, just as the organ itself happens to be corrupted in two ways. For, since the organ can be related to sense in two ways—namely, as its instrument joined to it through which it exercises its operation, and as the very subject sustaining it in being—insofar as it is an instrument, it is corrupted by the excellence of a sensible of that sense as by its proper corruptive, because such an excellence of the sensible dissolves the proportion of the organ by which it is suited for the operation of that sense; for from very bright things the proportion of the eye is dissolved which is required for eliciting the act of vision; but insofar as it is the subject of sense, which is composed of contraries, it is corrupted by active qualities, namely hot, cold, and the like, just as other things composed of contraries are corrupted. Therefore, similarly, sense can be corrupted in two ways with respect to the accidental corruption of the organ: namely, with respect to its corruption insofar as it is an organ; and with respect to its corruption insofar as it is a subject. The first corruption is proper to sense, because it belongs to it inasmuch as it is sense and uses such a body joined to it as an instrument for sensing: and it comes about from the excellence of its proper sensible as from the proper corruptive of its organ insofar as it is an organ. The second, however, is not proper to it, but is common to it and other accidental forms: for it is common to every accident to be corrupted along with the corruption of its subject. This corruption of the organ, however, as was said, comes about from common corruptives, namely from active qualities acting naturally.

From these things it is clear that it is not St. Thomas's mind in this passage that the sense is corrupted per se, without corruption of the organ, by the excellence of its proper sensible object; but that it is corrupted along with the corruption of the organ—sometimes indeed by its own corruption, namely when the organ, insofar as it is of this kind, is corrupted by the excellence of its proper sensible object; sometimes however by a corruption common to all accidents, namely when the organ, insofar as it is a subject, is corrupted by a corruption arising not from the excellence of its proper sensible object, but from other agents; in accordance with which the sense itself is said to be corrupted per accidens, and not by its own corruption.

3. But concerning that answer a doubt arises. For an exceedingly intense sensible object, if it corrupts the sense per se through its own corruption, can do so only through the reception of its sensible species in the sense and in the organ. But a sensible species existing in the sense cannot corrupt either the sense or the organ of sense, since such a species has intentional esse in the sense; and an intention does not cause natural transmutation, as is said in Prima, q. LXVII, a. 3, and II Sent., d. XIII, a. 3. Therefore, etc.

It is answered by denying the minor. — To the authority of Saint Thomas it is said that, although a form having intentional esse, insofar as it is such, is not of itself corruptive or active with respect to any natural effect, nevertheless the object of sense, by imprinting such a form, can cause a natural transmutation: just as, although the principal power of an agent, existing intentionally in an instrument, cannot of itself, insofar as it has such diminished esse, cause the effect of the principal agent; yet the principal agent itself can act through it, thus existing in the instrument. Therefore Saint Thomas intends that the intention, of itself, cannot cause a natural transmutation. But he does not deny that the object, through the very intention impressed upon the organ of sense, can dissolve the disposition of the organ.

XV. Tenth ³⁰. The intelligible, insofar as it is intelligible, is necessary and incorruptible. This is evident from the fact that necessary things are perfectly knowable by the intellect in themselves, whereas contingent things are so only insofar as they are incorruptible, namely, insofar as they are universal. Therefore the intellect must be incorruptible. — The consequence is proved. Because what belongs to the intelligible insofar as it is intelligible must belong to the intellect insofar as it is such: since the perfect and the perfectible must be of one genus.

Concerning that proposition, Necessary things are perfectly knowable by the intellect, it must be noted that Saint Thomas speaks of necessary things considered in themselves, and of the perfection of cognition as it resides on the side of the one understanding. For the necessary, insofar as it is from itself, is naturally apt to be understood with certain and evident cognition, which is perfect cognition on the part of the one knowing.

2. Concerning the proof of the consequence, a doubt is raised. For if the intellect is incorruptible because its perfection is incorruptible, on the ground that the perfectible and the perfecting must be of one genus, it will follow that the body of man is incorruptible. For its perfection, namely the intellectual soul, is incorruptible.

3. For the clarification of this, it must be considered that the proper perfection of anything is related to its perfectible as its proper act is related to its proper potency. Now a proper act and a proper potency are placed in the same order of things, since matter must be proportionate to form. Hence no potency regards as its proper form something of a higher or lower order; otherwise there would be no proportion between matter and form. Just as the matter of generable things does not regard the form of a celestial body as its proper act, since that form is of a higher order, being that which completes the whole capacity of its matter—a completion which cannot befit the matter of generables through one form—so neither is the matter of the heavens receptive of any generable and corruptible form, because the form of a generable and corruptible thing leaves the matter in which it is received in potency to another form, which is utterly alien to the matter of the heavens.

Since, therefore, St. Thomas says that the perfectible and its perfection must be of the same genus, by being of the same genus he means being of the same order. For thus, since the intelligible, insofar as it is intelligible, is the proper act of the one understanding insofar as he understands, the intellect and the intelligible, insofar as they are such, must be of one order of things. And therefore, since the intelligible as such belongs to the order of incorruptibles, being abstracted from individual matter, which is the principle of corruption, it is necessary that the one understanding as such be incorruptible.

4. With these suppositions, the answer to the objection is that, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Prima, q. LXXVI ³¹, and in the Quaestio de Anima, a. 8, the intellectual soul is of the same genus or of the same order as the human body with respect to those things in virtue of which such a body is assumed so as to be perfectible by the soul. But it need not be of the same order with respect to what follows from the necessity of matter and not from the first intention of the one choosing matter on account of form. Now the human body is taken as the matter of the intellectual soul insofar as it is a fitting instrument for the sensitive operations, through whose mediation the soul may receive intelligible species from things: for, as is said in the First Part, at the place cited above, a. 5, ad 2, a body is owed to the intellectual soul not on account of its intellectual operation considered in itself, but on account of the sensitive power. In this way, then, soul and body are of the same order: because the intellectual soul requires an organ proportioned to it equally, as the principle of sensing; and the body is thus proportioned as being fit for sensing. Hence each is placed in the order of sensible things: one indeed as act, the other as potency. But corruptibility follows from the necessity of matter, since a body so equally proportioned, and mixed of contraries, must necessarily be corrupted; and this happens to it insofar as it is assumed as the matter of such a form. Just as it happens to iron, when it is taken as the matter of a saw, that it contract rust: for the craftsman would rather choose a matter to which no such defect accrues, if one could be found. Therefore it is not necessary that the intellectual soul and the human body be of the same order with respect to corruptibility or incorruptibility: but they are well ordered as intelligible and understood, since corruptibility cannot follow from any necessity of matter in the intellect, because it is immaterial and unmixed.

Therefore, the consequence is denied as invalid. For corruptibility follows upon the human body from the necessity of matter. Saint Thomas's proposition is to be understood thus: that the perfect and the perfectible must be of the same order and mode of being, unless it happens otherwise per accidens from the necessity of matter, and beyond the first intention of the agent.

XVI. Eleventh. The intellect is not perfected through motion, but through that which exists outside motion. This is evident, because it is perfected through knowledge and prudence, with the passions of the soul stilled, as is said in Book VII of the Physics. Therefore the mode of an intelligent substance is that its esse be above motion and time. Therefore etc. — The first inference is proved. Because each thing is perfected according to the mode of its substance. — The second is also proved. Because the esse of any corruptible thing is subject to motion and time.

2. But this argument seems not to conclude. For although through the cessation of some external motion the soul is perfected by knowledge and prudence, it can nevertheless stand with this that the soul is perfected by prudence and knowledge through the motion of the intellect itself: just as, because a gust of wind sometimes prevents wood from burning, therefore it does not burn unless the wind and the motion of the air cease, and yet, when the motion of the air ceases, the wood burns through the motion of the wood itself. Similarly, although for acquiring knowledge and prudence the passions of the soul and the disturbances of the body must be stilled, since these impede the judgment of the intellect when they are disordered; nevertheless it does not necessarily follow from this that, those motions ceasing, knowledge and prudence come to the soul without the motion of the intellect itself.

3. For the evidence of this, it must be considered, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas on Physics VII, in his exposition of text 20 ³², that when the intellect is in its ultimate disposition for receiving the intelligible species, if it be considered in itself, then, once impediments are removed, it is at once informed by the intelligible species through the presence of the objects accepted by experience, just as a mirror is informed by the specular form at the presence of a body. But because the soul is hindered from acquiring knowledge by the disordered passions of the mind and the disturbances of the body, therefore, when such passions are removed or calmed, species are at once caused in the intellect of those things whose cognition has already been had by experience. And hence this sudden acquisition of knowledge upon the cessation of external motion is a sign that knowledge is not acquired through the motion of the intellect itself: nor does an preceding alteration belong to it of itself, although the removal of what prohibits it is required. And thus it is clear that the intellect, speaking properly, is perfected not through motion, but through that which exists outside motion and time.

To the doubt, then, it is said, first, that these do not stand together: that the soul is perfected by knowledge immediately upon the cessation of the external motion, as St. Thomas intends, and that the soul acquires knowledge through motion; for what is perfected immediately once the impediment is removed is not actualized through motion.

To the example that is brought forward, it is said that it is not to the point. For wood is not at once set on fire upon the cessation of the air's motion, because it is not in the ultimate disposition toward the form of fire; whereas the intellect is of itself in the ultimate disposition toward intelligible forms and toward knowledge.

XVII. Twelfth ³³. Intellectual substances desire perpetual esse by a natural appetite. Therefore, etc.

The consequence is evident. For natural desire cannot be in vain, since nature does nothing in vain.

The antecedent is proved. They know and apprehend perpetual esse. Therefore they also naturally desire it. — The consequence is proved by comparison with things that lack cognition. For those things in whose principles there is a power for preserving perpetual esse according to number desire perpetual esse according to number, by an appetite consequent upon those principles; while those whose principles have a power for preserving perpetual esse according to species desire perpetual esse according to species. Therefore those things that do not know esse except as present now desire esse only as present now, the appetite following the cognition, but not perpetual esse; whereas those that know perpetual esse desire perpetual esse as well. The consequence is evident: because both through an appetite following natural principles and through an appetite following cognition there is in things a natural desire of being (essendi). The sign of this is that both things lacking cognition and things possessing it resist what corrupts them, each in its own way.

XVIII. We can interpret the antecedent of this argument, and its proof, in two ways, both of them in keeping with the mind of St. Thomas.

For the evidence of the first interpretation, it must be known, first, that to apprehend the esse of intellectual substances as perpetual is, in the matter at hand, to apprehend their esse absolutely. Now to apprehend esse absolutely is to apprehend esse without any limitation. And since esse can be limited in two ways—namely, as an act is limited by the potency in which it is received, in which way we speak of human esse or angelic esse; and as what is measured by time is said to be limited to some determinate time, in which way we speak of the esse of one day, or of one month, or of one year, and the like—to apprehend esse here as absolute and without limitation is to apprehend esse without determination to any nature, and without determination to any time, but only insofar as it is existing in the nature of things. Now esse considered in this absolute way is sempiternal and perpetual negatively: namely, because it is enclosed by no terms of duration. It is not, however, positively perpetual: because, just as it abstracts from this or that time, so it abstracts from the perpetuity of time. Yet consequently it must be perpetual also positively: because, if it existed in nature just as it is apprehended and desired absolutely, since it abstracts from every limitation of time, it would be necessary for it to endure at all times; just as, because it abstracts from every limiting nature, it would be necessary for it to contain every perfection of being of whatever nature. Hence in God there accompany one another esse abstracted yet containing every perfection of being, and esse eternal, abstracted from every difference of time.

It must be noted, secondly, that the thing apprehended does not move the appetite unless it is apprehended under the aspect of the good and the fitting. Therefore the rational appetite of a creature does not follow upon the apprehension of perpetual esse with respect to absolute esse except insofar as absolute esse is apprehended under the aspect of the good and the fitting.

The foundation of this argument, then, is that because the intellectual nature, as such, apprehends being absolutely as a good and desirable thing, without determination to any fixed time, it therefore desires being absolutely, not with any determination to some time. Now to desire being in this way is to desire first of all that perpetuity belong to itself as befitting it: negatively indeed in the first instance; but secondarily, and consequently, affirmatively as well.

2. Second, we can interpret that proof as follows: by perpetual esse we are to understand esse considered together with perpetuity itself, so that it is distinguished against temporal esse. And then the sense of the argument is that, since an intellectual nature apprehends esse together with perpetuity under the aspect of the good and the desirable — for there is no doubt that it knows the perpetuity of being and judges it to be good, since it knows that the noblest being, who is God, is eternal — therefore it desires esse itself along with perpetuity in its desiring of being, just as those things whose principles contain a power of preserving perpetual esse desire esse with perpetuity. For the apprehension of the good in beings possessing intellect stands to intellectual appetite as principle and form stand to natural appetite in things without cognition.

XIX. But against each exposition there is a doubt. Against the first, indeed, because if, from appetiting being absolutely—which is universal and sempiternal being negatively—there follows appetiting perpetual being positively, as the first exposition says, it follows that the cognition by which being absolutely is known and apprehended is also an apprehension of the perpetuity of essendi, so that perpetuity is a part of the object known: for appetite is borne toward nothing except what is known. But this is false: because just as, when the universal is apprehended absolutely, its universality need not be apprehended, although it is a condition concomitant with the universal as it is known absolutely, so it need not be that, upon the apprehension of being absolutely, perpetuity itself be apprehended, even taken negatively, although it accompanies the object thus known. Therefore much less is the perpetuity of essendi apprehended positively.

2. Against the second exposition, however, it is argued: because the appetite consequent upon the apprehension of perpetuity does not seem natural, but rather a kind of imperfect will, according to which the will would want all perfections if it were possible.

Confirmed. For on this supposition it would follow that every man would naturally desire perpetual esse, since every man apprehends perpetual esse. Yet this is false, because then every man would be perpetual, according to the argument laid down here.

3. Against the antecedent itself ³⁴ an objection can also be brought from Scotus, where above ³⁵, to the first. For either the argument concerns natural desire properly so called. And then, in order to prove a natural desire for something, one must prove the possibility in that nature for that thing. And so, in the case at hand, in order to prove that an intellectual nature naturally desires perpetual esse, one would first have to show that there is in it a possibility for perpetual esse. And to argue the other way round would be begging the question.

Or it is argued of natural desire less properly so called, which is an elicited act. And then it cannot be proved that some desire is natural unless it is first proved that there is a natural desire in the first way toward that thing; and consequently, unless it is first proved the possibility in nature for that thing. And therefore, as was argued before, to prove a natural possibility in nature for that thing from natural desire is to beg the principle.

XX. To the first of these objections it is said that the appetite is related to the condition of the appetible object proposed to it in the same way in which apprehension itself is related to that condition. For if a thing is apprehended as a good, or as a reason of goodness, then the appetite tends toward it per se, as toward the thing desired or the reason of the thing desired. But if it is not apprehended, and instead accompanies the apprehended object as such, then it too is desired concomitantly, and as a condition of the thing desired, and through something else. Thus, if the intellect apprehends universal good as good and appetible, apprehending it as including every perfection, so that to include every perfection is part of the object known, then the appetite following this cognition tends per se toward universal good and toward that very containment of all perfection, as toward the thing desired. But if it apprehends the common reason of good by abstraction from every limiting principle toward some particular reason of good, apprehending nothing else about that common good, then the containment of all goodness and perfection is not part of the object known, but a condition accompanying the object known; and the appetite, following that apprehension, tends toward the containment of all perfection not per se, but through something else and concomitantly, insofar as it is a condition accompanying the object desired.

So, then, in the matter at hand: because the apprehension of esse absolutely, without limitation to any time, is accompanied by a negative perpetuity of essendi as the condition of the object known as such, therefore the appetite for that esse absolutely is likewise borne only concomitantly toward that negative perpetuity of essendi so taken. And because in esse thus perpetually negative there is included implicitly a perpetuity taken affirmatively—since, if esse absolute were posited in the nature of things as it is understood, it would endure perpetually, from which no certain time would be determined for itself—therefore in the apprehension of perpetual esse negatively, perpetual esse affirmatively is apprehended implicitly; and the appetite for esse absolute implicitly appetites perpetual esse affirmatively. And thus it is clear that in the manner in which perpetual esse is appetited, it is also apprehended by the intellect; and conversely, as it is apprehended, so it is appetited.

2. To make the second doubt evident, we must consider the likeness that St. Thomas posits between the natural principles of a thing and the cognition of the good: namely, that just as to the natural principles there follows a natural appetite for being, so also to the apprehension of esse itself. He gives as a sign of this that both things lacking cognition and things possessing cognition resist those that would corrupt them: the former indeed according to the power of their natural principles, the latter according to the mode of their cognition. For from this likeness and comparison it appears that, just as according to the condition of the natural principles the appetite following those principles naturally desires esse — because things whose principles have the power for perpetual esse naturally desire perpetual esse; whereas those whose principles do not have the power to preserve esse perpetually but only up to a determinate time do not naturally desire esse except for such a time — so according to the mode of apprehending esse itself must be the mode of desiring esse naturally; so that, namely, those things which apprehend esse as here and now may naturally desire esse as here and now, while those which apprehend perpetual esse may naturally desire perpetual esse.

When, therefore, it is objected that this is only a certain imperfect will: this is denied. Nor is it the same with esse as with the other perfections of other things. For esse is naturally desired by each thing according to its own mode, whereas the perfections of other things are not naturally desired by each thing. Therefore esse itself is also desired naturally, according to the mode in which it is apprehended.

In confirmation it is said that the consequence does not hold. For the apprehension by which man apprehends perpetual esse is not an operation of the whole composite, as if elicited immediately by the composite, but is an operation of the soul alone: in respect of which man is also said to understand, just as the whole is named from the operation of a part ³⁶. Therefore the composite itself need not naturally desire perpetual esse: rather, it is the soul of man alone that naturally desires perpetuity, whose alone it is to apprehend perpetuity. Hence below ³⁷ Saint Thomas, proving by this same argument the perpetuity of the human soul, concludes: It follows, therefore, that man has perpetuity according to his soul, by which he apprehends esse simply and throughout all time.

3. To the third objection, which is taken from Scotus, it is said that natural appetite is understood here as signifying an elicited act necessarily followed by cognition and apprehension of the good. But when it is argued that this would be begging the question, this is denied. For that such a natural desire is inherent in intellectual substances is proved from the fact that they apprehend perpetual esse. From this natural appetite, however, it is concluded a posteriori that they themselves are perpetual and incorruptible.

XXI. Thirteenth ³⁸ They could not have begun to be except through the power of the first agent. Therefore they cannot cease to be except through the power of the first agent. — The antecedent is proved: because they are not from matter that could have pre-existed. — The consequence is also proved: because things that begin and cease to be have both through the same power.

But someone might, by this line of reasoning, argue: Such substances can cease to be through the power of the first agent. Therefore they are corruptible. The opposite of which is what is intended here.

Saint Thomas responds by denying the consequence. First, because things are said to be necessary and contingent not by an extrinsic power but by an intrinsic one. — Second, because, since it is proper to them to be perpetual, God does not take this away from them, although he could annihilate them absolutely. For since God is the institutor of nature, he does not take from things what is proper to their natures.

2. But a doubt arises at this point. For it seems that what is said here contradicts what was said above in the second argument. There it was shown that substances which are themselves forms can never be deprived of esse, and that it is impossible for them to cease to be, because esse follows form of itself. Here, however, it is said that they can cease to be through the power of the first agent.

To this a twofold answer can be given. First, that he understood above that they cannot cease to be through some intrinsic power, in the way they would then be called corruptible. But this is not repugnant to their being able to cease to be through the extrinsic power of the first mover, as is said here.

Second, it can be answered that he understood above that they cannot be deprived of esse while they themselves or something of them remains in nature, which is to cease to be through corruption: for nothing of them can remain under their non-being, since they are wholly simple in substance. Here, however, he wishes that they can cease to be through annihilation, in which nothing of the annihilated thing remains in nature. But clearly these involve no contradiction with one another.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, Praise the Lord from the heavens, etc., where, after enumerating the angels and the heavenly bodies, it is added, He established them forever etc. — And Dionysius also, in chapter III of the Divine Names³⁹, says that on account of the rays of the divine goodness etc.