Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

As to the second point, it is shown that intellectual substances are of free choice in their operating ¹.

I. And it is argued first as follows. Through intellective cognition, intellectual substances have judgment about what is to be done. And they must have freedom, since they have dominion over their own act. Therefore, and so on.

Second. Those things are of free choice in acting which are of free judgment and free action. But only intellectual beings are of this kind. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident, together with the major premise.

The minor premise is now proved. That they are of free action is proved because they move themselves to act. But only self-movers have freedom in acting, not those which are neither moved nor act except as moved by another: for, since the free is that which is its own cause, what is not the cause of its own acting is not free in acting. — That they alone are of free judgment is proved. And indeed that they act by judgment is proved: because the self-mover is divided into mover and moved; and the moved ² is appetite moved by intellect or phantasy or sense, whose function it is to judge. That they alone possess free judgment is proved: because what moves itself to judge is of free judgment; but intellectual beings alone move themselves to judge, because intellect alone is reflected upon its own act, which is required in order that a judging power move itself to judge. Therefore, etc.

From these things it is concluded that inanimate things are neither free in their motion, since they are moved only by another, nor free in judgment, since they are not moved by judgment. Irrational beings, however, are indeed free in their motion in some way, since they move themselves; but they are not free in judgment. Intellectual beings, however, are free both in judgment and in action.

2. It must first be noted that, although irrational creatures are in some way free in their motion, they are nevertheless not said to be moved by free choice. For something to be moved by free choice, it is required that it move itself, and not merely be moved by another; and that it have free judgment concerning its motion, so that it can judge it fitting or unfitting for itself to be moved. Now, although irrational creatures do move themselves, since one part of them moves and the other is moved, they do not possess free judgment about moving or not moving; rather this is determined for them by nature. For a sheep, seeing a wolf, cannot determine that flight is not to be avoided. Hence they are said to be free in their motion, but not to move themselves by free choice.

It must be noted, second, that to be free in their motion is nothing other than to be a cause of motion to themselves: namely, that they move themselves toward a determinate end, and are not moved only from without as by a principal mover, like things moved by nature and things moved by violence. Yet, because to be moved freely in the unqualified sense is to have it within one's power both to be moved and not to be moved, which does not belong to brute animals, Saint Thomas does not say absolutely that they are free in their motion, but adds in a certain way, as if to say: they are free in their motion in a certain respect, but not simply.

II. Third. Only intellectual beings apprehend the common notion of the good or of the fitting. Therefore only they move themselves to judge. Therefore only they are free in judging, which is to have free will. — The antecedent is evident. — The first consequence is proved: because an apprehended form moves insofar as it is apprehended under the aspect of the good or of the fitting. If, therefore, a being that judges moves itself to judge, it must move itself to judge by means of some higher apprehended form. But this cannot be anything other than the very notion of the good or of the fitting, by which judgment is made about any determinate good or fitting thing. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that, since the apprehended form moves to operation insofar as something is judged by it to be good or fitting, if something is reflected upon above its own judgment by deliberating whether the judgment by which something is judged good or fitting is true or false, this must be done from the very common notion of the good or the fitting: just as, if it must be judged whether the judgment by which something is judged to be an animal is true, such a judgment must be made from the very notion of animal, by which we can know whether this or that particular thing is an animal. And therefore, since everything that moves itself to judgment is reflected upon above its own judgment (for it must be, if it moves itself to judgment, that it know its own judgment, as Saint Thomas said in the preceding argument), it is necessary that what moves itself to judgment know a higher and more common form than the form of this particular good or fitting thing, by which it judges whether it has been fittingly judged that this particular thing is good or fitting. Now this more common form can be nothing other than the very common notion of the good or the fitting, which can be apprehended by intellect alone. Therefore only things having intellect are free in judgment, that is, move themselves to judgment. And this is the foundation of this argument.

2. But a doubt arises concerning the last consequence. If to be free in judging is to have free choice, then free choice will not be the same as the will itself, but will be the intellect itself: because free judgment is an act of the intellect. Saint Thomas holds the opposite of this, wherever he speaks of free choice ³. Therefore what is said here contradicts what is said elsewhere by Saint Thomas.

For the sake of making this evident, it must be considered, from Questions on the Truth, question 24 ⁴, that free will, taken as a power, is the power by which we judge freely; and this can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it is the elicitive principle of that act which we call free judgment; in another way, because it is the principle producing freedom in judging. For these differ greatly: just as it differs greatly to say that grammar is the principle of speech which is correct, and to say that it is the principle not of speech but of the correctness which is in speech. Therefore, when we say that free will is the power by which we judge freely, we do not take it in the first way, for thus it would not be the same as will but would be intellect, as was argued, since judging pertains to intellect, not to will; but we understand it in the second way. And thus will is free will: because it itself makes us judge freely through itself; for we can choose through will to judge and not to judge.

III. Fourth. From a universal conception no action follows except through a particular apprehension as intermediary. But the intellect is apprehensive of universals. Therefore from the apprehension of the intellect no motion follows unless the universal conception be applied to particulars. But the application of an intellectual conception can be made to many and distinct things, since the universal contains many things in potency. Therefore the judgment of the intellect concerning things to be done is not determined to one. Therefore etc.

Fifth. Those things that have a judgment concerning what is to be done not determined by nature to one thing must belong to free choice. But intellectual beings are of this kind. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proved: because the reason some things lack freedom of judgment is only that either they have no judgment at all, or they have one determined by nature. The minor premise is also proved: the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but common good itself. Therefore the will is not determined by the intellect as mover toward this or that good, but only toward common good; for mover and moved must be proportionate to each other. Therefore whatever is offered to it under the aspect of good, toward that it can incline.

IV. From these considerations Saint Thomas concludes that all intellectual beings possess free will, arising from the judgment of the intellect: namely, because the root of liberty lies in reason, inasmuch as its judgment is not determined to it by nature; although liberty itself is formally first in the will. Hence free choice is defined as a free judgment of reason, that is, because it is a judgment proceeding freely from reason.

It must be noted that, although some of the arguments adduced at the beginning conclude explicitly that only intellectual beings possess free will, and not that all do, they nevertheless conclude implicitly that all intellectual beings are of this kind: for the same account holds of all intellectual substances; and the reason by which it is concluded that some of them have free will is preserved identically in all, as being common to all intellectual beings.