Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber II

After Saint Thomas had determined the questions of the creation and distinction of things, he begins to determine concerning the created things themselves, insofar as this pertains to the truth of faith ¹. And because among all creatures faith is concerned above all with spiritual ones, therefore the intention of Saint Thomas is to hand down a doctrine concerning the spiritual substances themselves.

Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he determines the nature of the spiritual substance; second, its union with the body, chapter 56; third, its operation, chapter 96.

On the first point he does two things: first, he treats of the existence of spiritual substance; second, of its nature, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first point, the following conclusion is proposed: For the perfection of the universe, it was fitting that certain spiritual creatures be made, established at the very summit of things. This is proved from the divine ordering, which assigns to created things perfection according to their own mode in the best way. ²

And first ³ thus: In order that the universe may attain its ultimate perfection, it is necessary for creatures to return to their principle. Therefore, for the perfection of creatures, it is necessary that some creatures be intelligent. — The antecedent is proved: because then an effect is most perfect when it returns to its principle, as is evident from the circle and circular motion. — The consequence is also proved: because individual creatures return to their principle insofar as they bear its likeness according to their esse and their nature, in which they possess a certain perfection. But the intellect of God is the principle of the production of creatures.

II. But a doubt arises concerning this argument. For it is not necessary that what proceeds from an agent through intellect be assimilated to it with respect to the intellective power, so that, namely, the effect should be intelligent just as its cause is; otherwise a house and all things made by art would have to possess intellect. Rather, it suffices that it be assimilated to the form conceived, which is the exemplar of the thing to be produced; as St. Thomas gives the example of a house, which must be assimilated to the art, but not to the intellective power of the craftsman. Therefore, although God's intellect is the principle of the production of things, it does not follow that the universe must have a part which is intellective.

Confirmed. For by this argument it would follow that all created things have intellect, since the principle of the production of all things is the divine intellect.

2. For the clarification of this point, we must first consider that although God produces things in esse through the intellect, just as the craftsman produces the things he makes, God nevertheless differs from the created craftsman in two respects. First, because the divine intellect is the productive principle of creatures in such a way that its operation, which is to understand, is really identical with producing the creature itself. The intellect of the craftsman is not so disposed: for the very act of understanding a house is not really identical with producing the house; rather, the production of the house is an operation of another power than the intellect, though regulated according to the exemplar present in the mind of the craftsman. Hence the divine intellect produces things immediately, but not the intellect of the craftsman. — Second, it differs in this: the intelligible form by which the created craftsman produces the thing he makes is not identical with his intellect and with the intelligible species by which he elicits the act of understanding, but is their effect. But the form by which the divine craftsman produces creatures is really identical with the intellect, as with the productive principle of things, and with the species by which God understands.

From these it follows that the divine intellect is the immediate principle of the production of creatures, and the reason for acting, or the form by which they are produced. And therefore, since an effect produced, if it be perfect, must be assimilated to the principle of its production, both elicitive and formal, as far as possible, it is necessary that the universe be assimilated to God according to intellect, namely, that it be according to some part of itself of intellectual nature. And this is the foundation on which this argument of St. Thomas rests.

3. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that, although not everything that proceeds from any agent acting through intellect must be assimilated to it with respect to the intellective power—because not every act of understanding of an agent acting through intellect is a production of a thing, nor is the form that is the ratio of acting the same as the intellect—it is nevertheless necessary that what is produced first and principally by God through intellect have an intellective nature, if it is capable of one: since divine effects are assimilated to God as much as they can be, with respect to the elicitive and formal principle of their production, which is intellect. — I do not think, however, that by the name intellect only the intelligible form, or the art of God by which He produced the world, is understood here, but also the intellective power itself: because St. Thomas adduces another argument for this very conclusion below ⁴ from that intelligible form itself through which creatures were produced.

In confirmation of this, it is said likewise that not all created things need have an intellect: for not all are capable, by their nature, of intellect as intellect is—just as the universe is—but rather of some likeness of the divine intellect; for they are not God's principal effect, but parts of the principal effect, that is, of the universe. Just as, although both light and heat are produced by the sun through its light, so that things luminous and things hot must alike have some likeness to solar light, nevertheless not all things participate in the character of solar light as light is—that is, in such a way that they are luminous—but only those which are naturally apt to receive light by way of light; other things, however, are assimilated to the light insofar as it contains heat virtually, or some other perfection. So each creature returns to the divine intellect as to its principle in its own way: for some things are assimilated to it insofar as it is intellect, while others insofar as it contains the other perfections of creatures virtually and eminently. — And thus it is clear that the argument of St. Thomas concludes most excellently to what was proposed.

III. *Second. For the consummate perfection of the universe, there had to be certain creatures that would return to God not only according to the likeness of nature, but also through operation. But this operation can be none other than that of intellect and will: for not even God himself operates toward himself in any other way. Therefore, etc. — The major premise is proved. Because the second perfection, which is that of operation, adds something over the first: namely, as being the ultimate and consummate perfection of a thing.

Third. For the perfection of the sum of things, there had to be some creatures that would act in the manner in which God acts. Therefore there had to be some intellectual substances. — The consequence is evident. Because God acts through intellect and will. — But the antecedent is proved. Because in what precedes it was shown that, for the perfect representation of the divine goodness through creatures, it was necessary that certain things act for the good of others. Therefore it was also necessary that there be an assimilation with respect to the mode of acting: for thus is one thing perfectly assimilated to another in acting.

Note that through creatures the divine goodness cannot be perfectly represented as it is in itself, but it can indeed be perfectly represented as the exemplar and form of the universe. This truly comes about if the universe is made like unto it in all those respects in which, by its nature, it is born to be made like unto it: just as then a house perfectly represents the form that is in the mind of its builder when it has all those features according to which it is born to represent it. And thus the representation is perfect on the side of the effect, not on the side of the cause. Since, therefore, it belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect effect that it be perfectly made like unto its cause in all the ways in which it can participate it, and since God acts toward the production of creatures through intellect and will, and since the universe, which he first intended to produce, would be born to be made like unto him as regards esse, as regards acting for the good of others, and as regards the mode of acting, which is through intellect and will: it was necessary that in the universe there be made certain creatures that would act for the good of others, and certain others that would act through intellect and will. And this is the foundation of this argument.

IV. Fourth. The perfection of the universe as a whole requires not only a likeness to God according to form, but also according to the same mode of being of the form, insofar as this is possible, since the second likeness is more perfect than the first. Therefore there had to be some creatures in which the esse of the divine intellect's form is expressed. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is evident. Because the form by which God acts upon a creature is a form having an intelligible mode of being. — The second is also evident. Because this is what it is for creatures to be intellectual by their own nature.

Note that a subsisting nature which is understood in act of itself, not needing anything else in order to become actually intelligible, is also intellective of itself: as Saint Thomas shows below ⁵ and Prima, q. xiv, a. 1. Hence it is rightly said here that for creatures to be such that the form of the divine intellect is expressed in them according to esse intelligibile is for creatures to be intellectual according to their nature.

Fifth. In order that the likeness of God might exist perfectly in possible modes — understand, not in possible modes absolutely, but in the possible modes pertaining to the universe which he intended — it was necessary that the divine goodness be communicated through likeness not only in being but also in knowing: for in these two ways the likeness of one thing is found in another. But only an intellect can know the divine goodness. Therefore, and so on.

Note that the possible modes of creatures are twofold: some are general, namely the mode of being of insensible things, of sensible things, and of intellectual things; and some are particular and specific, such as those of man, horse, stone, and the like. Since the general modes are finite, and the highest mode of being is that of intellectual things, as far as we can know, all modes of this kind seem to pertain to the perfection of the universe. But since the particular and specific modes are infinite, not all of them pertain to the perfection of the universe, but only those which God willed to exist in the universe. Therefore, when it is said here that in order for there to be a likeness of God in things according to their possible modes, it was necessary for the divine goodness to be communicated through likeness also in knowing, this is to be understood of the general modes, not of the special ones.

Sixth. In all things that are fittingly ordered, the relation of secondary things to the ultimate ones imitates the relation of the first to all things, both secondary and ultimate. But God comprehends all creatures intelligibly. Therefore there must also be some intellectual creatures that contain corporeal things intelligibly: just as higher bodies contain lower ones according to the extension of quantity.